How did the PAF looked like in 1965?
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The Magnificent Bomber Operations of PAF in Indo-Pak 1965 War
Thursday, 05 April 2007
A Bomber Pilot reminisces about PAF operations during the 1965 war.
A country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient Air Force, second to noneÃâ. This advice by the Father of the Nation, the Quaid-e-Azam has been the principle for those who have built the PAF into what it is today and continues to inspire the young generations which follow.
It was an arduous task to build a strong and potent air force made more difficult in the case of Pakistan due to its political, technological and, above all, economic constraints at the time of its birth. Pakistan Air Force since its first day; had to, therefore, strive hard and long to develop into a modern and effective air force. The ability of our airmen was amply tested in two major wars and today we can say, with reasonable confidence, that we are in a position to meet any challenge that may come our way. But, it must be understood that in this day and age of fast-changing technological environment, the struggle ahead may be even harder, more uphill than what was faced by our predecessors.
In 1965 war, the world has seen some historic bombing operations by PAF pilots against different enemy locations. The B-57 bomber wing which was located at Mauripur Base contributed in the war by performing classical bombing operations at Jamnagar, Adampur and Pathankot. All these operations were mostly carried out at night, and required a great deal of concentration and high precision. The sole aim of these operations was to deny the enemy, the use of its airpower, by destroying the airfields from which they were supposed to takeoff.
On 6th September 1965 at 4:30 p.m., a quick twenty minutes final briefing was conducted for the B-57 attack against Jamnagar to be carried out at 6:00 p.m., the same day. This was the second attack at Jamnagar which had earlier been attacked by six F-86 aircraft.
The six B-57 set out in two waves of three aircraft each, flying at 200 feet above ground level. Following the coast line, they soon crossed over into Indian territory, descending even lower to avoid radar detection. Mandvi lighthouse beacon shining brightly, helped the B-57s to fix their position for final approach at Jamnagar, now some four minutes away. A mile short of the target the aircraft pulled up and each was able to deliver its load of 4,000 lbs of bombs on to the target. All aircraft were carrying a full load of rockets as well, and for this reason only internal bombs had been taken. The last minute orders for the mission had not allowed time for the rocket to be replaced by external bombs. The leader, however, discharged his rockets at a hangar and set it ablaze. No fighter interceptors and anti-aircraft fire were encountered.
Thereafter a Ãâshuttle serviceÃ⢠to Jamnagar was kept up all night with single aircraft sorties. During these operations, one PAF aircraft was lost which was attributed towards fatigue and bad weather. A photo intelligence report of Jamnagar after the war confirmed that a total of about fifteen bombs landed inside the airfield complex destroying two Indian Air Force Vampires on the technical area.
In another operation, four of B-57s aircraft from Mauripur were ordered to report at Peshawar. On landing at Peshawar, the leader of the formation was informed about his mission to strike Adampur at 5:30 p.m.. The aircraft had left Mauripur with internal bombs only and were to have the external stations loaded at Peshawar. However, Peshawar that evening was crowded with aircraft and arrangements had not yet been made to meet the unforeseen commitments that had suddenly arisen for the base. While the maintenance staff struggled to refuel the aircraft, time was slipping by and in order not to delay their mission further, their leader decided to drop his demand for the external bombs.
It was already dusk before they took off and pitch dark when the B-57 crossed into India flying at low level. The Initial Point, ten minutes from their target, was the bridge over the river Beas Ãâ a darker streak on an already dark canvas; but they made no mistake about the attack. The anti-aircraft swung in action but the bombers repeated the attacks regardless of its hazard. Except for one aircraft, that had its left wing pierced by a 40 mm shell, no other damage was sustained. The formation landed back at Peshawar at 9:00 p.m. and was tasked for another mission against a bridge at 4:00 a.m. The formation, encouraged the success of the first mission, accept the task willingly and destroyed the target as required.
The non-stop nature of PAFÃâ¢s airfield offensive was indicated by the fact that, as the Adampur strike force was landing back at Peshawar, the other five B-57s were taking off for a follow up strike against Pathankot. The operational signal indicated four aircraft, but as five were available, so all took off. The discussed airfield at Pasrur was the IP (Initial Point) for run-in for the target. The new moon was giving a faint light and the visibility was fairly good. The Indian black out was quite good even in small villages.
There was no sign of any fire etc. of the previous F-86s attack. In fact there was a probability of missing the target. Thanks to an Indian who was kind enough to forget putting the airfield beacon off. It provided accurate pinpoint direction for the destruction of Pathankot. The enemy heard the attack and opened up with everything he had. It further assisted our pilots to see the airfield clearly. A large concentration of ground defences was reported at Pathankot. The PAF pilots were clear in their minds that once they were in an attack, they had to accomplish the mission. The enemy suffered a heavy loss. Next morning our troops intercepted an enemy radio message which said, ÃâPathankot burning, immediate help neededÃâ.
To conduct counter air offensive mission against enemy airfield, and to remain out of reach of their fighter aircraft, the PAF bomber wing remained elusive throughout the war. The pattern repeated was to take off from home base, strike inside Indian territory and recover at another airfield. The B-57 operations called for great skill, concentration, stamina and dedication. These qualities were found in abundance in the ever-eager crew of the wing and no task seemed impossible for them.
https://defence.pk/The_Magnificent_Bomber_Operations_of_PAF_in_Indo-Pak_1965_War/
Thursday, 05 April 2007
A Bomber Pilot reminisces about PAF operations during the 1965 war.
A country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient Air Force, second to noneÃâ. This advice by the Father of the Nation, the Quaid-e-Azam has been the principle for those who have built the PAF into what it is today and continues to inspire the young generations which follow.
It was an arduous task to build a strong and potent air force made more difficult in the case of Pakistan due to its political, technological and, above all, economic constraints at the time of its birth. Pakistan Air Force since its first day; had to, therefore, strive hard and long to develop into a modern and effective air force. The ability of our airmen was amply tested in two major wars and today we can say, with reasonable confidence, that we are in a position to meet any challenge that may come our way. But, it must be understood that in this day and age of fast-changing technological environment, the struggle ahead may be even harder, more uphill than what was faced by our predecessors.
In 1965 war, the world has seen some historic bombing operations by PAF pilots against different enemy locations. The B-57 bomber wing which was located at Mauripur Base contributed in the war by performing classical bombing operations at Jamnagar, Adampur and Pathankot. All these operations were mostly carried out at night, and required a great deal of concentration and high precision. The sole aim of these operations was to deny the enemy, the use of its airpower, by destroying the airfields from which they were supposed to takeoff.
On 6th September 1965 at 4:30 p.m., a quick twenty minutes final briefing was conducted for the B-57 attack against Jamnagar to be carried out at 6:00 p.m., the same day. This was the second attack at Jamnagar which had earlier been attacked by six F-86 aircraft.
The six B-57 set out in two waves of three aircraft each, flying at 200 feet above ground level. Following the coast line, they soon crossed over into Indian territory, descending even lower to avoid radar detection. Mandvi lighthouse beacon shining brightly, helped the B-57s to fix their position for final approach at Jamnagar, now some four minutes away. A mile short of the target the aircraft pulled up and each was able to deliver its load of 4,000 lbs of bombs on to the target. All aircraft were carrying a full load of rockets as well, and for this reason only internal bombs had been taken. The last minute orders for the mission had not allowed time for the rocket to be replaced by external bombs. The leader, however, discharged his rockets at a hangar and set it ablaze. No fighter interceptors and anti-aircraft fire were encountered.
Thereafter a Ãâshuttle serviceÃ⢠to Jamnagar was kept up all night with single aircraft sorties. During these operations, one PAF aircraft was lost which was attributed towards fatigue and bad weather. A photo intelligence report of Jamnagar after the war confirmed that a total of about fifteen bombs landed inside the airfield complex destroying two Indian Air Force Vampires on the technical area.
In another operation, four of B-57s aircraft from Mauripur were ordered to report at Peshawar. On landing at Peshawar, the leader of the formation was informed about his mission to strike Adampur at 5:30 p.m.. The aircraft had left Mauripur with internal bombs only and were to have the external stations loaded at Peshawar. However, Peshawar that evening was crowded with aircraft and arrangements had not yet been made to meet the unforeseen commitments that had suddenly arisen for the base. While the maintenance staff struggled to refuel the aircraft, time was slipping by and in order not to delay their mission further, their leader decided to drop his demand for the external bombs.
It was already dusk before they took off and pitch dark when the B-57 crossed into India flying at low level. The Initial Point, ten minutes from their target, was the bridge over the river Beas Ãâ a darker streak on an already dark canvas; but they made no mistake about the attack. The anti-aircraft swung in action but the bombers repeated the attacks regardless of its hazard. Except for one aircraft, that had its left wing pierced by a 40 mm shell, no other damage was sustained. The formation landed back at Peshawar at 9:00 p.m. and was tasked for another mission against a bridge at 4:00 a.m. The formation, encouraged the success of the first mission, accept the task willingly and destroyed the target as required.
The non-stop nature of PAFÃâ¢s airfield offensive was indicated by the fact that, as the Adampur strike force was landing back at Peshawar, the other five B-57s were taking off for a follow up strike against Pathankot. The operational signal indicated four aircraft, but as five were available, so all took off. The discussed airfield at Pasrur was the IP (Initial Point) for run-in for the target. The new moon was giving a faint light and the visibility was fairly good. The Indian black out was quite good even in small villages.
There was no sign of any fire etc. of the previous F-86s attack. In fact there was a probability of missing the target. Thanks to an Indian who was kind enough to forget putting the airfield beacon off. It provided accurate pinpoint direction for the destruction of Pathankot. The enemy heard the attack and opened up with everything he had. It further assisted our pilots to see the airfield clearly. A large concentration of ground defences was reported at Pathankot. The PAF pilots were clear in their minds that once they were in an attack, they had to accomplish the mission. The enemy suffered a heavy loss. Next morning our troops intercepted an enemy radio message which said, ÃâPathankot burning, immediate help neededÃâ.
To conduct counter air offensive mission against enemy airfield, and to remain out of reach of their fighter aircraft, the PAF bomber wing remained elusive throughout the war. The pattern repeated was to take off from home base, strike inside Indian territory and recover at another airfield. The B-57 operations called for great skill, concentration, stamina and dedication. These qualities were found in abundance in the ever-eager crew of the wing and no task seemed impossible for them.
https://defence.pk/The_Magnificent_Bomber_Operations_of_PAF_in_Indo-Pak_1965_War/
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Contrarian
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Im not sure, but i think it was teh PAF which enjoyed the latest marvels of technology. Didnt it have the starfighter? Or am i missing the timelines/
Contrarian
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Which means that PAF was technologically ahead as it was always before now.
Webby why creat new "heat potential thread" just revive the old ones.....1965 was 42 years ago,....what about now?
sword,
History section has a purpose.
Like they say, History will remain history. No one can change it now.
As for the "heat potential thread" this isn't the only one, and all the potential threads go almost fine here.
So why did Ottoman Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Pakistan ever lose to India, US, UK, Israel etc?
Prayers have thier place, but becareful God lsitens to prayers not advice and rarely takes sides when his children fight. Rather the sucess of the PAF in 65 and vs the I(Israel)AF were due to training and doctrine. The PAF however did not keep its edge and failed in 73 much like the I(Israel)AF recently failed in Lebanon.
Keysersoze
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Yep I think I have said stuff along these lines more times than I care to remember.......
The thing that stuck with me was some lines from the film "The longest day" It shows a American officer asking "Sometimes I wonder whose side god is on" Cut to a German officer who after some exposition ask the same question.
There are very many fallacies here that should be corrected, at least in terms of perceptions here.
Zraver, PAF faught again in 1971 and not 73 (that was Yom Kippur)....Egyptians actually held off on launching the war in 71 because of the distractions due to the Indo-Pak war
In 1965, PAF was newly revamped and had caught on to the US doctrines regarding maint, logistics and training. That was the biggest plus. The aircraft that the two sides flew were in the same catagory with IAF aircraft being slightly better.
The IAF had already inducted at least a sqn worth of Mig-21s by that time and PAF had 10 F-104s....starfighter was not as good a combat aircraft as the fishbed was and this was proven in the 1971 war despite having senior pilots in the cockpits of the 104s (in 1965 the two did not meet). The IAF fielded Hunters which many in the PAF had flown during their training visits to the UK and some other ME countries and in absolute performance, the Hunter exceeded the F-86 Sabre (former was faster and had greater range) and this was known to the PAF pilots. However the performance difference was limited and as such pilots exploiting their aircraft to the upper limits were able to get beyond the capabilities of their adversary's platforms.
Canberras on the IAF side were evenly matched with B-57 bombers (essentially the same aircraft). The tactics were similar too...in the end, aggressiveness of the pilots made the difference.
Adux
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Blain
As for as I know IAF didnt have any MiG-21's in 1965 war, can you confirm on this. IAf's main weapons were the Hunter's and Gnats, In 1965 PAF was a far more trained,proffessional and better equipped force than the IAF. F-86 and F-104 were the Spanking New aircraft of the USA,, and were considered the best in the world. Hunter's were less manoverable,had less speed and had an inferior cannon
As for as I know IAF didnt have any MiG-21's in 1965 war, can you confirm on this. IAf's main weapons were the Hunter's and Gnats, In 1965 PAF was a far more trained,proffessional and better equipped force than the IAF. F-86 and F-104 were the Spanking New aircraft of the USA,, and were considered the best in the world. Hunter's were less manoverable,had less speed and had an inferior cannon
niaz
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This is not correct. IAF had a squadron of Mig 21's. Most of these were shot down either on the ground or during take off. I am not sure but these were based either on Pathankot or Halwara. A certain Flt Lt Khalid Latif who took part in 65 war under the command of Nozy Haider, was younger brother of a close friend. He told me that he saw IAF Mig 21's himself.
I have also had a discussion with the great MM Alam once. He came to Kuwait sometimes in late 70's and I met him at the house of a mutual friend who was on secondment to Kuwaiti Air Force as an instructor. What I could gather was that PAF came on top in 1965 mainly because of two things:
1. Air Marshal Asghar Khan was an exceptional commander who instilled extreme professionalism in all branches of PAF. PAF was therefore better trained and prepared and behaved like a unit.
2. Hunter was a slightly superior aircraft to F-86, but Pakistan had the good fortune of having half a dozen exceptionally skilled pilots such as Aluddin Butch; MM Alam, Sarfraz Rafiqui and Nozey Haider etc. This prevented numerical superiority of IAF to have any effect of the battle.
Indians however learned a lot from this drubbing and competency of the pilots were evenly matched during 1971. PAF showing in 1971 is nothing to be pround off.
Incidentally, nepotism and lack of professionalism surfaced in PAF during Bhutto time and became worse during Zia era when he promoted his brother in law( husband of wife's sister), who was then base commander Mauripur and subsequently raised him to PAF Chief. MM Alam retired as AVM. Last PAF Chief who actually saw action was Pervez Mehdi Qureshi who was based in East Pakistan and shot down by ground fire while attacking IAF airfields in West Bengal in 1971.
I have a feeling the merit had ceased to be a basis of promotion in PA since Ayub Khan later years. ( The book "The way it was" by Brig Zafar Alam). Dont know much about Navy but according a retired AVM who I met in Dubai recently, skills of Pakistani pilots upto the Squadron Leader level is second to none, it is the Air Commodore and higher ranks where the merit is not necessarily the basis for promotion.
Among PAF Chiefs, there has been no one with professionalism and integrity to match Asgahr Khan/ Noor Khan. Mushif Mir was the only one who stands out among the rest.
F-104s were not new...they were ex-USAF. Niaz and I are pretty darn sure that Fishbed was already in service during the 65 war.
Contrary to common misperception in India at least, F-86 was inferior to the Hunter although it was smaller and more nimble (similar to the Gnat).
By the time 1965 war came, F-86s had been removed or were in the process of being removed from most of the western airforces. Luftwaffe sent over theirs to Pakistan in 1966 or thereabout since they were done using them. The F-86 was in its prime in the 50s (if you recall it was used in the Korean war first
Goodperson
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http://en.allexperts.com/e/f/f/f-86_sabre.htm
In the air to air combats of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the PAF claims to have lost only 7 Sabres while IAF maintains that 15 Sabres were downed by Indian Fighters, mostly to Hawker Hunters and Folland Gnats. In turn, 8 Hunters, 4 Vampires and 2 Gnats were shot down by Sabres.[1] This was despite the fact that F-86s of the PAF were armed with AIM-9B/GAR-8 Sidewinder missiles whereas none of the Hunters or Gnats had missiles. Sabres however, performed well in ground attack, claiming 10 aircraft on the ground at Indian airfields at Halwara and Pathankot.
During the war United States barred the sales of the F-86 to Pakistan. Nonetheless, Pakistan maintained its F-86 fleet through sales of Iranian Sabres and CL-13s (Canadian-made F-86 Sabres). Despite some early successes in the war, the F-86 proved vulnerable to the dimunitive Folland Gnat, which downed 7 Sabres.
In the air to air combats of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the PAF claims to have lost only 7 Sabres while IAF maintains that 15 Sabres were downed by Indian Fighters, mostly to Hawker Hunters and Folland Gnats. In turn, 8 Hunters, 4 Vampires and 2 Gnats were shot down by Sabres.[1] This was despite the fact that F-86s of the PAF were armed with AIM-9B/GAR-8 Sidewinder missiles whereas none of the Hunters or Gnats had missiles. Sabres however, performed well in ground attack, claiming 10 aircraft on the ground at Indian airfields at Halwara and Pathankot.
During the war United States barred the sales of the F-86 to Pakistan. Nonetheless, Pakistan maintained its F-86 fleet through sales of Iranian Sabres and CL-13s (Canadian-made F-86 Sabres). Despite some early successes in the war, the F-86 proved vulnerable to the dimunitive Folland Gnat, which downed 7 Sabres.
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