How Kashmir was stolen from Pakistan by Mountbatten

[Joe Shearer]

Sir,

There were many aspects to which India did not agree as well, with regard to not only the commission, the subsequent representative appointees also. The commission or others, may or may not have agreed with either India or Pakistan, they had to report their findings to the UNSC.

The mere fact that it took 113 meetings of the commission of which Josef Korbel was part of, with all concerned parties in 1948, to negotiate a basic ceasefire. Without Korbel, the Commission held another 126 meetings in a vain attempt to move forward on a truce agreement and plebiscite (Korbel mentions about this in his book, Danger in Kashmir). Korbel feared that a failure to settle the Kashmir dispute would fragment potential South Asian unity to the benefit of communist activism and potential domination.

Subsequent UN appointed individual mediators also followed with no better result.

The US-Pakistan agreement alarmed Nehru. Korbel’s analysis also partly supports Nehru’s concerns. However, despite this, considering the length and breadth of commission’s and interaction of other individual intermediaries’ consultations and Nehru’s raison-d’être for not holding plebiscite, it still did not highlight non-withdrawal of Pakistani Army as the major impediment for not holding the plebiscite.

After not reaching an agreement in various aspects, the later representatives also, in order to further the process made repeated additional changes/suggestions, while remaining within the ambit of overall UNSC resolutions. They would add or subtract or improve when either Pakistan or India would not agree to certain suggestions. Therefore, they were exercising flexibility in order to reach some amenable conclusion, while remaining within the ambit of UNSC resolution. Many examples exist and you can not straight-jacket it to either or nothing scenario which may have been presented, as the final authority was not the commission or an individual, but the UNSC to which they would report.

Like I said before also, we can continue discussing this, can quote different people, different reports and different analyses and findings. We still would not find a common ground on this aspect.

Sir,

You mention many aspects to which India did not agree as well. I put it to you that my question was simple and remains unanswered. Second, i put it to you that there was nothing in the Commission's proceedings other than the failure of Pakistan to comply with the Resolution that India did not agree to. Irrespective of it not being mentioned in the Commission's reports, the records of the Commission show the actual position.

Discussion of the efforts of subsequent interlocutors becomes futile.

My point is simple. The task before the Commission was straightforward and uncomplicated. There is all the evidence in the world that Pakistan was obstructive, and created impediments, asking for extensions of the Resolution to suit their own ends, the protraction of the proceedings and ultimate frustration of the entire effort, knowing very well that a plebiscite would go against them. There is no evidence to justify any surmise of Indian obstruction of the proceedings.

Bringing in the subsequent developments, when a series of interlocutors proposed their own modifications of the UN Resolution, is a retrospective justification. None of those subsequent proceedings had any relevance to the original meetings, and the record shows clearly what happened.

Once again, would you agree, absence of mention of this in the Commission reports notwithstanding, the only sticking point was the intransigence of Pakitan?

 

[A1Kaid]

His nephew, sister's son, is Prince Philip of Greece, Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Consort to the Queen of Great Britain. The next British monarch is likely to be his Great-nephew, Charles, Prince of Wales, who will have the surname Mountbatten-Windsor when (and if) he ascends the throne, and his descendants, after him.

Philip took the surname Mountbatten when he became a British citizen, but he was not a Mountbatten, he was a Gluecksburg, a junior branch of the Danish royal family, the Oldenburgs. His mother was a Mountbatten, or rather, a Battenberg. The Battenbergs settled in Britain were embarrassed by their German titles when WWI broke out, and the senior of the House in Britain, Admiral of the Fleet Louis Lord Battenberg was given an English title, the Marquess of Milford Haven, by his cousin the King of Britain, George V. This (older) Louis' daughter Alice married Prince Andrew of Greece, and was Philip's mother. His son joined the Navy and came to India as Viceroy, later being raised to the Peerage as Earl Mountbatten of Burma.

Mountbatten's own children and grand-children included Patricia, Lady Mountbatten, who inherited the title, married Lord Brabourne and had eight children. Seven survive; one of the two youngest (twins) was murdered with his grandfather by the IRA.

His younger daughter, Lady Pamela Mountbatten, married David Hicks and had three children.

Thank you for the well-informed response, I do remember learning the British monarchy are originally from Germany and were transplanted in Britain to rule England. Many of them changed their surnames, the earlier generations of monarchs couldn't even speak English when they were ruling England.

 

[Nelson]

Was it Mountbaton who ordered PA to infiltrate in Kashmir without the latter approved its accession to Pakistan??

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thank you for the well-informed response, I do remember learning the British monarchy are originally from Germany and were transplanted in Britain to rule England. Many of them changed their surnames, the earlier generations of monarchs couldn't even speak English when they were ruling England.

You are quite right, of course. The British had decided, after their bad experience with the returned Stuarts, specifically, with James II,s who was adamantly Catholic, that no Catholic would come to reign. This meant that the monarchy shifted to the daughters of Charles I who had married Protestants, first to William and Mary, then, after they both died, to Anne, finally, to the son of Sophie, George, Elector of Hanover, who came to the throne as George I, and did not have a word of English. His great-grandsons both came to reign, as George IV, and as William IV. Neither of them had children, so the daughter of the fourth son, Edward, Duke of Kent, came to the throne as Victoria. She was a Hanover, but married Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, so the royal family was the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha family until George V changed their name to Windsor.

In other words, the next King will be descended from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha on his mother's side, Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Gluecksburg on his father's side; the Mountbatten name is an adopted one.

Simple enough, isn't it?

Was it Mountbaton who ordered PA to infiltrate in Kashmir without the latter approved its accession to Pakistan??

No.

It was Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, but acting with the vague knowledge of Jinnah. Jinnah specifically wanted not to be told, not to be involved in what he held in distaste.

 

[Nelson]

No.

It was Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, but acting with the vague knowledge of Jinnah. Jinnah specifically wanted not to be told, not to be involved in what he held in distaste.

That means that Kashmir was not stolen by Mountbaton (as claimed by the article) but Pakistan threw it away for showing her immaturity and impatience. Pakistanis should blame their own policies for this mess and not Mountbaton or India for that matter.

 

[Nassr]

Sir,

You mention many aspects to which India did not agree as well. I put it to you that my question was simple and remains unanswered. Second, i put it to you that there was nothing in the Commission's proceedings other than the failure of Pakistan to comply with the Resolution that India did not agree to. Irrespective of it not being mentioned in the Commission's reports, the records of the Commission show the actual position.

Discussion of the efforts of subsequent interlocutors becomes futile.

My point is simple. The task before the Commission was straightforward and uncomplicated. There is all the evidence in the world that Pakistan was obstructive, and created impediments, asking for extensions of the Resolution to suit their own ends, the protraction of the proceedings and ultimate frustration of the entire effort, knowing very well that a plebiscite would go against them. There is no evidence to justify any surmise of Indian obstruction of the proceedings.

Bringing in the subsequent developments, when a series of interlocutors proposed their own modifications of the UN Resolution, is a retrospective justification. None of those subsequent proceedings had any relevance to the original meetings, and the record shows clearly what happened.

Once again, would you agree, absence of mention of this in the Commission reports notwithstanding, the only sticking point was the intransigence of Pakitan?

A process is being followed. There is a dialectic involved. If Pakistan does not agree to certain interpretations offered by the commission, it had a right to do so. The commission did not have the power to force its will on Pakistan, neither did India. When a portion of the process did not yield result, it was furthered, through appointment of other interlocutors following normal conflict resolution norms.

If Pakistan feels that certain aspects are not in its interest, it objects. How can you term it intransigence. What if the Indians feel that there are certain aspects which are not in their interest and they object. Would you term it as being intransigent.

I have read the commission’s report and the observations of individual members like Korbel etc. And in my opinion many of their demands were outright frivolous. The commission’s inclination and bias was as clear as the daylight. There are many others who opined identically.

A process like this does not end with non-agreement in one particular phase. You surprise me when you say that the discussion of subsequent interlocutors became futile. It smacks of arrogance. A small new upstart challenges great India – is that what you want to imply.

The multi-lateral dialogue process is a tedious undertaking and is never easy. The retrospective judgments and decisions would come into play if needed. And just because it happens, does not mean that the process failed.

The difference in interpretation between Pakistan and India in this case is so wide that both will have to lose quite a lot to arrive at a consensus.

 

[Ticker]

OK, OK, smart Alec!

You do know your stuff, though you use it to propagandize.

Don't we all sir.

 

[Joe Shearer]

A process is being followed. There is a dialectic involved. If Pakistan does not agree to certain interpretations offered by the commission, it had a right to do so. The commission did not have the power to force its will on Pakistan, neither did India. When a portion of the process did not yield result, it was furthered, through appointment of other interlocutors following normal conflict resolution norms.

It is mistaken to believe that the Commission sought the power to force its will on Pakistan, considering that it sought to interpret the Resolution which formed its basis in minimal terms. It was Pakistan that sought to interpret the Resoution, and read nuances into it which never existed, for purposes of its own. How can we decide that Pakistan, against whose presence in the disputed area the Resolution was worded, in unambiguous terms, and which took upon itself a revision of both wording and spirit of the Resolution, had a right to disagree? A right to disagree might have existed if the Commission sought to do what was not contained in the Resolution; for such a right to exist when the Commission sought to do the precise things set out for it and the disagreeing party disagreed due to a desire to extend the scope and wording is contradictory.

If Pakistan feels that certain aspects are not in its interest, it objects. How can you term it intransigence. What if the Indians feel that there are certain aspects which are not in their interest and they object. Would you term it as being intransigent.

This was not about nationality but about acceptance of the terms of the Resolution. It is important to concentrate on that for the simple reason that the Pakistani administration has hoodwinked the world by letting it be understood that it was for a plebiscite, and India was not, while carefully concealing the facts about the systematic sabotage of the Commission's initial proceedings.

In such a case, whichever party agrees with the bare interpretation of the Resolution, and cooperates with the Commission, is to be considered positive; whichever party disagrees, and seeks to superimpose its own interests through stalling the proceeds, is intransigent. Is that unfair?

It boils down to Pakistan seeking to dilute the implied rebuke contained in the wording of the Resolution, and to neutralize its effect by twisting it on the ground.

I have read the commission’s report and the observations of individual members like Korbel etc. And in my opinion many of their demands were outright frivolous. The commission’s inclination and bias was as clear as the daylight. There are many others who opined identically.

Would you care to display a single instance in which it sought to deviate from the Resolution?

If strict compliance is termed bias, and unbiased proceedings are identified with the interpolated desires of a rebuked party, surely the bias in the judgement itself is evident? If the Resolution says one thing, and your opinions say another, which should we give more weight, in terms of the intentions of the UN?

A process like this does not end with non-agreement in one particular phase. You surprise me when you say that the discussion of subsequent interlocutors became futile. It smacks of arrogance. A small new upstart challenges great India – is that what you want to imply.

That is not what I mean to imply, and it is not going to work to make me feel guilty of bullying a small, helpless, new entity by asking that we stick to the facts rather than encourage fishing expeditions.

The process did not end with disagreement on one small phrase. It ended with the Pakistani disruption of the entire process by flat refusal to comply with the terms of the Resolution: in bald terms, with the Resolution itself. When the Commission reverted to its parent body, the response was to reiterate the terms of the original Resolution. Any change in response to Pakistan's strenuous efforts to alter things to its own liking might have been incorporated then, if the UN was so inclined. Apparently, it was not.

For that reason, and no other, I termed the efforts of other interlocutors futile.

Trust that the point is abundantly clear.

The multi-lateral dialogue process is a tedious undertaking and is never easy. The retrospective judgments and decisions would come into play if needed. And just because it happens, does not mean that the process failed.

There was no multilateral dialogue process at the level of the Commission. That dialogue had already taken place in the UN. The UN took a view. Pakistan disagreed with that view, seemingly, because its actions at the Commission level suggest that. Instead of getting its point at the UN, it was sought to get it by stopping the process of the plebiscite dead in its tracks by raising requests that reversed the implications of the Resolution.

What you have deemed earlier the bias of the Commission was no such thing; it was the sense of the UN. We criticize Nehru severely for allowing the matter to go to the UN when a military victory was well within sight. We tend to forget that the UN. In fact backed India's stand by its wording of its Resolution. That wording showed clearly what it thought had happened and what the situation on the ground was. It was thereafter Pakistan's fixed and sole intention to convert this rebuke into an equally distributed decision. There was no equal distribution in the thinking of the UN and it shows very clearly what the world thought at that moment.

All the argument at the Commission and subsequently, for instance, here, is intended to neutralize that stinging criticism of Pakistan's failed aggression.

The difference in interpretation between Pakistan and India in this is so wide that both will have to lose quite a lot to arrive at a consensus.

It has been made wide by one side, as is its wont, in order to secure gains through a compromise between the existing position of one side and the expanded position of the other. Except where the existing position is maintained by a hugely weaker entity, this is unlikely to succeed, which will explain why bilateral discussions between the two countries seldom succeed. One side seeks to bargain without any strength, and is then aggrieved at its lack of success and accuses the other of exercising its superior strength in unfair ways. A strange and perverse argument, from a weak power seeking to browbeat a stronger power.

 

[Bang Galore]

....... Except where the existing position is maintained by a hugely weaker entity, this is unlikely to succeed, which will explain why bilateral discussions between the two countries seldom succeed. One side seeks to bargain without any strength, and is then aggrieved at its lack of success and accuses the other of exercising its superior strength in unfair ways. A strange and perverse argument, from a weak power seeking to browbeat a stronger power.

This small paragraph beautifully sums up the India-Pakistani relationship better that what reams & reams of paper written on the subject don't.

 

[Ticker]

It is mistaken to believe that the Commission sought the power to force its will on Pakistan, considering that it sought to interpret the Resolution which formed its basis in minimal terms. It was Pakistan that sought to interpret the Resoution, and read nuances into it which never existed, for purposes of its own. How can we decide that Pakistan, against whose presence in the disputed area the Resolution was worded, in unambiguous terms, and which took upon itself a revision of both wording and spirit of the Resolution, had a right to disagree? A right to disagree might have existed if the Commission sought to do what was not contained in the Resolution; for such a right to exist when the Commission sought to do the precise things set out for it and the disagreeing party disagreed due to a desire to extend the scope and wording is contradictory.

Pakistan also had the right to interpret the wording of the resolution as it deemed appropriate. So did India. If you think the commission was the only one who could interpret in whatever manner it could, you are wrong. It could and then in the absence of an agreement would report to the UNSC. That’s what it did.

This was not about nationality but about acceptance of the terms of the Resolution. It is important to concentrate on that for the simple reason that the Pakistani administration has hoodwinked the world by letting it be understood that it was for a plebiscite, and India was not, while carefully concealing the facts about the systematic sabotage of the Commission's initial proceedings.

In such a case, whichever party agrees with the bare interpretation of the Resolution, and cooperates with the Commission, is to be considered positive; whichever party disagrees, and seeks to superimpose its own interests through stalling the proceeds, is intransigent. Is that unfair?

It boils down to Pakistan seeking to dilute the implied rebuke contained in the wording of the Resolution, and to neutralize its effect by twisting it on the ground.

Pakistan accepted the resolution. But at the same time like any other country it reserved the right to interpret its various articles as it deemed appropriate. It would not accept India’s biased interpretation or commission’s interpretation thrust down its throat, primarily because it was a weaker party or that India being a bigger party and therefore her interpretation is correct, or India perceived that Pakistan was attempting to hoodwink the world. The resolution never said that Pakistan has to accept India’s interpreted version. You can perceive anything as to why Pakistan interpreted a particular article in the manner that it did. Pakistan wanted to create this or that impression or because Pakistan’s Foreign Minister didn’t brush his teeth that morning.

Would you care to display a single instance in which it sought to deviate from the Resolution?

If strict compliance is termed bias, and unbiased proceedings are identified with the interpolated desires of a rebuked party, surely the bias in the judgement itself is evident? If the Resolution says one thing, and your opinions say another, which should we give more weight, in terms of the intentions of the UN?

Who said anybody deviated from the resolution. It was the interpretation of certain articles which was contested. Pakistan did not agree with the India’s or commission’s interpretation in certain articles. Like you say, “If the resolution says one thing and your opinion says another thing, which should we give more weight, in terms of intentions of the UN?

Who decides the correct interpretation, India, Pakistan, Commission? If a party does not agree, they take it back to the UNSC. That’s what they did.

That is not what I mean to imply, and it is not going to work to make me feel guilty of bullying a small, helpless, new entity by asking that we stick to the facts rather than encourage fishing expeditions.

The process did not end with disagreement on one small phrase. It ended with the Pakistani disruption of the entire process by flat refusal to comply with the terms of the Resolution: in bald terms, with the Resolution itself. When the Commission reverted to its parent body, the response was to reiterate the terms of the original Resolution. Any change in response to Pakistan's strenuous efforts to alter things to its own liking might have been incorporated then, if the UN was so inclined. Apparently, it was not.

For that reason, and no other, I termed the efforts of other interlocutors futile.

Trust that the point is abundantly clear.

Which means that after the failure of initial rounds in a dialogue, and if I form a perception, subsequent parleys would be futile. It normally doesn’t happen this way unless the accusing party has already decided the outcome.

There was no multilateral dialogue process at the level of the Commission. That dialogue had already taken place in the UN. The UN took a view. Pakistan disagreed with that view, seemingly, because its actions at the Commission level suggest that. Instead of getting its point at the UN, it was sought to get it by stopping the process of the plebiscite dead in its tracks by raising requests that reversed the implications of the Resolution.

What you have deemed earlier the bias of the Commission was no such thing; it was the sense of the UN. We criticize Nehru severely for allowing the matter to go to the UN when a military victory was well within sight. We tend to forget that the UN. In fact backed India's stand by its wording of its Resolution. That wording showed clearly what it thought had happened and what the situation on the ground was. It was thereafter Pakistan's fixed and sole intention to convert this rebuke into an equally distributed decision. There was no equal distribution in the thinking of the UN and it shows very clearly what the world thought at that moment.

All the argument at the Commission and subsequently, for instance, here, is intended to neutralize that stinging criticism of Pakistan's failed aggression.

That’s what you think and it’s your interpretation of events. Which is entirely wrong. Why would you go to the UN if you thought you could win the war. Pakistan asked India earlier to collectively approach the UN. India refused, as it thought they could win the war. When Pakistan consolidated its gains, India knew that it cannot win the war and thus went running to the UN. And in the end the favourite ploy is blame it all on Nehru. Poor man can’t even reply.

Conveying the sense of the UN, as interpreted by the commission was not agreed to by Pakistan. Pakistan had the right to do this. Whatever and however the twist you may like to spun it with, Pakistan exercised its right as a sovereign and independent state. And please take it out of your mind that Pakistan spoiled it in order to avoid a plebiscite. There is nothing far from the truth than Shangri La from reality.

Pakistan’s failed aggression gained it enough real-estate. Infact it was an Indian aggression which failed. India wanted an ethnically cleansed Muslim less Kashmir. It sent forces and hordes from Patiala, Alwar etc etc to Kashmir to kill or force Muslims out. This pogrom started much before the so-called Pathan invasion commenced.

It has been made wide by one side, as is its wont, in order to secure gains through a compromise between the existing position of one side and the expanded position of the other. Except where the existing position is maintained by a hugely weaker entity, this is unlikely to succeed, which will explain why bilateral discussions between the two countries seldom succeed. One side seeks to bargain without any strength, and is then aggrieved at its lack of success and accuses the other of exercising its superior strength in unfair ways. A strange and perverse argument, from a weak power seeking to browbeat a stronger power.

When a stronger power failed to attain its objectives against a weaker power through the use of force, it sought refuge and support from an umbrella of powers and wanted to attain the same very objectives, perverse as it may sound, through a coerced dialogue process. Having failed to even coercively use a dialogue process, blamed the weaker power of aggression and capture of territory and attempts to avoid Plebiscite of a people who would have favoured the weaker rather than joining the stronger to avoid becoming a minority.

 

[toxic_pus]

Thank You Toxic Sahib,Some Interesting Points Have Been Raised

And yet you have only rehashed the same old arguments.

Regarding Your First Point Yes Many Points Which Could Have Helped Pakistan Get Better Concessions From Were Ignored.One Good Reason Could Have Been That Quaid E Azam and and The Pakistani Government Were Not Aware Of The Detailed Information As To What Was Really Happening In Kashmir At That Point of Time and What The Indian Machinations Were.

Part II, para A(1) of the all pervasive Security Council resolution of 13th August, 1948, begins thus:

'As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council....'​

That's Pakistan's machination codified in the body-text of the resolution. Do you know what it is referring to?

Or for that matter, why did it take 9 odd months for Pakistan to sign the Truce Agreement, which India signed within 15 days of it being passed at Security Council?

1.When The Nawab Of Junagadh Acceded To Pakistan,The Indian Government and UN Was Informed.No Such SOP Was Followed By India In Case Of Kashmir.None Of This Was Done.The Indian Government Claimed That The Original Accession Agreement Was Lost rendering Their Claim To Be Even More Suspicious.

Pretty much irrelevant. The rules of accession as prescribed by extant laws were followed in toto. The original accession Instrument is now a public document

India’s False Claim on Kashmir On October 28th 1993, Robin Raphel stated that Washington did not recognise the Instrument of Accession to India as meaning that Kashmir is not forever more an integral part of India. She expressed the view that the whole of Kashmir is disputed territory, the future status of which must be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

Again, US views on Kashmir have no bearing on UN resolutions and Indian Constitution.

2.I Will Not Comment Much On The Words of Prem Chand Mahajan.Considering The Fact That He Was A Party To The Conflict and Later Would Hold Prominent Positions In The Indian Administration.I Will Certainly Doubt His Neutrality.

If you have any means to refute Prem Chand, do so. Don't hide behind the issue of 'neutrality', because that would make everybody from Jinnah to Nehru unquotable because they were also 'party to the conflict'.

3.Victoria Schofield Is Right In Saying That In Return For Indian Military Aid,He Would Accede To India.A Promise To Accede Does Not Amount To Full Accession.Even When You Sell Land You Have To Follow Legal Procedures.You Have To Have A Sales Deed.You Cannot Just Sell Land By The Word Of The Mouth.

4.Miss Victoria's Quote Does Not Vindicate India's Stance In Anyway.She Did Not Say The Accession Document Had Indeed Been Signed Before The Airlift Of Indian Soldiers. [...] Once The Troops Started Landing In Srinagar and The Maharaja Became Totally Dependent Upon The Sweet Will of The Indian Government,He Would Have Signed Anything,Even His Death Warrant.

Nonsense.

I have already explained in my earlier post why it is irrelevant if the actual signing happened after the landing of Indian troops. Meeting of minds between the Maharaja and the Indian Govt. regarding accession of J & K had already happened long before the troops were given orders to board those Dokotas. Victorial Schofield - not that I consider her to be of any authority, but since you quoted her - agrees as much. Signing was a matter of formality. Whether it happened before the troops landed or after, doesn't in any way prejudice the Instrument.

5.You Only Quoted A Portion Of My Reference and Arguements.I Wish You Had Answered One By One.I Will Quote Again and Reiterate my Point

I have responded to the basic points raised in that post. That should suffice.

6.Regarding The Airlift Of The Indian Troops Itself,A Man No Less Than Lord Mountbatten Stated


“In all my extensive experience as Allied Commander in South-East Asia and Pacific during the Second World War, I have never seen an airlift of this magnitude with such slender resources and at such short notice”

Three C47 Dakotas No 12 Sqn RIAF took off from Willingdon (Safdarjung) airfield at 0500h on 27 Oct 1947 with troops of the 1st Sikh Regiment ex-Gurgaon. The first aircraft touched down at 0830h, within hours of the signing of the aleged 'Instrument of Accession'.The Fact That Such A Large Airlift In Such A Short Time Must Have Been Planned Well In Advance.It Is Just Not Possible That Pundit Nehru Gave The Order and The Operation Started All Of A Sudden.This Also Puts Indian Intentions Under Suspicion.

Following is the text of the document jointly signed by General R.M.M. Lockhart, Commander-In-Chief Indian Army, Air-Marshal T.W.Elmhirst, Chief of Royal Indian Air Force and Rear Admiral J.T.S.Hall, Chief of Royal Indian Navy. It was presented to the Council at the UN Meeting #234, 23 Jan, 1948 [pg 222-3].

'It has been alleged that plans were made for sending Indian forces to Kashmir at some date before 22 October, on which day the raid on that State from the direction of Abbottabad began.

1. The following is a true time-table of events, as regards decisions taken, plans made, orders given, and movement started in this matter:

2. On 24 October the Commander-in-Chief, received information that tribesmen had seized Muzaffarabad. This was the first indication of the raid.

3. Prior to this date, no plans of any sort for sending Indian forces into Kashmir had been formulated or even considered. On the morning of 25 October, we were directed to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to Kashmir by air and road, in case this should be necessary to stop the tribal incursions. This was the first direction which we received on this subject. No steps had been taken, prior to the meeting, to examine or prepare such plans.

4. On the afternoon of 25 October we sent one staff officer of the Indian Army and one of the Royal Indian Air Force by air to Srinagar. There they saw officers of the Kashmir State Forces. This was the first contact between officers of our Headquarters and officers of the Kashmir State Forces on the subject of sending Indian troops of Kashmir.

5. On the afternoon of 25 October we also issued orders to an infantry battalion to prepare itself to be flown, at short notice, to Srinagar, in the event of the Government of India deciding to accept the accession of Kashmir and to send help.

6. On the morning of 26 October the staff officers mentioned in paragraph 4 above. returned from Srinagar and reported on their meetings with officers of the Kashmir State Forces.

7. On the afternoon of 26 October we finalized our plans for the dispatch by air of troops to Kashmir.

8. At first light on the morning of 27 October, with Kashmir's Instrument of Accession signed, the movement by air of Indian forces to Kashmir began. No plans were made for sending thees forces, nor were such plans even considered before 25 October, three days after the tribal incursions began.'​

[...contd.]

 

[toxic_pus]

Would you care to display a single instance in which it sought to deviate from the Resolution?

Unfortunately, several instances can be given, but all were in favour of Pakistan. Numerous attempts were made to equate India with Pakistan, former being the victim, later the aggressor. Proposals were given that went right against the spirit of the Truce Agreement but put Pakistan in a favourable position. So much so, one rapporteur even completely disregarded a previous Commission report to militarily weaken Indian position in J & K.

There is a reason why Nehru, once a great advocate for UN, literally gave up on UN.

It has been made wide by one side, as is its wont, in order to secure gains through a compromise between the existing position of one side and the expanded position of the other. Except where the existing position is maintained by a hugely weaker entity, this is unlikely to succeed, which will explain why bilateral discussions between the two countries seldom succeed. One side seeks to bargain without any strength, and is then aggrieved at its lack of success and accuses the other of exercising its superior strength in unfair ways. A strange and perverse argument, from a weak power seeking to browbeat a stronger power.

Absolute gem.

 

[Joe Shearer]

It is mistaken to believe that the Commission sought the power to force its will on Pakistan, considering that it sought to interpret the Resolution which formed its basis in minimal terms. It was Pakistan that sought to interpret the Resoution, and read nuances into it which never existed, for purposes of its own. How can we decide that Pakistan, against whose presence in the disputed area the Resolution was worded, in unambiguous terms, and which took upon itself a revision of both wording and spirit of the Resolution, had a right to disagree? A right to disagree might have existed if the Commission sought to do what was not contained in the Resolution; for such a right to exist when the Commission sought to do the precise things set out for it and the disagreeing party disagreed due to a desire to extend the scope and wording is contradictory.
Original Post By Joe Shearer

Pakistan also had the right to interpret the wording of the resolution as it deemed appropriate. So did India. If you think the commission was the only one who could interpret in whatever manner it could, you are wrong. It could and then in the absence of an agreement would report to the UNSC. That’s what it did.

This was not about nationality but about acceptance of the terms of the Resolution. It is important to concentrate on that for the simple reason that the Pakistani administration has hoodwinked the world by letting it be understood that it was for a plebiscite, and India was not, while carefully concealing the facts about the systematic sabotage of the Commission's initial proceedings.

In such a case, whichever party agrees with the bare interpretation of the Resolution, and cooperates with the Commission, is to be considered positive; whichever party disagrees, and seeks to superimpose its own interests through stalling the proceeds, is intransigent. Is that unfair?

It boils down to Pakistan seeking to dilute the implied rebuke contained in the wording of the Resolution, and to neutralize its effect by twisting it on the ground.

Pakistan accepted the resolution. But at the same time like any other country it reserved the right to interpret its various articles as it deemed appropriate. It would not accept India’s biased interpretation or commission’s interpretation thrust down its throat, primarily because it was a weaker party or that India being a bigger party and therefore her interpretation is correct, or India perceived that Pakistan was attempting to hoodwink the world. The resolution never said that Pakistan has to accept India’s interpreted version. You can perceive anything as to why Pakistan interpreted a particular article in the manner that it did. Pakistan wanted to create this or that m
All the argument at the Commission and subsequently, for instance, here, is intended to neutralize that stinging criticism of Pakistan's failed aggression.

That’s what you think and it’s your interpretation of events. Which is entirely wrong. Why would you go to the UN if you thought you could win the war. Pakistan asked India earlier to collectively approach the UN. India refused, as it thought they could win the war. When Pakistan consolidated its gains, India knew that it cannot win the war and thus went running to the UN. And in the end the favourite ploy is blame it all on Nehru. Poor man can’t even reply.

Conveying the sense of the UN, as interpreted by the commission was not agreed to by Pakistan. Pakistan had the right to do this. Whatever and however the twist you may like to spun it with, Pakistan exercised its right as a sovereign and independent state. And please take it out of your mind that Pakistan spoiled it in order to avoid a plebiscite. There is nothing far from the truth than Shangri La from reality.

Pakistan’s failed aggression gained it enough real-estate. Infact it was an Indian aggression which failed. India wanted an ethnically cleansed Muslim less Kashmir. It sent forces and hordes from Patiala, Alwar etc etc to Kashmir to kill or force Muslims out. This pogrom started much before the so-called Pathan invasion commenced.

It has been made wide by one side, as is its wont, in order to secure gains through a compromise between the existing position of one side and the expanded position of the other. Except where the existing position is maintained by a hugely weaker entity, this is unlikely to succeed, which will explain why bilateral discussions between the two countries seldom succeed. One side seeks to bargain without any strength, and is then aggrieved at its lack of success and accuses the other of exercising its superior strength in unfair ways. A strange and perverse argument, from a weak power seeking to browbeat a stronger power.

When a stronger power failed to attain its objectives against a weaker power through the use of force, it sought refuge and support from an umbrella of powers and wanted to attain the same very objectives, perverse as it may sound, through a coerced dialogue process. Having failed to even coercively use a dialogue process, blamed the weaker power of aggression and capture of territory and attempts to avoid Plebiscite of a people who would have favoured the weaker rather than joining the stronger to avoid becoming a minority.

It all boils down to this: while the text of the Resolution is in front of us all, apologists for Pakistan feel that it needed interpretation, and that both the Commission and India were in effect interpreting it when they wished to implement it in literally the way it was worded.

Does it sound right even from within your patriotic fog to insist that deviation from the exact wording of the resolution was an interpretation, and that literal adherence to it was also an interpretation? Are you equating the action of somebody who reads 2+2=4 as 2+2= something which has to be determined by mutual discussion, because we lose if 2+2=4, with somebody else who says 2+2=4 means just that, 2+2=4, nothing more, nothing less? Do you see no fallacy in this equalization?

You spoke about India's interpreted version. How did India's version deviate from the wording, and if it didn't deviate, how can it be termed an interpretation? Why should it be necessary to interpret something as clearly worded as this resolution?

You deny that there was any deviation from the wording. The text is in front of you. Do you see no difference between that and the Pakistani position? There was no question of interpretation, as you can see for yourself. Which part needed interpretation? Would you reproduce it, for us to understand what mystic formation caused the Pakistani side such anxiety?

The question of considering further proceedings futile emerges straightaway from this issue. If you believe, with the straightforward text on front of you, that it needed interpretation, will anyone neutral, uninvolved in this dispute, take your position seriously? Would you have taken such a determined bid to reverse the sense of the resolution as indicating any inclination to resolve the problem? Or would you have understood the determination of the other side to deny reality as a clear signal that further progress was not possible?

With regard to the timing and motivation for India to approach the UN, it has already been pointed out to the fanboys that the greatest extent of Pakistani occupation of Kashmir was when Pakistani forces, the Gilgit Scouts, were besieging Leh, Kargil was iniakistani occupation, Baramula was in Pakistani occupation, and the Mehtar's forces in occupation of Skardu. When the reference to the UN was made, Leh had been relieved permanently, Kargil had been taken back, Baramula and the entire route to Muzaffarnagar cleared, and Indian troops occupied the Haji Pir Pass.

Does it, even to you, sound as if India was not in increasingly control of the situation, and Pakistan had lost ground?

 

[Executioner]

ha ha .......... Himmat hai to cheer lo.

Kashmir maangein ge nahin ...........

zabadasti cheen len ge ............ Himmat hai to rok lo.

It's has been 65 yr still no luck, how many year you need. Le lo Kashmir zabardasti you are more than welcome.

 

[Ticker]

It all boils down to this: while the text of the Resolution is in front of us all, apologists for Pakistan feel that it needed interpretation, and that both the Commission and India were in effect interpreting it when they wished to implement it in literally the way it was worded.

Does it sound right even from within your patriotic fog to insist that deviation from the exact wording of the resolution was an interpretation, and that literal adherence to it was also an interpretation? Are you equating the action of somebody who reads 2+2=4 as 2+2= something which has to be determined by mutual discussion, because we lose if 2+2=4, with somebody else who says 2+2=4 means just that, 2+2=4, nothing more, nothing less? Do you see no fallacy in this equalization?

You spoke about India's interpreted version. How did India's version deviate from the wording, and if it didn't deviate, how can it be termed an interpretation? Why should it be necessary to interpret something as clearly worded as this resolution?

You deny that there was any deviation from the wording. The text is in front of you. Do you see no difference between that and the Pakistani position? There was no question of interpretation, as you can see for yourself. Which part needed interpretation? Would you reproduce it, for us to understand what mystic formation caused the Pakistani side such anxiety?

The question of considering further proceedings futile emerges straightaway from this issue. If you believe, with the straightforward text on front of you, that it needed interpretation, will anyone neutral, uninvolved in this dispute, take your position seriously? Would you have taken such a determined bid to reverse the sense of the resolution as indicating any inclination to resolve the problem? Or would you have understood the determination of the other side to deny reality as a clear signal that further progress was not possible?

With regard to the timing and motivation for India to approach the UN, it has already been pointed out to the fanboys that the greatest extent of Pakistani occupation of Kashmir was when Pakistani forces, the Gilgit Scouts, were besieging Leh, Kargil was iniakistani occupation, Baramula was in Pakistani occupation, and the Mehtar's forces in occupation of Skardu. When the reference to the UN was made, Leh had been relieved permanently, Kargil had been taken back, Baramula and the entire route to Muzaffarnagar cleared, and Indian troops occupied the Haji Pir Pass.

Does it, even to you, sound as if India was not in increasingly control of the situation, and Pakistan had lost ground?

The different interpretations of UNSC Iraqi resolutions by different countries is a recent case which clearly exemplifies this fact. Where was the 2+2=4 in this case.

After adoption of a UNSC resolution and its implementation there are many aspects which need coordination.

When there is disagreement on such coordination aspects, UNSC is approached again to render solutions/decisions/amendments/new resolutions.

If Nehru thought that these interactions were futile, why did he wait, from 1948 to 1954 to announce his decision and then too India blamed US-Pakistan agreement and not Pakistani intransigence or non-withdrawal of troops. Why wasn’t India so black and white in its pronouncements at that time. Therefore, your perception of events doesn’t matter. What India as a nation announced through its good offices is the truth.

If India was so confident of its position and was gaining ground, why did it go to the UN, it should have continued with its conquests and captured the whole of Kashmir. India was not confident that it would be able to sustain her advances as Pakistan Army was getting more and more involved and stabilizing the situation. The only way out for India then was to knock the UN door to attain status quo and continue playing with UN resolutions and commissions and appointed interlocutors in order to improve her position on ground.