'India builds 60 dams on Jehlum to deprive Pakistan of water'

[Neo]

The reason why there is so much co-operation between India and Isreal has a lot to do with Pakistan's support of the Arab countries during the two wars.

And the co-operation has expanded to many area's including water management as the article quotes.

We didn't use any "card." If there is a Jewish lobby working in our favor, which I highly doubt, then it is not our creation.

Jewish lobby is working in India's favor, the name Ackerman rings a bell?

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

And the co-operation has expanded to many area's including water management as the article quotes

Because Israel is well known for water management. Guess what there are lot of Germans working on water resource development in India too.

 

[indiapakistanfriendship]

Jewish lobby is working in India's favor, the name Ackerman rings a bell?

Because he favours India for strategic purposes. Heard of GOP hiring a lobbying firm, heck even the Myanmar Junta has lobbyists in US, so your point being?

 

[Neo]

Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: The Indus Water Treaty ​

Background

Irrigation in the Indus River basin dates back centuries; by the late 1940s the irrigation works along the river were the most extensive in the world. These irrigation projects had been developed over the years under one political authority, that of British India, and any water conflict could be resolved by executive order. The Government of India Act of 1935, however, put water under provincial jurisdiction, and some disputes did begin to crop up at the sites of the more-extensive works, notably between the provinces of Punjab and Sind.

In 1942, a judicial commission was appointed by the British government to study Sind 's concern over planned Punjabi development. The Commission recognized the claims of Sind, and called for the integrated management of the basin as a whole. The Commission's report was found unacceptable by both sides, and the chief engineers of the two sides met informally between 1943 and 1945 to try to reconcile their differences. Although a draft agreement was produced, neither of the two provinces accepted the terms and the dispute was referred to London for a final decision in 1947.

Before a decision could be reached, however, the Indian Independence Act of August 15, 1947 internationalized the dispute between the new states of India and Pakistan. Partition was to be carried out in 73 days, and the full implications of dividing the Indus basin seem not to have been fully considered, although Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was responsible for the boundary delineation, did express his hope that, "some joint control and management of the irrigation system may be found" (Mehta 1986, p. 4). Heightened political tensions, population displacements, and unresolved territorial issues, all served to exacerbate hostilities over the water dispute.

As the monsoon flows receded in the fall of 1947, the chief engineers of Pakistan and India met and agreed to a "Standstill Agreement," which froze water allocations at two points on the river until March 31, 1948, allowing discharges from headworks in India to continue to flow into Pakistan.

On April 1, 1948, the day that the "Standstill Agreement" expired, in the absence of a new agreement, India discontinued the delivery of water to the Dipalpur Canal and the main branches of the Upper Bari Daab Canal. Several motives have been suggested for India 's actions. The first is legalistic-that of an upper riparian establishing its sovereign water rights. Others include an Indian maneuver to pressure Pakistan on the volatile Kashmir issue, to demonstrate Pakistan 's dependence on India in the hope of forcing reconciliation, or to retaliate against a Pakistani levy of an export duty on raw jute leaving East Bengal. Another interpretation is that the action was taken by the provincial government of East Punjab, without the approval of the central government.

The problem

Even before the partition of India and Pakistan, the Indus posed problems between the states of British India. The problem became international only after partition, though, and the attendant increased hostility and lack of supra-legal authority only exacerbated the issue. Pakistani territory, which had relied on Indus water for centuries, now found the water sources originating in another country, one with whom geopolitical relations were increasing in hostility.

The question over the flow of the Indus is a classic case of the conflicting claims of up- and down-stream riparians. The conflict can be exemplified in the terms for the resumption of water delivery to Pakistan from the Indian headworks, worked out at an Inter-Dominican conference held in Delhi on 3-4 May 1948. India agreed to the resumption of flow, but maintained that Pakistan could not claim any share of those waters as a matter of right (Caponera, 1987, p. 511). This position was reinforced by the Indian claim that, since Pakistan had agreed to pay for water under the Standstill Agreement of 1947, Pakistan had recognized India 's water rights. Pakistan countered that they had the rights of prior appropriation, and that payments to India were only to cover operation and maintenance costs (Biswas, 1992, p. 204).

While these conflicting claims were not resolved, an agreement was signed, later referred to as the Delhi Agreement, in which India assured Pakistan that India would not withdraw water delivery without allowing time for Pakistan to develop alternate sources. Pakistan later expressed its displeasure with the agreement in a note dated 16 June 1949, calling for the "equitable apportionment of all common waters," and suggesting turning jurisdiction of the case over to the World Court. India suggested rather that a commission of judges from each side try to resolve their differences before turning the problem over to a third party. This stalemate lasted through 1950.

Attempts at conflict management

In 1951, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, whose interest in integrated river management along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority had been piqued, invited David Lilienthal, former chairman of the TVA, to visit India. Lilienthal also visited Pakistan and, on his return to the US, wrote an article outlining his impressions and recommendations (the trip had been commissioned by Collier's Magazine-international water was not the initial aim of the visit). These included steps from the psychological-a call to allay Pakistani suspicions of Indian intentions for the Indus headwaters, to the practical-a proposal for greater storage facilities and cooperative management. Lilienthal also suggests that international financing be arranged, perhaps by the World Bank, to fund the workings and findings of an "Indus Engineering Corporation," to include representatives from both states, as well as from the World Bank.

The article was read by Lilienthal's friend, David Black, president of the World Bank, who contacted Lilienthal for recommendations on helping to resolve the dispute. As a result, Black contacted the prime ministers of Pakistan and India, inviting both countries to accept the Bank's good offices. In a subsequent letter, Black outlined "essential principles" that might be followed for conflict resolution. These principles included the following: that water resources of the Indus basin should be managed cooperatively; and that problems of the basin should be solved on a functional and not on a political plane, without relation to past negotiations and past claims. Black suggested that India and Pakistan each appoint a senior engineer to work on a plan for development of the Indus basin. A Bank engineer would be made available as an ongoing consultant.

Both sides accepted Black's initiative. The first meeting of the Working Party included Indian and Pakistani engineers, along with a team from the Bank, as envisioned by Black, and met for the first time in Washington in May 1952. The stated agenda was to prepare an outline for a program, including a list of possible technical measures to increase the available supplies of Indus water for economic development. After three weeks of discussions, an outline was agreed to, whose points included

determination of total water supplies, divided by catchment and use;
determination of the water requirements of cultivable irrigable areas in each country;
calculation of data and surveys necessary, as requested by either side;
preparation of cost estimates and a construction schedule of new engineering works which might be included in a comprehensive plan.
In a creative avoidance of a potential and common conflict, the parties agreed that any data requested by either side would be collected and verified when possible, but that the acceptance of the data, or the inclusion of any topic for study, would not commit either side to its "relevance or materiality."

When the two sides were unable to agree on a common development plan for the basin in subsequent meetings in Karachi, November 1952, and Delhi, January 1953, the Bank suggested that each side submit its own plan. Both sides did submit plans on October 6, 1953, each of which mostly agreed on the supplies available for irrigation, but varied extremely on how these supplies should be allocated (Table 2).The Indian proposal allocated 29 million acre-feet (MAF) per year to India and 90 MAF to Pakistan, totaling 119 MAF (MAF = 1233.48 million cubic meters; since all negotiations were in English units, that is what is reported here). The Pakistani proposal, in contrast, allocated India 15.5 MAF and Pakistan 102.5 MAF, for a total of 118 MAF.

The two sides were persuaded to adjust somewhat their initial proposals, but the modified proposals of each side still left too much difference to overcome. The modified Indian plan called for all of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) and 7% of the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) to be allocated to India, while Pakistan would be allocated the remainder, or 93% of the western rivers. The modified Pakistani plan called for 30% of the eastern rivers to be allocated to India, while 70% of the eastern rivers and all of the western rivers would go to Pakistan.

The Bank concluded that not only was the stalemate likely to continue, but that the ideal goal of integrated watershed development for the benefit of both riparians was probably too elusive a goal at this stage of political relations. On February 5, 1954, the Bank issued its own proposal, abandoning the strategy of integrated development in favor of one of separation. The Bank proposal called for the entire flow of the eastern rivers to be allocated to India, and all of the western rivers, with the exception of a small amount from the Jhelum, to be allocated to Pakistan. According to the proposal, the two sides would agree to a transition period while Pakistan would complete link canals dividing the watershed, during which India would continue to allow Pakistan's historic use to continue to flow from the eastern rivers.

The Bank proposal was given to both parties simultaneously. On March 25, 1954, India accepted the proposal as the basis for agreement. Pakistan viewed the proposal with more trepidation, and gave only qualified acceptance on July 28, 1954; they considered the flow of the western rivers to be insufficient to replace their existing supplies from the eastern rivers, particularly given limited available storage capacity. To help facilitate an agreement, the Bank issued an aide memoir, calling for more storage on the western rivers, and suggesting India 's financial liability for "replacement facilities"-increased storage facilities and enlarged link canals in Pakistan which could be recognized as the cost replacement of pre-partition canals.

Little progress was made until representatives from the two countries met in May 1958. Main points in contention included whether the main replacement storage facility ought to be on the Jhelum or Indus rivers-Pakistan preferred the latter but the Bank argued that the former was more cost-effective; and what the total cost of new development would be and who would pay for it-India's position was that it would only pay for "replacement" and not "development" facilities.

In 1958, Pakistan proposed a plan including two major storage facilities: one each on the Jhelum and the Indus; three smaller dams on both tributaries; and expanded link canals. India, objecting both to the extent and the cost of the Pakistani proposal, approximately $1.12 billion, proposed an alternative plan which was smaller in scale, but which Pakistan rejected because it necessitated continued reliance on Indian water deliveries.

By 1959, the Bank evaluated the principal issue to be resolved as follows: which works would be considered "replacement" and which "development," in other words, for which works would India be financially responsible. To circumvent the question, Black suggested an alternative approach in a visit to India and Pakistan in May. Perhaps one might settle on a specific amount for which India is responsible, rather than arguing over individual works. The Bank might then help raise additional funds among the international community development for watershed development. India was offered help with construction of its Beas Dam, and Pakistan 's plan, including both the proposed dams would be looked at favorably. With these conditions, both sides agreed to a fixed payment settlement, and to a ten-year transition period during which India would continue to provide Pakistan 's historic flows to continue.

In August 1959, Black organized a consortium of donors to support development in the Indus basin, which raised close to $900 million, in addition to India 's commitment of $174 million. The Indus Water Treaty was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960 and government ratifications were exchanged in Delhi in January 1961.

Outcome

The Indus Water Treaty addressed both the technical and financial concerns of each side, and included a timeline for transition. The main points of the treaty included (Alam, 2002):

an agreement that Pakistan would receive unrestricted use of the western rivers, which India would allow to flow unimpeded, with minor exceptions
provisions for three dams, eight link canals, three barrages, and 2500 tube wells to be built in Pakistan

a ten-year transition period, from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1970, during which water would continue to be supplied to Pakistan according to a detailed schedule

a schedule for India to provide its fixed financial contribution of $62 million, in ten annual installments during the transition period
additional provisions for data exchange and future cooperation

The treaty also established the Permanent Indus Commission, made up of one Commissioner of Indus Waters from each country. The two Commissioners would meet annually in order to establish and promote cooperative arrangements for the treaty implementation; promote cooperation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the Indus system; examine and resolve by agreement any question that may arise between the Parties concerning interpretation or implementation of the Treaty; submit an annual report to the two governments.

In case of a dispute, provisions were made to appoint a "neutral expert." If the neutral expert fails to resolve the dispute, negotiators can be appointed by each side to meet with one or more mutually agreed-upon mediators. If either side (or the mediator) views mediated agreement as unlikely, provisions are included for the convening of a Court of Arbitration. In addition, the treaty calls for either party, if it undertakes any engineering works on any of the tributaries, to notify the other of its plans and to provide any data which may be requested.

Since 1960, no projects have been submitted under the provisions for "future cooperation," nor have any issues of water quality been submitted at all. Other disputes have arisen, and been handled in a variety of ways. The first issues arose from Indian non-delivery of some waters during 1965-66, but became instead a question of procedure and the legality of commission decisions. Negotiators resolved that each commissioner acted as government representatives and that their decisions were legally binding.

One controversy surrounding the design and construction of the Salal Dam was resolved through bilateral negotiations between the two governments. Other disputes, over new hydroelectric projects and the Wuller Barrage on the Jhelum tributary and the Baglihar dam on the Chenab River in Kashmir, have yet to be resolved.

Case studies | Water Conflict Management and Transformation at OSU

 

[Xeric]

Lets come back to the topic....
A question to all indians (i'll not call u friends..coz friends dont do the kind of the things u ppl do)....is indian occupied Kashmir an indian territory...??? Just occupying a piece of land by force doesnt give you a right to claim its resources and other stuff. If you people and your government had some guts, shame and ethics you would have never thought of building anything unless the kashmir issue was solved..but why should you ofcourse you the same people with akhud bharat nonsense syndrome.

 

[HAIDER]

NEW DELHI, June 7: India said on Saturday that work on the Kishanganga water project would be expedited citing the reason that Pakistan was also constructing a power project on the same river on its side.

During a meeting of the Indus Water Commissioners held earlier last week in Lahore, the two countries had decided that experts from the two countries would inspect the Kishanganga and Neelum Hydel projects.

Media reports quoting Indian Minister of State for Power

Jairam Ramesh said in Srinagar that work on the 300MW Kishanganga project was at an advanced stage.

“We need to speed up the work on the project as Pakistan is also constructing a power project on the river with Chinese assistance,” he said.

Talking to reporters, he claimed that the power project was based on ‘run of the water’ and did not involve storage of water at any stage. When asked about the rationale behind constructing two projects on the same river while one of the two will not be viable, Ramesh said the project had “great strategic” and “foreign policy implications.”

“I am sure Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must have given a thought to it. Only the prime minister or the external affairs minister will be able to comment on the issue,” he said.

“However, we are determined to implement the project which was approved by the Union Cabinet in 2007,” the minister said. Ramesh said the first phase of the Baghlihar project would be commissioned by March next year.

“Some 150MW will be in the stream by August this year, 150MW in October and another 150MW in December,” he said.—APP


India to speed up work on Kishanganga -DAWN - Top Stories; June 08, 2008

 

[dillip]

How can both the countries create a dam on the same river. After all which way the river flows? India to Pak or Pak to India.

 

[PlanetWarrior]

Lets come back to the topic....
A question to all indians (i'll not call u friends..coz friends dont do the kind of the things u ppl do)....is indian occupied Kashmir an indian territory...??? Just occupying a piece of land by force doesnt give you a right to claim its resources and other stuff. If you people and your government had some guts, shame and ethics you would have never thought of building anything unless the kashmir issue was solved..but why should you ofcourse you the same people with akhud bharat nonsense syndrome.

The issue is about the water resources and the treaty which was accepted by Pakistan. The issues you raise here have simply nothing to do with this thread. Whilst I as an Indian national principally agree with the perception that Kashmir should be decided on a plebiscite, there remains too many obstacles to that and both India and Pakistan have their own selfish interests to allow that to happen. In the interim, the building of the dams are not in contravention of the treaty which was agreed upon by Pakistan and India and their neighbours. Now that Pakistani authorities cannot carry out their mandate and ensure adequate supply of electricity to its people they find it easy to find an excuse and this is simply an excuse. If India is doing anything illegal then Pakistan should legally enforce its rights. To complain and threaten does not take the situation anywhere. And to bring in the issue of Kashmir and expect a conscience from India and the Indians will require Pakistan and the Pakistanis to develop a conscience over the issue of Kashmir as well. Now since this thread is not related to the Kashmir issue I shall not go further into that

 

[R.A.W.]

Why is it so surprising?

Didn't India use the "Ohh...muslims hate us too" card to establish strategic alliance with Israel against Pakistan?

Deny if you want but there's a strong jewish lobby in India and elswhere actively working against Pakistan's interests.

see how good we are......... and we go to middle east and say "Ohh we have third largest muslim population."

Advantage India.

 

[aimarraul]

州官可以防火，老百姓当然可以点灯。。。。

 

[dvk1982]

'India builds 60 dams on Jehlum to deprive Pakistan of water' ​

LAHORE (June 06 2008): India has constructed 60 dams on River Jehlum, Chanab besides two other rivers to deprive Pakistan of water and it is expected that the country may face acute water shortage in the coming years, said the chief organiser Sindh Tass Water Council of Pakistan Mian Azizul Haq Qureshi.

Other members of the council including the chairman of the council Zahoorul Hasan Dahir, Engineer Salman were also present on the occasion. Addressing a press conference at Lahore Press Club on Thursday he said India had violated the Indian Water Basin Treaty by constructing dams on the Pakistani side of the rivers.

"India had chalked out a mega plan with the help of Jewish lobby and international NGOs to built dams on the rivers flowing towards Pakistan from Kashmir and Karghal," he said adding that at present the nation had been facing a shortage of electricity due to the shortage of water in the rivers of the country. Aziz Qureshi further said that Pakistan is a nuclear state and the rulers should take strong stance for the country instead of going for negotiations.

Business Recorder [Pakistan's First Financial Daily]

there is sth wrong with the pshychy of these leaders in pakistan...
they seem to thump their chest everytime with nuclear... if US were like u every document of negotiation wud have "nuclear action" mentioned somewhere to threaten.. r u a real nuclear power ? if so behave like one... don't keep saying and reminding everyone else time and again.... show some maturity - to leaders !!

 

[dvk1982]

Lets come back to the topic....
A question to all indians (i'll not call u friends..coz friends dont do the kind of the things u ppl do)....is indian occupied Kashmir an indian territory...??? Just occupying a piece of land by force doesnt give you a right to claim its resources and other stuff. If you people and your government had some guts, shame and ethics you would have never thought of building anything unless the kashmir issue was solved..but why should you ofcourse you the same people with akhud bharat nonsense syndrome.

and cud u also justify owning a land becoz u just belong to same religion... sell this crap to sbdy...
it worked only twice for creating pakistan and Israel... u take care of what u have now... we want to develop and make India a better place.

 

[Gin ka Pakistan]

The one reason Kashmir will always be important is because five rivers comes out of it and five rivers in Punjabi means Punjab (land of five rivers) and they all become one in river Indus for Sind.

 

[PakSher]

Now we know that we need to build 20 cruise missile for every Indian Navy ship to make sure none survive in a conflict. As we know the Indians will never be able to defeat us militarily, stealing water is along term strategy, but that can be dealt with building dams and storing millions of cucis of water that goes into the Arabian Sea. This can dealt in the medium and short term. Can someone pull the knife from my back some damn Indian stabbed me, oh but I was wearing a bullet proof west. Gotcha .........

 

[EjazR]

According to the Indus Water treaty, Pakistan has rights to Jhelum so India will not, and afaik hasn't utlised this river, let alone plan to build 60 dams.

Despite all the anti-India rhetoric related to water, the fact remains that people of Pakistan have suffered the most due to the mismanagement and non-tranparent planning of dam construction by their OWN government with water deprivation to Sind and NWFP and flooding and displacement in northern Punjab and Mirpur. Its easy to blame India than resign from your post because of your mismanagement.

Kalabagh on Indus, Mangla dam on Chenab are examples. Ironically, the large number of Mirpuris in UK today is because they were displaced from their homeland because of the Mangla dam.
Kalabagh Dam: An Ecological Disaster
India finds Pak charge on Chenab water flow unsubstantiated