AgNoStiC MuSliM
ADVISORS
- Joined
- Jul 11, 2007
- Messages
- 25,259
- Reaction score
- 87
- Country
- Location
Energon and hellfire:
Yes, but we really haven't seen any sort of sustainability in infiltration or widespread operations by the insurgents in kashmir since 2002-2003. By the Indian military's own count the number of active insurgents in Kashmir is only between 300 to 800 (I came across two different figures in reports attributed to the IA).
So in terms of 'elements' within the ISI encouraging either the insurgency in Kashmir or attacks in India, there is little to suggest active institutional participation or support in the recent past.
The second issue is that of the impact of the continued existence of these camps and groups. Even if the State policy since 2002 has been one of restraint, it is an accurate argument that the very nature of these groups means that the State cannot completely control them from acting in ways counter to State policy.
The ability of these groups to raise resources from non-state avenues gives them the ability to plan and operate independently of the State, and the instability in Afghanistan and FATA has proven to be a boon for non-state entities in multiple ways.
In this new dynamic, of the ability of non-state actors created and abetted by the State for a specific purpose to operate independently, lies the challenge Energon referenced elsewhere - the ability of the Pakistani state to effectively argue for the continued existence of these groups till some progress in normalization with India, while providing assurances that it has the ability to control them.
Mumbai was a huge failure on that count, whereas the continued low levels of cross LoC infiltrations, along with the infrequency of attacks like Mumbai, validate the Pakistani argument of having enough influence in various ways to control these groups.
Understand of course that so long as the State struggles with an insurgency in FATA and struggles to impose its writ there, dismantling of camps elsewhere in Pakistan will only serve to shift them into regions where the GoP has even less control, and remove the remaining controls and influence the State exercises over them at this point in time.
Of course even with complete dismantlement in Pakistan proper and no insurgency in FATA, there can be no fool proof guarantee against terrorism occurring again. One can only be as vigilant as possible (both India and Pakistan), and hope to prevent acts like Mumbai from taking place again.
This is getting off topic though, so I'm going to find a thread elsewhere to move these posts to.
Yes, but we really haven't seen any sort of sustainability in infiltration or widespread operations by the insurgents in kashmir since 2002-2003. By the Indian military's own count the number of active insurgents in Kashmir is only between 300 to 800 (I came across two different figures in reports attributed to the IA).
So in terms of 'elements' within the ISI encouraging either the insurgency in Kashmir or attacks in India, there is little to suggest active institutional participation or support in the recent past.
The second issue is that of the impact of the continued existence of these camps and groups. Even if the State policy since 2002 has been one of restraint, it is an accurate argument that the very nature of these groups means that the State cannot completely control them from acting in ways counter to State policy.
The ability of these groups to raise resources from non-state avenues gives them the ability to plan and operate independently of the State, and the instability in Afghanistan and FATA has proven to be a boon for non-state entities in multiple ways.
In this new dynamic, of the ability of non-state actors created and abetted by the State for a specific purpose to operate independently, lies the challenge Energon referenced elsewhere - the ability of the Pakistani state to effectively argue for the continued existence of these groups till some progress in normalization with India, while providing assurances that it has the ability to control them.
Mumbai was a huge failure on that count, whereas the continued low levels of cross LoC infiltrations, along with the infrequency of attacks like Mumbai, validate the Pakistani argument of having enough influence in various ways to control these groups.
Understand of course that so long as the State struggles with an insurgency in FATA and struggles to impose its writ there, dismantling of camps elsewhere in Pakistan will only serve to shift them into regions where the GoP has even less control, and remove the remaining controls and influence the State exercises over them at this point in time.
Of course even with complete dismantlement in Pakistan proper and no insurgency in FATA, there can be no fool proof guarantee against terrorism occurring again. One can only be as vigilant as possible (both India and Pakistan), and hope to prevent acts like Mumbai from taking place again.
This is getting off topic though, so I'm going to find a thread elsewhere to move these posts to.
