How Kashmir was stolen from Pakistan by Mountbatten

[Ticker]

If I may say with the utmost respect to you personally, bunkum.
The Iraq resolutions number in the scores. Prior to 1990, there were 14, so let us start with those. The resolutions were clearly articulated, but they related to the Iraq-Iran war, and presumably you are referring to the Desert Shield/Desert Storm resolutions.

Briefly, when required, the language included full and clear instructions, for instance:

I hope you see the vast difference between the language of this resolution and the corresponding plebiscite resolution that we have been discussing. In simple but plain terms, this is what the Pakistani side had hoped for but did not get, and which it then tried to insert into the proceedings by raising pettifogging objections.

Now regarding the later set of resolutions, would you like to indicate which resolution you are referring to, and what confusion you have in mind? I ask this as the matter ought to be treated at the same level of detailed scrutiny as the plebiscite resolution.

Tony Blair’s British position that the invasion of Iraq was legal rests on a particular interpretation of Security Council resolutions dating back to 1990.

Both the Blair and Bush arguments on the legality of war in Iraq rely on creative interpretations of the existing international law regarding the use of force. Blair has strung together the Security Council resolutions in such a way as to argue that the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ had prior authorization through the use of resolutions 678 and 687. Bush creatively interpreted the argument for pre-emptive self-defence to find a legal basis for war in a threat that had not yet materialized

Many countries and international law experts opine that the coalition’s decision to use force without a second Security Council resolution cannot stand as precedent for future action and therefore was not legal.

All this is based on interpretation of UNSC resolutions. I wonder sir, if it is me ‘speaking to Buncombe’.

This is a generalization of massive proportions, at the level of motherhood and apple pie. There are resolutions and resolutions; those that are clear obviously need no discussion, or less discussion than others. These others might be ambiguously worded.

If it is your case that all resolutions are subject to interpretation, it is for you to point out what needs clarification. As you have seen from the example above, usually resolutions are far too clearly worded to warrant the kind of Fabian tactics adopted by Pakistan.

This probably is in the simplest of the form a UNSC procedure and norm, followed since long could be explained. And calling it a generalization of massive proportions is almost as good as calling it a presumptuous sin of the text, and equating it with the chief of all sins.

What possible benefit would India have derived from such an action - other than to settle a discussion on PDF in the year 2012?

May I with equal, if not more, humility and respect, reciprocate - bunkum.

The difficulty with Pakistan, and the Pakistani point of view, is that every principled act of compromise or coming forth to bridge the gap is immediately associated with hitherto unsuspected weakness, and with sinister, clandestine plans having come undone. A refusal to move is seen as a display of hegemonism, and the brutality of a bullying superior power. This was displayed on numerous occasions, for instance, in Nehru's selecting a point of equilibrium, beyond which a serious push by the Indian Army would be required, at a time when sizable gains had been made, at which to fulfill his commitment to a plebiscite. Later, it raised huge suspicion among uninformed Pakistanis when Shastri accepted a Russian offer to mediate; as usual, the Pakistani reaction to being rescued at the nick of time was deep suspicion of the motives of the rescuer. Again in 1971, when Bhutto and his delegation travelled to Simla, and Bhutto confided that an open treaty on Kashmir would doom him in the eyes of Pakistan, and the matter was merely touched upon, Pakistani speculation ran towards the motives behind Pakistan not being crushed utterly - understandably so, since that is what Pakistan would have done, and will do in future if ever it is to find itself in the position of India. Need i even mention 1999? Considering that a party to the frantic mission of rescue to Washington blandly denied it when asked in later years?

Your response has the great merit of conforming to type.

Look who is calling kettle black. Sir, see every nook and corner of Indian media, intelligence agencies, MEA and you name it – Pakistan is blamed for everything that bedevils India. Much has been said about this aspect. Let me just accept it as a tap on the knuckles for being a conformist to a type.

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Tick Tick Tick clock is ticking Ticker and don't forget Zion Hamid with you. I will request Comedy Circus bring Zion Hamid next time with shakeel siddiqi. Thanks to many Pakistani for entertaining us.

Yaar, I need to see who this Zaid Hamid fellow is. He is so famous amongst the Indians.

Yeah the clock is ticking for you guys - and I've been sent as the Ticker.

 

[Ticker]

what kind of moral and diplomatic support have you extended to Ajmal Kasab after he was caught alive in mumbai????.

what kind of moral and diplomatic support are u going to extend to Abu jindal who is being interrogated in mumbai????.

The kind of moral and diplomatic support which is moral as well as diplomatic.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Tony Blair’s British position that the invasion of Iraq was legal rests on a particular interpretation of Security Council resolutions dating back to 1990.

Both the Blair and Bush arguments on the legality of war in Iraq rely on creative interpretations of the existing international law regarding the use of force. Blair has strung together the Security Council resolutions in such a way as to argue that the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ had prior authorization through the use of resolutions 678 and 687. Bush creatively interpreted the argument for pre-emptive self-defence to find a legal basis for war in a threat that had not yet materialized

Many countries and international law experts opine that the coalition’s decision to use force without a second Security Council resolution cannot stand as precedent for future action and therefore was not legal.

All this is based on interpretation of UNSC resolutions. I wonder sir, if it is me ‘speaking to Buncombe’.



This probably is in the simplest of the form a UNSC procedure and norm, followed since long could be explained. And calling it a generalization of massive proportions is almost as good as calling it a presumptuous sin of the text, and equating it with the chief of all sins.



May I with equal, if not more, humility and respect, reciprocate - bunkum.



Look who is calling kettle black. Sir, see every nook and corner of Indian media, intelligence agencies, MEA and you name it – Pakistan is blamed for everything that bedevils India. Much has been said about this aspect. Let me just accept it as a tap on the knuckles for being a conformist to a type.

___________________________________________________________





Yaar, I need to see who this Zaid Hamid fellow is. He is so famous amongst the Indians.

Yeah the clock is ticking for you guys - and I've been sent as the Ticker.

Another brilliant and challenging post - I hope Nassr and notorious_eagle are reading this, and Atanz.

In keeping with the spirit of the occasions coming up, I shall defer my responses to the 17th or so. Except to wonder aloud if '...it is I speaking to Buncombe' makes for better grammar, and to express profound gratitude that I am not cast as either Walker or Clingman.

The kind of moral and diplomatic support which is moral as well as diplomatic.

Slippery, very.

 

[toxic_pus]

It is being claimed that Pakistan had the right to interpret UN resolutions in their own way. Fair enough. I am presenting here the vital paragraph of the SC resolution of 13th Aug, 1948, the interpretation of the same by Pakistan, as summerised in UNCIP 3rd Interim Report, and also the Commission's opinion, most of which I have already presented.

Part II/B/1 of Truce Agreement

When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.​

Pakistan's interpretation, as summerised by the Commission:

Mr Robert van de Kerchove, UNCIP 3rd Interim Report; Para 229; pg 60

..the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balace between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of here regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal with that of the bulk of the Indian forces.​

Now the Commission's opinion:

Mr Robert van de Kerchove, UNCIP 3rd Interim Report; Para 242; pg 63

...the Resolution [...], as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal. [...] The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans.

Para 243; pg 60

The Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a 'synchronization' which would have been incompatible with the terms of Resolution of 13 August.
​

In plain and simple words, Pakistan's interpretation, i.e. the Resolution sought 'military balance' and conditioned Pakistani withdrawal to the Indian plans for withdrawal being 'acceptable to the Pakistan Government', was taken by the scruff of it's neck and kicked out of the window as something 'incompatible with the terms of Resolution of 13 August.'

Just where the eff is the ambiguity.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Great job.

 

[my2cents]

The kind of moral and diplomatic support which is moral as well as diplomatic.

I see -- your kind of moral support is to disown the nationality like in Kasab's case.

Your kind of diplomatic support is no legal representation during trial.

Talk is big but action is zero.

 

[Nassr]

Part II/B/1 of Truce Agreement, states the following

1. That the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn;

2. That the PAKISTAN FORCES ARE BEING WITHDRAWN from the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

3. The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AGREES TO BEGIN TO WITHDRAW the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

Simply put, it means that various events had to be synchronized in order to achieve the objective.

Complete the withdrawal of Pathans from Kashmir before withdrawal of Indian forces could begin.

Start the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and while the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn, commence the withdrawal of Indian forces.

Some of the answers Pakistan needed to plan the withdrawal of Pakistani forces:

1. The date of Indian start of withdrawal so that it could start the withdrawal before that. Without knowing the above date, Pakistan could have planned to start the withdrawal later than the Indian forces and would have gone against the resolution.

2. The date Indian forces would have completed the withdrawal of bulk of its forces. This date was needed so that Pakistan could have finished the withdrawal either on the same date or before that. If Pakistan was not told of this date it could have been in default by withdrawing late.

3. Indian withdrawal plan would also be needed in such cases to ensure that withdrawal of Pakistani forces at any stage, do not remain out of sync within the overall environment, in order to avoid being blamed for slow movement etc.

How could the commission pronounce judgment on a request for synchronization being incompatible with the terms of August 13, Resolution, when the event could not have been completed without some form of synchronization and necessary coordination.

This either displayed a lack of understanding on the part of the commission or a clear bias.

The commission also stated that, Pakistani request was not the only method of assuring this form of synchronization and that full and free exchange of information was not necessary. It clearly implied that other forms of synchronization could be used, which could be in contradiction to commission's earlier pronouncements.

If full or free exchange of information exchange was not considered necessary by the commission, did the commission then expect to take Pakistani or Indian forces under its own command in order to plan and coordinate the withdrawal, to order them when to start withdrawing and when to stop. This could not have happened, nor was it within the mandate of the commission.

So, how would the withdrawal be coordinated, without synchronization of effort.

And if there was some methodology to synchronize the event, it could not have been implemented without the consent of both the countries.

Did the main resolution specify such a methodology. No it didn’t. Therefore, further consultations between the two countries had to be undertaken to arrive at a mutually agreed plan of withdrawal.

Which also clearly identifies the fact, that between signing of the agreement and its implementation on ground, much more needs to be done and coordinated, which does not form part of the main text of the resolution, in all the cases.

I am not an expert in international law. I have just raised some questions with regard to the difference of interpretation.

Interpretation of a clear aspect for one may not translate into the same for the other.

Regarding the Pakistani contention that the resolution also sought to achieve a military balance; at the end of the day, it was Nehru who cited US-Pakistan agreement and the shift it created in the balance of power, to deny plebiscite to the Kashmiris.

 

[Ticker]

I see -- your kind of moral support is to disown the nationality like in Kasab's case.

Your kind of diplomatic support is no legal representation during trial.

Talk is big but action is zero.

You are totally out of sync with your surroundings.

Slippery, very.

Indeed....

 

[DarkPrince]

You are totally out of sync with your surroundings.



Indeed....

bhai tera naam hasan hai kya ???

 

[my2cents]

You are totally out of sync with your surroundings.



Indeed....

Care to elaborate...............

 

[Ticker]

Care to elaborate...............

No........

bhai tera naam hasan hai kya ???

No........

 

[toxic_pus]

1. The date of Indian start of withdrawal so that it could start the withdrawal before that. Without knowing the above date, Pakistan could have planned to start the withdrawal later than the Indian forces and would have gone against the resolution.

2. The date Indian forces would have completed the withdrawal of bulk of its forces. This date was needed so that Pakistan could have finished the withdrawal either on the same date or before that. If Pakistan was not told of this date it could have been in default by withdrawing late.

You have taken the resolution and turned it right on its head. Indian withdrawal was conditioned upon withdrawal of Pakistan, not the other way round. If anything it was India that needed to know the details of Pakistani withdrawal so India could start withdrawing.

3. Indian withdrawal plan would also be needed in such cases to ensure that withdrawal of Pakistani forces at any stage, do not remain out of sync within the overall environment, in order to avoid being blamed for slow movement etc.

The commission proposed 7 weeks for Pakistan and 3 months for India for their respective troop withdrawal.

UNCIP 3rd Interim Report;Para 234; pg 61

A period of 7 weeks was envisaged for the complete withdrawal of Pakistan troops. In a covering letter to the Government of India a plan was suggested for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces to take place within a period of 3 months. The Commission's proposals of different time limits for the withdrawal of the Pakistan and Indian forces was determined by the inadequacy of road conditions between Kashmir and India and the differences in terrain and distances between Kashmir and India and the differences in terrain and distances between forward area in Kashmir and base areas in India and in Pakistan. For Pakistan, withdrawal is comparatively easy to achieve and can be quickly carried out. For India it is a more difficult and longer military operation.​

How could the commission pronounce judgment on a request for synchronization being incompatible with the terms of August 13, Resolution, when the event could not have been completed without some form of synchronization and necessary coordination.

This either displayed a lack of understanding on the part of the commission or a clear bias.

The commission also stated that, Pakistani request was not the only method of assuring this form of synchronization and that full and free exchange of information was not necessary. It clearly implied that other forms of synchronization could be used, which could be in contradiction to commission's earlier pronouncements.

Commission didn't disagree with the obvious 'synchronization' that was envisaged by the Resolution. Commission disagreed with Pakistan's spin on how this 'synchronization' was to be achieved. Agreeing to the demand for 'the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans' would imply that Pakistan was also a party to the negotiation. But the Resolution envisaged the Indian plans 'to be agreed upon with the Commission' not Pakistan. In other words, it was Commission that would be the only party to the negotiation with India and it was Commission that would decide if the Indian plan was fair. Not Pakistan.

Hence, 'Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a 'synchronization' which would have been incompatible with the terms of Resolution of 13 August.'

By demanding something that was clearly not part of the Resolution, Pakistan was deliberately scuttling the process of demilitarization and consequently plebiscite. Pakistan was well aware that neither India nor Commission would agree to it. Curiously, when it suited, Pakistan wanted strict adherence to the literal meaning of the Resolution. When it didn't they resorted to 'interpretations'.

If full or free exchange of information exchange was not considered necessary by the commission, did the commission then expect to take Pakistani or Indian forces under its own command in order to plan and coordinate the withdrawal, to order them when to start withdrawing and when to stop. This could not have happened, nor was it within the mandate of the commission.

So, how would the withdrawal be coordinated, without synchronization of effort.

UNCIP 3rd Interim Report, Para 234; pg 61

The Commission's reference to synchronization should be interpreted to mean that discussions with the Government of India concerning the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces would ensue without delay and lead to the establishment of a time sequence for the two withdrawals agreed upon between the respective High Commands and Commission after the acceptance of the Truce Terms by both Governments. The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans. It was feasible, in the Commission's judgment and the Commission's military adviser had had this in mind, that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represnt a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadavantage.​

Further:

UNCIP 3rd Interim Report, Para 244; pg 65

The Commission did take into account Pakistan's concern that the withdrawal be synchronized. It repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the two Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces, a part of that agreement, was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side.​

When Pakistan signed the Truce Agreement, Pakistan agreed to take UN appointed Commission as the 'mediation party'. But when the real negotiations began, Pakistan wanted to completely bypass the Commission.

 

[DGMO]

Oh God, still on this subject I see. Can't we just move on and realise that debating whatever happened will make no difference to the final solution on Kashmir?

LoC as the border is that solution, so why continue to cover old ground? Totally pointless.

 

[Jinx1]

When the discussion took turn towards the aspects being discussed now, the bone of contention was that the resolution was crystal clear, black and white. And that there was no need to interpret its clauses any further or seek additional information and clarifications. And that it should have been implemented, being so clear and concise.

Different interpretations, as interpreted by different posters here is indicative of the fact that even crystal clear clauses may have different meanings for one and different for the other.

The mere fact that a commission was constituted to check and oversee the implementation of the resolution, confirms in my opinion, that there would have been ambiguities and differing interpretations.

The most surprising aspect has been, again in my opinion, an almost lack of information as to how bi-lateral or multi-lateral discussions in such matters proceed. Unless of-course one of the parties has suffered a total defeat and is offered no other option but to acquiesce.

In this case, the two parties had differing interpretations of same clauses, irrespective of the fact that both parties had agreed to the overall resolution. The formulated commission could offer its own opinion about the so-called sense of the UNSC resolution, but it was not granted the powers to effect a force-implementation.

Some further interesting aspects emerge from the discussion so far:

How could Pakistan have initiated withdrawal without knowing details of Indian Plan, as Indian withdrawal was linked to the withdrawal of Pakistan. You could not segregate the two and expect a smooth undertaking. And stating that this was not required is downright frivolous.

Pakistan was not seeking direct parleys with the Indians and was interacting through the commission.

The withdrawal of Indian forces would commence after the withdrawal of Pathans was completed. How would the Pathans withdraw. They also needed time and they being irregulars and civilians needed much more time to get organized and undertake a withdrawal. Due appropriation to this aspect was not adequately dealt with.

The 7 weeks time period for Pakistan was also contentious. More time was needed by Pakistan as well. This was due to the deployment of troops far ahead of the existing road and track infrastructure. Coming down from the mountain based deployment to the road-head needed more time, though after arriving at the road-head, remaining travel was comparatively shorter. The staff checks conducted by the commission’s military adviser were highly contentious as well.

Both sides were interpreting various constituent clauses of the resolution to suit their interests. What’s wrong with this. These were two independent sovereign states, unless India perceived that Pakistan was somehow a lesser state of the two.

Pakistan never intended to bypass the commission. Infact all negotiations were taking place through the commission. The commission was a mediation party and not a deciding authority. Certain proposals the commission made were not considered appropriate by Pakistan and Pakistan was well within its right to do so.

Again, the main impediment here seems to be incomplete information or the lack-thereof, as to how such parleys are conducted between two independent and sovereign states. Both sides fight to serve their interests and there are no morals involved. It is my interest against yours.

The historians of both sides would tend to project the viewpoint which suits their nations. The term unbiased historians is a farce.

Indians here may not agree to the sequence of events, viewpoints and interpretations highlighted by Pakistan – please don’t. It is not going to change the facts as are apparent to me.

There would always be two sides of the coin and both would have different engravings.

 

[karan.1970]

Oh God, still on this subject I see. Can't we just move on and realise that debating whatever happened will make no difference to the final solution on Kashmir?

LoC as the border is that solution, so why continue to cover old ground? Totally pointless.

Because some people prefer living in hypotheticals instead of the real world