CIVIL Disobedience in Georgia- How it worked and led to success??
This is very important to understand to which results a civil disobedience could lead. Does it means only electricity bills or gas Bills???
Amazing similarity in Rose Revolution Georgia and Azadi March.
Following is a report on Civil disobedience movement in Georgia. The so called Rose revolution.
Very similar situation as we have now in Pakistan. Check the timing when they announced and impacts.
The same day, opposition leaders Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, and Zurab
Zhvania met with Shevardnadze. Their brief talks produced no tangible results, and the
president commented pointedly:
“I do not intend to resign at the demand of individual
politicians and a few dozen young people waving flags. If there were at least a million
people, it would have been different.”
Within just a few days, national petitions contained
1 million signatures demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation and calling for the
election results to be overturned
Protesters in front of the parliament building maintained their positions in shifts
throughout the day and night. Promising to “paralyze Shevardnadze’s government,”
Saakashvili soon called for civil disobedience.
The process started slowly, but the
opposition managed to gain public attention through a few successful incidents of
civil disobedience in state institutions, such as schools, throughout the country.
Groups of well-known artists, writers, and poets started campaigning in various public
establishments—primarily universities—urging people to join the protest. These efforts
bore fruit as disobedience committees began popping up in universities throughout the
country, aided by Kmara activists who often were students themselves.
On November 17 more than 50,000 gathered at Freedom Square in central Tbilisi, and
3,000 held hands to form a human chain around the state chancellery. Many in the crowd
wanted to push forward and try to go in, but the apparent readiness of special forces
units to use force, as well as the absence of a “critical mass,” forced the leaders to call
off the rally and go to the regions to mobilize more supporters. Rallies were suspended
for the next two days, allowing Saakashvili and other opposition leaders to gather as
many followers as possible throughout the country. Meanwhile government employees
from Adjara took over the space in front of the parliament to express support for the
fraudulent results. These protests were not taken very seriously, since many of the participants attended only because they had been threatened with job termination and other sanctions should they refuse to go.
On the evening of November 20, a convoy of cars stretching for kilometers and carrying
thousands of people arrived from western Georgia. The next day more than 100,000
gathered in Freedom Square to pressure all the opposition parties with more than 7 percent
of the votes not to enter parliament. This effort was not successful, and protesters
had to consider other ways to disrupt the illegitimate parliament’s first session. During
the afternoon, protesters moved toward the chancellery, towing buses with heavy trucks
to block the way and facing riot troops along the route. Overwhelmed by the number of
people, troops stood by and took no action as the protesters passed them.
Troops also stood at the rear entrance of parliament, while the front was occupied
by Revival Union supporters unaware of what was happening in back.
Demonstrators
began entering parliament from the rear in the middle of Shevardnadze’s speech.
His
guards promptly removed him from the podium and evacuated him. After escaping to his
Krtsanisi residence, Shevardnadze announced a state of emergency in Georgia and ordered
the use of force to stop the protests. But the loyalty of the troops went increasingly to
Nino Burjanadze, who had declared herself acting president. The order for violent repression
was never carried out. Bereft of all other options, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned the
evening of November 23.
Opposition groups, including Kmara, did not anticipate a 2003 election victory that
would result in Shevardnadze stepping down.
When they started their activities, they hoped only to influence the presidential elections of 2005, when Shevardnadze’s term would legally expire.
However, a number of factors accelerated Shevardnadze’s exit:
blatant electoral fraud, especially in the results from Adjara; the government’s stubborn
refusal to consider even minor compromises; and opposition groups’ discipline and organization,
which included their ability to project nonviolent power.
Three actors played a crucial role in making the Rose Revolution possible: the youth
movement Kmara; the opposition parties, especially Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement;
and Rustavi-2, the most prominent independent-media outlet. Each played a distinctive
role in making the Rose Revolution successful and nonviolent.
Read complete Report here:
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr167.pdf
