Hatf-IX - Tactical Multi-Tube Ballistic Missile
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The Deterrent
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I'm also asking myself the same question...
BelligerentPacifist
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Two tubes only - the fins don't fold. In these many tubes per launcher a B611-ski would've been fittable to the TEL and have offered a much superior capability.
foxhound
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I think the new missile system follows up from previous systems such as the lance tactical nuclear missile - for strategic tactical battlefield situations. the missile would erode any further imbalance in its strategic deterrence.
The MGM-52 Lance is a battlefield short-range, road mobile, liquid propellant ballistic missile. It is a tactical system developed to replace the Sergeant tactical missile. It was designed to be a small, inexpensive missile that could be deployed in large numbers and fired repeatedly. It is carried in a tracked M752 Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle and is often accompanied by reload vehicles, which carry two additional Lance missiles. The primary contractor was Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.
The Lance missile system is a tactical asset designed for use against the Soviet Union. It was developed to follow US doctrine of maintaining low-yield nuclear weapons in case of nuclear escalation in Europe. Its short-range prevents it from engaging strategic targets, but its nuclear warhead is of a sufficient size to be able to threaten population centers and hardened targets. A neutron bomb warhead was developed for use against military units, particularly armored troops. High explosive (HE) warheads were developed to allow for non-nuclear deployment, though only the submunition warheads would be feasible against specific military units. The unitary HE warhead could only effectively be used against large targets such as manufacturing complexes, airports, etc. Far more nuclear warheads were developed for the Lance than conventional, and the Lance would probably have been used to attack concentrated troops, command facilities and military bases with its fairly powerful nuclear warhead. The mobility of the Lance TEL vehicle enables it to follow movements in the front and avoid attack.
ref:MissileThreat :: Lance
As a DETERRENCE SYSTEM it is a good system and would keep the enemy at bay, making them think more than twice if they planned to initiate hostilities leading to an all out war. I PRAY THESE SYSTEMS ARE JUST KEPT AS A DETTERENCE AND NEVER FIRED AS THIS WILL RESULT IN A GLOBAL CATASTROPHE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SO MANY INNOCENT LIVES (INCLUDING THE DEVASTATION OF ITS LANDS FOR MANY DECADES). The system is probably based on NATO's strategy with the former Warsaw pact nations during the cold war. I have given 2 peoples view on their doctrine:
View 1
The cold-war NATO strategy behind 'tactical' warheads in the European theatre was to ensure that any advance by the Warsaw Pact armies on the West could be halted in its tracks regardless of any numerical superiority in conventional forces. Tactical nuclear detonations (particularly of neutron warheads) on their line of advancement would be devastating within a limited area and prevent further progress for several days, during which time peace negotiations would hopefully prevent escalation to strategic nuclear exchange. The gambit was controversial because, contrary to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrance, it assumed a first-strike policy on NATO's part. This was premised on the expectation that, having demonstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons (even on its own territory), the Soviet union would realise that strategic nuclear retaliation would precipitate MAD (mutually assured destruction).
Interestingly, a policy mooted by Labour in the 1970s-80s recognised the absolute immorality of nuclear holocaust but accepted that the retention of nuclear weapons as a deterrent was morally justifiable so long as the weapons were never actually used- after all if the circumstances for their deployment were actualised, by definition, the nukes' deterrent potential must have failed. Ironically, such a stance could never have been made public without removing the deterrent value...
View 2
I don't think there is any more dangerous fantasy than the term "tactical nuclear weapon." There is no reason to think any exchange of nuclear weapons will not escalate very quickly. For decades its been regarded that once you cross the nuclear threshold there is no guarantee your adversary will respond proportionally and not massively. Almost any critical explosion can be regarded as a weapon of mass destruction - even the lower range of the B61, 1.5KT is enough to destroy a small town - it's higher range, 170KT could destroy the centre of the largest city.People advocating tactical nuclear weapons have no idea what they're talking about. They make crossing the nuclear threshold more likely as they are perceived to be less massive than strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have never kept the peace - if there is any merit or truth to deterrence it is the fear of strategic exchange that has kept the use of nuclear weapons in check. Tactical weapons destabilise deterrence as they are imagined to be used against larger conventional forces (this was NATO planning in the last decades of the Cold War - a larger invasion from the East was meant to be checked by tactical nuclear weapons thus NATO would use nuclear weapons first). Needless to say, nuclear weapons (of any kind) are useless against anything other than Nation states.
This new missile is probably based on the detterence that NATO has, when facing a numerical larger foe.
ref:Lance: 50missileclubra.com
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence aims to prevent unwanted action by an opponent by convincing them that the resultant costs would exceed any gains. In short, the costs would involve massive destruction
from a nuclear strike.
Nuclear deterrence involves several paradoxes. For example, the threat of use of nuclear weapons is supposed to prevent war, including the use of nuclear weapons. But to be credible,
the deterring state must demonstrate a readiness to use nuclear weapons, which increases the probability of such use, particularly over a long period of time. Thus, nuclear deterrence is an inherently unstable policy.
Nuclear deterrence has evolved from the simple threat of massive retaliation to a range of forms. It includes: counter-force; the threat of nuclear retaliation against military targets, counter-value; the threat of nuclear retaliation against the opposing state in general, flexible response; the deployment of sub-strategic or tactical weapons for battlefield use or for use as an interim step prior to massive retaliation; first-strike; the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack or to pre-emptively destroy the weapons of an opponent, extended deterrence; the extension of nuclear deterrence to cover the territories of non-nuclear allies, existential deterrence; the ability to develop nuclear weapons without actual deployment.
See: The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (ret), Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch, 2000. Welcome to Disarmament & Security Centre
http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policies/nuclear-doctrine.htm
The MGM-52 Lance is a battlefield short-range, road mobile, liquid propellant ballistic missile. It is a tactical system developed to replace the Sergeant tactical missile. It was designed to be a small, inexpensive missile that could be deployed in large numbers and fired repeatedly. It is carried in a tracked M752 Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle and is often accompanied by reload vehicles, which carry two additional Lance missiles. The primary contractor was Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.
The Lance missile system is a tactical asset designed for use against the Soviet Union. It was developed to follow US doctrine of maintaining low-yield nuclear weapons in case of nuclear escalation in Europe. Its short-range prevents it from engaging strategic targets, but its nuclear warhead is of a sufficient size to be able to threaten population centers and hardened targets. A neutron bomb warhead was developed for use against military units, particularly armored troops. High explosive (HE) warheads were developed to allow for non-nuclear deployment, though only the submunition warheads would be feasible against specific military units. The unitary HE warhead could only effectively be used against large targets such as manufacturing complexes, airports, etc. Far more nuclear warheads were developed for the Lance than conventional, and the Lance would probably have been used to attack concentrated troops, command facilities and military bases with its fairly powerful nuclear warhead. The mobility of the Lance TEL vehicle enables it to follow movements in the front and avoid attack.
ref:MissileThreat :: Lance
As a DETERRENCE SYSTEM it is a good system and would keep the enemy at bay, making them think more than twice if they planned to initiate hostilities leading to an all out war. I PRAY THESE SYSTEMS ARE JUST KEPT AS A DETTERENCE AND NEVER FIRED AS THIS WILL RESULT IN A GLOBAL CATASTROPHE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SO MANY INNOCENT LIVES (INCLUDING THE DEVASTATION OF ITS LANDS FOR MANY DECADES). The system is probably based on NATO's strategy with the former Warsaw pact nations during the cold war. I have given 2 peoples view on their doctrine:
View 1
The cold-war NATO strategy behind 'tactical' warheads in the European theatre was to ensure that any advance by the Warsaw Pact armies on the West could be halted in its tracks regardless of any numerical superiority in conventional forces. Tactical nuclear detonations (particularly of neutron warheads) on their line of advancement would be devastating within a limited area and prevent further progress for several days, during which time peace negotiations would hopefully prevent escalation to strategic nuclear exchange. The gambit was controversial because, contrary to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrance, it assumed a first-strike policy on NATO's part. This was premised on the expectation that, having demonstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons (even on its own territory), the Soviet union would realise that strategic nuclear retaliation would precipitate MAD (mutually assured destruction).
Interestingly, a policy mooted by Labour in the 1970s-80s recognised the absolute immorality of nuclear holocaust but accepted that the retention of nuclear weapons as a deterrent was morally justifiable so long as the weapons were never actually used- after all if the circumstances for their deployment were actualised, by definition, the nukes' deterrent potential must have failed. Ironically, such a stance could never have been made public without removing the deterrent value...
View 2
I don't think there is any more dangerous fantasy than the term "tactical nuclear weapon." There is no reason to think any exchange of nuclear weapons will not escalate very quickly. For decades its been regarded that once you cross the nuclear threshold there is no guarantee your adversary will respond proportionally and not massively. Almost any critical explosion can be regarded as a weapon of mass destruction - even the lower range of the B61, 1.5KT is enough to destroy a small town - it's higher range, 170KT could destroy the centre of the largest city.People advocating tactical nuclear weapons have no idea what they're talking about. They make crossing the nuclear threshold more likely as they are perceived to be less massive than strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have never kept the peace - if there is any merit or truth to deterrence it is the fear of strategic exchange that has kept the use of nuclear weapons in check. Tactical weapons destabilise deterrence as they are imagined to be used against larger conventional forces (this was NATO planning in the last decades of the Cold War - a larger invasion from the East was meant to be checked by tactical nuclear weapons thus NATO would use nuclear weapons first). Needless to say, nuclear weapons (of any kind) are useless against anything other than Nation states.
This new missile is probably based on the detterence that NATO has, when facing a numerical larger foe.
ref:Lance: 50missileclubra.com
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence aims to prevent unwanted action by an opponent by convincing them that the resultant costs would exceed any gains. In short, the costs would involve massive destruction
from a nuclear strike.
Nuclear deterrence involves several paradoxes. For example, the threat of use of nuclear weapons is supposed to prevent war, including the use of nuclear weapons. But to be credible,
the deterring state must demonstrate a readiness to use nuclear weapons, which increases the probability of such use, particularly over a long period of time. Thus, nuclear deterrence is an inherently unstable policy.
Nuclear deterrence has evolved from the simple threat of massive retaliation to a range of forms. It includes: counter-force; the threat of nuclear retaliation against military targets, counter-value; the threat of nuclear retaliation against the opposing state in general, flexible response; the deployment of sub-strategic or tactical weapons for battlefield use or for use as an interim step prior to massive retaliation; first-strike; the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack or to pre-emptively destroy the weapons of an opponent, extended deterrence; the extension of nuclear deterrence to cover the territories of non-nuclear allies, existential deterrence; the ability to develop nuclear weapons without actual deployment.
See: The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (ret), Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch, 2000. Welcome to Disarmament & Security Centre
http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policies/nuclear-doctrine.htm
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Najam Khan
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Yayyy Pakistan rocks!!!
Thats a sound response to India's Cold Start Doctrine!
This missile gives Pakistan the capability to counter the incoming Indian forces. It may choose to use the tactical nuke warhead on its own soil or may destroy the supply lines and break the back of enemy.
Cool strategy!
Congratulations to all Pakistanis and salute to our scientists, engineers and policy-makers
Thats a sound response to India's Cold Start Doctrine!
This missile gives Pakistan the capability to counter the incoming Indian forces. It may choose to use the tactical nuke warhead on its own soil or may destroy the supply lines and break the back of enemy.
Cool strategy!
Congratulations to all Pakistanis and salute to our scientists, engineers and policy-makers
A-100 that Pakistan has is in the same category. The purpose of Nasr is different. Its a tactical battlefield BM with a limited yield to stop ingressing armour etc. without causing an irreparable damage to the local infrastructure. The idea is to take the "start" out of the "cold start" and keep it cold. ;-)
marcos98
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farhan_9909
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will it be tested again?
or after this successfull test they will produce it in mass number and will be deployed?
or after this successfull test they will produce it in mass number and will be deployed?
Bratva
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Than what is the use of Hatf-1 and Abdali short range ballistic missiles?
It matters little whether its 2 or 4 tube. The idea is not to saturate the target and thus needing very many tubes becomes redundant. For area saturation, we have the 122mm and 300mm systems.
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