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‘India not looking at isolating China in Asia-Pacific region’

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Washington, Nov 28:

India does not subscribe to the idea of “isolating” China while dealing with the Asia-Pacific region, and would rather engage the country with which it shares a thriving trade relationship, into more cooperation, Indian envoy Nirupama Rao has said.

“We are not looking at isolating China in this whole narrative of building better relations with the Asia-Pacific,” Rao said while observing that India has always regarded the United States as a Pacific power.

“We see the need to engage China. We see the need to develop more and more habits of cooperation with China,” the Indian Ambassador to the US said responding to a question at a forum yesterday on ‘All eyes on Asia: Perspectives from our allies’ organised by Foreign Policy Initiative, a Washington-based think tank.

Rao, who was India’s Ambassador to China before becoming the Foreign Secretary, however, said India would like to have “rule-based” security architecture in the region that is bedevilled by territorial disputes between China and its neighbouring states like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

“But when it comes to a security architecture for the Asia-Pacific, we also believe that it must be open and inclusive and rule-based, of course, and that we should strengthen dialogue rather than, you know, see confrontation escalating for whatever reason,” Rao said at the discussion forum which was moderated by Congressman Randy Forbes.

The centre of gravity, she said, is now shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. “India has always been a part of that region. We have always had a history of engagement with the countries of the Asia-Pacific,” she said.

Responding to a question on India-US relationship, Rao said it has now evolved into a multi-dimensional one. “The relationship between India and the United States has come to be defined as a strategic partnership today. In fact President Obama referred to it, I think quite appropriately, as an indispensable partnership,” she said.

Business Line : Industry & Economy / Economy :
 
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Expanding the Idea of Asia

By Kanwal Sibal
Issue Net Edition | Date : 29 Nov , 2012


As economic power shifts increasingly to Asia and affects global political equations, adddressing security issues in the region becomes more pressing. Can the often discussed pan-Asian security architecture be created?

The idea of such an architecture is not new. In 1969, with the Cold War raging and the Sino-Soviet break occurring, the Soviets had proposed the concept of collective security in Asia. In 1967 the South-east Asian countries had created ASEAN for economic and security reasons. From this an ASEAN-centric security architecture has emerged with the establishment in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which now comprises 27 countries, including ASEAN dialogue partners like India, US, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the EU, and others such as DPRK, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Foundations

ASEAN has taken a leadership role in the emergence of the East Asia Summit (EAS). At its first summit in 2005, the 10 ASEAN members plus India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand attended. Russia and US have since joined and their Presidents attended the 2011 summit.

Can ARF/EAS provide the foundation for building an Asia-wide security architecture? If regional bodies with security agendas had successfully emerged in other parts of Asia this could have been attempted, with the pre-requisite of diluting the present ASEAN/East Asia centric nature of ARF/EAS. Central Asia has been gathered under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, with India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia and Afghanistan as observers, but the Russians, to counter China’s economic weight in SCO, promote the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) established in 1992 to provide security under Russian tutelage in former Soviet space that includes some Central Asia countries. US exclusion from SCO and CSTO even when it is present in Central Asia is a complicating factor. SAARC has been hobbled by India-Pakistan differences. Afghanistan has seen conflict since 1979 and Iran too. US is currently fighting in Afghanistan and is threatening military action against Iran if the nuclear issue is not resolved through negotiations. Establishing a consensual security agenda in this part of Asia has to overcome these problems.

Indeed, territorial disputes at the western end of Asia have a larger dimension than those at the eastern end. Terrorism, with its linkage to Islamic extremist groups that have ideological and financial connections to the Gulf, is a far greater problem here than in the east. The international approach to proliferation issues at the two ends is strikingly different. Maritime issues in the Arabian Sea/Bay of Bengal differ from those in the South China sea. At this stage, to create a wider security architecture that would encompass East, South-east, South, South-west and Central Asia seems hardly possible.

A consensus on US role in an Asian security architecture is required. US is not part of Asia geographically, but as the dominant global power it is present there politically, economically and militarily.

Given this, the Asian countries cannot evolve any pan-Asian security architecture independently of US. The latter will maintain its presence in Asia independent of the volition of individual Asian countries with strategic competition from China and Russia’s Asian reality in mind. In turn, most Asian countries, while no longer seeing Russia as a threat see rising China as potentially one and would want US to provide them a security safety net for the future.

An external power like US will thus be a key pillar of an Asian security architecture. In Europe such an architecture was built by countries permanently burying old animosities, accepting existing borders and pooling the traditional economic sinews of war etc. In Asia it will be driven by balance of power considerations, which is qualitatively different.

Obstacles

China and Pakistan are the biggest obstacles to the emergence of a security architecture from within Asia itself through a process of normalization of relations between key countries based on shared norms and interests as well as a common world view. Both of them seek territorial aggrandizement, are unwilling to bury historical differences and have opaque or dysfunctional political systems.

US has further complicated the establishment of an Asian security architecture by developing the concept of Asia-Pacific, mirroring the Euro-Atlantic region as a geopolitical concept where the US exercises its hegemony with the consent of its partners.

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture represented by NATO was directed against an external threat- the Soviet Union. Now it has become an instrument for exercise of Euro-Atlantic power outside Europe. US will not be able to exercise such hegemony in any Asia-Pacific security architecture. Nor can China, which is an integral part of Asia in a way the Soviet Union was not part of Europe, be treated as an external threat. US’s own mutually dependent relationship with China adds to the complexity of security arrangements that seek to treat China simultaneously as a partner and a threat.

The Asia-Pacific concept, which gives US allies like Australia and New Zealand a geopolitical anchor in Asia, pulls the continent and international interest in it eastwards, distorting thereby its geographical expression to India’s disadvantage. India remains excluded from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It was also initially excluded from the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) though this anomaly has been rectified. The tendency to limit the westwards extension of Asia to Myanmar to achieve some kind of ethnic coherence makes Asia unduly China-centric and omits the huge cultural, religious and civilizational impact of India on eastern Asia. India has interest in working with US in developing a security architecture in Asia that seeks to put constraints on China at both ends of Asia, not merely the eastern end.

Expanding the Idea of Asia » Indian Defence Review
 
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is this a joke or what? how can they isolating china ? india is a nobody at world stage

In that case , why has China launched its great warnings ? insecure much about a nobody at world stage?

ANGRY Chinese authorities have issued formal diplomatic protests to Australia, the US, Japan and India because they feared the four countries were ganging up on them in a security alliance.

The protests came after the Chinese discovered that officials from the four countries were planning a joint meeting.

China warns Canberra on security pact
 
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India not looking at isolating China in Asia-Pacific region, but it's trying to make itself looking important, what a self promoted statement...LMAO.:beside hidding under other's shadow, India is only good on catwalking with so call coalition,let see if i remember all

India-Vietnam,
India-US
India-Japan
India-Indonesia-Australia
India-Vietnam-Philippine
India-Mongolia
India-Mongolia-Russia
India-Japan-U.S
 
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India not looking at isolating China in Asia-Pacific region, but it's trying to make itself looking important, what a self promoted statement...LMAO.:beside hidding under other's shadow, India is only good on catwalking with so call coalition,let see if i remember all

India-Vietnam,
India-US
India-Japan
India-Indonesia-Australia
India-Vietnam-Philippine
India-Mongolia
India-Mongolia-Russia
India-Japan-U.S

If India is trying to make itself looking important, beside hidding under other's shadow, and only good on catwalking with so call coalition

Why should China bother about it? Insecure much?

Li suggested that China has "double insurance" for maintaining influence in Thailand -- China's increasing involvement in the Thai economy and the large number of ethnic Chinese-Thai who hold wealth and political power in the country -- and therefore is not overly concerned with losing influence in Thailand. In fact, Li added that Chinese strategic policies "tend to be passive elsewhere unless it concerns America, Taiwan, or the oil-producing countries." Li also suggested that India is becoming a new concern for China for various reasons including recent Indian offers to help safeguard the Malacca Strait.

Eye On America? - Chinese Media In Thailand

FM Singh's trip to Vietnam October 15-18 was less significant in strategic terms, Kaul continued, describing that relationship as more "historical." The FM also made an effort to secure one more handshake in support of India's bid for permanent membership in the UNSC. The IDSA's Mohanty noted that India sees Vietnam as a big market, but also as a "strategic balance between China and East Asia," which has resulted in "low level discomfort" in Beijing.

Looking Ahead To Asean: India Engages East Asia
 
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India needs big self-confidence boost

Global Times | 2012-11-29 1:00:05
By Ding Gang


The second round of the India-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held in New Delhi on November 26. Strategic cooperation should be based on mutual trust. Both China and India haven't greatly improved their relationship in recent years, mainly due to a lack of mutual trust.

Building that trust lies with the countries themselves. External factors are not the key reasons for this lack of confidence. Any nation, as long as it trusts in its national development and strength and has broader strategic vision, it will not hold strong strategic mistrust on others when developing relations.

A measure of vigilance is necessary when cooperating with others, but too many suspicions will damage the strategic balance and affect the establishment of mutual trust. At present, a few factors have been influencing the ties between China and India. Economic, political and military factors have become entangled and, coupled with historical barriers, have prevented the two moving closer. Border security is one typical example.

But all these factors are related to how China and India view their own development. A country's opinion of its neighbors in essence reflects its own self-assessment. Growing national strength could bring confidence, while a disparity in power could fuel more suspicions.

The mutual trust between China and India to a large extent depends on their balance of power. Both countries have a large population, are positioned in the same stage of development and have similar outlooks for their future. Therefore, a strength disparity is considered a vitally important factor.

Traces of history could easily be found in present-day relations between neighboring countries. Against the background of a changing balance of power between China and India, lingering historical issues will become prominent and potentially turn into real problems today.

Whether the dragon and elephant can dance together depends on whether they are in sync. To perform a harmonious dance requires the two to match the other's skills and strengths.

India needs to increase its confidence in Sino-Indian cooperation, but it should first become more confident in its self-development. I have spoken with Indian scholars and media personalities. Generally speaking, India's domestic economic situation wields a great influence on their impression and attitudes on China. They admire China's development, but also worry over historical and boundary issues. However, they have the common view that India should further accelerate its reform and open its market.

Ordinary Indians may feel China is increasingly looking down upon them. They think China may get tougher on boundary issues with their country. However, the Chinese public often holds that with China's strength growing, India is likely to join hands with the US or others to deal with and balance China out.

Nowadays, more and more Chinese have the opportunity to visit India either for business or tourism. They observe and experience India by themselves and develop their own understanding of the country.

But from the perspective of Chinese diplomacy, China treats India as a big power. Any neglect of this huge neighbor will be considered to be a shortsighted strategy.

Consolidating and developing the Sino-Indian strategic partnership needs the creation of common interests. China and India should learn from each other.

For China, its confidence in cooperating with India is mainly determined by looking ahead, while for India, such confidence comes more from real trust in its own development.

India needs big self-confidence boost - Globaltimes.cn
 
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India not looking at isolating China in Asia-Pacific region, but it's trying to make itself looking important, what a self promoted statement...LMAO.:beside hidding under other's shadow, India is only good on catwalking with so call coalition,let see if i remember all

India-Vietnam,
India-US
India-Japan
India-Indonesia-Australia
India-Vietnam-Philippine
India-Mongolia
India-Mongolia-Russia
India-Japan-U.S

Don't forget India -Taiwan.
 
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And India- Australia

In another word, India perceive China as the enemy and it seeks to Allie with countries around China to counter China. But most regard India as another country that will need US help to counter China as India is backward and poor.
 
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India is hardly a player in South East Asia.

ASEANTradeBreakdowncopy.jpg


Again another example of Indian talking big.:argh:
 
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India is hardly a player in South East Asia.

ASEANTradeBreakdowncopy.jpg


Again another example of Indian talking big.:argh:

The thread title says: "Asia-Pacific"


I ask again.

If "India is hardly a player in South East Asia" ,and the above is just "Again another example of Indian talking big"

Why should China send Diplomatic protest to India or why should China be concerned about Indian offers to help safeguard the Malacca Strait.

make up your mind Chinese members.
 
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