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American Diplomacy and the1999 Kargil Summit atBlair HouseBruce Riedel** Bruce Riedel was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East andSouth Asia Affairs in the National Security Council at the White House from 1997 to 2001. Inthat role, Mr. Riedel was President Clintonâs senior adviser on South Asian issues andtraveled with the President to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in March 2000. His prior officewas Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Issues in thePentagon. He is a graduate of Brown (BA) and Harvard (MA) Universities and is currentlya member of the Royal College of Defence Studies in London.
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Center for the Advanced Study of IndiaProfessor Francine R. Frankel, DirectorUniversity of Pennsylvania3833 Chestnut Street, Suite 130Philadelphia, PA19104-3106USAURL:
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casiE-mail: casi@sas.upenn.eduTel: 215-898-6247Fax: 215-573-2595© 2002 by the Center for the Advanced Study of IndiaAll rights reserved. Published 2002.Production and design: Shruti Agarwala
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TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION1KARGIL AND KASHMIR2NAWAZ CALLS FOR HELP5THE 4th DAWNS8AFTERMATH - NEWDEALIN NEWDELHI,COUP IN ISLAMABAD14REFERENCES18SUPPLEMENTSIndia-Pakistan Timeline191999 Kargil Timeline20Map of Kargil21Map of Indiaâs Nuclear-Related Facilities22Map of Pakistanâs Nuclear-Related Facilities23Military Expenditure24Military Expenditure as Percent of GDP24Defence Expenditure Per Capita25Number in Armed Forces25Military Assumptions in 200326
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INTRODUCTIONJuly 4th, 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4thin American diplomatic history,certainly among the most eventful. President Clinton engaged in one of the mostsensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration, successfully persuadingPakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters froma confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war be-tween the worldâs two newest nuclear powers. The events of that 4thacceleratedthe road to a fundamental reconciliation between the worldâs two largest democra-cies, India and the United States, but also set the scene for another in the series ofmilitary coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. As the Presidentâs SpecialAssistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security CouncilI had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviserfor the dayâs events.
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2KARGIL ANDKASHMIRFor fifty years Pakistan and India have quarreled over the fate of Kashmir. Thedispute is not a cold confrontation like that between the two superpowers overGermany in the Cold War. Rather it is a hot confrontation, which has been punctu-ated by three wars. Since the early 1990s it has been particularly violent withalmost daily firefights along the Line of Control (LOC) that divides the state andwithin the valley between the Indian security forces and the Muslim insurgency.Both India and Pakistan deploy hundreds of thousands of troops in the area.In the spring of 1999 the Pakistanis sought to gain a strategic advantage in thenorthern front of the LOC in a remote part of the Himalayas called Kargil. Tradi-tionally the Indian and Pakistani armies had withdrawn each fall from their mostadvanced positions in the mountains to avoid the difficulties of manning them duringthe winter and then returned to them in the spring. The two armies respected eachotherâs deployment pattern and did not try to take advantage of this seasonal change.In the winter of 1999, however, Pakistani backed Kashmir militants and regulararmy units moved early into evacuated positions of the Indians, cheating on thetradition. The Pakistani backed forces thus gained a significant tactical advantageover the only ground supply route Indian forces can use to bring in supplies to themost remote eastern third of Kashmir. By advancing onto these mountaintops over-looking the Kargil highway, Pakistan was threatening to weaken Indian control overa significant (yet barren) part of the contested province.What was all the more alarming for Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeeâs hard-line Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was that the Pakistani military incur-sion came after the Prime Minister had made a bold effort in early 1999 at reconcili-ation with Pakistan by traveling by bus to the Pakistani city of Lahore for a summitwith Sharif. The spirit of Lahore was intended to be the mechanism for breaking
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3the two giants of south Asia out of their half century of violence and fear andmoving the subcontinent to a better future. Instead, the Indians felt betrayed, de-ceived and misled by Sharif and were determined to recover their lost territory.By late May and early June 1999 a serious military conflict was underway along ahundred fifty kilometer front in the mountains above Kargil (some of which rise to aheight of 17,000 feet above sea level), including furious artillery clashes, air battlesand costly infantry assaults by Indian troops against well dug in Pakistani forces.Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants weredoing the fighting â a claim not taken seriously anywhere.The situation was further clouded because it was not altogether clear who wascalling the shots in Islamabad. Prime Minister Sharif had seemed genuinely inter-ested in pursuing the Lahore process when he met with Vajpayee and he had arguedeloquently with a series of American guests, including U.S.UN Ambassador BillRichardson, that he wanted an end to the fifty year old quarrel with India. Hismilitary chief, General Pervez Musharraf, seemed to be in a different mold. Musharrafwas a refugee from New Delhi, one of the millions sent into exile in the 1947 catas-trophe that split British India and the subcontinent. He was said to be a hardliner onKashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all.We will probably never know for sure the exact calculus of decision making inIslamabad. Each of the players has his own reasons for selling a particular versionof the process. Musharraf and Sharif have already put out different versions ofwho said what to whom. Others like former Pakistani Prime Minister BenazirBhutto have also given their views. What is clear is that the civil-military dynamicbetween Sharif in Islamabad and Musharraf in Rawalpindi was confused and tense.The United States was alarmed from the beginning of the conflict because of itspotential for escalation. We could all too easily imagine the two parties beginning to
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mobilize for war, seeking third party support (Pakistan from China and the Arabs,India from Russia and Israel) and a deadly descent into full scale conflict all alongthe border with a danger of nuclear cataclysm.The nuclear scenario was obviously very much on our minds. Since the surpriseIndian tests in May 1998 the danger of a nuclear exchange had dominated Ameri-can nightmares about South Asia. Clinton had spent days trying to argue Sharif outof testing in response and had offered him everything from a State dinner to billionsin new U.S. assistance. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Central Com-mand chief General Tony Zinni, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Rick Inderfurthand I had traveled to Islamabad to try to persuade him, but all to no avail.After a few weeks of agonizing, Sharif had gone forward with his own tests citingas a flimsy excuse an alleged Israel plot to destroy Pakistanâs nuclear facilities incollusion with India. (I had the Israeli Chief of Staff deny categorically to thePakistani Ambassador in Washington any such plan the night before the tests butthat fact mattered little to Islamabad). In the new post-May era we confronted thereality of two nuclear tested states whose missiles could be fired with flight times ofthree to five minutes from launch to impact. One well-informed assessment con-cluded that a Pakistani strike on just one Indian city, Bombay, with a small bombwould kill between 150,000 and 850,000 alone.Given these consequences for escalation, the U.S. was quick to make known ourview that Pakistan should withdraw its forces back behind the Line of Control im-mediately. At first Rick Inderfurth and Undersecretary Thomas Pickering con-veyed this view privately to the Pakistani and Indian ambassadors in Washington inlate May. Secretary Albright then called Sharif two days later and General TonyZinni, who had a very close relationship with his Pakistani counterparts, also calledChief of Army Staff General Musharraf. These messages did not work. So wewent public and called upon Pakistan to respect the LOC. I laid out our position in4
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5an on the record interview at the Foreign Press Center in Washington. The Presi-dent then called both leaders in mid-June and sent letters to each pressing for aPakistani withdrawal and Indian restraint.The Pakistanis and Indians were both surprised by the U.S. position: Pakistanbecause Islamabad assumed the U.S. would always back them against India andIndia because they could not believe the U.S. would judge the crisis on its merits,rather than side automatically with its long time Pakistani ally. Both protagonistswere rooted in the history of their half-century conflict and astounded that the U.S.was not bound by the past.For the previous fifty years, with a few exceptions, the United States had been tiedto Pakistan, while India had been aligned with the Soviet Union in the Cold War.Pakistan had been the take off point for U2s flying over Russia and for HenryKissingerâs trip to China. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980sPakistan had been the U.S.â critical ally in aiding the mujahedin freedom fightersagainst communism, along with Saudi Arabia. In 1971 the Nixon Administrationhad âtiltedâ toward Pakistan and against India during the war that led to Bangladeshâsfreedom. Although U.S.-Pakistani relations had cooled significantly after 1990 whenthe U.S. determined Islamabad was building a nuclear arsenal (leading to an aidsuspension), the popular and elite perception in both countries was that the U.S. wasmore pro-Pakistani than pro-Indian. The imposition of tough sanctions on bothcountries in 1998 (so-called Glenn sanctions) after they tested nuclear weapons hadnot altered the perception of American bias for Pakistan.NAWAZCALLS FORHELPBy late June the situation was deteriorating fast. The two parties were engaged inan intense conflict along the Kargil front and both were mobilizing their forces forlarger conflict. Casualties were mounting on both sides. Our intelligence assess-
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6ments were pointing toward the danger of full-scale war becoming a real possibility.The danger was that the Indians would grow weary of attacking uphill (actually up-mountain) into well dug in Pakistani positions.
The casualties the Indian forceswere taking were mounting. New Delhi could easily decide to open another frontelsewhere along the LOC to ease its burden and force the Pakistanis to fight onterritory favorable to India. Even if the conflict remained confined solely to Kargil,the danger of escalation was high. While the Indian forces were making someprogress against the Pakistanis and their militant allies, it was slow and both sideswere mobilizing more and more of their regular forces.Sharif became increasingly desperate as he saw how isolated Pakistan was in theworld. He urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counterat-tack. Washington was clear â the solution required a Pakistani withdrawal behindthe LOC, nothing else would do. In the last days of June Sharif began to ask to seePresident Clinton directly to plead his case. Sharif had met the President severaltimes earlier, in New York and Washington and at the funeral of King Hussein inAmman. They had also spoken extensively in the spring of 1998 when the Presi-dent had pleaded with Sharif not to follow Indiaâs example and test its nuclearweapons. Although that effort failed (despite promises of enormous U.S. aid toPakistan), the two leaders had developed a genuine personal bond and felt comfort-able talking to each other.On the 2ndof July the Prime Minister put in a call to the President. He appealed forAmerican intervention immediately to stop the fighting and to resolve the Kashmirissue. The President was very clear â he could help only if Pakistan first withdrewto the LOC. The President also consulted with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee onthe phone. The Indians were adamant â withdrawal to the LOC was essential,Vajpayee would not negotiate under the threat of aggression. The President soughtto reassure Vajpayee that we would not countenance Pakistani aggression, not re-ward them for violating the LOC and that we stood by our commitment to the
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Lahore process, i.e. direct talks between India and Pakistan were the only solutionto Kashmir, not third party intervention.On the 3rd, Sharif was more desperate and told the President he was ready to comeimmediately to Washington to seek our help. The President repeated his caution âcome only if you are ready to withdraw, I canât help you if you are not ready to pullback. He urged Sharif to consider carefully the wisdom of a trip to Washingtonunder these constraints. Sharif said he was coming and would be there on the 4th.The White House and State Department spent much of the rest of the 3rdpreparing.Logistics were one problem. Blair House had to be made available for the Pakistanis and the Secret Service needed to secure Pennsylvania Avenue. As anyvisitor to the Mall on a 4thof July knows, tens of thousands of Americans comedown to the Mall to see the fireworks, many come via the area around the WhiteHouse and would be inconvenienced by a shut down of Pennsylvania Avenue.A small group also prepared for the substance of the encounter. I led the effort atthe NSC to prepare the President, National Security Advisor Samuel R. (Sandy)Berger and Chief of Staff John Podesta. The State effort was led by DeputySecretary of State Strobe Talbott, the senior point man on South Asian issues in theDepartment and Karl (Rick) Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Af-fairs at State, whose bureau had the strongest expertise on the Subcontinent in theU.S. government. Strobe, Rick and I had already logged many hours traveling toSouth Asia to work to advance the Presidentâs agenda of improving our relationswith this too long neglected part of the world.The product of this work was two pieces of paper. The first was a draft statementthe President would issue if Sharif agreed to pulling back his forces to the LOC, thesecond a statement which would be used if Sharif refused. The latter would makeclear that the blame for the crisis in South Asia lay solely with Pakistan.7
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8On the third, more information developed about the escalating military situation inthe area â disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nucleararsenals for possible deployment. Sharifâs intentions also became clearer. He wasbringing his wife and children with him to Washington, a possible indication that hewas afraid he might not be able to go home if the summit failed or that the militarywas telling him to leave. At a minimum, Sharif seemed to be hedging his bet onwhether this would be a round trip.Sharif would be met at Dulles Airport, where his commercial PIA flight was beingdiverted to from JFK, by the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Bandarhad a long history of helping assist key American diplomatic initiatives and also hadworked with Pakistan extensively in the past during the Afghan war against theSoviets. Bandar asked for a briefing on what the President needed from Sharif. Imet with him in his McLean home and gave him our sense of the crisis. Bandarpromised to weigh in forcefully with Sharif on the ride from Dulles to Blair House,and he secured Crown Prince Abdallahâs support for our position.British Prime Minister Blair also contacted Sharif to weigh in as well on the need forwithdrawal. Like us, the British were increasingly worried over the direction thecrisis was headed and the danger of escalation to full- scale war. Other govern-ments, including Pakistanâs ally China, shared these concerns as well and we askedBeijing to weigh in with Islamabad. We concluded that the Chinese played a con-structive role in trying to defuse the crisis.THE4THDAWNSThe Presidentâs advisers gathered early on the 4thto brief him on the meeting aheadand provide advice. The mood was somber. Sandy Berger opened the session bytelling the President that this could be the most important foreign policy meeting ofhis Presidency because the stakes could include nuclear war. He had to press
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Sharif to withdraw while also giving him enough cover to keep him in office todeliver the retreat. Strobe noted the importance of being very clear with Nawazand not letting the Prime Minister be alone with the President so that he could laterclaim commitments not made. A record of who said what was critical. Rick and Ibriefed the President on the latest information we had.There was more disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenalfor possible use. I recommended that he use this only when Sharif was without hisaides, particularly not when the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad, who wasknown to be very close to Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) was in earshot.Bandar called and told me the results of his discussion with Sharif. The PM wasdistraught, deeply worried about the direction the crisis was going toward disaster,but equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his militarychiefs who were pressing for a tough stand. I briefed the President and the team.He said he was ready to go and we crossed Pennsylvania Avenue to Blair House.Sharif had a couple of hours to rest and refresh himself since his arrival early in themorning. The Presidentâs meeting opened at around 1:30 in the afternoon with aplenary session with their teams. The President began by noting he had to travel onthe 5thto Americaâs poorest states, a long planned event to help eradicate poverty inAmerica and thus was glad the PM could be available on the 4th. He then framedthe dayâs discussion by handing the PM a cartoon from the dayâs Chicago Tribunenewspaper that showed Pakistan and India as nuclear bombs fighting with eachother. Clinton said this is what worried him.Sharif opened by thanking the President for resolving the long outstanding quarrelbetween the two countries over the suspended delivery of F16 fighters â sus-pended when sanctions were imposed in 1990. Clinton had secured a sizable cashpayment to Pakistan that compensated Islamabad for the cost of the never deliv-ered fighters.9
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Sharif then went into a long and predictable defense of the Kashmiri cause. Heappealed to the President to intervene directly to settle the dispute by pressing India.Much of his argumentation we had heard before â only the U.S. could save abillion and a half South Asians from war, if only the President would devote 1% ofthe effort he gave to the Arab-Israeli dispute to Kashmir it would be resolved, etc.The President pushed back by reminding Sharif that the U.S. played a role in theArab-Israeli conflict because both sides invited it to mediate, that is not the casewith Kashmir. The best approach was the road begun at Lahore, that is directcontact with India. Pakistan had completely undermined that opening by attackingat Kargil, it must now retreat before disaster set in.Sharif noted that India had been the first to test nuclear weapons and refused to holdan election to determine the future of Kashmir. Again the President said that wasall true but the fundamental reality of the day was the Pakistani army and its militantallies were on the wrong side of the LOC and must withdraw. Only if Pakistanwithdrew completely and quickly could the U.S. help Islamabad. A full and com-plete withdrawal without pre-conditions would give the U.S. some leverage withIndia, money in the bank of showing America could help India.The President urged Sharif to give him that money in the bank. But he warned therecould be no quid pro quo, no hint that America was rewarding Pakistan for itsaggression nor for threatening its nuclear arsenal at India. If the United Statesappeared to be acting under the gun of a nuclear threat its ability to restrain othersfrom threatening use of their nuclear forces would be forever undermined. Sharifmust act today.The room was tense and Sharif visibly worried. The President told the Pakistaniteam that he had just read John Keeganâs new book on the first World War. TheKargil crisis seemed to be eerily like 1914, armies mobilizing and disaster looming.The President had sent Strobe and his team to South Asia a half dozen times in the10
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last year to try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ease Indo-Pakistani tensions and build confidence on both sides. Pakistan was threatening toundo all of that and plunge the world into its first nuclear exchange.Sharif handed the President a document which he said was a non-paper provided tohim early in the crisis by Vajpayee in which the two would agree to restore thesanctity of the LOC (a formula for Pakistani withdrawal) and resume the Lahoreprocess. Sharif said at first India had agreed to this non-paper but then changed itsmind. Sharif then asked that the meeting continue just with the two leaders.Everyone left the room except Sharif, Clinton and myself. The President insisted hewanted a record of the event. Sharif asked again to be left alone, the Presidentrefused. The Prime Minister then briefed the President on his frantic efforts in thelast month to engage Vajpayee and get a deal that would allow Pakistan to withdrawwith some saving of face. He had flown to China to try to get their help to pressIndia to agree to a fixed timetable for talks to resolve Kashmir. Sharifâs brief wasconfused and vague on many details but he seemed a man possessed with fear ofwar.The Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution thatwould allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Without something to point to,Sharif warned ominously, the fundamentalists in Pakistan would move against himand this meeting would be his last with Clinton.Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was?Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharifseemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the same. ThePresident reminded Sharif how close the U.S. and Soviet Union had come to nuclearwar in 1962 over Cuba. Did Sharif realize that if even one bomb was droppedâ¦Sharif finished his sentence and said it would be a catastrophe.11
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Sharif asked again to have me leave the room. The President dismissed this with awave of his hand and then told Sharif that he warned him on the second not to cometo Washington unless he was ready to withdraw without any precondition or quidpro quo. Sharif had been warned by others as well. The President said he had adraft statement ready to issue that would pin all the blame for the Kargil crisis onPakistan tonight.The President was getting angry. He told Sharif that he had asked repeatedly forPakistani help to bring Usama bin Ladin to justice from Afghanistan. Sharif hadpromised often to do so but had done nothing. Instead the ISI worked with bin Ladinand the Taliban to foment terrorism. His draft statement would also mentionPakistanâs role in supporting terrorists in Afghanistan and India. Was that whatSharif wanted, Clinton asked? Did Sharif order the Pakistani nuclear missile forceto prepare for action? Did he realize how crazy that was? Youâve put me in themiddle today, set the U.S. up to fail and I wonât let it happen. Pakistan is messingwith nuclear war.Sharif was getting exhausted. He denied that he had ordered the preparation oftheir missile force, said he was against that but he was worried for his life now backin Pakistan. The President suggested a break to allow each leader to meet with histeam and consider next steps. He would also call Prime Minister Vajpayee to briefhim on the discussions. After ninety minutes of intense discussion the meetingbroke up.The President and I briefed the others in our room in Blair House while Sharifhuddled with his team in another room. The President put through a short call toNew Delhi just to tell Vajpayee that he was holding firm on demanding the with-drawal to the LOC. Vajpayee had little to say, even asking the President âwhat doyou want me to say?â There was no give in New Delhi and none was asked for.After the intensity of the first round, the President lay down on a sofa to rest his12
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eyes for a few minutes. We all were consumed by the tension of the moment anddrama of the day.After an hour break the President, Sharif and I returned to the discussion. ThePresident put on the table a short statement to be issued to the press drawing fromthe non-paper Sharif had given us and the statement we had drafted before themeeting to announce agreement on withdrawal to the LOC. The key sentence readâthe Prime Minister has agreed to take concrete and immediate steps for the resto-ration of the LOC.â Strobe, Sandy, Rick and I had drafted this key sentence duringthe break. The statement also called for a ceasefire once the withdrawal wascompleted and restoration of the Lahore process. Finally, the statement included areaffirmation of the Presidentâs long standing plans to visit South Asia.The President was clear and firm. Sharif had a choice, withdraw behind the LOCand the moral compass would tilt back toward Pakistan or stay and fight a wider anddangerous war with India without American sympathy. Sharif read the statementseveral times quietly. He asked to talk with his team and we adjourned again.After a few minutes Sharif returned with good news. The statement was accept-able with one addition. Sharif wanted a sentence added that would say âthe Presi-dent would take personal interest to encourage an expeditious resumption and inten-sification of the bilateral efforts (i.e. Lahore) once the sanctity of the LOC had beenfully restored.âThe President handed the sentence to me and asked my opinion. I said we couldeasily agree to this because the President already supported the Lahore process butwe need a clear understanding on how we would portray the LOC issue â wewould need to explain to our press that this language meant a Pakistani withdrawal.Clinton agreed and told Sharif that was his intention. Reluctantly, the Prime Minis-ter said yes.13
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The mood changed in a nano-second. Clinton told Sharif that they had tested theirpersonal relationship hard that day but they had reached the right ending. Once thewithdrawal from Kargil was done the U.S. would have more credibility with Indiaand the President expressed his determination to do what he could on Kashmir.The President called Vajpayee to preview the statement.As the U.S. delegation was exiting the door from Blair House, Sharifâs ForeignSecretary Ahmad, made a last minute effort to reopen the text. He approachedSandy Berger with a list of alterations in the text. Sandy dismissed him with a curtâyour boss says it is ok as is.âThe press briefing by Rick and I was a tough event. The journalists were convincedthere must be some quid for Pakistani withdrawal. We made clear there was none.AFTERMATHâ NEWDEAL INNEWDELHI,COUP INISLAMABADSharif came to the White House early the next morning for a photo op with hisfamily and the President. His mood was glum, he was not looking forward to thetrip home. The Prime Minister knew he had done the right thing for Pakistan andthe world, but he was not sure his army would see it that way. He stopped inLondon and Riyadh on the way home. Both our allies gave him their support.The Prime Minister was good to his word. He ordered his army to pull back its menand its allies and they did so. India was jubilant, Pakistan morose. The fighting hadtaken a toll. Estimates of the dead on both sides vary. Indians usually claim 1300killed on both sides, Pakistanis cite around 1700.The President also lived up to his word. As soon as the Pakistani forces were backacross the LOC he pressed India for a cease-fire in the Kargil sector. After this14
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occurred he privately invited Sharif to send a senior trusted official to Washington tobegin discrete discussions on how to follow up on his âpersonal commitmentâ to theLahore process.It soon became apparent, however, that all was not well in Islamabad. For weeksthe Prime Minister did not respond to our queries to send someone to discuss Kash-mir. The only explanation offered was that it was difficult to decide whom the rightperson combining the PMâs trust and the background on Kashmir was. We con-cluded the Pakistani internal situation was not ripe for Sharif to take action.Finally in September Sharif sent his brother, the governor of Lahore, to Washingtonfor the long awaited discussions. Rick Inderfurth and I met with him for hours in hissuite at the Willard Hotel. Aday-long downpour of rain made the capital a wet anddreary place.We tried to get a feel for how the Prime Minister wanted to pursue the Kashmirissue. Instead, Shahbaz Sharif only wanted to discuss what the U.S. could do tohelp his brother stay in power. He all but said that they knew a military coup wascoming.On October 12, 1999 it came. Ironically, it was Nawaz who provoked the coupâstiming by trying to exile Musharraf when he was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. Hisplane was denied permission to return to Karachi or anywhere in Pakistan. Themilitary rebelled and forced open the airport. Within hours, Nawaz was in jail andthe army was in control.The President instructed the NSC to do all we could to convince the new Pakistanileadership not to execute Sharif as General Zia had executed Prime Minister Bhuttoin 1978. That outcome would have been a horrible one for all Pakistanis and wouldhave considerably set back the countryâs already slim hope of a better future. The15
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President urged Musharraf to let Sharif free. With our encouragement the Saudispressed hard for Sharifâs freedom. Finally, in December 2000 Sharif was exiled tothe Saudi Arabian Kingdom.Why did Sharif agree to withdraw on the fourth? Only the former Prime Ministercan answer this question authoritatively. What is clear is that President Clinton wasdirect and forceful with him at Blair House â there were no options except with-drawal or isolation. Whatever hopes Sharif and the rest of the Pakistani leadershiphad of getting American support for their Kargil adventure vanished that afternoonin Washington.
The most important strategic result of the Blair House summit was its impact onIndo-U.S. relations. The clarity of the American position on Kargil and its refusal togive Pakistan any reward for its aggression had an immediate and dynamic impacton the relationship.
Doors opened in New Delhi to Americans that had been shutfor years. The Indian elite â including the military â and the Indian public beganto shed long held negative perceptions of the U.S.The stage was set for the unprecedented back to back summits between PresidentClinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000.
After a quarter century gap in Presi-dential visits to India, Clintonâs spring visit symbolized a new level of maturity in therelationship between the worldâs two largest democracies. Vajpayeeâs return visitformalized the commitment.President Bush has accelerated and intensified the process of U.S.-India rapproche-ment. After the September 11thattacks on America, he lifted the Glenn sanctionsimposed after the 1998 tests and welcomed Vajpayee to the Oval Office. U.S.relations with Pakistan have substantially improved as well thanks to the Musharrafâsgovernmentâs role in the war against the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin, a strikingreversal of earlier Pakistani policy. But the tensions following the attack on the16
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Indian Parliament show the Kashmir issue remains as dangerous today, however, asit was in 1999, a time bomb capable of exploding upon the subcontinent with little orno warning.17
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REFERENCESThere is a large library on the India-Pakistan conflict. A few pieces are particularlynotable as they apply to the Kargil episode. The best discussion of the backgroundto Pakistanâs incursion into Kargil and the strategic significance of the territory Ihave seen is by Indiaâs former Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, âADefining Moment,âin Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (Harpers, 1999). Also usefulis Gaurav Sawantâs Dateline Kargil (Macmillan, 2000) for descriptions of the fight-ing by a journalist who was there. A recent useful update on the nuclear dimensionof the India-Pakistan conflict is the essay by M.V. Ramana and A.H. Nayyar, âIn-dia, Pakistan and the Bomb,â in Scientific American December 2001.18
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India-Pakistan TimelineAugust 1947India and Pakistan become independent nationsOctober 1947Kashmir signs Instrument of Accession, giving India legalclaim over the territory, First undeclared between Pakistanand India over Kashmir1965Second India-Pakistan war over KashmirMarch 1971East Pakistan secedes from Pakistan and forms the nationof Bangladesh; Civil War erupts in Pakistan, Third India-Pakistan war as India supports East PakistanMay 1974India conducts underground nuclear test at Pokhran,RajasthanDecember 1988India and Pakistan sign agreement prohibiting attack oneach otherâs nuclear installationsJanuary 1996India tests Prithvi II, a missile capable of carrying nuclearweaponsApril 1998Pakistan tests Ghauri missile, capable of reaching 937milesMay 11, 1998India conducts three underground nuclear tests in RajasthanMay 13, 1998India conducts two more underground nuclear tests tocomplete its nuclear test programMay 28, 1998Pakistan conducts its five underground nuclear tests for thefirst timeMay 1999Conflict between India and Pakistan in Kargil in KashmirSource: Hayes, Bradd. "International Game '99: Crisis in South Asia",Sponsored by United States Naval War College, January 19991999 Kargil TimelineMay 26May 29May 31June 5June 9June 13June 29July 4July 11Source: BBC News, July 13, 1999Kashmir militants infiltrate Kashmir and India launches airattacksPakistan proposes sending foreign minister (Sartaj Aziz) toIndia to ease tensionsIndia and Pakistan agree to hold talks over KashmirIndia halts bombing to hand over Pakistani bodiesIndia continues air strikes ahead of talks with PakistanIndia and Pakistan end Kashmir talks without anyagreements on how to end the conflictPakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif returns from Chinaas efforts to end conflict acceleratePresident Clinton urges India-Pakistan talksIndia captures key strategic peak Tiger HillKashmir pull-out takes effect as militants leave IndianKashmirSrinagarKargilPakistanOccupiedKashmirChinaOccupiedKashmirINDIAPAKISTANCHINAAfghanistanMapofJammu&KashmirShowingKargilNew DelhiMumbaiKolkataJammu & KashmirNangalNaroraPokaran(Nuclear test site)KotaIndoreBarodaHaziraKakraparTarapurTrombayThal VaishetKaigaRattehalliKoodankulamTuticorinChennaiKalpakkamHyderabadManuguruChandipur(Missile test site)TalcherSource: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998SelectedIndianNuclear-RelatedFacilitiesMap not drawn to scaleIslamabadWahGolra SharifRawalpindiPakistan Institute of Nuclearand Science TechnologyKahutaSinhalaLahoreKhushabIssa KhelLakkiDera Ghazi KhanMultanKundianChasmaChagai HillsPakistan'sNuclear-RelatedFacilitiesSource: Center for Nonproliferation Studies Database, 1997IndiaPakistanSource: SIPRI DatabaseMilitary Expenditure as Percent of GDP02500500075001000012500200019991998199719961995199419931992199101.32.63.95.26.5199919981997199619951994199319921991Percent(%)ofGDPMillionsofUSDollars($)1998ConstantSource: SIPRI DatabaseMilitary Expenditure 1991-2000IndiaPakistan0IndiaPakistan200019991985US$mpercapitaIndiaPakistanIndiaPakistan3212231423140IndiaPakistan20001985IndiaPakistan482.81,2606121,303ThousandsofpeopleDefenceExpenditurePerCapitaNumbersinArmedForcesSource:TheMilitaryBalance,2001-02PakistanIndiaTotal Military Personnel587,000 active526,000 reserve1,145,000 active1,005,000 reserveARMYArmy Troops520,000980,000Tanks2,3504,500Artillery1,566 towed240self-propelled4,075 towed180self-propelledLight Aircraft200NAAIR FORCECombat Aircraft503900Transport Aircraft28230HelicoptersNA60Air Force Personnel45,000110,000NAVYSurface ShipsDestroyersFrigates112436818Aircraft Carriers--1Submarines917NUCLEAR FORCES50 - 75 warheads(10-20 ktons yield)75-100 warheads(10-20 ktons yield)BALLISTIC MISSILETYPETYPEAbabeel SRBM60Prithvi I SRBM60Ghauri MRBM15Prithvi II20Shaheen I5Agni10-15Shaheen II2Military Assumptions in 2003Source: Hayes, Bradd. "International Game '99: Crisis in South Asia", Sponsored by United States Naval War College, January 1999
i am cool infact i say bring it on we are ready for you boys 
