What's new

How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?

VCheng

ELITE MEMBER
Joined
Sep 29, 2010
Messages
48,460
Reaction score
57
Country
Pakistan
Location
United States
An interesting article:


How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?​

It has one tank factory, and is increasingly reliant on refurbishing old models

During the second world war Germany’s armed forces destroyed Soviet tanks at a phenomenal rate. But although the Red Army lost 80,000 tanks, the Soviet Union’s industrial might allowed it to finish the war with more tanks than it had when the conflict began.

Today’s tanks are much more sophisticated and expensive, and are therefore deployed in far smaller numbers. Yet in its war with Ukraine Russia, like the Soviet Union, has lost a huge number of tanks. Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 3,250. Oryx, an open-source intelligence blog, has documented 1,700 losses. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, says that around half of Russia’s pre-war fleet of t-72s—which numbered around 2,000 and made up the bulk of its tank force—has been destroyed.

Russia’s tanks have failed to give it the advantage in Ukraine, and its forces will struggle to carry out another major offensive without sufficient armoured support. Ukraine has secured battle tanks from its Western allies in recent weeks, which it will probably use in a spring counter-offensive. Russia will need to bolster its own fleet if it hopes to hold on to territory it has won. Can it replace its lost tanks this time?

In the 1940s Soviet factories could produce more than 1,000 tanks a month. Plants that made tractors and railway engines were told to build tanks instead. Today ramping up production is harder. The electronics in modern tanks—for night vision, aiming guns and a host of other functions—are highly sophisticated. That makes production slower and means that many factories designed for other types of manufacturing cannot easily make tanks instead. Russia has only one tank factory left: UralVagonZavod, a huge complex built in the 1930s. But financial mismanagement and huge debts have slowed modernisation. Workers joke that they assemble tanks by hand. Novaya Gazeta, a liberal Russian newspaper, reports that the plant makes just 20 per month. One Western official tells The Economist that, in total, the Russian armed forces’ demand for tanks is outstripping production by a factor of ten.

In an attempt to meet the demand, Russia has increased the rate at which it restores old tanks, of which it has thousands in storage. In Ukraine modern Russian tanks, such as t-90s, now fight alongside large numbers of t-72b3s, built decades ago but upgraded with guns, reactive armour (which reduces the chance of a hit penetrating the vehicle) and digital communications. Even with these improvements, older tanks are inferior to new models, and are less likely to survive a hit from Ukrainian forces—but they are still useful. UralVagonZavod rebuilds about eight tanks a month, and three other armoured-vehicle repair plants each refurbish around 17, according to Russian media. Two more plants of similar size are due to come online in the next few months.

This means that, although Russia can only build 20 new tanks a month, it may soon be able to resurrect 90 or so a month from its boneyards. Still, that would not make up for the estimated 150 it is losing each month, according to analysis by Oryx. And production may be hampered by shortages of parts. Semiconductors, the computer chips that control modern tanks, are in particularly short supply. The European Commission claims that Russia is using chips from imported dishwashers and refrigerators in military hardware. Some newly refurbished tanks in Ukraine contain a hodgepodge of hardware from different models and lack high-tech gear, such as wind-speed sensors, which allow accurate shooting.

Russia is not alone in these problems. Ukraine and its allies also lack the ability to produce tanks quickly. Ukraine’s only tank factory, near Kharkiv, was destroyed early in the war. America, which has promised to send 31 M1A2 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, has one factory, with capacity to make 15 tanks each month. Production elsewhere in the West is similarly slow, leading to a scramble to find old tanks to donate. But in general, attacking forces use more tanks than defenders. As the conflict grinds on, Russia is likely to see its fleet steadily decline in both quantity and quality. This time, manufacturing might not save it.
 
.
An interesting article:


How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?​

It has one tank factory, and is increasingly reliant on refurbishing old models

During the second world war Germany’s armed forces destroyed Soviet tanks at a phenomenal rate. But although the Red Army lost 80,000 tanks, the Soviet Union’s industrial might allowed it to finish the war with more tanks than it had when the conflict began.

Today’s tanks are much more sophisticated and expensive, and are therefore deployed in far smaller numbers. Yet in its war with Ukraine Russia, like the Soviet Union, has lost a huge number of tanks. Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 3,250. Oryx, an open-source intelligence blog, has documented 1,700 losses. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, says that around half of Russia’s pre-war fleet of t-72s—which numbered around 2,000 and made up the bulk of its tank force—has been destroyed.

Russia’s tanks have failed to give it the advantage in Ukraine, and its forces will struggle to carry out another major offensive without sufficient armoured support. Ukraine has secured battle tanks from its Western allies in recent weeks, which it will probably use in a spring counter-offensive. Russia will need to bolster its own fleet if it hopes to hold on to territory it has won. Can it replace its lost tanks this time?

In the 1940s Soviet factories could produce more than 1,000 tanks a month. Plants that made tractors and railway engines were told to build tanks instead. Today ramping up production is harder. The electronics in modern tanks—for night vision, aiming guns and a host of other functions—are highly sophisticated. That makes production slower and means that many factories designed for other types of manufacturing cannot easily make tanks instead. Russia has only one tank factory left: UralVagonZavod, a huge complex built in the 1930s. But financial mismanagement and huge debts have slowed modernisation. Workers joke that they assemble tanks by hand. Novaya Gazeta, a liberal Russian newspaper, reports that the plant makes just 20 per month. One Western official tells The Economist that, in total, the Russian armed forces’ demand for tanks is outstripping production by a factor of ten.

In an attempt to meet the demand, Russia has increased the rate at which it restores old tanks, of which it has thousands in storage. In Ukraine modern Russian tanks, such as t-90s, now fight alongside large numbers of t-72b3s, built decades ago but upgraded with guns, reactive armour (which reduces the chance of a hit penetrating the vehicle) and digital communications. Even with these improvements, older tanks are inferior to new models, and are less likely to survive a hit from Ukrainian forces—but they are still useful. UralVagonZavod rebuilds about eight tanks a month, and three other armoured-vehicle repair plants each refurbish around 17, according to Russian media. Two more plants of similar size are due to come online in the next few months.

This means that, although Russia can only build 20 new tanks a month, it may soon be able to resurrect 90 or so a month from its boneyards. Still, that would not make up for the estimated 150 it is losing each month, according to analysis by Oryx. And production may be hampered by shortages of parts. Semiconductors, the computer chips that control modern tanks, are in particularly short supply. The European Commission claims that Russia is using chips from imported dishwashers and refrigerators in military hardware. Some newly refurbished tanks in Ukraine contain a hodgepodge of hardware from different models and lack high-tech gear, such as wind-speed sensors, which allow accurate shooting.

Russia is not alone in these problems. Ukraine and its allies also lack the ability to produce tanks quickly. Ukraine’s only tank factory, near Kharkiv, was destroyed early in the war. America, which has promised to send 31 M1A2 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, has one factory, with capacity to make 15 tanks each month. Production elsewhere in the West is similarly slow, leading to a scramble to find old tanks to donate. But in general, attacking forces use more tanks than defenders. As the conflict grinds on, Russia is likely to see its fleet steadily decline in both quantity and quality. This time, manufacturing might not save it.
well it depends on how many washing machines they can swipe from Ukraine :partay:
 
.
well it depends on how many washing machines they can swipe from Ukraine :partay:

Maybe China will help them? I keep hearing boasts about Chinese industrial output here on PDF all the time. :D
 
.
An interesting article:


How quickly can Russia rebuild its tank fleet?​

It has one tank factory, and is increasingly reliant on refurbishing old models

During the second world war Germany’s armed forces destroyed Soviet tanks at a phenomenal rate. But although the Red Army lost 80,000 tanks, the Soviet Union’s industrial might allowed it to finish the war with more tanks than it had when the conflict began.

Today’s tanks are much more sophisticated and expensive, and are therefore deployed in far smaller numbers. Yet in its war with Ukraine Russia, like the Soviet Union, has lost a huge number of tanks. Ukraine claims to have destroyed more than 3,250. Oryx, an open-source intelligence blog, has documented 1,700 losses. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, says that around half of Russia’s pre-war fleet of t-72s—which numbered around 2,000 and made up the bulk of its tank force—has been destroyed.

Russia’s tanks have failed to give it the advantage in Ukraine, and its forces will struggle to carry out another major offensive without sufficient armoured support. Ukraine has secured battle tanks from its Western allies in recent weeks, which it will probably use in a spring counter-offensive. Russia will need to bolster its own fleet if it hopes to hold on to territory it has won. Can it replace its lost tanks this time?

In the 1940s Soviet factories could produce more than 1,000 tanks a month. Plants that made tractors and railway engines were told to build tanks instead. Today ramping up production is harder. The electronics in modern tanks—for night vision, aiming guns and a host of other functions—are highly sophisticated. That makes production slower and means that many factories designed for other types of manufacturing cannot easily make tanks instead. Russia has only one tank factory left: UralVagonZavod, a huge complex built in the 1930s. But financial mismanagement and huge debts have slowed modernisation. Workers joke that they assemble tanks by hand. Novaya Gazeta, a liberal Russian newspaper, reports that the plant makes just 20 per month. One Western official tells The Economist that, in total, the Russian armed forces’ demand for tanks is outstripping production by a factor of ten.

In an attempt to meet the demand, Russia has increased the rate at which it restores old tanks, of which it has thousands in storage. In Ukraine modern Russian tanks, such as t-90s, now fight alongside large numbers of t-72b3s, built decades ago but upgraded with guns, reactive armour (which reduces the chance of a hit penetrating the vehicle) and digital communications. Even with these improvements, older tanks are inferior to new models, and are less likely to survive a hit from Ukrainian forces—but they are still useful. UralVagonZavod rebuilds about eight tanks a month, and three other armoured-vehicle repair plants each refurbish around 17, according to Russian media. Two more plants of similar size are due to come online in the next few months.

This means that, although Russia can only build 20 new tanks a month, it may soon be able to resurrect 90 or so a month from its boneyards. Still, that would not make up for the estimated 150 it is losing each month, according to analysis by Oryx. And production may be hampered by shortages of parts. Semiconductors, the computer chips that control modern tanks, are in particularly short supply. The European Commission claims that Russia is using chips from imported dishwashers and refrigerators in military hardware. Some newly refurbished tanks in Ukraine contain a hodgepodge of hardware from different models and lack high-tech gear, such as wind-speed sensors, which allow accurate shooting.

Russia is not alone in these problems. Ukraine and its allies also lack the ability to produce tanks quickly. Ukraine’s only tank factory, near Kharkiv, was destroyed early in the war. America, which has promised to send 31 M1A2 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, has one factory, with capacity to make 15 tanks each month. Production elsewhere in the West is similarly slow, leading to a scramble to find old tanks to donate. But in general, attacking forces use more tanks than defenders. As the conflict grinds on, Russia is likely to see its fleet steadily decline in both quantity and quality. This time, manufacturing might not save it.
read an article somewhere, can't seems to remember where it come from........


Anyway, it's not the problem of how many tank Russia can make is the issue, but what kind of quality said tank being made is the issue, that article I read talks about Russia putting 1950/1960 vintage fire control system in new T-90M being build because the chips that was on that T-90M was from Germany (Siemens IIRC), Russia tried to replace it first with local domestic chip, not powerful enough, then tried to replace it with Chinese chip, but those aren't really high quality replacement, which mean whatever T-90M they are making now they are going to have to use an analogue system that even my grand father found it annoying to use. That's no way it can complete with new (or newer) Western tank in that regard.

Other thing might have stay the same but the fire control system is going to be amissed in the Russian tank, and that would not be the same tank that was otherwise rolled out of the factory 2 years ago.
 
.
read an article somewhere, can't seems to remember where it come from........


Anyway, it's not the problem of how many tank Russia can make is the issue, but what kind of quality said tank being made is the issue, that article I read talks about Russia putting 1950/1960 vintage fire control system in new T-90M being build because the chips that was on that T-90M was from Germany (Siemens IIRC), Russia tried to replace it first with local domestic chip, not powerful enough, then tried to replace it with Chinese chip, but those aren't really high quality replacement, which mean whatever T-90M they are making now they are going to have to use an analogue system that even my grand father found it annoying to use. That's no way it can complete with new (or newer) Western tank in that regard.

Other thing might have stay the same but the fire control system is going to be amissed in the Russian tank, and that would not be the same tank that was otherwise rolled out of the factory 2 years ago.

But we hear claims about how the US chip ban on China is a good thing because it can now produce high quality chips all by itself. :D
 
.
But we hear claims about how the US chip ban on China is a good thing because it can now produce high quality chips all by itself. :D
probably good when you are sitting behind a computer talking trash, not when you are facing an enemy tank and you need to shoot first and hit first......
 
.
If they go full war production,like in WWII,they can produce dozens of tanks each month. I'm talking about new tanks. However,what quality of tanks? Like the T-72B3? It would be far more difficult and expensive to produce hundreds of T-90M tanks in just a few months. One of their problems is their lack of good anti-drone systems (and not using expensive missiles to hit small drones) and fire-and-forget AT weapons with top attack capability. And of course a modern APS for their tanks and armored vehicles.
 
.
probably good when you are sitting behind a computer talking trash, not when you are facing an enemy tank and you need to shoot first and hit first......

You mean real war is not like playing a video game? :D
 
.
They can rebuild their tank fleets, but they cannot renew their tank crew.
 
.
You mean real war is not like playing a video game? :D
or video game not like real war?? :lol: :lol:

I think I was cheated with all these call of duty bullshit.........I would have been a superduper special force Tier 1 guy since I am very good at Call of Duty....

Actually, i lied, I sucked at Call of Duty....I think most service guy do...
 
. .
It's one thing to build its tank fleet. It's another to train new (and competent) tank crewmen and commanders to operate them. The Russians can rebuild its pre-war tank fleet but will still flounder if they do not update their tactics.


Lack of expertise also bedeviled the Russians. Many of their most elite units had been left in shambles from earlier fighting. Their spots were filled with newly conscripted soldiers, unschooled in Ukraine’s tactics for ambushing columns. In one indication that Russia is running short of experienced tank commanders, Ukrainian soldiers said they captured a medic who had been reassigned to operate a tank.

The Russian army has focused on, and even mythologized, tank warfare for decades for its redolence of Russian victories over the Nazis in World War II. Factories in the Ural Mountains have churned out tanks by the thousands. In Vuhledar, by last week Russia had lost so many machines to sustain armored assaults that they had changed tactics and resorted only to infantry attacks, Ukrainian commanders said.
In a detailed interview last week in an abandoned house near the front, Lt. Vladislav Bayak, the deputy commander of Ukraine’s 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 72nd brigade, described how Ukrainian soldiers were able to inflict such heavy losses in what commanders said was the biggest tank battle of the war so far.

Ambushes have been Ukraine’s signature tactic against Russian armored columns since the early days of the war. Working from a bunker in Vuhledar, Lieutenant Bayak spotted the first column of about 15 tanks and armored personnel carriers approaching on a video feed from a drone.

“We were ready,” he said. “We knew something like this would happen.”

They had prepared a kill zone farther along a dirt road that the tanks were rumbling down. The commander needed only to give an order over the radio — “To battle!” — Lieutenant Bayak said.

Anti-tank teams hiding in tree lines along the fields, and armed with American infrared-guided Javelins and Ukrainian laser-guided Stugna-P missiles, powered up their weapons. Farther away, artillery batteries were ready. The dirt road had been left free of mines, while the fields all about were seeded with them, so as to entice the Russians to advance while preventing tanks from turning around once the trap was sprung.

The column of tanks becomes most vulnerable, Lieutenant Bayak said, after the shooting starts and drivers panic and try to turn around — by driving onto the mine-laden shoulder of the road. Blown-up vehicles then act as impediments, slowing or stalling the column. At that point, Ukrainian artillery opens fire, blowing up more armor and killing soldiers who clamber out of disabled machines. A scene of chaos and explosions ensues, the lieutenant said.

Russian commanders have sent armored columns forward for a lack of other options against Ukraine’s well-fortified positions, however costly the tactic, he said.

Over about three weeks of the tank battle, repeated Russian armored assaults floundered. In one instance, Ukrainian commanders called in a strike by HIMARS guided rockets; they are usually used on stationary targets like ammunition depots or barracks, but also proved effective against a stationary tank column.
During the battle for Vuhledar, Private Hrebenok, the commander, was ordered to drive forward from that spot on dangerous missions, three or four times per day.

Private Hrebenok, only 20 years old, had no formal training in tank combat when the war started. But in the frantic first days of the war he was assigned to a tank, and has fought continuously in them since, picking up tricks along the way.

Training still looms as a problem. Ukraine, too, is losing skilled soldiers and replacing them with green recruits. And many Ukrainian tank crewmen are being trained on Western tanks in countries like Germany and Britain.

“All my knowledge I gained in the field,” he said. The Russian tank crews, he said, are in contrast mostly new recruits without the benefit of any combat to season them.
 
Last edited:
.

Latest posts

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom