In a rare meeting, Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi apprises FIIs about party's stand on stuck G

[dadeechi]

yea yeah whatever. Tak big things when people actually give a $hit.

I know you will run away..

 

[Mamsalaphala]

Only if the PM thinks so else they are just ceremonial or optional.
I know what I am talking. Today, CTBT is not a reality yet due to PVN's veto.
I have lived through this history myself and do not really need to google those events.

When India is NOT a part of CTBT how does the question of Veto arise ? We are OUTSIDE the CTBT.

It was Indira Gandhi who refused to sign the CTBT, not PRN.

I said "India is not desperate for nuclear deal. Nuclear deal is just a red herring."
In a rare meeting, Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi apprises FIIs about party's stand on stuck G | Page 3
I have already quoted the links how liability clause was being diluted by Modi.

The Nuclear deal MMS made is a dicey deal. India continues to be OUTSIDE the Established Nuclear power and have got "Dalit" reservation in the Nuclear power circle. Some might say its a good deal, others might say we got screwed. Let history judge.

The Nuclear Liability bill is just a Fig leaf, its not worth discussing. I am not sure why you are blowing it up to be something it clearly not.

 

[dadeechi]

When India is NOT a part of CTBT how does the question of Veto arise ? We are OUTSIDE the CTBT.

It was Indira Gandhi who refused to sign the CTBT, not PRN.



The Nuclear deal MMS made is a dicey deal. India continues to be OUTSIDE the Established Nuclear power and have got "Dalit" reservation in the Nuclear power circle. Some might say its a good deal, others might say we got screwed. Let history judge.

The Nuclear Liability bill is just a Fig leaf, its not worth discussing. I am not sure why you are blowing it up to be something it clearly not.

My dear friend you need to read further and get more educated on this subject. Read the highlighted part below. Also, Nuclear liability law is a big deal. Do you know what happened in Bhopal tragedy?

Statement made by Ms. Arundhati Ghose,Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices at Geneva, in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on August 8, 1996
Mr. President,
May I first of all convey to you our congratulations, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that your dedication and wisdom will be a great asset in guiding the work of the Conference at this stage. May I also take the opportunity to convey our appreciation to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan for the skill with which he presided over the Conference before you.
Mr. President, I am instructed to read to the CD an extract from the statement made by the Minister of External Affairs of India Mr. I. K. Gujral to both Houses of the Indian Parliament on 31st July, 1996. I quote:
"India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament. This is why, since 1954, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ban on nuclear weapon tests, we have urged that the CTBT must be seen as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. The approach taken by India in the CTBT negotiations therefore calls for a genuinely comprehensive CTBTwith a view to ending future development of nuclear weapons and placing the CTBTin the framework of a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Ongoing testing programs, whether at test sites or in laboratories, are clear indications that the nuclear weapons states are not willing to give tiptheir reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider CTBT merely as a non-proliferation measure.
Such testing programs inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security. While we have adopted the policy ofrestraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India."
Mr. President, on the 28th of June we had received a text of a draft CTBT from the Chairman of the Ad hoc committee on Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Ramakar. My Government gave this text contained in WP 330-Rev.1 its most careful and detailed consideration. We examined if this Treaty w as the Treaty which we had been mandated to negotiate by the CD and for which India had entered the negotiations two and a half years ago, participating in them constructively and with seriousness. it was with disappointment and regret that we noted that this text is not very different from the earlier Working Paper of the Chairman which had led us to state on the 20th of June that we could not sign the Treaty in that form. This text, while it does contain a Treaty, does not contain the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty we had been mandated to negotiate nor does it meet India's basic concerns. Therefore, our position as stated on 20th June not to sign this Treaty in this form, stands.
Mr. President, the present text not only ignores our substantive objections but also contains an Article, Article XIV, to which we have the strongest objections. The Article, as it is presently drafted, not only totally disregards the fact that we have stated that we will not sign this treaty today, tomorrow or in three years time but seeks to enforce our signature by means unprecedented in treaty negotiating practice in that it creates obligations for a country without its consent and therefore runs contrary to customary international law. We understand that this formula is not in accordance with the wishes of the majority of delegations who have but reluctantly accepted it but has been retained because of the rigid positions adopted by a small number of delegations. Clearly, those who support this formula do not wish, for their own reasons, this treaty to come into force-ever. With a view to correcting this unacceptable situation, I had proposed an amendment to Article XIV in the Ad-hoc committee which would follow the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This proposed amendment reads:
"This Treaty shall enter in to force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the Instruments of Ratification by 65 States and no less than two years after its opening for signature. "
Mr. President, I sincerely hope that it would be possible for the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban to accept a modification to the present text of Article XIV. If, however, the present text is sought to be retained, I am instructed to inform the Conference that India would be reluctantly obliged to oppose such efforts. While we do not wish to prevent other countries form exercising their sovereign right to adopt a Treaty to which they wish to accede, we cannot have our sovereign right not to sign the Treaty taken away and accept obligations on India that we cannot and will not accept.
Mr. President, my delegation would commend to the members of the CD, the amendment proposed by us to Article XIV to enable a just and fair solution to one of the problems currently facing the Ad-Hoc Committee.
Mr. President, India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament remains unchanged and undiminished. We will continue to work, with like minded countries towards that end. We have therefore, together with 28 other countries of the G-21 supported the phased program for nuclear disarmament presented by the Coordinator of the G-21 today. It is a statement of our belief that work on a Treaty on the total elimination of nuclear weapons must start urgently even more so in the present circumstances.
Thank you.


Statement in explanation of vote by Ms. Arundhati Ghose,Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices at Geneva,
on Item 65: CTBT at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly
at New York on September 10, 1996
Mr. President,
In 1995, India had participated in the adoption by consensus of resolution 50/65 which, inter alia, called on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable CTBT which would contribute effectively to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, so as to enable its signature at the outset of the 51st session of the GA.
The resolution proposed for adoption today in Document A/50/L.78 quotes only selectively from resolution 50/65 and proposes a text identical to the one on which there was no consensus in the body which had been charged with negotiating it. It has been presented as a national text to bypass the lack of consensus on it in the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, diverging from usual practice, the GA is being asked to 'adopt' the text, a function usually that of a Conference of States. The resolution also calls on all States to sign the Treaty - even after it is known that the text is a non-consensual one.
The CTBT requested by resolution 50 / 65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear disarmament. We have, during the negotiations, been convinced by the nuclear weapon States that they had no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. Weak preambular paragraphs have been included to pay lip service to nuclear disarmament and stronger paragraphs which had been introduced by the neutral and non-aligned countries during the negotiations were ignored. India is, in any case, not satisfied with mere preambular references - we have seen the fate of such preambles in other treaties. We had wished and continue to wish for a genuine commitment by the nuclear weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons in a reasonable and negotiated finite span of time. Without such a commitment the treaty becomes an unequal treaty which retains the present discriminatory nuclear regime -sanctioning, in effect, the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries for their security and that of their allies, while ignoring the security concerns of other States.
Secondly, the CTBT envisaged by resolution 50/65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The text presented for adoption bans only explosive testing. The reason is clear. Such a prohibition is today considered acceptable by the nuclear weapon States as these states have already completed their programmes of explosive testing. They are well placed to exploit the lessons learnt through their extensive testing programmes, through more sophisticated and non-explosive technologies. During the negotiations treaty language that would have signified an end to the qualitative development and upgradation of nuclear weapons, thus curbing vertical proliferation, was categorically rejected, thereby frustrating another key element of the mandate. It is also our view and indeed our concern, that this partial test ban treaty is not only flawed, but is a dangerous one. As the 1963 PTBT which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of underground tests, we feel that this Treaty, far from being a ban, will encourage a nuclear weapons technology race, a consequence that a CTBT should have prevented. As this text will not lead to the qualitative capping of the development of nuclear weapons, it cannot be considered an integral and first step of a nuclear disarmament process.
The CTBT requested by the General Assembly should have been one which was multilaterally negotiated and universal -one which would attract adherence by all States by meeting the concerns of all States. Our concerns were ignored. The flawed text which is now proposed for adoption was negotiated in its most critical aspects, by a handful of countries and presented to the majority of the international community on a virtually 'take it or leave it basis'. India could not accept this text in the Conference on Disarmament and cannot agree to it now in the General Assembly.
We also believe that the text fails in the overarching objective set out in the mandate reiterated in GA resolution 50/ 65 - "the enhancement of international peace and security". This is the striving of the entire world community. The text has betrayed this ideal. It has confirmed and perpetuated the existing global insecurity born of a world divided unequally into nuclear haves and have-nots.
Mr. President, General Assembly resolutions are the expression of the will of nations in which multilateral treaties can find their sanction. General Assembly resolutions by definition cannot support violations of international law. The text circulated by the sponsors contains a provision in its article 14 on Entry into Force, which is contrary to the fundamental norms of international law. This provision which makes ratification by India and 43 other countries essential for Entry into Force of this Treaty was introduced after India had clearly stated that it was not in a position to subscribe to this treaty in its present form. Customary international law lays down that no obligations can be imposed on a country without its specific consent. We had indicated that we would withhold our consent to the Treaty text unless our concerns were addressed. We did not want such a provision on Entry into Force to be included in the text and repeatedly urged the Conference on Disarmament to change this article, so as to enable those countries who wanted the Treaty, flawed though it was, to achieve it, if that was indeed their intent, though it would have been without India's signature. We could have prevented, Mr. President, the present sad turn of events in which a text which runs contrary to customary international law has been brought for adoption to the General Assembly of the UNI. Mr. President, I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, nor later. As long as this text contains this article, Mr. President, this treaty will never enter into force.
The resolution in document A/50/L.78 is as flawed as the treaty text it proposes for adoption.
Mr. President, for the reasons above and as the draft text falls far short of the mandate which reflected the will of the international community, India will vote against the resolution.

http://fas.org/news/india/1996/ctbt_cd_august_8_96.htm

http://fas.org/news/india/1996/ctbt_UN_september_10_96.htm

 

[Mamsalaphala]

My dear friend you need to read further and get more educated on this subject. Read the highlighted part below. Also, Nuclear liability law is a big deal. Do you know what happened in Bhopal tragedy?

Statement made by Ms. Arundhati Ghose,Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices at Geneva, in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on August 8, 1996
Mr. President,
May I first of all convey to you our congratulations, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that your dedication and wisdom will be a great asset in guiding the work of the Conference at this stage. May I also take the opportunity to convey our appreciation to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan for the skill with which he presided over the Conference before you.
Mr. President, I am instructed to read to the CD an extract from the statement made by the Minister of External Affairs of India Mr. I. K. Gujral to both Houses of the Indian Parliament on 31st July, 1996. I quote:
"India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament. This is why, since 1954, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ban on nuclear weapon tests, we have urged that the CTBT must be seen as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. The approach taken by India in the CTBT negotiations therefore calls for a genuinely comprehensive CTBTwith a view to ending future development of nuclear weapons and placing the CTBTin the framework of a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Ongoing testing programs, whether at test sites or in laboratories, are clear indications that the nuclear weapons states are not willing to give tiptheir reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider CTBT merely as a non-proliferation measure.
Such testing programs inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security. While we have adopted the policy ofrestraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India."
Mr. President, on the 28th of June we had received a text of a draft CTBT from the Chairman of the Ad hoc committee on Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Ramakar. My Government gave this text contained in WP 330-Rev.1 its most careful and detailed consideration. We examined if this Treaty w as the Treaty which we had been mandated to negotiate by the CD and for which India had entered the negotiations two and a half years ago, participating in them constructively and with seriousness. it was with disappointment and regret that we noted that this text is not very different from the earlier Working Paper of the Chairman which had led us to state on the 20th of June that we could not sign the Treaty in that form. This text, while it does contain a Treaty, does not contain the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty we had been mandated to negotiate nor does it meet India's basic concerns. Therefore, our position as stated on 20th June not to sign this Treaty in this form, stands.
Mr. President, the present text not only ignores our substantive objections but also contains an Article, Article XIV, to which we have the strongest objections. The Article, as it is presently drafted, not only totally disregards the fact that we have stated that we will not sign this treaty today, tomorrow or in three years time but seeks to enforce our signature by means unprecedented in treaty negotiating practice in that it creates obligations for a country without its consent and therefore runs contrary to customary international law. We understand that this formula is not in accordance with the wishes of the majority of delegations who have but reluctantly accepted it but has been retained because of the rigid positions adopted by a small number of delegations. Clearly, those who support this formula do not wish, for their own reasons, this treaty to come into force-ever. With a view to correcting this unacceptable situation, I had proposed an amendment to Article XIV in the Ad-hoc committee which would follow the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This proposed amendment reads:
"This Treaty shall enter in to force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the Instruments of Ratification by 65 States and no less than two years after its opening for signature. "
Mr. President, I sincerely hope that it would be possible for the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban to accept a modification to the present text of Article XIV. If, however, the present text is sought to be retained, I am instructed to inform the Conference that India would be reluctantly obliged to oppose such efforts. While we do not wish to prevent other countries form exercising their sovereign right to adopt a Treaty to which they wish to accede, we cannot have our sovereign right not to sign the Treaty taken away and accept obligations on India that we cannot and will not accept.
Mr. President, my delegation would commend to the members of the CD, the amendment proposed by us to Article XIV to enable a just and fair solution to one of the problems currently facing the Ad-Hoc Committee.
Mr. President, India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament remains unchanged and undiminished. We will continue to work, with like minded countries towards that end. We have therefore, together with 28 other countries of the G-21 supported the phased program for nuclear disarmament presented by the Coordinator of the G-21 today. It is a statement of our belief that work on a Treaty on the total elimination of nuclear weapons must start urgently even more so in the present circumstances.
Thank you.


Statement in explanation of vote by Ms. Arundhati Ghose,Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices at Geneva,
on Item 65: CTBT at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly
at New York on September 10, 1996
Mr. President,
In 1995, India had participated in the adoption by consensus of resolution 50/65 which, inter alia, called on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable CTBT which would contribute effectively to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, so as to enable its signature at the outset of the 51st session of the GA.
The resolution proposed for adoption today in Document A/50/L.78 quotes only selectively from resolution 50/65 and proposes a text identical to the one on which there was no consensus in the body which had been charged with negotiating it. It has been presented as a national text to bypass the lack of consensus on it in the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, diverging from usual practice, the GA is being asked to 'adopt' the text, a function usually that of a Conference of States. The resolution also calls on all States to sign the Treaty - even after it is known that the text is a non-consensual one.
The CTBT requested by resolution 50 / 65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear disarmament. We have, during the negotiations, been convinced by the nuclear weapon States that they had no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. Weak preambular paragraphs have been included to pay lip service to nuclear disarmament and stronger paragraphs which had been introduced by the neutral and non-aligned countries during the negotiations were ignored. India is, in any case, not satisfied with mere preambular references - we have seen the fate of such preambles in other treaties. We had wished and continue to wish for a genuine commitment by the nuclear weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons in a reasonable and negotiated finite span of time. Without such a commitment the treaty becomes an unequal treaty which retains the present discriminatory nuclear regime -sanctioning, in effect, the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries for their security and that of their allies, while ignoring the security concerns of other States.
Secondly, the CTBT envisaged by resolution 50/65 should have been one which would have contributed effectively to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The text presented for adoption bans only explosive testing. The reason is clear. Such a prohibition is today considered acceptable by the nuclear weapon States as these states have already completed their programmes of explosive testing. They are well placed to exploit the lessons learnt through their extensive testing programmes, through more sophisticated and non-explosive technologies. During the negotiations treaty language that would have signified an end to the qualitative development and upgradation of nuclear weapons, thus curbing vertical proliferation, was categorically rejected, thereby frustrating another key element of the mandate. It is also our view and indeed our concern, that this partial test ban treaty is not only flawed, but is a dangerous one. As the 1963 PTBT which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of underground tests, we feel that this Treaty, far from being a ban, will encourage a nuclear weapons technology race, a consequence that a CTBT should have prevented. As this text will not lead to the qualitative capping of the development of nuclear weapons, it cannot be considered an integral and first step of a nuclear disarmament process.
The CTBT requested by the General Assembly should have been one which was multilaterally negotiated and universal -one which would attract adherence by all States by meeting the concerns of all States. Our concerns were ignored. The flawed text which is now proposed for adoption was negotiated in its most critical aspects, by a handful of countries and presented to the majority of the international community on a virtually 'take it or leave it basis'. India could not accept this text in the Conference on Disarmament and cannot agree to it now in the General Assembly.
We also believe that the text fails in the overarching objective set out in the mandate reiterated in GA resolution 50/ 65 - "the enhancement of international peace and security". This is the striving of the entire world community. The text has betrayed this ideal. It has confirmed and perpetuated the existing global insecurity born of a world divided unequally into nuclear haves and have-nots.
Mr. President, General Assembly resolutions are the expression of the will of nations in which multilateral treaties can find their sanction. General Assembly resolutions by definition cannot support violations of international law. The text circulated by the sponsors contains a provision in its article 14 on Entry into Force, which is contrary to the fundamental norms of international law. This provision which makes ratification by India and 43 other countries essential for Entry into Force of this Treaty was introduced after India had clearly stated that it was not in a position to subscribe to this treaty in its present form. Customary international law lays down that no obligations can be imposed on a country without its specific consent. We had indicated that we would withhold our consent to the Treaty text unless our concerns were addressed. We did not want such a provision on Entry into Force to be included in the text and repeatedly urged the Conference on Disarmament to change this article, so as to enable those countries who wanted the Treaty, flawed though it was, to achieve it, if that was indeed their intent, though it would have been without India's signature. We could have prevented, Mr. President, the present sad turn of events in which a text which runs contrary to customary international law has been brought for adoption to the General Assembly of the UNI. Mr. President, I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, nor later. As long as this text contains this article, Mr. President, this treaty will never enter into force.
The resolution in document A/50/L.78 is as flawed as the treaty text it proposes for adoption.
Mr. President, for the reasons above and as the draft text falls far short of the mandate which reflected the will of the international community, India will vote against the resolution.

http://fas.org/news/india/1996/ctbt_cd_august_8_96.htm

http://fas.org/news/india/1996/ctbt_UN_september_10_96.htm

I don't want to read this nor do I find it interesting enough to spare time.

Provide a summary if you want me to respond.