That post was in response to the Bangladeshi guest member claims that India looted West Pakistani assets after 1971, and denied Bangladesh the spoils of victory. The Bangladeshi members were specifically citing military equipment surrendered by the our forces.
My counter argument was:
1. 90% of military assets were destroyed or rendered useless by our forces. It was possible to destroy these assets quickly
and did happen. If large scale equipment had been surrendered then India would have been boasting about it. India only touts "93,000 " POWs , not how many artillery pieces, AFVs , etc captured.
2. 90% of civilian aviation assets were removed, or rendered useless by our civil aviation crew. This is the most evident aspect of the war. Since after the war Bangladesh essentially did not have an airline, or civilian aviation resources of any kind.
3.Other civilian assets such as civilian vehicles owned by Public Works Departments etc. Railways such as locomotives, rolling stock etc. probably fell into Indian hands . It is hard to claim 90% destruction or disabling here but it is unlikely these were of any use to India.
Being of foreign origin getting spares to maintain these assets would have been difficult.
Also India was still debating annexation of Bangladesh so these assets particularly the Railways were to be left in Bangladesh.
4. India then nowhere had the media and diplomatic clout it has today and was under international radar, with media correspondents all over the place. TV footage was still in its infancy but there is sufficient 35 mm film still surviving of the war and now freely available on-line. Looting of assets is a war crime under international law and would have been reported by international media.
Agree here, which is what I said. In the 1965 war even the small air component of the then East Pakistan defense was able to inflict damage on the enemy.
By 1971, the important part is that more air force assets were not transferred from West Pakistan, when it was evident that an enemy assault on the territory was inevitable.
Even as early as June 1971 there was evidence of sabotage, and compromise by East Bengali origin aircraft maintenance crew members of our air assets.
We did manage to disable all the planes before leaving. The most important aspect is the behind the scenes diplomatic and military liaison with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and China and opened their airspace and refueling facilities for all the planes to return to Pakistan safely without mishap. This in itself is a brilliant feat of diplomatic and military coordination.,
Agree again. The strategy is common knowledge. However , there was a defense strategy for East Pakistan upto 1965, based on terrain advantages, and a massive people's resistance. By 1971 the situation had completely changed. India had invested heavily in airborne assault troops and amphibious light tanks, assault boats. But all that equipment still would not have helped against a robust people's resistance.
What blinded an idealistic and unrealistic set of politicians is the fact that extreme ethno-linguistic chauvinism had resulted in a hostile population willing to make a deal with the enemy.International pressure works only in a clear cut two country war, not a civil war. Lower level right thinking intelligent commanders in our armed forces had realized that as early as March 1971.
Will disagree here. There is no evidence that our forces were preparing for a "street-to-street" "house-to-house" battle in Dacca. Foreign correspondents in Dacca would have reported barricades, ditches, machine gun bunkers, anti-tank strong points, and the "break out" of the armed forces out of Dhaka Cantt into smaller resistance groups. Approach roads and bridges would have been mined and most important of all the telephone exchange, and national TV and radio stations would have been destroyed to deny their use to the enemy paratroopers. as The Tejgaon airport runway would have been dug up and obstacles placed on open ground such as Ramna Maidan and the stadium to deter helicopter or STOL aircraft born assault. Dhaka and Savar Cantt would have been completely empty, with a highly mobile command center operating underground. No general keeps a Mercedes ready during street fighting.
The "Tet" offensive in Vietnam and the defense of Hue, or the defense of Grozny in Chechnya show how ugly street fighting can be. We don't even want to draw parallels to Stalingrad, Warsaw, Berlin, or more recently Alleppo, and Homs .
General Niazi's mission was to hold Dacca with minimal losses, until international pressure or a remote chance of Indian reverses on the Western Front resulted in ceasefire in the East. A negotiated withdrawal could then be discussed. Once international pressure was ineffective due to multiple Soviet vetos in the UN there was no point fighting for a hostile people in a foreign land . The prime objective then was to save the lives of our troops and get them back to Pakistan even if it meant a highly publicized surrender.
Agree, again entirely . Why the professional advice of the security advisors was rejected is a different topic for a different thread.
Agree again. There were small Chaffee tanks in use in the border areas. Pakistan possibly had some M113 amphibious IFV but am not an expert on this . Very few Chaffees were captured intact ( but completely disabled).
We can dispute the percentage of equipment disabled and how much was captured by the enemy but the clinching evidence is that India only claims POWs in Bangladesh not so much equipment captured. On the western front both in 1965 and 1971 there are plenty of photographs and video images of equipment captured or destroyed by both sides.
Agree again. There is still reason to believe that our armed forces were professional enough to deny the enemy military assets. Economically whatever production capital assets was left behind could not be maintained and deteriorated rapidly. By 1974 the country was in a famine mode.
See this
link to a video of conditions in 1974.
Most PDF members here have what is called the "rubber band" effect.
We wish to talk about the
aftermath of the war, and the conversation goes zips back "rubber band" style to why the war happened and whose fault it was.