India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Lord Of Gondor]

IAF has top coverage in the form of Swordfish and Phalcons. Both these assets are data-linked providing the Indian C4I the ability to look deep inside Pakistan and share that information live with all the Sector Commanders. My question is, why didn't IAF pick up PAF's incoming strike package when it was expected that PAF would retaliate and the border was hot. From the limited information we have about IAF, it does not appear that the Phalcons were Airborne during the time of the confrontation. That would explain why the IAF interceptors were having an incredible tough time getting a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. The Swordfish and Phalcons are incredibly potent assets which clearly were not utilized to their full capacity.

The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.

Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
"The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"

 

[TsAr]

The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.

Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
"The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"

Going by this narration raises a few questions, if indeed IAF AWACS were working then why was Abhinandan left on the mercy of the ground controllers who were presumably jammed by PAF.
PAF had AMRAAMS in its inventory since the early 2000's, IAF should have prepared themselves for any eventualities.

 

[Lord Of Gondor]

Going by this narration raises a few questions, if indeed IAF AWACS were working then why was Abhinandan left on the mercy of the ground controllers who were presumably jammed by PAF.

He went for his kill by crossing the LC, his call.

PAF had AMRAAMS in its inventory since the early 2000's, IAF should have prepared themselves for any eventualities.

Yes fully prepared. In war losses happen.

 

[PanzerKiel]

That's a non-sequitur.

Sam got the mandate from the political leadership, and told Bewoor in the West and Arora in the East what to do. He didn't actually go out there and pull triggers, and go ratatat at Pakistani planes flying overhead.

[Diversion]I had a fairly fixed idea about what happened in the west, driven by two factors:

• Eftekhar (Iftikhar?) Janjua's firm grip on the battle he fought; the outstanding thing was the way he changed axis once his original thrust was defeated, and caught us off balance.
• Bewoor's general state of muddle, and the inability of Candeth to recover the situation.

However, @PanzerKiel threw out a view that has made me think very hard about the whole situation; he points out that Longewala was a spoiling operation, and that it succeeded, because it completely 'spoilt' Khambatta's plans for his own deep strike into Pakistan. That is a new angle to that most unusual of battles, Hawker Hunters vs. armoured tanks, won by the Hunters (I don't remember things too well these days, and can't remember what tanks the Pakistani formation had deployed).

A fascinating thought. Coming from anyone else, I would have dismissed it as post-defeat justification; coming from that professional officer, the thought takes on very tangible dimensions. [End of Diversion]

What people don't realise was that the Indian Army had very modest aims all along. First, there was never any thought of destroying the West, never any thought of destroying the military capability of the Pakistan Army; the Pakistani Air Force was to be held at bay, then progressively whittled down by steadily increasing the sortie rate. The Indian Navy had the bit in its teeth, and were stopping for no one.

In the East, the first phase was to have been to slice off a piece of territory in which the emigres could hoist their flag. That grew to taking up the maximum amount of space possible to re-capture with the troops at Jake's disposal.

It was a stroke of daring audacity on Jake's part to fly to Dhaka and bully Niazi into surrendering. That was all his. Obviously he had to clear it with the corps commanders and with his own Army commander. But they presumably thought that it was a good idea, so there he was in Dhaka.

So my answer is - neither did. The soldiers were the ones who did it.

@Joe Shearer
Two Pakistani armor regiments were involved.....newly raised 38 Cavalry with old Sherman tanks and 22 Cavalry with Chinese T-59 Tanks....

moreover, as far as 1971 surrender is concerned, apart from Gen Jacob, we should mention the role of Gen Nagra as well in securing the surrender...Nagra had known Niazi from before when he was posted as military advisor to Indian High Commission in Islamabad. The ceasefire had taken effect at 1700 hours on 15 December. On the morning of 16 December, Nagra, who was some 30 miles outside Dacca with elements of 95 Mountain Brigade and 2 Para, well after the ceasefire went into force, sent a message to Niazi to send his representative.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Joe Shearer
Two Pakistani armor regiments were involved.....newly raised 38 Cavalry with old Sherman tanks and 22 Cavalry with Chinese T-59 Tanks....

moreover, as far as 1971 surrender is concerned, apart from Gen Jacob, we should mention the role of Gen Nagra as well in securing the surrender...Nagra had known Niazi from before when he was posted as military advisor to Indian High Commission in Islamabad. The ceasefire had taken effect at 1700 hours on 15 December. On the morning of 16 December, Nagra, who was some 30 miles outside Dacca with elements of 95 Mountain Brigade and 2 Para, well after the ceasefire went into force, sent a message to Niazi to send his representative.

I had completely forgotten about General Nagra. But my excuse would be that I was distracted, unhappy about thread drift, and trying to explain about only the two mentioned, General Manekshaw and General Jacob.

Thank you for the very useful reminder about the armour used by the two regiments in question; I was really feeling totally distracted, and incapable of thought.

Above all, thanks for the thought that their intervention unbalanced Khambatta. After reading what you said, I went back and looked events once again, and it seemed as clear as crystal.

You, dear Sir, are a spiffing marvel, and it is such a pleasure to be in your company.

PS: I will return to this thread,now that my culinary contribution to my little band of waifs is over; it went off very well, btw, but they liked most the dish I finished last and had made for the first time.

 

[notorious_eagle]

Of course, Chief. I will ask questions and leave it to readers to understand why those questions needed to be asked. My questions are:

1. Who on the IAF side had sat down and, at levels below the command level in each Air Force command, worked out concurrently with planning the strike at Balakote what the reaction would be during the inevitable PAF counter-strike? Was it all left to the ground controller, as Abhinandan Varthaman's case seems to indicate?
2. Who decided, on the attack build-up being detected during the build-up, as it was, what reaction was to be prepared?
3. Why was the IFF not on in the rescue chopper? Why was its mission not conveyed to the Air Defence teams?
4. Why were our AWACS aircraft not in evidence? Had they been flown already to zones outside the probable striking range of the PAF? If so, why did we invest in white elephants, that can't work for a living and has only symbolic value?
5. Why were only Bisons in action? Were the bigger planes flown away from danger zones due to the mismatch of BVR missile ranges? When did we get to know about this mismatch, and what steps were taken to rectify it? If there was a civilian failure of procurement at ministry level, why did we not get to hear about it?

Incidentally, the Bisons were jammed, as they were linked to Ground Control only during their mission, or that is the information seeping out.

Thank You for this Sir. After scanning the questions you wrote, i am convinced the AWACS were not airborne during the time of the strike.

This raises two questions:

1. Were the AWACS not airborne due to the serviceability issues suffered by the IL78? The IL78's are notorious for poor serviceability.
2. Or the Central Command did not believe PAF would retaliate due to the face saving given by IAF, thus, the orders were not given to have AWACS airborne 24/7.

PAF's intercepts do reveal that AWACS were airborne immediately after PAF strike. But then again, that was too late.

The citation for Wing Co. Abhinandan reveals important details.

Phalcon/Netra was managing the battle
"The enemy ac were under seamless airborne radar cover and control"

@Joe Shearer

Sir, i am sorry to say, if this is the citation the IAF published for WC Abhi, this is a disgrace to the professionalism of the Indian Armed Forces.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thank You for this Sir. After scanning the questions you wrote, i am convinced the AWACS were not airborne during the time of the strike.

This raises two questions:

1. Were the AWACS not airborne due to the serviceability issues suffered by the IL78? The IL78's are notorious for poor serviceability.
2. Or the Central Command did not believe PAF would retaliate due to the face saving given by IAF, thus, the orders were not given to have AWACS airborne 24/7.

PAF's intercepts do reveal that AWACS were airborne immediately after PAF strike. But then again, that was too late.

I have been waiting for @jbgt90 to fill in the details,and hope that he is back in station. His details are likely to be accurate and current. @Hellfire might also have helped, but I cannot trace him any longer.

@Joe Shearer

Sir, i am sorry to say, if this is the citation the IAF published for WC Abhi, this is a disgrace to the professionalism of the Indian Armed Forces.

I really do not wish to comment on an officer's citation.

 

[PanzerKiel]

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....

In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?

Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”

But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?

No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.

There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.

A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.

A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.

The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.

The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.

Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.

Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?

Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?

IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.

It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.

Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.

The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.

 

[Joe Shearer]

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....

In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?

Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”

But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?

No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.

There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.

A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.

A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.

The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.

The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.

Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.

Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?

Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?

IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.

It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.

Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.

The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.

I really wish you had been around during the discussion on this between Chausim and myself; it was some years ago, and disappeared with many old files and records.

The terrible heat in Hyderabad has led to me making hit-and-run visits to the study, and to the computer and to this forum but there is a little bit left to be written up, and I hope to do it by tomorrow.

Meanwhile, if you look at the Indo-Chinese conflict of 62, you would not have failed to notice that the situation of the Indian Army in NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh and of the Pakistan Army in Azad Kashmir and the hinterland beyond are almost exactly in parallel, other than some fairly serious differences in logistical capability. So the Indian Army/PLA GF sit on high level plateaux looking down at the Pakistan Army/Indian Army on lower-level plains, with the distance between them covered by heavily-forested ravines and narrow rivers, equally accessible to both sides. The lower level plains are very well connected, the upper level one, in the case of Xijang, is also well-connected because the Chinese worked on it, but it is very badly connected in the Vale, because India never worked on it. About 70 to 80% of the friction in the Vale between the man in the street and the authorities is due to the coming onto common access roads of both very heavy military traffic and civilian commuter traffic.

So whatever the Pakistan Army can do in Kashmir - attack, but attack an enemy that knows how to defend - applies to whatever the Indian Army can do in Arunachal.

These do not apply to Ladakh, where the PLA GF seems to be intent on salami-slicing their way closer to Pakistan Army positions, and XIV Corps doesn't seem to know what to do about it.

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....

In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?

Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”

But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?

No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.

There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.

A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.

A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.

The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.

The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.

Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.

Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?

Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?

IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.

It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.

Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.

The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.

I also think that there is a lot of impact of what happened at top levels to the Indian Army. Let me list them seriatim, solely from the point of view of what happened after the Chinese attacked Tawang.

1. Dalvi and his Brigade fell apart; Dalvi had not stood up very strongly to Biji Kaul, but for a Brigadier to tell a Corps Commander to naff off is not easy, as I hope you will agree.
2. The Div. commander later became an old friend of the Pakistan Army, and contributed his jeep to your War Museum; this was Niranjan Prasad's role in 62, and - wait for this - he survived and went on to be a Div commander in 65.
3. The Corps Commander was a city slicker who had a liking for the rounded phrase, and replied to a sceptical JCO's asking why the Indian Army was down, looking up at the PLA, by pompously proclaiming that while what the JCO was saying was unusual, it was even more unusual to have an officer of his level at the front.
4. Not being used to field conditions, he promptly fell ill, and, without handing over charge, got into hospital in Delhi.
5. He was replaced by Harbaksh, and was galvanised into action by the news, got off his sickbed and charged off to Walong, the other end of NEFA (Arunachal).
6. Harbaksh was asked to let go of IV Corps and take XXXIII Corps instead.
   
   You are aware of all these incidents, and had published Biji Kaul's fictional account of Niranjan Prasad's coolness under fire.
   
   
7. Bogey Sen had gone past his use-by date, and was bumbling around ineffectively, but finally managed to cause serious problems.
8. The DMO, a scheming, thoroughly political Bengali officer, decided to get involved, informed everyone that he had 'cabinet' approval for his thoughts and deeds and plans, and tried to get the retreating units to make a stand at Se La. This landed up in becoming a 3-way tussle between himself, the Army Commander, Eastern Command, and Corps Commander, IV Corps. Nobody won, the jawans lost.
9. There were two Generals Pathania involved, and M. A. S. did the worse damage (M. S. was heading up the newly formed 2 Div in Walong, and messing up over there; the saving grace there was Rawlley, just as the saving grace in Ladakh was 'Teppy' Raina.
10. The ONE Brigadier who was ready to fight from a 'box' (a concept that the British had used in Burma, when over-run by the IJA), Hoshiar Singh, was threatened with court-martial by A. S. Pathania if he didn't abandon Se La and retreat to the plains. He did withdraw, and was ambushed and killed on the way down.

My questions to you follow.

 

[Arulmozhi Varman]

This is a note sent to me by one of the finest young minds on this forum, in private. I reproduce it without his permission because of the value of the note. To protect his privacy, I omit his name.

Joe if you would the role of Nehru is pretty hard to criticize. Leaders evolve with what they experience. A leader at peace time would struggle to lead in a war just like a leader at wartime would struggle to lead in peace. This has never been more proven than with the fact that Churchill was the British war hero who led the British to victory but was removed bcz he was not seen as an effective peace time leader. The military leadership of both countries blames the civilian leadership of that time however the leaders were product of their experience. India and Pakistan had largely won their independence through peaceful non violent efforts and through logical arguments. What the US needed mobilization to beat the super power of the world to earn their independence, india and Pakistan had done it through peaceful events, even if it was against a dead power. Nehru,Gandhi, Jinnah, liaqat, bacha khan, all of them were non violent in nature and believed in peaceful but firm resolution. They had carved large countries through this method. On that day when they succeeded, in their minds one thing was set that the world is now going to be non violent and the war to end all wars had actually ended all wars after all they didn't need to mobilize the masses to arms and fight city after city for their independence against a ruthless empire. What the British took a hundred years of violence to achieve, they had done it through a few decades of non violence thus non violence is the answer and peaceful resolutions will eventually solve the problems... This is the environment they were formed in, groomed in and succeeded in and nothing evolves your ideology more than success.
[16:17]
Then a month later they faced a massive conundrum. They faced war when nehru was talking about whether an army is needed or not and Jinnah was talking about india and Pakistan being like US and Canada. In these times, it was the military leadership that was aware since wars had groomed them. It was yahya khan during a celebration held by British at Quetta ta barracks had asked his superiors as to what they were celebrating since now rather than becoming a super power, the two nations will fight forever. This was in august 1947,
[16:18]
So joe when the opportunity to take Kashmir by force came, Pakistani leadership was found sleeping and wanting and same happened in junagad and Hyderabad. There was no desire to fight a war bcz war was not in their blood. Was it not habitullah who was told that that Kashmir was coming to Pakistan on a plate. There is a reason behind that statement. Its bcz they got such huge lands without spilling countless blood on it bar partition violence. They didn't have to fight decades of war like other nations did. They just didn't thus in that environment india and Pakistan found themselves in a state of war. What do you expect them to do? Of course they would mess up or underestimate the situation.
[16:18]
Nehru went to UN bcz his entire life had proven that conflicts can be resolved on table and conflicts can solved. He went to the UN since peace and non conflict had given them Pakistan and india so what is kashmir to that.
[16:18]
Leaders of peace and leaders of war are two different breeds just like how hasbrudal the splendid was different from Hannibal and hamilcar
[16:18]
He could make calls Hannibal couldnt and Hannibal could make calls hasbrudal couldn't. Pakistan and india found itself in a war with the two peaceful leaders the region had ever seen.
[16:19]
And there is the entire understanding as to why the leadership was found wanting.
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I just received this stunningly brilliant post-script. It is a must-read!

Once you have read it and digested it, sit back and ponder on this - this is a Pakistani member in his 30s! who is 28 and will be 29 this September.
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Now that I think about it there is another example and a far closer home one. Faqir of ippi and bacha khan. Both of them were not happy with Pakistan and both of then were the same ethnicity no why did one raise weapons against Pakistan whereas the other led khudai khidmatgars on peaceful protests? Bcz both were products of their environment. Both were charismatic, had their set of followers and both stuck to their belief. Faqir of ippi, who had experienced war and fight with British his entire life to secure the freedom of roh did the exact same action against Pakistan that he had done against the British his entire life. He took up arms whereas bacha khan did what he had done his entire life which was protest peacefully. Could you imagine faqir of ippi sitting in a protest in Waziristan and bacha khan telling khudai khidmatgars to pick up arms. The reason bcz their life experience told them that their respective methods are efficient. Both of them had the same goal which was to push out Pakistan but they employed different ideals which they had done their entire lives and they had both found success in it in their experience. Same story happened with nehru or Jinnah. All were signing standstill agreements rather than sending army convoys. We did the same in Baluchistan. Signed standstill agreements. I mean Jinnah was arguing with khan of kalat like a lawyer on how Quetta is under the domain of Pakistan since Pakistan is a successor state of British in international law and thus inherited the treaties that British signed. Can you imagine the likes Chang ki shaik, Mao, or even Lenin or Trotsky or let's take a more close example, faqir of ippi doing that?
[19:16]
*so
[19:19]
The reason why Jinnah was doing that because that is how he had done it with British and Congress his entire life. Cabinet mission being torn apart by lawyers. The reason why Jinnah didn't move a finger to Hyderabad was bcz in his eyes Hyderabad was a separate legal state whose annexation or non annexation was no concern of Pakistan apart from belligerence of a neighbor.
[19:20]
Why would Pakistan send its army to save an area that is legally a separate state? Why even would Pakistan itself try to annex it even? Wouldn't that break international law? He thought like a lawyer with legal senses and India annexed Hyderabad simple.
[19:22]
Nehru was a peaceful protestor with Gandhi. Both of them simply did what they did their entire life. Protest in front of the world how they are wronged.
[19:23]
Liaqat did the same thing. The moment the war got 40km away from Pakistan territory, they agreed to a ceasefire and decided to protest in front of the world how they are wronged
[19:25]
Leaders are products of their environment just like you and I are joe. The difference is that they are far better,dedicated products with a vision. They may not always succeed. Some of the most charismatic leaders in history have failed but they were human. Chiseled by the experience that thought them, the environment that moulded them.
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@Nilgiri @jbgt90 @Naofumi @xeuss@BL33D

@PanzerKiel @TsAr @El Observer @JamD @Psychic @phantom @Gryphon @Signalian

Wasn't it odd? I mean Nehru grew up in times of WW1 and WW2 and believing the world will achieve peace through war seems far fetched. Peace was achieved by nuk bombing Japan. Destruction of Germany was such wholesome that Germans worked in India during 50's and 60's.
While he was responsible for guiding down the institution development along with ensuring federal characteristics govt, his foreign affairs hasn't been awesome if we judge by today's standards. NAM, Panchasheel might have looked brilliant on paper, but achieved little in terms of anything concrete. Just years after WW2 he said what was the need for army. When WW2 just taught how having an independent armed forces is very important for an independent nation as a whole.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Wasn't it odd? I mean Nehru grew up in times of WW1 and WW2 and believing the world will achieve peace through war seems far fetched. Peace was achieved by nuk bombing Japan. Destruction of Germany was such wholesome that Germans worked in India during 50's and 60's.
While he was responsible for guiding down the institution development along with ensuring federal characteristics govt, his foreign affairs hasn't been awesome if we judge by today's standards. NAM, Panchasheel might have looked brilliant on paper, but achieved little in terms of anything concrete. Just years after WW2 he said what was the need for army. When WW2 just taught how having an independent armed forces is very important for an independent nation as a whole.

Not just foreign affairs; his allowing Menon to mishandle the military was verging on the criminal.

 

[Buddhistforlife]

A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.

The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800

More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier

Speaking of Pakistani tactics, in every Indo Pak wars, the Pak army used large number of informal militants. In 1947 and 1965, Pakistan

A look into the history of conflicts between India and Pakistan to better understand the context of the current prevailing situation and the possibilities and probabilities of various hypothetical engagements to come.

The previous thread chains for reference (where ORBAT and analysis among some members commenced):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-6#post-11197800

More recently (highlight of a newer thread of similar vein):

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/behind-the-ceasefireline-cfl.632242/page-11#post-12334338

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel @jbgt90 @Signalian @Gryphon @Cuirassier

Watch Kabir Bedi's guns and glory. Excellent series and explains your questions-Aims,Results, Strategy in details. It is also pretty non biased.

 

[Nilgiri]

Watch Kabir Bedi's guns and glory. Excellent series and explains your questions-Aims,Results, Strategy in details. It is also pretty non biased.

I watched that stuff already....long time ago.

Nah man, its nowhere near the analysis I have read here lately ....especially full neutral and sound perspective from the Pakistani side.

 

[Nilgiri]

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians

Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html

 

[Joe Shearer]

Now that we have segued a bit to that theatre....you (and others) might find this blog post quite interesting to read:

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2020/05/what-has-plagf-learnt-from-dogra-gen.html

It's a nice blog, as blogs go. I like him, but he has this appalling habit, like Armchair, of outlining the most outlandish manoeuvres, and then wishing into existence the entire logistics chain that would enable it (sometimes, very seldom, creating magic kingdoms of exotic weaponry as well). He refuses to use existing logistics capabilities as a constraint, and plan within that.