rent4country
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When I was active duty, I made friends with a few people in the intelligence sector of the USAF, namely, the guys who flies those SIGINT flights off the coasts of the Soviet Union and China. So am going to paraphrase what I learned from these guys...
Let us say I am a burglar looking at your house.
Let us say I intercepted a message you sent to your parents: " We are having a great time in Disneyland. "
According to communication specialists, of which there are plenty in the intel world, the bulk of our communication is composed of 'filler materials'. Since I am a burglar looking to rob you, do I care if you have a 'great time' in Disneyland? No, I do not. Of that sentence, I am only interested in four words: " We" , " are ", " in " , and " Disneyland ". It does not matter if I decoded the sentence out of order. The English language is such that with those four letters, I know when to rob you. Fifty percent of your message was 'filler materials'.
Under Chinese laws, TT is obligated to provide the Chinese government with as much user data as possible when ordered. Not requested, but ORDERED. A request at least implied an option to refuse. This is not the case. If ordered, TT must comply. It is not just TT but all companies with size over X employees that the national intelligence law applied.
So what can China do with user data from a social media software? More threats than you can think of.
Nefariously speaking, I can use that user data to compile a list of highest concentration of young Americans and disperse NBC agents to targets in that list. US military bases are open knowledge, so I can use that user data to compile a list of time when there is lowest social media activities to hint at base operations. This is not new. Washington DC pizza operators know whenever something is up at the Pentagon based on sharp spikes of delivery orders.
Interesting read.
With some of my acquaintances, they say the security concerns with apps which are teen-centric like TT, have to do with the ability to use the user data to phish into a high-value target's kid's phone and gain complete access. Proceed to have access to all apps and messages. Install hidden apps that record all activity. Hack the camera to observe facetime with dad/mom stationed outside of the home territory, pick up inadvertently talk about location.