Hi,
Reading the DAWN, I came across this letter to the editor---this gentleman should have writing for the defence forum---here it is for your reading---
It is baffling how 400 Taliban fighters, indicating a battalion-sized force, had overrun and captured the Sararogha Fort. These forts, built by the British, were intended to serve as outposts. The purpose of such forward military bases is to observe insurgent activity, to patrol the area and to block the enemy from threatening the local population.
The Sararogha Fort sits on a ridge overlooking the Razmak-Jandola Road. Given that the insurgents were carrying heavy weaponry, mortars and rocket launchers, it is unlikely that they came on foot. To transport such a force with their munitions would require a convoy of minimum 40 vehicles.
The terrain is rugged there are patches of pine forest, also some agricultural plots mostly terraced, but for the most part, are rocky. Mean elevation is 2,000m peaks at 2,200m and valleys at 1,800m. In this time of rain, the area is well watered by torrential streams. As a result, the off-road terrain is unjeepable given the rocky, terrace and water obstacles. In all probability, therefore, the Taliban convoy travelled on the main road on the Razmak to Sararogha segment.
As is usual in night operations, the convoy would have waited till sundown and then mobilised -- indicating 5.30pm local time. The attack itself commenced at 9pm, which means they must have arrived at a safe nearby spot around 8pm and begun to regroup and take positions for the assault. This indicates a two-and-a-half hours travel time.
If the 40-odd vehicles travelled in a single convoy from start, then it could well have come out of the pine forested Shawal Mountains that straddle the Afghan border. These mountains can be seen from Razmak and are less than 50 miles from the Sararogha Fort. Alternatively, several smaller convoys of four to five vehicles, hidden in the small residential settlements, could have converged on the main road from different directions. This mode would generate considerable wireless chatter that savvy intelligence can pick up. In either mode, the convoys would be travelling with headlights off except for the lead vehicle a suspicious thing even for a casual onlooker.
It is baffling that a convoy of 40 vehicles carrying armed Taliban, travelling on the main road for several miles can elude intelligence, roadside checkposts and aerial surveillance.
The operation commenced around 9pm with the Taliban breaching a hole in the wall of the fort using explosives. Even then, the 38 FC personnel held off the invading battalion for six hours. When did the FC HQ receive the first distress signal? Was it communicated to their commander?
Did the commander request for reinforcements for his men in trouble? What is the standard operating procedure in an event of this nature?
As the FC men fought on, was a request sent to the Army Aviation squadrons under the Peshawar Corps to send in the Cobra AH1-F attack helicopters -- eight of which are night-capable (C-NITE equipped)? Did the Ludda Fort nearby receive a distress call requesting artillery fire on the Taliban position? What artillery equipment was available to it and who was going to make the decision? Was it in artillery range and were the Talibans coordinates known?
Apart from rescuing the lives of the 38 FC personnel and the morale of all other FC personnel, this was an opportunity to take out 400 Taliban fighters thereby striking a major blow to their operations in the area.
The Taliban butchered and captured the FC personnel, and after removing ammunition and communications equipment, set the fort on fire and made their way back probably reaching their safe havens before sunrise. Again, nobody saw where the 40 vehicles carrying armed Taliban went, and so they live to fight another day.
This brings us to the question: Are we conducting our national fight against these elements to the best of our abilities? This is the real battle for Pakistan. I would urge Gen Kayani to hold an inquest into this case. I am concerned that in the not too distant future we may be facing a Taliban assault force of brigade strength.
MOAZZAM HUSSAIN,
Lahore