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India could become a power in the Pacific

aanshu001

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SOURCE : Foreign Policy/New York Times News Service

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For some time now, many have argued that India should assume the role of the so-called “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean and across the Asia-Pacific. Taking on this responsibility will require it to assert its strategic goals across the region. But given the evolving security environment in this region, it is quickly becoming apparent that many countries, including the United States, want India to step up perhaps more than New Delhi itself wants to. Furthermore, it also seems that India’s understanding of the role is significantly different from those making these demands.

Despite New Delhi’s reassurances, it has yet to build a “blue water navy”, a force capable of operating in open seas and projecting power to areas of strategic interest. The Indian army continues to be the favourite child of the Indian military, with nearly half of the defence budget typically going to the ground forces. On the other hand, the navy has seen a reduction in its allocated budget from 19 per cent in 2012 to 2013 to 16 per cent in 2015 to 2016. As of January 2015, the Indian navy had a shortage of 1,322 officers and 11,257 sailors. In the past, there have been reports of acute shortages of ships and helicopters. Furthermore, a series of mishaps aboard Indian naval ships and submarines led to the resignation of former Naval Chief D.K. Joshi in February 2014 — the first resignation of a leader of the armed forces since Indian independence in 1947.

With the Indian navy clearly facing numerous organisational challenges, why is Washington encouraging New Delhi to take on the role of the net security provider in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific region?

In 2009, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates argued that India should be a net security provider; Leon Panetta implied the same in 2012. The most recent and significant acknowledgment of the Pentagon’s push for India’s role as a net security provider was outlined in the US Department of Defence’s recently released ‘US Asia Pacific maritime security strategy’ which noted that the US is “seeking to reinforce India’s maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond”.

At the crux of all this is India’s geographic location. During his September 2015 visit to India, Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews said that “Australia recognises India’s critical role in supporting the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indian Ocean region and the stability of a wider, rules-based global order.”

Despite the challenges the Indian navy faces, the country’s geographic location allows it to assert itself in the Indian Ocean region in a manner that exceeds its capabilities. India’s long eastern coastlines provide access and command over the Bay of Bengal, while its western coast provides access to the Arabian Sea. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located close to critical sea lines, provide comfortable access to the Malacca Straits and the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean.

Its naval limitations aside, New Delhi’s contributions in fighting maritime piracy both off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia are noteworthy. The Indian navy’s performance during natural calamities and in search and rescue operations (SAR) after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Maldives Fresh water crisis of 2014, and during SAR operations for MH370, demonstrate its strength.

Expanding its reach

But to be the net security provider for the region, this is not enough. India must articulate a clear policy with political will to direct it. It will have to get involved in regional developments and take a lead in creating mechanisms and frameworks, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Dialogue, while simultaneously joining existing ones (like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Maritime Silk Road) to expand its reach.

Last July, the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Evan Garcia encouraged India to play a greater role in the South China Sea when he remarked that India “is not an invited guest, India should be at the head table” when it comes to policing the South China Sea. Nations such as Singapore and Vietnam also share these sentiments. Furthermore, many navies — the US, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines or Singapore — stand ready to cooperate with the Indian navy. But India can only deliver the guarantees it hopes to through increased participation at regional security forums, where it can shape the discourse and, in doing so, define the role that it is willing to play.

India’s own definitions of what being a net security provider entails and what a blue water navy looks like, also differ from that of countries involved in the region. India’s definition of power projection in its area of interests may not necessarily align with the definition outlined by other Asia-Pacific nations. India’s interests in securing the Indian Ocean are likely to substantially converge with those of Pacific powers like the US. But in areas like the South China Sea, which form a “secondary area” of interest for the Indian navy, the overlap may be considerably less.In October 2015, India’s Defence Minister Shri Manohar Parrikar released India’s revised maritime military strategy document for 2015 (IMSS-2015), which offers a definition from the Indian perspective of what it means to be a net security provider. The Indian Navy, for the first time, has defined the phrase “net security provider” as maintaining “the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these”.

However, the definition does not include the geographical scope of the region where India would pursue the above defined role, which reflects Indian hesitation to assert beyond its immediate strategic considerations.

The pressure for India to emerge as a regional leader and as a net security provider is high, and will only increase. The support from nations in the Chinese maritime neighbourhood (Vietnam, Philippines, and Singapore) is encouraging, but perhaps their expectations exceed India’s own vision.

India’s current leaders have suggested that India is willing to play the role of an active security provider. After former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that India is well-positioned to be a net security provider, the Narendra Modi government has taken a firmer stand through its engagement with its maritime neighbours, joint strategic visions, and collaborations with regional navies. The Asia-Pacific is ready for a new discourse on maritime security. India is a central part of the discussion on maritime cooperation and security in the Indian Ocean region, among Australia, US, European, and Southeast Asian countries. What the region now requires, however, is a bit of patience while India charts its own policy and adds its own substance to this narrative, before it can truly emerge as a net security provider.

India could become a power in the Pacific
 
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A ship going to the Pacific does not make it a naval power. You need logistics agreements, bases, personnel deployed, strategic relationships with littoral states. First let us dominate the IOR and our immediate seas.
 
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that's what New York Times News Service saying, even I would prefer IN to operate in IOR and develop A&N and Lakshadweep as their Naval fortress
 
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Ehhh.. no thank you. We'd rather be self sufficient, developed and secure.
 
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We shouldn't bite more than we can chew.

First we need the capability to dominate the IOR which should be made our area of influence. The Pacific should be our area of interest and nothing more at this juncture.
 
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Of Course Indian Army always a good chunk of defence budget .But ttheir capital acquisition is very low.But for Navy ,now they have modernization with aggressive push.
On topic: We need to tight our security in IOR .Then we will provide naval security to small Asia Pacific nations.
 
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A ship going to the Pacific does not make it a naval power. You need logistics agreements, bases, personnel deployed, strategic relationships with littoral states. First let us dominate the IOR and our immediate seas.
We do dominate the Indian Ocean Region...and quite comprehensively at that. No one else bar USN even comes close to the capability we deploy.

The only Navy in the world that can match the IN in IOR is USN.

However certain acquisitions have delayed the Naval expansion/modernization program.

Off the top of the head - the Submarine arm is very low in numbers along with the ASW choppers.
 
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They want us to get involved in this mess. I would say not before UNSC seat.
 
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We do dominate the Indian Ocean Region...and quite comprehensively at that. No one else bar USN even comes close to the capability we deploy.

The only Navy in the world that can match the IN in IOR is USN.

However certain acquisitions have delayed the Naval expansion/modernization program.

Off the top of the head - the Submarine arm is very low in numbers along with the ASW choppers.

We currently have a presence in the IOR. To dominate you need to establish power. Let's see. We have 1 Aircraft carrier operational and one in the dock. To dominate the IOR one needs the following at the least :

1. A CBG operating in the Bay of Bengal
2. A CBG operating in the Arabian Sea
3. A CBG operating in the Indian Ocean.
4. A CBG in docks under going maintenance,
5. A minimum force of 25 SSK. And a minimum of 9 SSNs
6. An expeditionary force with a minimum of a brigade level force. Including vehicles, marine infantry and support functions.
7. 3 Destroyer Groups with their escorts.
8. Surveillance capabilties with dedicated surveillance satellites and persistent monitoring coverage.
9. Support and logisitics off the coast of Africa.
10. Naval base in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Aden.
11. Cruise missile capabilities which we currently do not have.

The above is a bare minimum to dominate. Domination of an area means, somebody opposing us moves, they are dead. Today PN subs can impose sea denial. When we dominate, PN subs will be dead.

We will get there. But we are a couple of decades away.
 
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We currently have a presence in the IOR. To dominate you need to establish power. Let's see. We have 1 Aircraft carrier operational and one in the dock. To dominate the IOR one needs the following at the least :

1. A CBG operating in the Bay of Bengal
2. A CBG operating in the Arabian Sea
3. A CBG operating in the Indian Ocean.
4. A CBG in docks under going maintenance,
5. A minimum force of 25 SSK. And a minimum of 9 SSNs
6. An expeditionary force with a minimum of a brigade level force. Including vehicles, marine infantry and support functions.
7. 3 Destroyer Groups with their escorts.
8. Surveillance capabilties with dedicated surveillance satellites and persistent monitoring coverage.
9. Support and logisitics off the coast of Africa.
10. Naval base in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Aden.

The above is a bare minimum to dominate. Domination of an area means, somebody opposing us moves, they are dead. Today PN subs can provide us sea denial. When we dominate, PN subs will remain an irritant.

We will get there. But we are a couple of decades away.
This is about 30-40% the size of USN.
I believe this is the target goal in any case...and I concur with your timeline. This won't be achieved before 2030-35 at the earliest.
 
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This is about 30-40% the size of USN.
I believe this is the target goal in any case...and I concur with your timeline. This won't be achieved before 2030-35 at the earliest.

No its actually less than 10% their size. That should tell you what their fire power is.
 
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