The Gwadar Port will be an important trade and economic asset for Pakistan. It will be linked to Karachi, Pasni, Ormara and Turbat by roads. Already the construction of the Coastal Highway to Karachi is being done.
Pasni will be linked to Gupt on the Iranian border and the various road networks will connect China via the Indus Highway. Pakistan, China, Kazakhistan, Kyrgizstan and Uzbekistan are to develop extensive railroad links from Central Asia and the Chinese province of Sinkiang to the Arabian Sea Coast.
Thus, Gwadar from the economic point of view is of tremendous value to Pakistan, Given the trade hub that it becomes for the landlocked countries of Asia, as also an alternate route for China, the colossal amount of shipping that it will be handling catapults into the global strategic realm.
From the defence of Pakistan point of view, the fact that Gwadar is about 470 kms West of Karachi, a naval blockade, by the Indian Navy, in its current form, will be difficult to enforce, unlike the blockade of Karachi in 1971. The strategic import internationally can be gauged from the fact that 40 % of world’s oil flows through the Straits of Hormuz and it is 250 miles from Gwadar. Thus, the Pakistan Navy can, when it has adequately developed, blockade the Straits in pursuance of her own interest or in the interest of an ally! The article, "India's New Naval Ambition," DefenseNews, 7 June 2004 maybe perused.
It is of interest to note whether Pakistan’s Gwadar port or Iran’s Chabahar port, built with Indian assistance, will serve as Central Asia’s conduit to warm waters is also a contentious issue. In this context, the article “New Iranian Port to Hurt Gwadar Port's
Prospects,” Daily Times, 15 September 2003, Sarfaraz Ahmed, “The Latest Hotspot: Gwadar,”Daily Times, 5 May 2004 and “Navy to Build Base in Gwadar,” Daily Times, 19 April 2004 maybe read. It is also of note that Iran has also undertaken to link this port to China.
The strategic scene is not as simple as it appears. The Times of India report of February 19, 2002, indicated that leasing of Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchistan) to the US for the operations in Afghanistan has not been appreciated by China nor the allowing of the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. China while undertaking financial and technical assistance for the project, has asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed. This has, in turn, not been appreciated by the U.S.
China is alarmed that the U.S. forces has projected itself into Asia nations via Afghanistan and fear that this is a plan to ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenceless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability has made Beijing explore alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port as also the Iranian Chabahar port is two options for China
While from the economic necessities, it is important for China to open up its western areas to the oilfields of the Middle East through pipelines, roads and ports, it still remains a matter of disquiet for her. Opening up Xinjiang, an area of 635,833 square miles, which is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan makes it vulnerable to problem with the Uighur Moslem separatist movement (The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)). Despite China’s massive investment in Xinjiang, the displacement of Uighurs from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is causing unrest, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi. These Uighurs are open to influence of the radical elements in Pakistan and that does give rise to concerns of China. However, in this context it must also be noted that ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan was killed on October 2, 2004. That the ETIM has a presence to create problems in Pakistan was evident that seven day later, two Chinese were captured and one died during the rescue operations. China is seriously concerned about the ETIM presence in Pakistan and that is why it was immensely concerned and upset over the Chinese being kidnapped and forced the Pakistan govt to act with alacrity.
From the Indian point of view, Gwadar, thus becomes important with this input to the ones given earlier.
Texas John's post is pertinent for understanding the strategic compulsions.