F.M S.Manekshaw has praised PA in the past also but praising doesnt win wars. It was the effort of the soldiers in the battlefield that took the war to roughly two weeks before surrendering to IA.
On the PA Command level, especially at the planning level there was no foresight. The decision makers on Pakistan side were on a very different mindset, for some losing E-Pakistan was not a big deal and defence of the East lies in the West was an absurd idea. With such an approach defeat was inevitable.
F.M S.Manekshaw is right, it was a lost cause and there are many reasons for that. Not listing the political factors which were equally important.
The main PA component in E-Pak was 14 Infantry division.with 3-4 brigades and the only regiment of tanks of PA in E-Pak. Two more divisions were sent to from W-Pak, the 9th and 16th infantry plus an independent infantry brigade group. All these formations were sent without any heavy weapons. Most of the personnel were sent on PIA flights as military transport was restricted to sea route usually. These formations arrived to quell the rebellions in E-pak, not exactly to fight a war with India, another foresight blunder by Command, which is why accompanying heavy weapons was not seen as priority at start
When it was observed that a war with India could be on the cards, the paramilitary forces such as scouts, rangers, mujahid formations start to pour in E-Pak to take over COIN ops. The PA regular formations (9th and 16th ID) were not trained for COIN ops to start with. By the time the paramilitary forces arrived, much damage was done already. PA had resorted to unorthodox methods to bring the rebellions to an end, which had turned the local population against W-Pakistan administration as well as the Army.
The paramilitary formations couldnt speak the local language let alone handle the already deteriorated situation. To counter this problem two local forces, Al-Badr and Al-shams were created to aid the PA and paramilitary forces. Pakistan had lost the edge by creating a huge distance between itself and the local population. Infact the locally raised forces started on their own vendettas against the local population instead of following a thorough battle plan.
PA also started to shift the command of fighting formations to W-Pak officers sighting a mutiny from E-Pak born officers. The shuffling further increased the problem by doubting the loyalty of E-Pak officers and jawans. With mistrust in the ranks and the local population against PA, guerilla warfare for Mukti Bahini(MB) became very easy. Eventually the E-pak born officers and soldiers started deserting their regiments in large numbers and joined MB forces. before deserting, they either murdered their W-Pak officers and comrades or destroyed the KOTEs(weapon holding area) apart from taking the PA issued weapons along with them.
Then started the intel and communication failures as MB backed by IA started its raids against PA. Instead of manning the borders, PA was providing internal security at sensitive points inside E-Pak. There were many No-Go zones for E-Pak personnel already for safety reasons even inside cities including Dhaka. The Western Command along with gen Niazi created many plans even of PA thrusts inside India and helping Naxal, Naga rebels against India. With the given resources, situation, man power and reserves, this was impossible.
PA in E-pak went into war with understrength formations. No heavy artillery, no armoured support, depleted resources of ammunition and rations.
Gen Niazi created more formations from already understrength divisions further thinning them out. The brigades had usually one regular PA battalion and rest of the force was usually paramilitary with no artillery or armour support, clipping its fighting potential drastically. The shuffling resulted in 9th Infantry and 16th Infantry Divisions were thinned out by creating 37 Infantry and 39 Infantry Divisions. The 37 and 39 ID's were just composed of one understrength fighting brigade rendering them useless as fighting formations with any substance.
Supply became a major issue since many areas and roads were BM dominated and supplying to formations fighting on either front was becoming difficult as troops needed for convoy security had priority to defend major roads leading towards Dhaka instead. The small PAA air contingent was hopeless in supplying three Infantry divisions and two Ad-hoc Infantry divisions with the ammo required.
Where as IA was planning months ahead to attack E-Pak, the PA in E-Pak was fighting for its own survival against the MB after the failure of quelling the rebellions across the country. MB sabotage ops had increased with such ferocity that SSG was stretched out to lead every operation against them. In the end the numbers of MB and their local knowledge held an edge in every scenario.
The state of PAF and PN was hopeless, infact SSG(N) trained MB deserters sabotaged PN facilities and boats. 14 PAF aircraft were too less to defend E-Pak.
The courage shown by Brigade commanders, Battalions commanders, company commanders, the JCO's, NCO's and jawans to protect the motherland from the IA is what F.M S.Manekshaw is talking about.
This has been done to death. I'd just like to say that Marshall Manekshaw was an exceptional solider. RIP to all the soldiers who lost their lives in the 71 war.
very diplomatic reply, as usual.
