India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[truthseeker2010]

Looking forward to it.

Incidentally, I went through a thread on the Skardu Air Base modernisation, and nearly did myself an injury laughing. Finally I deleted my response as it only have enraged the chipmunks, but a thought that lingers is that the Pakistan Army (and Air Force, and Navy) are in serious danger of being confined to barracks by these young lions and tigers.

PS: I would deem it a personal favour if you were to do a head-count of XV Corps, and explain to the young heroes that it does not add up to 700,000, not even by including the RR and the Central Armed Police (BSF, CRPF and CISF).

No hurry, any time you are bored and have the inclination.

Lets do a rough estimate:

There are 7 div of IA in NC, out of 5 would be for kashmir (150-170k)
RR 60 Btns (70-80k)
CPRF 70 btns (60-70k)
CAPF 45k
BSF 12 Btn (14k)
J&K Police 83k

Total 420-465k troops

 

[Joe Shearer]

Lets do a rough estimate:

There are 7 div of IA in NC, out of 5 would be for kashmir (150-170k)
RR 60 Btns (70-80k)
CPRF 70 btns (60-70k)
CAPF 45k
BSF 12 Btn (14k)
J&K Police 83k

Total 420-465k troops

About 30% on the higher side.

Take only the divisions reporting to XV Corps, remember each RR contingent is 1,000 jawans, and the CRPF ARE the CAPF; the CAPF includes CRPF, and BSF (in other parts of India, they include the SSB, the Assam Rifles and the CISF). Most of the CRPF is posted elsewhere than in J&K; many of them are in Chhatisgarh, patrolling against Naxalites.

Most of the counter-insurgency is done by RR units working with the J&K Police. There is a macabre drill exercised between them that I do not want to go into just here.

Do remember that Northern Command includes XIV Corps, XV Corps and XVI Corps. Of these, XIV Corps is dedicated to the LAC (the Siachen Brigade and the 8th Mtn. Div. are assigned to the Siachen front and to the Dras-Kargil-Batalik front respectively); XV Corps is responsible for Kashmir but NOT for counter-insurgency; and XVI Corps is an overweight Corps guarding the Chicken's Neck, the Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian salient. AFAIK, there are some armoured elements with XIV Corps, but nowhere else (of course, in XVI Corps as well).

The numbers in the Vale, even counting the RR, are nowhere near the numbers that fanboys have been given to quoting. This has been pointed out at least a dozen times by me and no doubt others have also given their figures.

Do take a look at the very rough outline by PanzerKiel. He has very properly taken the XV Corps reserve into account, something that I always forget to do, but he has divided the RR into two forces; actually, there are now three five, of which two are in the Vale working with XV Corps (totalling about 58,000 jawans), but the numbers even then are nowhere near the gigantic numbers usually bandied around.

 

[PanzerKiel]

About 30% on the higher side.

Take only the divisions reporting to XV Corps, remember each RR contingent is 1,000 jawans, and the CRPF ARE the CAPF; the CAPF includes CRPF, and BSF (in other parts of India, they include the SSB, the Assam Rifles and the CISF). Most of the CRPF is posted elsewhere than in J&K; many of them are in Chhatisgarh, patrolling against Naxalites.

Most of the counter-insurgency is done by RR units working with the J&K Police. There is a macabre drill exercised between them that I do not want to go into just here.

Do remember that Northern Command includes XIV Corps, XV Corps and XVI Corps. Of these, XIV Corps is dedicated to the LAC (the Siachen Brigade and the 8th Mtn. Div. are assigned to the Siachen front and to the Dras-Kargil-Batalik front respectively); XV Corps is responsible for Kashmir but NOT for counter-insurgency; and XVI Corps is an overweight Corps guarding the Chicken's Neck, the Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian salient. AFAIK, there are some armoured elements with XIV Corps, but nowhere else (of course, in XVI Corps as well).

The numbers in the Vale, even counting the RR, are nowhere near the numbers that fanboys have been given to quoting. This has been pointed out at least a dozen times by me and no doubt others have also given their figures.

Do take a look at the very rough outline by PanzerKiel. He has very properly taken the XV Corps reserve into account, something that I always forget to do, but he has divided the RR into two forces; actually, there are now three, but the numbers even then are nowhere near the gigantic numbers usually bandied around.

There are overall 200+ RR units in Kashmir.

14 Corps has an armored brigade under command.

 

[Joe Shearer]

There are overall 200+ RR units in Kashmir.

True, but that is divided across XV Corps and XVI Corps. XV Corps itself has about 55-60 RR detachments, between 55,000 to 60,000 jawans.

14 Corps has an armored brigade under command.

Thanks; mentioned in passing in my post.

 

[PanzerKiel]

There were serious effects of Gibraltar, I'll present them shortly....

Op Gibralter, well its effects...

Bulk of the Indian Army was engaged around Jura and Bedori Bulges which had already been reduced. Indian attention was fixed on these sectors thats why their commanders completely failed to detect the buildup for Grandslam (despite being warned by UN observers at the last moment). Thats why Indians were unable to disconnect themselves from the north, this allowed Grandslam the success it had.

On 1 Aug 65, there was a meeting at Srinagar in which COAS IA, GOC WC, GOC 15 Corps were there.
There main three points were...
IA over extended on CFL
Low standard of police bns in Kashmir
Ineffective Home Guard Organization.

The first news of Gibralter infiltration was received by IA on 5 Aug 65, once Salahuddin force was discovered at Dara Kasi and Nusrat was detected in Mendhar.

68 Brigade, the reserve of 15 Corps was moved to Tanmarg, no ther troops were readily available, less 4 J&K Militia units.
Can be judged from the fact that 4 Sikh LI was in Ambala, was alerted and then hastily air lifted to Srinagar.
Therefore, IA took some time to be effective.

On 8 Aug, Indian Def Secretary recommended Martial Law in state, however, Comd 15 Corps told him that he was confident of handling the situation.


Maj achievement of Gibralter forces include...

E/Nusrat mounted a daring attack against 4 Kumaon, in which 4 Kumaon lost its CO as well.

Salahuddin force managed to infiltrate till suburbs of Srinagar.

Gaznavi force, the most successful of Gibralter forces..almost got Ramban bridge....gained complete control of Budil area till it was ORDERED to exfil on 27 Sep.

G/Nusrat, the most successful of Nusrat forces, ambushed lead unit of 52 Mountain Brigade (3 Rajputana), killing 71 soldiers....captured Mandi

Meanwhile, Indians had increased artillery fire across CFL....GOC 12 Division asked for 4 Corps Artillery...this w to be first of its many successful actions....

On 15 Aug, 4 Corps Artillery opened up a well planned, surprise artillery fire plan which hit Indian 191 Brigade O Group, wounding many and killing the brigade commander, Brig B F Masters...Brigade ammo dump was also destroyed, IA abandoned Palanwala post due to artillery fire....lot may other losses due to artillery fire.

It is also pertinent to mention that till the end, Indians failed to open the Uri Poonch road which was one of their main aims in Bedori....


Overall

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.

 

[Cuirassier]

Op Gibralter, well its effects...

Bulk of the Indian Army was engaged around Jura and Bedori Bulges which had already been reduced. Indian attention was fixed on these sectors thats why their commanders completely failed to detect the buildup for Grandslam (despite being warned by UN observers at the last moment). Thats why Indians were unable to disconnect themselves from the north, this allowed Grandslam the success it had.

On 1 Aug 65, there was a meeting at Srinagar in which COAS IA, GOC WC, GOC 15 Corps were there.
There main three points were...
IA over extended on CFL
Low standard of police bns in Kashmir
Ineffective Home Guard Organization.

The first news of Gibralter infiltration was received by IA on 5 Aug 65, once Salahuddin force was discovered at Dara Kasi and Nusrat was detected in Mendhar.

68 Brigade, the reserve of 15 Corps was moved to Tanmarg, no ther troops were readily available, less 4 J&K Militia units.
Can be judged from the fact that 4 Sikh LI was in Ambala, was alerted and then hastily air lifted to Srinagar.
Therefore, IA took some time to be effective.

On 8 Aug, Indian Def Secretary recommended Martial Law in state, however, Comd 15 Corps told him that he was confident of handling the situation.


Maj achievement of Gibralter forces include...

E/Nusrat mounted a daring attack against 4 Kumaon, in which 4 Kumaon lost its CO as well.

Salahuddin force managed to infiltrate till suburbs of Srinagar.

Gaznavi force, the most successful of Gibralter forces..almost got Ramban bridge....gained complete control of Budil area till it was ORDERED to exfil on 27 Sep.

G/Nusrat, the most successful of Nusrat forces, ambushed lead unit of 52 Mountain Brigade (3 Rajputana), killing 71 soldiers....captured Mandi

Meanwhile, Indians had increased artillery fire across CFL....GOC 12 Division for 4 Corps Artillery...the first of its many successful actions....

On 15 Aug, 4 Corps Artillery opened up a well planned, surprise artillery fire plan which Indian 191 Brigade O Group, wounding many and killing the brigade commander, Brig B D Masters...Brigade ammo dump was also destroyed, IA abandoned Palanwala post due to artillery fire....lot may other losses due to artillery fire.

It is also pertinent to mention that till the end, Indians failed to open the Uri Poonch road which was one of their main aims in Bedori....


Overall

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.

8 Kumaon's CO LTC MV Gore was killed in action at Dak Bungalow, Naugam in a raid conducted by men of the 9 AK, led by the legendary Haq Nawaz Kayani. Got an SJ for this as a Major, came out of retirement and got an SJ for '72 Leepa Ops - albeit posthumously.

 

[PanzerKiel]

8 Kumaon's CO LTC MV Gore was killed in action at Dak Bungalow, Naugam in a raid conducted by men of the 9 AK, led by the legendary Haq Nawaz Kayani. Got an SJ for this as a Major, came out of retirement and got an SJ for '72 Leepa Ops - albeit posthumously.

Exactly, he was commanding E Group, Nusrat Force.....this action occurred on 13 August. Moreover, during exfil, this group managed to get across CFL through two IA units.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@PanzerKiel

If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning.

Is that it?

About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?

I take it that the conclusions from these are that

1. If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
2. If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel

If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning.

This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.

@PanzerKiel


About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?

It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.

@PanzerKiel

I take it that the conclusions from these are that

1. If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
2. If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.

Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.

Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.

I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.

I hear you saying that there was a material effect of Gibraltar in softening up the front for Grand Slam.

It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.

Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.

Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.

For that, I would refer you to the quip by M. J. Akbar, an observant Muslim.

Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.

I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.

Much, much clearer now.

• First, PA troops, because of Gibraltar or in any case, were on top of the ridges along the line Uri-Poonch and perhaps further down south towards Rajauri (these were old battlegrounds from 47-48).
• Second, there was sufficient dislocation and uproar so that all reserves - specifically, Corps reserves of XV Corps - were diverted to suppress them. You have mentioned that two brigades were diverted from Jammu to work with XV Corps on suppressing the attacks by Gibraltar Force contingents.
• Third, the Haji Pir Pass was recaptured, but not the ridges to north and south, and this led to the Uri-Poonch road still being unpassable.
• Fourth, there was nothing but 191 Brigade left to stop 12th Division's main attack, and that comprised of 3rd Mahar, 16th SLI and 15th Kumaon (not 8th Kumaon), as well as 9 Punjab, also 14th Field Artillery and a troop of 39th Medium Artillery.

So it was not an under-strength Brigade with which Harbaksh faced 12th Div., it was a line-up from which two other brigades had been subtracted, and could not be brought back in time.

Most educative. Thank you very much.

@jbgt90

I know what you are going through, but you MUST keep up with this thread.

 

[T90TankGuy]

I hear you saying that there was a material effect of Gibraltar in softening up the front for Grand Slam.



Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.



For that, I would refer you to the quip by M. J. Akbar, an observant Muslim.



Much, much clearer now.

• First, PA troops, because of Gibraltar or in any case, were on top of the ridges along the line Uri-Poonch and perhaps further down south towards Rajauri (these were old battlegrounds from 47-48).
• Second, there was sufficient dislocation and uproar so that all reserves - specifically, Corps reserves of XV Corps - were diverted to suppress them. You have mentioned that two brigades were diverted from Jammu to work with XV Corps on suppressing the attacks by Gibraltar Force contingents.
• Third, the Haji Pir Pass was recaptured, but not the ridges to north and south, and this led to the Uri-Poonch road still being unpassable.
• Fourth, there was nothing but 191 Brigade left to stop 12th Division's main attack, and that comprised of 3rd Mahar, 16th SLI and 15th Kumaon (not 8th Kumaon), as well as 9 Punjab, also 14th Field Artillery and a troop of 39th Medium Artillery.

So it was not an under-strength Brigade with which Harbaksh faced 12th Div., it was a line-up from which two other brigades had been subtracted, and could not be brought back in time.

Most educative. Thank you very much.

@jbgt90

I know what you are going through, but you MUST keep up with this thread.

I barely get any time for my self Joe. exhausted to the point i fall asleep in my car . let me go through this on sunday

 

[Joe Shearer]

I barely get any time for my self Joe. exhausted to the point i fall asleep in my car . let me go through this on sunday

I know. I hate doing this to you, but am desperate that you should not miss it.

Talk to you Sunday, possibly.

PS: This narrative is a huge supplement to Praval, especially if read with a map.

 

[VCheng]

Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.

That pass and its environs is one of the most beautiful places on Earth that I have had the pleasure to see, its military aspects notwithstanding.

 

[Psychic]

In the 1965 war, the PAF suffered mid level command failure which many people are unaware of as it is eclipsed by the stellar performance of its fighting force. PAF's war plan which was akin to Operation Moked never materialized. The war plan envisaged pre-emptive strikes on all Indian forward air stations. The plan had the potential to knock the IAF out of war in the first two days of the conflict.

Sometime in June 1965, Asghar Khan had called all station commanders and squadron commanders for a brief at AHQ Peshawar. The field commanders were briefed about their war time plan. PAF's war strategy aimed at: (a) Minimizing enemy's superior numbers to create a favorable balance of air-power (b) Not allowing the enemy to carry out a surprise attack which would enable him to control the skies and support his land forces later on.
The Salient features of the plan were as follows:
1- Dusk Attack: Raids on all enemy forward airfields and radars 15 minutes before sunset. Neutralize enemy assets and escape enemy's retaliation owing to lack of daylight. Sargodha, Peshawar and Maripur were allocated their respective targets.
2- Night Attack: B-57s were to carry out night bombings to maintain pressure. Enemy was also expected to retaliate with its canberas during the night.
3- Dawn Attack: Repeat attacks on enemy airfields the next morning. Dhaka was assigned Kalaikunda for dawn attack. It wasn't supposed to conduct dusk attack the previous evening owing to the fact that sunset occurs earlier in Bengal than in the Western theater and an earlier dusk strike, if carried out would alert the defenders in the West of impending raids.
The expected outcome was as follows:
1- Destruction of 50-60 IAF aircraft on the ground in the dusk attack.
2- Delay in IAF fighter operations caused by night bombing allowing for a follow up attack at dawn.
3- A second blow to enemy's capabilities at dawn.
3- Reprisal attacks by IAF against an already alert Pakistani air defence leading to infliction of heavy attrition on IAF's raiders at the hands of PAF interceptors.

The June Plan for which the PAF was fully trained and equipped was not executed due to the incompetence of some meek mid-level commanders. Only two strikes were launched (Pathankot and Kalaikunda) and both were successful. Further two strike packages from Sargodha destined for Adampur and Halwara were botched operations as the strikes were delayed and launched under-strength. The strikes were launched well after Pathankot was already struck and IAF defenses were already alerted. The late and under-strength launch of the strikes was a result of (alleged) lack of serviceable aircraft (in addition to indecisiveness and timidness). The lack of serviceable aircraft was owed to the ten PAF fighter planes which were sent to Chamb looking for targets of opportunity instead of being allocated for this all important task. The fact that the Sargodha commander couldn't find serviceable aircraft despite the presence of 60+ fighters at the station alludes to the extent of command failure. Maripur did not even bother to launch. Maripur's excuse was that it's assets were relocated up North; that was a poor justification for not launching strikes as IAF presence was not that strong in the South to begin with. This indicates a further failure in command when the aircraft relocated from Maripur were not dispersed in forward airfields but bunched up in Sargodha.

PAF owes a lot to the incompetence of the IAF(both at command and fighting level) in the 1965 war. Despite the fact that the Indian Army achieved total surprise at Lahore, the IAF failed to capitalize on the initial success of its sister service.
The failure of IAF can be summarized as follows:
1- Failure to launch air raids despite Indian Army's surprise attack at Lahore. It is now known that the IAF high command told its field commanders to launch missions against "targets of opportunity only" which shows how pathetic it was.
2- Failure to provide air-umbrella to Indian Army advancing towards Lahore. The extent of this failure can be gauged from the fact that 8 PAF sabres pounded advancing columns of 3 JAT and detachment of tanks for 17 minutes with impunity. The IAF was nowhere to be seen over the battlefield when Indian Army's advance was blunted by sabres which strafed and rocketted till they were low on ammo and fuel. (The SOP was to make one or two attack passes in such attacks which was discarded by the squadron commander)
3- Failure to inflict damage in reprisal attacks on the morning of 7th September. The first IAF attack against Sargodha was a complete surprise for PAF when 7 mysteres pulled up 3 miles from the airfield. The airfield was sprawling with around 70 aircraft at that time which presented a lucrative target. The IAF pilots however, did not press their attack and many of them jettisoned their rocket pods without even firing. They made just one pass in which little to no damage was done before exiting as if they were in a hurry to put out a fire somewhere. Had the IAF pilots shown some determination, they could've inflicted a significant damage. Contrast the lackluster performance of IAF's raiders to PAF's Pathankot attack which was at the outer fringes of sabre's operational range(which flew from Peshawar); three attack runs were conducted and 12 aircraft destroyed.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@Joe Shearer

shall we move on to Grandslam, or has Gibralter sapped our will to continue?