LOL.
You have this annoying habit of summarising things into tight precis formats that leave no space for any long-winded Poona Colonel stories of the sort that I like to weave (I am saying this with the greatest admiration, and, if it is not misunderstood, with the greatest affection for one of the sharpest minds I have had the pleasure to encounter).
Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.
Actually, I just summarized conclusions from your first part only ..... Was waiting for your next part....
Brevity, somehow, remains the hallmark of our profession.
What has emerged from the close look at operations in Kashmir in 1947-48 are these three very broad-brush conclusions, that are so broad as to offer few or no operational guidelines specific to the sector; however, for whatever they are worth, they seem to be
- What the Indian Army has been doing in the eastern sector is as applicable, if not more, in the equally mountainous and equally thickly forested slopes of the Vale of Kashmir and its outer slopes. It needs to hone its small-unit jungle- and mountain-warfare skills. In addition, it must allow the border guards to shoulder their share of the burden, and withdraw a few kilometres. This will allow them to reduce their numbers, once released from the mechanical coverage of the entire frontage, but will demand the equipment for very quick, very strong reactions.
- It need not worry about irregulars; it should continue to worry about regulars dressed and deployed as irregulars. That is now part of the DNA of the force that they oppose, and they need to address this issue firmly.
- It needs to drastically improve its logistics, and ensure that all roads are 'redundant'; there must always be two, preferably even three ways to get from A to B, throughout the sector.
That touches upon, but does not focus upon the very serious role that logistics plays in this sector, where troops are at the end of a very long line of communications, and even the slightest dislocation can give rise to sleepless nights for the commanders.
In general, a useful approach to logistics will be to build circular roads around the Vale at contour lines at increasing heights. This will reduce a substantial amount of friction between civilians and the military convoys that seek to share the existing roads; these run right through thickly populated areas, and the security measures taken during convoy passage do not find friends anywhere in the Vale.
That is within the Vale. Outside it, there need to be more of the road-building that is mentioned so frequently nowadays: the Durbok-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road, for instance, but many more like it. There is automatically a need to build in two other features - one is a close vigilance over these roads, to stop Lawrence of Arabia theatrics, and the second is very careful joint planning with ecological experts. Even a cursory look at the map will reveal that there are serious economies to be achieved.
- Manali to Dras via Keylong is 564 kms; Dalhousie to Dras, as the crow flies, is 210 kms.;
- Kishtwar to Dras is hardly 120 kms.
- Manali to Kargil is 500 kms.; as the crow flies, it is 275 kms.
One can go on and on, but this will offer a quick heads-up into the role of communications in the supply chain.
With that, it is time to look afresh at the Indian Army and its role in future, specifically in the boundaries of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir. (to be cont.)
Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?
I will finish in two small posts, of which one is already up.
Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.
I see. That makes sense of the whole thing.
To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.
My take is that they haven't put their toys together into an integrated battle management system. All these gadgets and facilities have to be used. Now. Instead, people have procured these, and are now sitting in talk shows on television explaining what these weapons do.
What we had was more than enough to cover the ground of the entire episode.
[/quote]Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.[/QUOTE]
Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.
Coming to the last point relating to 47-48, what should the Indian Army be looking at, given these memories and war histories?
- The present division of responsibility between XIV, XV and XVI Corps is all right, BUT your #77 made a very fundamental point: we cannot switch formations from one end to the other. So XIV Corps has to be detached from Northern Command, and attached to a different Theatre, running from
- Daulat Beg Oldie to Bareilly in UP, from
- Bareilly to Kishanganj in Bihar, from
- Kishanganj to Tezpore in Assam, and from
- Tezpore to Walong (not really; the correct point of assembly and coordination should be Dibrugarh or Jorhat)
- XV and XVI Corps need to take stock, and use their paramilitary front rank effectively, to release regular troops from duty on the borders guarding lines and boundaries. There is no space to dwell on this in this summary.
- Northern Command, with these two Corps, needs to identify missions that it will seek to execute at appropriate times, both in war-time and in the conditions of low-level conflict that prevail during peace-time.
- These might include the expansion of the footprint forward of Turtuk;
- The constant vigilance over Haji Pir Pass, whose recapture can make a significant difference in reducing vulnerability of the sector;
- The sealing off of the Akhnoor salient;
- The dog that barked at night.
- These objectives cannot be met by putting together an ad-hoc force at short notice, but must be a thoroughly well-planned exercise, with ample options for the event that for each mission, the PA will throw a spanner in the works as soon as it possibly can.
With that, I put myself at the disposal of the contributors to move on to the 1965 conflict.