Very interesting topic.
Some of the aspects which directly or indirectly impinge on the environment are:
Increased US presence in the GCC. Which may have implications on Pakistani involvement in GCC.
Keeping peaceful environment in GCC is in US interest.
However, Pakistan does have certain amount of leverage in GCC which the US cannot ignore.
Bahrain has 60-70 % Shia population, which can be influenced by Iran. This can play both-ways. During Shia uprising in Bahrain, the Headquarters of US 5th Fleet, many Pakistani workers were killed by the Shia population for alleged support to Bahraini rulers.
Qatar has become the base of almost all major US covert/overt operations in middle east. Sensitive location for the US.
Moving of BB from Afghanistan, in all probability was on Pakistan’s insistence. Apparently, his move to Europe may also have been part of an agreed solution.
GCC’s major concern is a fully functional Gawadar port. Currently Gawadar is a shallow water port and can not accommodate large ships. So is Chahbahar, an Iranian port not far up north from Gawadar, built with Indian assistance. Therefore, understanding one aspect of Indian interest in undermining Gawadar in addition to many other which can be quoted.
US interest may hinge on what if Pakistan completely goes to the other camp and how would they approach not only Afghanistan, but also the CARs. Therefore, keeping their influence with secessionist Baloch elements becomes visible.
Indian interest is nothing more than attempting to create environment which keep elements of Pak Army involved and therefore unavailable for Indian front. And in case of war, create rear area security problems. This can last only as long as the situation in Afghanistan does not stabilize – and it may take a while for this to happen.
The secessionist Balochi elements themselves do not have the capability to capture areas and declare independence. Infact, interestingly the Baloch are lesser in number than the Brauhis. Then the element of Pushto speaking population of Balochistan, which does not see eye to eye with secessionist Balochis. The fundamentalist elements also may not have many common grounds with these Balochis and may be tolerating each other by keeping a shut eye.
The internal Balochi feelings and environment may be aggressive towards Pakistan, but not all want secession. Adding the Pushtun and Brauhi and other ethnic mix, it is likely that this armed movement may remain a par below the capability to declare themselves independent and then sustain the independence. The chances are that if they do it at this stage or in a future identical environment, they will be mauled to the extent that they may not regain such a power for a long time, if at all.
Therefore, Pakistan needs to keep a manageable environment in Balochistan till it can bring the situation along Afghan front to an amenable end. If this happens, the roll on affect will help to bring problems in Balochistan also to an amenable environment.
I have deliberately not talked about the political, administrative and economic improvements needed to improve the living standards inside Balochistan. Needless to say that these would have to continue inspite of the situation and would definitely help bring normalcy back to this area.
