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Egyptian Armed Forces

^^^

Thanks mate but from Frogman's post, we can
derive that social change would help push for
an upgrade. In the present context, the more
professional attitude may come from the Arab
League expeditionary force proposal ( Mistrals et al. ).

If Egypt is to become the pillar ( nation cadre )
of an operational force, the discussion we just
had shows what needs to change.

At the moment, I'd push for more quality NCOs
which can be found/made faster.

Have a great day, Tay.
 
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This also did not go unnoticed by me :


I loathe that kind of person with all my soul.
To me, knowledge is paramount to the point
of having a hard time morally in being paid
for sharing it.
Knowledge is manna and he who impedes its
flow to all humans is an agent of evil.

Mille grazie as our Italian friends say, all earned!

Have a great day, Tay.

Such behavior is inherent of (almost) all Arab armies... and this is also why their previous wars end up like it did...
No verticality of power share/Knowledge... it's a one man army...and a one man "Hero"... only problem... they would be no one to decorate him at the end...
 
Oh, mon ami, that works for Napoléon,
maybe your namesake or Alexander ...
but those are so few apart in real life.

Me, I'm struggling to find bright enough
people to talk with so geniuses are not
an ordinary occurrence and we still need
the army to work on ordinary days/years.

All the best to you and yours, Tay.
 
The Platoon Commander would typically take 1 Section to assault while the Platoon Sjt takes 2 Section to provide fire support/suppress the enemy. Knowing they're the only two with radios.

SOP, nothing wrong with that at all.

Other than that they use runners to deliver messages. What that looks like under En contact in the Sinai is a Platoon that lacks cohesion and is unable to take the initiative as the only way it works is by being micromanaged.

Might be a bit of a stretch to claim that micromanaging certain units on a platoon level makes them lack cohesion. Sometimes taking the initiative is situational and there's really no way to tell that is actually happening, my bro. Following orders is the basic principle of the military and it works from the squad level all the way up to division. On the flip side, if the training is inadequate for infantrymen in the Egyptian army, micromanaging might not be a bad thing in this case.

27th paras special ops platoon and even these guys probably could use some managing until they get enough experience, which ain't a bad thing TBH. They're really young guys.

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Other than that they use runners to deliver messages.

Despite it being slow and archaic, I'm sure you realize that runners or messengers are the most secure form of coms, especially in areas infiltrated with cretins using all sorts of their own radios and CBs trying to intercept anything from the army.

Some of the amazing stuff they've seized from the vermin, and ironically, a VHT640 Waterproof Marine VHF made by Entel company located in UK! :lol:

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Look at all the seized radios the cretins are using!

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Maybe, just maybe the way they're operating their coms is actually working and it's easy to lose the balanced perspective, while at the same time, not realize some other major difficulties that create the need to operate their system of coms the way they have; aside from the enemy's certain capabilities of intercepting, there is a huge jamming process happening at the same time. One that not only has blacked out major areas of Sinai, it's gone all the way through gaza, southern Israel up to parts of Jerusalem. Must keep these things in mind.

That's why you see Officers rather than Riflemen leading patrols in Egypt from any combat footage.

I honestly don't see anything wrong with that. Strong leadership -- even at the squad level -- is imperative and if it's done differently than what the UK or France does, so what, ma bro.

In our Sections in the UK each Rifleman had a Personal Role Radio (500m range unencrypted) and the Section IC and 2IC both had Bowman (long range encrypted). So there is coms within the section and to the Platoon Commander and Platoon Sgt.

Can't rely on military spokesman to show any details of coms in any of the presented combat footage.

So unlike the UK or France where a Platoon Commander would insert into a Platoon full of Pvts and Corporals with at least one tour their Egyptian counterpart knows he knows best.

While that might be true in some cases, the problem with describing it in that manner is that it casts a general shadow over the entire armed forces and that might be a little bit unfair and too generalized.

It doesn't help that being an Officer in Egypt in itself is a sign of prestige in a pretty classist society, thus a stereotype exists for a reason. The designer sunglasses wearing Officer who wants to be the centre of attention, go through this thread and you will see plenty. This sort of Officer wants everything in the Platoon to rely and depend on him so he remains the bearer of knowledge. He wants to be the most powerful man there.

Very generalized and ultra presumptive, Froggy. This issue does exist for sure, but you just can't blanket statement it like that. Also keep in mind, grunts are grunts. This is everywhere, even in the mighty US Army.

BTW, going back to your comment that JTACS doesn't exist is crazy, ma man. All the combined exercise with the US all used JTACS, calling in F-16 bombing runs and going way back using the Mirages. Just last year's BS was heavily CAS using relayed pinpoint coordinates live fire. All the recon flights with Beechcraft and E2-Cs and such are happening for a reason. If in these Sinai ops they're using general vicinity coordinates to helos and aircraft, then it's a command structure issue with the way they're dealing with this fight, but doesn't suggest that it doesn't exist.

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This is going back 8-9 years.

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Also, all the footage of precision strikes on the Libyan border and elsewhere with F-16s and Wingloongs and AT-802s are all part of a functioning JTACS system, albeit on a larger scale.

Do you see the troops qualified both tactically
and technically to give some to corporals or
should there be a grouped buy of Bowmans & Sgts?

Sgts? I think Frogman was referring to 'sergeants' with the Sgt abbreviation, mon bon amis. :-)

Because if each section has a long-range radio
it becomes possible to occupy more terrain and
in that vast expanse of the Sinaï, it could help!

They're not short of coms radios on any capacity, Tay. Just because we haven't seen what we think is conventional in some of the combat footage released isn't 100% indicative. And they're not using British-made Bowmans and will probably never use them. One of my favorite pics dates back to 1973 and Egyptian radio operators were a huge part of the war. Sorry couldn't find a bigger pic.

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And BTW, they don't need to "occupy more terrain." This all Egyptian land so the military ops are completely different than expeditionary ones in a foreign land. Some might get the impression this is like what's going on in Syria when it's not even remotely close. This is an important factor to consider with how they're dealing with coms and specifically the non-conventional enemy which is entrenched in very different sections of Sinai, from villages to cities to farmlands to desert areas. The area is entirely local, right? Also, the Egyptian army has close to 4500 HUMVEEs, not to mention the slew of other military vehicles and a certain portion of those Hummers are equipped with all sorts of radios and coms and are trailing many of these units. In other words, this is hardly a lacking issue whatsoever, just to be clear.

And what I'm concerned with is that with all this criticism -- which is fine as long as it's constructive and applicable -- is that we don't lose sight of the positives. The fact is that they've done an outstanding job so far and the decrease in activity is very appreciable. While it's easy to pick apart their faults and the failures, the fact is their successes far outweigh any failures and that they've taken out quite a few of these terrorist elements and have seized massive amounts of contraband and weapons and equipment and have exterminated a good chunk of the roaches. So a balanced view is absolutely necessary.
 
SOP, nothing wrong with that at all.

Other than both the Platoon Commander and Sjt being in positions where they can not be in control of all three sections?

The Platoon Commander (and his rad op + runner) should be a tactical bound behind the point section, so he can send out sitreps up the chain and then call on two Section Commanders (the assaulting section and the one providing fire support) for an Orders Group.

The Platoon Commander will then lead the assaulting section to a deployment point if necessary. He remains a tactical bound behind his assaulting section, never actually taking part in the assault. He must remain in a position where has tactical control of his entire platoon.

The Platoon Sjt and his work party (usually the reserved 3rd section) will remain a tactical bound behind the Platoon Commander ready to resupply the ammunition intensive fire support/suppressing section or move to carry out a casualty evacuation. He also needs to anticipate the Platoon Commanders orders to move the reserve section to carry out an assault or suppress another en position.

Might be a bit of a stretch to claim that micromanaging certain units on a platoon level makes them lack cohesion. Sometimes taking the initiative is situational and there's really no way to tell that is actually happening, my bro. Following orders is the basic principle of the military and it works from the squad level all the way up to division. On the flip side, if the training is inadequate for infantrymen in the Egyptian army, micromanaging might not be a bad thing in this case.

There is no need to ask if training is inadequate for infantrymen. We know it is.

A lack of cohesion necessitates micromanaging, and micromanaging hurts cohesion. Micromanagement does not result in effective infantry platoons.

Of course taking the initiative is situational. But platoons and sections used to being micromanagement will typically never take it when required.

Despite it being slow and archaic, I'm sure you realize that runners or messengers are the most secure form of coms, especially in areas infiltrated with cretins using all sorts of their own radios and CBs trying to intercept anything from the army.

You still use runners. Both the Platoon Commander and Sjt have their own runners. A section commander or 2IC can task any one of their Riflemen to relay a message. It isn't an either or situation.

Problems arise when you only use one form of communication. When IS over ran the Burkan checkpoint in the Sinai a lack of coms and the distance between defensive positions essentially split an infantry platoon into single sections fighting for their lives rather than a platoon that could operate together with sections providing mutual support to each other.

Maybe, just maybe the way they're operating their coms is actually working and it's easy to lose the balanced perspective, while at the same time, not realize some other major difficulties that create the need to operate their system of coms the way they have; aside from the enemy's certain capabilities of intercepting, there is a huge jamming process happening at the same time. One that not only has blacked out major areas of Sinai, it's gone all the way through gaza, southern Israel up to parts of Jerusalem. Must keep these things in mind.

That's why there's a communications and specialist equipment part of your orders group. Any need to run radio silent or note interference would be detailed there.

The use of ECM and coms in the same environment is a regular occurrence.

I honestly don't see anything wrong with that. Strong leadership -- even at the squad level -- is imperative and if it's done differently than what the UK or France does, so what, ma bro.

Point man is usually the first to be engaged. If you're reacting to effective enemy fire you're not in a positon in which you are in control of your platoon or could carry out your combat estimate and issue Quick Battle Orders in a secure O group. You're also very likely to go man down by en fire or IED.

The difference being the UK and France are not tactically incompetent.

Can't rely on military spokesman to show any details of coms in any of the presented combat footage.

Never rely on the Spox for anything.

While that might be true in some cases, the problem with describing it in that manner is that it casts a general shadow over the entire armed forces and that might be a little bit unfair and too generalized.

In a Conscript Army that routinely discharges soldiers and rotates out Officers every 3 years?

It is a consequence of the system.

Very generalized and ultra presumptive, Froggy. This issue does exist for sure, but you just can't blanket statement it like that. Also keep in mind, grunts are grunts.

Only to support my point. There is a general lack of trust between Officers, NCOs, and Conscripts. Competent leaders are the exception, not the rule.

Leadership itself can be taught. But Egyptian academies focus on wrote memorisation rather than practical application, much like the Egyptian educational system as a whole.


This is everywhere, even in the mighty US Army.

Except the US Army does not retain fundamental training as an Officer only experience.

BTW, going back to your comment that JTACS doesn't exist is crazy, ma man. All the combined exercise with the US all used JTACS, calling in F-16 bombing runs and going way back using the Mirages. Just last year's BS was heavily CAS using relayed pinpoint coordinates live fire. All the recon flights with Beechcraft and E2-Cs and such are happening for a reason. If in these Sinai ops they're using general vicinity coordinates to helos and aircraft, then it's a command structure issue with the way they're dealing with this fight, but doesn't suggest that it doesn't exist.

It doesn't exist. Anyone with any idea of how to give a grid reference can call in fires. That's not the only qualification for the role.

And they're not using British-made Bowmans and will probably never use them.

It is what the UK uses. Not suggesting that anyone else does. The general principle remains the same.

not to mention the slew of other military vehicles and a certain portion of those Hummers are equipped with all sorts of radios and coms and are trailing many of these units. In other words, this is hardly a lacking issue whatsoever, just to be clear.

So what happens when you dismount?


the fact is their successes far outweigh any failures

It has only been days since a handful of IS infantrymen and two suicide bombers infiltrated a Battalion HQ and killed twenty (including the Btn CO and 2IC) without any opposition. That is something you expect of the ANA/ANP/PMU/Pesh not of a military that expects to be taken seriously.

It has only been a couple months since IS mowed down 300 worshippers in an area that was allegedly "under control" and running distance away from an Army position.

It has also been a couple months where a few minutes separated the DM and MoI from being killed during a visit to Arish airport

In six years we have lost damn near the same number of troops the US has over the course of the Afghan war in an area a quarter the size of an Afghani province whilst facing no more than a couple hundred militants.

The failures have been constant and embarrassing, totally exposing the tactical incompetence of Egyptian forces for all to see.
 
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SOP, nothing wrong with that at all.

I'd go for an NCO per squad. New sarge, old sarge, Commander.

On the flip side, if the training is inadequate for infantrymen in the Egyptian army, micromanaging might not be a bad thing in this case.
27th paras special ops platoon and even these guys probably could use some managing

Special forces are a particular case, not good
for comparison as A-micro management is the
name of their game and individual qualities much
more developed so that B- you find FS units with
2 corporals, 3 sergeants and two lieutenants for
some ops, not a standard section format by far.
____-___-____
On the radios, agreed that runners are safe ...
except from bullets and accidents but they are
also slow. When attacking an outpost, my men
could be about 700m apart with the target near
the middle of the line joining them. Where do
my runners go? It's not formation fight anymore.
Having/using both is a boon.

But I would like to find a paper trail for those rats'
radios your guys nabbed; to see who paid for 'em.

Strong leadership -- even at the squad level -- is imperative and if it's done differently than what the UK or France does, so what, ma bro.
Except the US Army does not retain fundamental training as an Officer only experience.

NCOs can do that with a proper finishing school
and a good training program. What's more, it helps
in elevating the level of lower classes citizens.

And as far as terrain, I've answered the more ground
coverage prior so that I'm left with agreeing that the
criticism has to be constructive, as in the above bit.

And that pic with the smiling pretty boy looks like an advert. :azn:

That's why there's a communications and specialist equipment part of your orders group. Any need to run radio silent or note interference would be detailed there.

The use of ECM and coms in the same environment is a regular occurrence.

Gotta agree there too. Your own radios are of
course supposed to work under your jamming.

And I hope the rats' ECM are limited if they exist.

In a Conscript Army that routinely discharges soldiers and rotates out Officers every 3 years?
It is a consequence of the system.

When France had the compulsory service, the armed
forces, especially the army, were split in operational
vs conscript regiments so to speak with only the pros
& a very small number of conscript ( usually on a pro
conversion course ) doing the OPEX / hard stuff.

The duration by the last era was down to a single year.
Three years is not much, 6 to 10 + is a minimum goal.

Nice convo, guys; have a great day, Tay.
 
Rafale in Egyptian markings looking very nice! Congrats :)

Ah, ok. I thought you were stationed in IC as a personnel. I misunderstood. Yeah my father was in an administrative capacity. Traveled and lived in many places as a result. Besides Pakistan and Thailand, in Africa we were in Burundi, Zaire and Kenya. Great experience as a child growing up.



They shouldn't have any problem absorbing the building of those two additional ships at the Alexandria shipyard. The only obstacle would be the usual agreement on the financing.

BTW, the new Qatari Rafales have almost completed their testing. It's nice to see a Rafale with a different camo than the usual single tone grey, but they've also added the Qatari colors now as well.

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The conclusion of Khalifa 3 with the UAE.


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Qatari Rafales looking cool in two tone camouflage.

Which ship is that and which helicopter its carrying?
 
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That's a Baynunah "corvette", airmarshal!

It is produced at Abu Dhabi Ship Building
on the lead BR70 Combattante by CNM
made in France.

The chopper is a Eurocopter AS 565 also
known as the Panther and also made in Fr.

Particularity : fast enough at around 32 Kt.

Have a great day, Tay.
 

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