Featured How Pakistan Is Preparing to Kill India’s New Aircraft Carriers

[Abid123]

South Asia’s naval race is in full swing.

by Robert Beckhusen

Here's What You Need to Remember: Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three.


The Indian Navy has put out a proposal for its third aircraft carrier, tentatively titled the Vishal due to enter service in the latter 2020s. The 65,000-ton Vishal will be significantly larger than India’s sole current carrier, the Vikramaditya known formerly as the ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov, and the incoming second one, the domestically-built Vikrantwhich is expected to enter service later in 2018.

To see why Vishal is a big deal for the Indian Navy, one needs only to look at her proposed air wing — some 57 fighters, more than Vikramaditya — 24 MiG-29Ks — and Vikrant‘s wing of around 30 MiG-29Ks. While below the 75+ aircraft aboard a U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford-class supercarrier, Vishal will be a proper full-size carrier and India’s first, as the preceding two are really small-deck carriers and limited in several significant ways.

The Indian Navy is also looking at an electromagnetic launch system for its third carrier, similar to the one aboard the Ford class. India’s first two carriers have STOBAR configurations, in which aircraft launch with the assistance of a ski-jump, which limits the maximum weight a plane can lift into the air. Typically this means that fighters must sacrifice weapons, or fuel thus limiting range, or a combination of both.

The Indian Navy is searching for a foreign-sourced twin-engine fighter for the Vishal, with the U.S. F/A-18 and French Rafale in the running, and India has already ordered 36 multi-role Rafales for its air force. This is a blow to advocates of an Indian-made fighter for the carrier such as naval version of the delta-wing HAL Tejas, which is too heavy for carrier work

But regardless of what kind of fighters Vishal uses, the question is whether India really needs a third carrier, which will cost billions of dollars over its lifetime. To be sure, a third and much larger carrier will free up the burden on the Vikramaditya and Vikrant, only one of which is likely to be battle-ready at any given time.

These smaller carriers probably have fewer operational fighters than they do on paper, given that the air wings likely have serviceability rates below 100 percent. Vikramaditya by itself could have significantly less than 24 MiGs capable of flying — and fighting.

Now imagine a scenario in which these carriers go to battle.

Most likely, India would attempt to enforce a blockade of Pakistan and use its carriers to strike land-based targets. But Pakistan has several means to attack Indian carriers — with near-undetectable submarines and anti-ship missiles — which must also operate relatively far from India itself in the western and northern Arabian Sea. China does not have a similar disadvantage, as the PLAN would likely keep its carriers close and within the “first island chain” including Taiwan, closer to shore where supporting aircraft and ground-based missile launchers can help out.

Thus, Indian carriers would be relatively vulnerable and only one of them will have aircraft capable of launching with standard ordnance and fuel. And that is after Vishal sets sail in the next decade.

To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver nearer to shore — and thereby closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them. And even with a third carrier, the threat of land-based Pakistani aircraft will force the Indian Navy to dedicate a large proportion of its own air wings to defense — perhaps half of its available fighters, according to 2017 paper by Ben Wan Beng Ho for the Naval War College Review.

“Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier would pack a significant punch,” Ho writes. “With aircraft available for strike duties barely numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a substantial ‘pulse’ of combat power against its adversary.”

Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three. Under the circumstances, India’s investment in carriers makes more sense symbolically, and primarily as a way of keeping shipyards busy and shipyard workers employed.

However, this is not to entirely rule out a carrier-centric naval strategy. Ho notes that Indian carriers could be useful when operating far out at sea and in the western Arabian Sea, effectively as escort ships for commercial shipping and to harass Pakistani trade. Nevertheless, this strategy comes with a similar set of problems.

“In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a blockade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier,” Ho added. “What is more, Pakistani ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier.”

Another possibility is India massing its carriers in the later stages of a war after the Army and Air Force pummel and degrade the Pakistani military.

But this raises the question as to whether India strictly needs carriers at all if it cannot use them during the decisive periods of a conflict — as opposed to, say, less-expensive warships, and more of them, equipped with long-range missiles.

How Pakistan Is Preparing to Kill India’s New Aircraft Carriers

South Asia’s naval race is in full swing.

nationalinterest.org

 

[HRK]

This is exactly what wrote few years back, its simple and logical thing to understand tha India if deploy its carrier against Pakistan would either deploy it +400 km south from the coast of Gujrat as from this area carrier would have air cover of not only of its own air wing but from IAF as well, further the support of P-8i would also be available to provide security against PN submarines. In this case Indian Navy would have higher chances of success stop or decrease civilian maritime operations at Karachi port the air wing of the carier would also have comparative advantage in offensive operation.

Other possible area of deployment of carrier would be little south of Pakistan's EEZ somewhere in east of Duqm port of Oman right outside of the Oman's EEZ .... This will keep carrier out of the reach of PAF jets so the carrier would not have to face the constant threat of air attacks & would have comparative freedom to conduct task of harassing of Pakistan bound sea traffic, but in that area one potential threat would come from PN submarines so the role of Indian anti submarine capabilities would be crucial here.

 

[sparten]

Other possible area of deployment of carrier would be little south of Pakistan's EEZ somewhere in east of Duqm port of Oman right outside of the Oman's EEZ .... This will keep carrier out of the reach of PAF jets so the carrier would not have to face the constant threat of air attacks & would have comparative freedom to conduct task of harassing of Pakistan bound sea traffic, but in that area one potential threat would come from PN submarines so the role of Indian anti submarine capabilities would be crucial here.

This place would expose the carrier attacks from IFR equipped PAF jets.

 

[mqur1963]

what happen to aircrfat carrier killer missiles

 

[TheSnakeEatingMarkhur]

View attachment 765194

South Asia’s naval race is in full swing.

by Robert Beckhusen

Here's What You Need to Remember: Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three.


The Indian Navy has put out a proposal for its third aircraft carrier, tentatively titled the Vishal due to enter service in the latter 2020s. The 65,000-ton Vishal will be significantly larger than India’s sole current carrier, the Vikramaditya known formerly as the ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov, and the incoming second one, the domestically-built Vikrantwhich is expected to enter service later in 2018.

To see why Vishal is a big deal for the Indian Navy, one needs only to look at her proposed air wing — some 57 fighters, more than Vikramaditya — 24 MiG-29Ks — and Vikrant‘s wing of around 30 MiG-29Ks. While below the 75+ aircraft aboard a U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford-class supercarrier, Vishal will be a proper full-size carrier and India’s first, as the preceding two are really small-deck carriers and limited in several significant ways.

The Indian Navy is also looking at an electromagnetic launch system for its third carrier, similar to the one aboard the Ford class. India’s first two carriers have STOBAR configurations, in which aircraft launch with the assistance of a ski-jump, which limits the maximum weight a plane can lift into the air. Typically this means that fighters must sacrifice weapons, or fuel thus limiting range, or a combination of both.

The Indian Navy is searching for a foreign-sourced twin-engine fighter for the Vishal, with the U.S. F/A-18 and French Rafale in the running, and India has already ordered 36 multi-role Rafales for its air force. This is a blow to advocates of an Indian-made fighter for the carrier such as naval version of the delta-wing HAL Tejas, which is too heavy for carrier work

But regardless of what kind of fighters Vishal uses, the question is whether India really needs a third carrier, which will cost billions of dollars over its lifetime. To be sure, a third and much larger carrier will free up the burden on the Vikramaditya and Vikrant, only one of which is likely to be battle-ready at any given time.

These smaller carriers probably have fewer operational fighters than they do on paper, given that the air wings likely have serviceability rates below 100 percent. Vikramaditya by itself could have significantly less than 24 MiGs capable of flying — and fighting.

Now imagine a scenario in which these carriers go to battle.

Most likely, India would attempt to enforce a blockade of Pakistan and use its carriers to strike land-based targets. But Pakistan has several means to attack Indian carriers — with near-undetectable submarines and anti-ship missiles — which must also operate relatively far from India itself in the western and northern Arabian Sea. China does not have a similar disadvantage, as the PLAN would likely keep its carriers close and within the “first island chain” including Taiwan, closer to shore where supporting aircraft and ground-based missile launchers can help out.

Thus, Indian carriers would be relatively vulnerable and only one of them will have aircraft capable of launching with standard ordnance and fuel. And that is after Vishal sets sail in the next decade.

To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver nearer to shore — and thereby closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them. And even with a third carrier, the threat of land-based Pakistani aircraft will force the Indian Navy to dedicate a large proportion of its own air wings to defense — perhaps half of its available fighters, according to 2017 paper by Ben Wan Beng Ho for the Naval War College Review.

“Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier would pack a significant punch,” Ho writes. “With aircraft available for strike duties barely numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a substantial ‘pulse’ of combat power against its adversary.”

Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three. Under the circumstances, India’s investment in carriers makes more sense symbolically, and primarily as a way of keeping shipyards busy and shipyard workers employed.

However, this is not to entirely rule out a carrier-centric naval strategy. Ho notes that Indian carriers could be useful when operating far out at sea and in the western Arabian Sea, effectively as escort ships for commercial shipping and to harass Pakistani trade. Nevertheless, this strategy comes with a similar set of problems.

“In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a blockade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier,” Ho added. “What is more, Pakistani ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier.”

Another possibility is India massing its carriers in the later stages of a war after the Army and Air Force pummel and degrade the Pakistani military.

But this raises the question as to whether India strictly needs carriers at all if it cannot use them during the decisive periods of a conflict — as opposed to, say, less-expensive warships, and more of them, equipped with long-range missiles.

If 25 years ago we had capability to surprise Americans we can surely surprise india with these less capable aircraft carriers.

 

[HRK]

This place would expose the carrier attacks from IFR equipped PAF jets.

Dear distance of Duqam port from Gawadar port is around 500 miles while from Karachi its around 700 miles thing need to be understand here is that Duqam is mention here as reference point not as exact location where Indian Navy would deploy its carrier they will obviously deploy its at some distance let say 200-300 miles so overall IN carrier group would be deployed at acdistance of around 800-100 miles from the coast of Pakistan

In this case even with IFR JF-17 would have some limitations keep in mind JF-17 with 3 extarnal fuel tank and two 1000 pound bombs have have combat radius of 1000 KM

Plz also note

- Around 79 JF-17 are not IFR capable

- With 2 C-802 or CM-400 AKG it will have smaller combat radius due to the absence of 2 external fuel tank

- In that scenario Indian carrier group would be deployed +1200 to 1600 km away from coast of Pakistan

- Inflight refuelears either have to fly earlier than strick package to reach the refueling point with will put them in danger against Indian interceptors

So comparatively indian navy would be in less danger zone

 

[Zarvan]

This is exactly what wrote few years back, its simple and logical thing to understand tha India if deploy its carrier against Pakistan would either deploy it +400 km south from the coast of Gujrat as from this area carrier would have air cover of not only of its own air wing but from IAF as well, further the support of P-8i would also be available to provide security against PN submarines. In this case Indian Navy would have higher chances of success stop or decrease civilian maritime operations at Karachi port the air wing of the carier would also have comparative advantage in offensive operation.

Other possible area of deployment of carrier would be little south of Pakistan's EEZ somewhere in east of Duqm port of Oman right outside of the Oman's EEZ .... This will keep carrier out of the reach of PAF jets so the carrier would not have to face the constant threat of air attacks & would have comparative freedom to conduct task of harassing of Pakistan bound sea traffic, but in that area one potential threat would come from PN submarines so the role of Indian anti submarine capabilities would be crucial here.

No that is way to close. Deploying AC there would be asking us to hit that and we would. At best India would deploy its AC close to Kochi around Lakshadweep islands

 

[Jobless Jack]

This is exactly what wrote few years back, its simple and logical thing to understand tha India if deploy its carrier against Pakistan would either deploy it +400 km south from the coast of Gujrat as from this area carrier would have air cover of not only of its own air wing but from IAF as well, further the support of P-8i would also be available to provide security against PN submarines. In this case Indian Navy would have higher chances of success stop or decrease civilian maritime operations at Karachi port the air wing of the carier would also have comparative advantage in offensive operation.

Other possible area of deployment of carrier would be little south of Pakistan's EEZ somewhere in east of Duqm port of Oman right outside of the Oman's EEZ .... This will keep carrier out of the reach of PAF jets so the carrier would not have to face the constant threat of air attacks & would have comparative freedom to conduct task of harassing of Pakistan bound sea traffic, but in that area one potential threat would come from PN submarines so the role of Indian anti submarine capabilities would be crucial here.

Indian AC is aimed at china. Will work to provide support to quad allies.

In a war with pakistan IA will try to take Karachi or cause enough chaos in the city to hamper civil/ military naval ops by IAF bombing.

This is why gawadar is important.

In a very desperate situation such as if IA and IAF fails to break the stalemate the will AC be deployed by india.

 

[Sine Nomine]

There is no chance of WAR, if current setup continued.
Period

 

[Tornado23]

There is no chance of WAR, if current setup continued.
Period

Big chance of war.

India is still hurting from 27th of Feb. They will be wanting to avenge their fallen mig21 and su30mki

India is a war mongering country in general

 

[Sine Nomine]

Big chance of war.

India is still hurting from 27th of Feb. They will be wanting to avenge their fallen mig21 and su30mki

India is a war mongering country in general

They are getting what they want.

 

[Solidify]

How to sink Aircraft carriers using fighter aircraft watch

 

[alee92nawaz]

View attachment 765194

South Asia’s naval race is in full swing.

by Robert Beckhusen

Here's What You Need to Remember: Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three.


The Indian Navy has put out a proposal for its third aircraft carrier, tentatively titled the Vishal due to enter service in the latter 2020s. The 65,000-ton Vishal will be significantly larger than India’s sole current carrier, the Vikramaditya known formerly as the ex-Soviet Admiral Gorshkov, and the incoming second one, the domestically-built Vikrantwhich is expected to enter service later in 2018.

To see why Vishal is a big deal for the Indian Navy, one needs only to look at her proposed air wing — some 57 fighters, more than Vikramaditya — 24 MiG-29Ks — and Vikrant‘s wing of around 30 MiG-29Ks. While below the 75+ aircraft aboard a U.S. Navy Gerald R. Ford-class supercarrier, Vishal will be a proper full-size carrier and India’s first, as the preceding two are really small-deck carriers and limited in several significant ways.

The Indian Navy is also looking at an electromagnetic launch system for its third carrier, similar to the one aboard the Ford class. India’s first two carriers have STOBAR configurations, in which aircraft launch with the assistance of a ski-jump, which limits the maximum weight a plane can lift into the air. Typically this means that fighters must sacrifice weapons, or fuel thus limiting range, or a combination of both.

The Indian Navy is searching for a foreign-sourced twin-engine fighter for the Vishal, with the U.S. F/A-18 and French Rafale in the running, and India has already ordered 36 multi-role Rafales for its air force. This is a blow to advocates of an Indian-made fighter for the carrier such as naval version of the delta-wing HAL Tejas, which is too heavy for carrier work

But regardless of what kind of fighters Vishal uses, the question is whether India really needs a third carrier, which will cost billions of dollars over its lifetime. To be sure, a third and much larger carrier will free up the burden on the Vikramaditya and Vikrant, only one of which is likely to be battle-ready at any given time.

These smaller carriers probably have fewer operational fighters than they do on paper, given that the air wings likely have serviceability rates below 100 percent. Vikramaditya by itself could have significantly less than 24 MiGs capable of flying — and fighting.

Now imagine a scenario in which these carriers go to battle.

Most likely, India would attempt to enforce a blockade of Pakistan and use its carriers to strike land-based targets. But Pakistan has several means to attack Indian carriers — with near-undetectable submarines and anti-ship missiles — which must also operate relatively far from India itself in the western and northern Arabian Sea. China does not have a similar disadvantage, as the PLAN would likely keep its carriers close and within the “first island chain” including Taiwan, closer to shore where supporting aircraft and ground-based missile launchers can help out.

Thus, Indian carriers would be relatively vulnerable and only one of them will have aircraft capable of launching with standard ordnance and fuel. And that is after Vishal sets sail in the next decade.

To directly threaten Pakistan, the small-deck carriers will have to maneuver nearer to shore — and thereby closer to “anti-access / area denial” weapons which could sink them. And even with a third carrier, the threat of land-based Pakistani aircraft will force the Indian Navy to dedicate a large proportion of its own air wings to defense — perhaps half of its available fighters, according to 2017 paper by Ben Wan Beng Ho for the Naval War College Review.

“Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier would pack a significant punch,” Ho writes. “With aircraft available for strike duties barely numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a substantial ‘pulse’ of combat power against its adversary.”

Essentially, this makes Indian carriers’ self-defeating, with the flattops existing primarily to defend themselves from attack rather than taking the fight to their enemy. Carriers are also expensive symbols of national prestige, and it is unlikely the Indian Navy will want to risk losing one, two or all three. Under the circumstances, India’s investment in carriers makes more sense symbolically, and primarily as a way of keeping shipyards busy and shipyard workers employed.

However, this is not to entirely rule out a carrier-centric naval strategy. Ho notes that Indian carriers could be useful when operating far out at sea and in the western Arabian Sea, effectively as escort ships for commercial shipping and to harass Pakistani trade. Nevertheless, this strategy comes with a similar set of problems.

“In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a blockade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier,” Ho added. “What is more, Pakistani ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier.”

Another possibility is India massing its carriers in the later stages of a war after the Army and Air Force pummel and degrade the Pakistani military.

But this raises the question as to whether India strictly needs carriers at all if it cannot use them during the decisive periods of a conflict — as opposed to, say, less-expensive warships, and more of them, equipped with long-range missiles.

Saturated attack with YJ-12s (CM-300akg) would sink any indian warships

 

[newb3e]

war btw Pak and ind wont be a isolated war it will include all the regional players not just china but also America so it will be interesting if india plans to use their only aircraft against Pakistan and not Chinese navy in that case one can takeout the carrier while other keeps it occupied! americans have the history of betraying their allies so can india actually rely on america?

two phront sarr very dagerous!

 

[Blacklight]

Just my humble opinion, Pakistan now has the capability to use BM's to neutralize moving targets at sea.

@PanzerKiel @Rashid Mahmood @Raider 21 @The Eagle @SQ8 ?