India's obsession with the US, Pak & China
India's obsession with the US, Pak & China - Analysis - DNA
Pakistan again occupied the whole Indian mind space from November 26, 2008 when alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists attacked Mumbai.
From the failed summit at Agra in 2001 between prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf to the joint statement issued by the two leaders on the sidelines of the 2004 Saarc summit in Islamabad, it seemed that the BJP-led NDA government could think of nothing else but Pakistan. The whole foreign policy approach was Pakistan-oriented.
Even closer ties with the United States were seen as a part of India's Pakistan policy.
From July 2005 when prime minister Manmohan Singh and the then US president George W Bush issued a joint statement which talked about the India-US civil nuclear deal to October 2008 when the US Congress passed the required legislation, the Indian political class and media did nothing but speak ad nauseam about the pros and cons of the issue.
Pakistan again occupied the whole Indian mind space from November 26, 2008 when alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists attacked Mumbai. Politicians and media were grappling with the question of finding the right response to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorism. For the last few weeks, it is China that has become a nightmare for the Indian media and policy wonks dealing with foreign policy.
The curious thing is that despite the time and energy Indians dealing with such matters spend thinking and arguing about Pakistan, the US and China, there is no clarity about relations with these three countries. Secondly, it sometimes appears that India has strategic concerns only with these three and no one else. Is it possible to do better than indulge in these obsessive-compulsive responses which do not befit an emerging global power like India?
Will it be easier to deal with Pakistan if India were to pay attention to relations with Bangladesh? Compared to the irreconcilable issues which plague relations with Islamabad, the problems with Dhaka are solvable. Yet, the Indian establishment refuses to consider the possibility of improving ties with Bangladesh, which could serve as a benchmark for the problem-ridden Indian-Pakistan relations.
If Pakistan is India's obsession in south Asia, then it is China that seems to be the sole trouble for India in the whole of Asia. India has no time for Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) group, which is a hugely influential group on India's eastern front.
If India were to become an important strategic player in the Asean region, then it could have a subtle impact on India-China relations. India's relations with Japan and South Korea could be leveraged as well in dealing with Beijing. The possibilities aren't even considered in New Delhi.
The US is India's weak point. Both in the government and outside, the idea of dealing with America is overwhelming. The India-US civil nuclear deal is seen as a gift from Washington and not as recognition of India's enhanced status.
There is a sense of diffidence when it comes to dealing with the US. There is the strong feeling that India cannot do much on its own on the world stage if the US were not to be on its side. There is also the perception that the US is a key player in India-Pakistan as well as India-China relations. The assumptions are of course totally mistaken.
The pathetic aspect of this obsession is that India's foreign policy vision remains nebulous when it has to define its position with regard to the wide world. India's economic potential remains constricted because it is so US-focused, and its neighbourhood relations are disabled by its concerns with Pakistan and China.
It should be possible for the next generation of politicians, policymakers and entrepreneurs to break out of the caged thinking of the present and reach out to the open horizons of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. India cannot hope to be a big power if it cannot get rid of its fixations.
