How Pakistan secures its nuclear weapons

[Manticore]

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakist...or-arms-control-disarmament-affairs-acda.html



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btw on the flip side

British nukes were protected by bike locks
By Meirion Jones
Newsnight producer

How to arm a bomb

Newsnight has discovered that until the early days of the Blair government the RAF's nuclear bombs were armed by turning a bicycle lock key.
There was no other security on the Bomb itself.
While American and Russian weapons were protected by tamper-proof combination locks which could only be released if the correct code was transmitted, Britain relied on a simpler technology.

The Dr Strangelove scenario

The British military resisted Whitehall proposals to fit bombs with Permissive Action Links - or PALs - which would prevent them being armed unless the right code was sent.

UK nuclear weapons are designed first and foremost to be secure and safe

Read the MoD statement

PALs were introduced in the 1960s in America to prevent a mad General or pilot launching a nuclear war off their own bat - the Dr Strangelove scenario.
President Kennedy ordered that every American nuclear bomb should be fitted with a PAL.
The correct code had to be transmitted by the US Chiefs of Staff and dialled into the Bomb before it could be armed otherwise it would not detonate.

Safeguards

Crews in missile silos also had a dual key arrangement so one man could not launch Armageddon.
Similar safeguards are in place on Russian nuclear weapons.
They are familiar from numerous Hollywood films such as Broken Arrow with John Travolta, The Peacemaker with Nicole Kidman and various James Bond films.

Under control

Papers at the National Archive show that as early as 1966 an attempt was made to impose PAL security on British nuclear weapons.
The Chief Scientific Adviser Solly Zuckerman formally advised the Defence Secretary Denis Healey that Britain needed to install Permissive Action Links on its nuclear weapons to keep them safe.
"The Government will need to be certain that any weapons deployed are under some form of 'ironclad' control".
The Royal Navy argued that officers of the Royal Navy as the Senior Service could be trusted:
"It would be invidious to suggest... that Senior Service officers may, in difficult circumstances, act in defiance of their clear orders".
Neither the Navy nor the RAF installed PAL protection on their nuclear weapons.
The RAF kept their unsafeguarded bombs at airbases until they were withdrawn in 1998.

Bicycle lock key

With the help of Brian Burnell - a researcher into the history of the British nuclear weapons programme who once designed bomb casings for atom bombs - Newsnight tracked down a training version of the WE 177 nuclear bomb at the Bristol Aero collection at Kemble.
Tornado and earlier V-bomber crews trained with these, which were identical in every way to the live bombs except for the nuclear warhead.
To arm the weapons you just open a panel held by two captive screws - like a battery cover on a radio - using a thumbnail or a coin.
Inside are the arming switch and a series of dials which you can turn with an Allen key to select high yield or low yield, air burst or groundburst and other parameters.
The Bomb is actually armed by inserting a bicycle lock key into the arming switch and turning it through 90 degrees. There is no code which needs to be entered or dual key system to prevent a rogue individual from arming the Bomb.

This report can be seen on Newsnight on Thursday, 15 November, 2007 at 10.30pm on BBC TWO

BBC NEWS | Programmes | Newsnight | British nukes were protected by bike locks

 

[Manticore]

 

[alexx12lucyy]

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and other related weapons are controlled by the National Command Authority (NCA), which has an Employment Control Committee (ECC) that decides on doctrine, posture and nuclear use.

 

[Safriz]

A recent addition to Pakistan's Nuclear safety is "Post launch Destruction".

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The establishment of postlaunch controls on nuclear‐armed missiles, which would enable a country to destroy its missiles in flight in case of an accidental or unauthorized launch, would add another safeguard to the control of nuclear weapons. A system of postlaunch control could be made secure against attempts by another country to use the system to destroy authorized launches in flight.

 

[Rafi]

A recent addition to Pakistan's Nuclear safety is "Post launch Destruction".

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PAL's have also been deployed for a while, also the telemetry system, and with the three man rule, our safety features - make our weapons some of the safest in the world, unlike our adversary who uses padlocks to secure their arsenal.

 

[The Deterrent]

A recent addition to Pakistan's Nuclear safety is "Post launch Destruction".

That isn't recent, it has been an integral part of the missile systems since early 2000s. Same goes for PLAs.

 

[Safriz]

That isn't recent, it has been an integral part of the missile systems since early 2000s. Same goes for PLAs.
Additionally, environment sensing devices (ESDs) are also employed:

Whats PLA?

and i said recent because there is no evidence of testing the system in any previous launches..Only that "Skyfall" event in Dadu revealed this...

 

[The Deterrent]

Whats PLA?

and i said recent because there is no evidence of testing the system in any previous launches..Only that "Skyfall" event in Dadu revealed this...

Sorry, was a typo. I meant PAL i.e. Permissive Action Links.
No, the "skyfall" did not reveal this. The flight wasn't aborted, it was just the detached correction system that crashed off the course.

 

[Bonhomie]

PAL's have also been deployed for a while, also the telemetry system, and with the three man rule, our safety features - make our weapons some of the safest in the world, unlike our adversary who uses padlocks to secure their arsenal.

still our neighbor speak as if we use;

 

[Immanuel]

Exactly how did you get the idea that India secures its Weapons using a padlock, matter of fact Indian nuclear program is among the most secretive, little is known in open forum about its arsenal, size or its security for that matter. I would like some sources for your claim.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology


1960s
1965: Pakistani nuclear research reactor at Parr, Rawalpindi, starts functioning.

1968: Nonproliferation Treaty completed. Pakistan refuse to sign.


1970s
1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.'' Pakistani Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells meeting of Pakistan's top scientists of intention to develop nuclear arms.


1974 -- Pakistan proposed to India the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in south Asia

1978 -- Pakistan proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons

1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.


1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards
1980s

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.


1980
1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).

1981
1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).

1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'

1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.

1982
1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').

1983
1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'

1984
1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'

1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.

1985
1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.

1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.

1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.

1986
1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.

1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.

1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'

1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'


1987

1987 -- Pakistan proposed to India an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).

1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.

1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'

1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).

1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'

1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.


1988
1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'

1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.

1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'

1989
1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.

1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.

1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'

1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.

1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.

1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.

1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.

1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'

1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'

1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.

1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'


1990
1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.

Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]

1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.

1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.

1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.

1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'

1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'

1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.

October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.


1991

1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia
1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.

1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'

1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'

1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.

July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.


1992
1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.

Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.

December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.

01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours [Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].


1993

1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia

25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.

Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.


1994
Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.

April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."


1995
April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.

September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan.


1996
01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.

January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.

March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons production.

03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.


1997
04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.

06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."


1998

28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).

30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six.

Sources and Resources
Pakistan Special Weapons News

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

What the POINT WE ARE NUCLEAR power nation now , Congradulations once again

 

[fatman17]

What the POINT WE ARE NUCLEAR power nation now , Congradulations once again

its free information - no point. frankly i was not aware of some of those milestones...

Box 1. Screening programmes


Pakistan has set up screening procedures to ensure the loyalty and mental balance of personnel serving in the most sensitive
positions. These procedures were established in the early 2000s, took two years to set up and required overcoming various
forms of resistance.

Two different programmes exist: a Human Reliability Program for civilian personnel and a Personnel Reliability Program for
military personnel. They have been applied to up to 4000 people (although the numbers vary), including about 2000 scientists
or engineers working in particularly sensitive areas or who have critical knowledge, and who continue to be monitored after
retirement.a The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) plans to extend these programmes to 10 000 personnel with access to sensitive
information. The screening process can take up to a year and involves four different agencies: the Intelligence Bureau, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Military Intelligence and the SPD. There are clearance rechecks every two years.
Unsurprisingly, checks are said to focus on finances and religious beliefs. Punjabis (who make up two-thirds of Pakistan’s
officers) are reportedly privileged over people of other origins. There have been reports of attempts by militant groups to
infiltrate the nuclear complex through Pakistani scientists trained abroad.

a SPD officials estimate that 7000 to 10 000 people out of a total of 70 000 people in the nuclear and missile complex are
nuclear scientists and engineers.


Sources: Goldberg, J. and Ambinder, M., ‘The ally from hell’, The Atlantic, Dec. 2011; Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV),
‘Security and safety issues about the nuclear complex: Pakistan’s standpoints’ (LNCV: Como, 2008); Luongo, K. and Salik, N.,
‘Building confidence in Pakistan’s nuclear security’, Arms Control Today, Dec. 2007; Pennington M., ‘Pakistan: nuclear assets
safe, outlines nuclear protocol’, Associated Press, 26 Jan. 2008; Sanger, D., The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (Harmony Books: New York, 2009), p. 212; and Wonacott, P., ‘Inside Pakistan’s drive to guard its A-bombs’, Wall Street Journal, 29 Nov. 2007.

 

[fatman17]

Box 2. Physical security and surveillance


Three levels of nuclear security exist. The first level (or inner ring) is managed by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which controls around 9000 personnel dedicated to this task.a The SPD’s directorate in charge of nuclear security is led by a two-star general and is endowed with its own counter-intelligence team. It has a cell in each of the four laboratories controlled by the National Command Authority (NCA), each headed by a one-star general.

The second level is physical, including fencing, sensors and so on.

The third level (or outer ring) is surveillance and monitoring of suspicious activities around the sites, with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) involvement. The SPD has a system of sensitive material control and accounting, which involves
regular and surprise inspections. It has reportedly adopted inventory systems to track individual components of warheads.
Theft- and tamper-proof containers and vehicles are used for storage and transport. The SPD has set up a ‘Special Response
Force’ presumably to deal with nuclear incidents.

On the civilian side, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), created in 2001 and including 200 experts, is in
charge of the physical security of fissile material and radioactive sources. The military is strongly involved and the SPD’s
director general is a member of the PNRA. A five-year Nuclear Security Action Plan, designed to enhance the safety and
security of nuclear materials and radioactive sources, was adopted by the PNRA in 2006. Special border controls have been set
up. In 2011 a safety review of existing and planned facilities was conducted. All known sources have reportedly been registered,
orphan sources have been recovered and two secure storage sites have been set up.

Pakistan cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve nuclear safety.b It ratified the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in 2000 and participates in the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Pakistan has not, however, ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and is not a party to the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

a SPD officials give numbers ranging from 8000 to 10 000. A 2011 report by Rezaul Laskar claims that over 8000 new
personnel will be trained by 2013 at the SPD Training Academy. A report by Andrew Bast mentions two army divisions, or about
18 000 troops, with the source being the former President Musharraf in a 2011 on-the-record interview with the author. This
number may refer to the total of the current and future force.

b According to Michael Krepon, in 2006 the Stimson Center began hosting fellows from the PNRA.

Sources: Bast, A., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear surge’, Newsweek, 23–30 May 2011; Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press
Release PR29/2012-ISPR, 27 Feb. 2012; Krepon, M., ‘Addressing the US–Pakistan strategic relationship’, Testimony before
the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 12 June 2008 (US Government Printing Office:
Washington, 2009); Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV), ‘Security and safety issues about the nuclear complex: Pakistan’s
standpoints’ (LNCV: Como, 2008); Laskar, R., ‘Pak plans to train over 8000 personnel to augment N-security’, Press Trust
of India (PTI), 18 Oct. 2011; and Lavoy, P., ‘Islamabad’s nuclear posture: its premises and implementation’, ed. H. Sokolski,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, 2008), p. 152.

 

[fatman17]

Table 2. Pakistani nuclear and WMD risks and associated preventive measures

An x denotes the existence of a preventive measure.


Risk.......................................Screening...Separation of cores..Codes.....Physical security...Export controls
............................................programs....warheads/launchers................& surveillance.
State-sanctioned export of WMD...... –.................... –................ –............... –........................ –
Transfer of WMD expertise............... x.................... –................ –............... x........................ –
Theft of WMD material.................... x.................... –................ –............... x........................ –
Export of WMD material................... x.................... –................ –............... x........................ x
Capture of a nuclear weapon............ x.................... x................ –............... x........................ –
Unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. x.................. –................ x................ x........................ –
Deliberate use of a nuclear weapon..... –.................. –............... –................ –......................... –

WMD = weapon(s) of mass destruction.