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1983 before cold test ... location unknown...
May 1, 1972: A. Q. Khan Starts Work for Dutch Nuclear Company, Obtains Classified Information despite Lacking Proper Clearance
A. Q. Khan starts work for an engineering company called Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), which is based in the Netherlands. He obtains the job, evaluating high-strength metals to be used for centrifuge components, through a former university classmate and a recommendation from his old professor, Martin Brabers. FDO is a subcontractor for a company called Urenco. Urenco owns an enrichment facility and was established in 1970 by the governments of Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands to manufacture top-quality centrifuges that can be used to produce highly-enriched uranium for use in power plants and nuclear weapons.
Khan Obtains Security Clearance - Khan obtains a security clearance with minimal background checks because he tells investigators he intends to become a Dutch citizen. However, he finds that security is lax and he has access to areas that should be denied him. For example, less than a week after he is hired, he visits the centrifuges, although he does not have clearance to see them. He obtains access to data about them and is also asked to help translate sensitive documents, as he has lived in various European countries and can speak several languages. Khan is allowed to take the documents home, even though this is a clear violation of security protocols. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 46-7]
Studied in Europe, Developed Network of Contacts - Prior to being hired by FDO, Khan had studied in Europe for some time. First he attended a series of lectures about metallurgy at the Technical University in West Berlin in 1962, then obtained a master’s degree in engineering from Delft Technical University in the Netherlands in 1967, and received his doctorate from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium in 1971. His studies in Europe will later turn out to be useful when he starts a nuclear smuggling ring. Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will comment, “Along the way the affable Pakistani had developed a wide range of contacts, including individuals who would later emerge as part of his smuggling network.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 22-25; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 46-7]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, URENCO
Category Tags: Netherlands, A. Q. Khan's Career
March 1974: Pakistan Sets up Nuclear Warhead Design Team, Facility
A team of scientists and engineers working on conventional weapons at a Pakistan army ordnance facility are transferred to a secret location to begin working on a nuclear warhead design. The team is led by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a founding member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. However, the team will not have finished its work by 1981, and a second, competing program will then be set up (see 1981). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 90-91]
Entity Tags: Samar Mubarakmand
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
May 18, 1974: India Tests First Nuclear Device
India detonates a nuclear device in an underground facility. The device had been built using material supplied for its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program by the United States, France, and Canada. The test, and this aspect of India’s nuclear program, is unauthorized by global control mechanisms. India portrays the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” and says it is “firmly committed” to using nuclear technology for only peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: 'Fait Accompli' - Pakistan, India’s regional opponent, is extremely unhappy with the test, which apparently confirms India’s military superiority. Due to the obvious difficulties producing its own nuclear bomb, Pakistan first tries to find a diplomatic solution. It asks the US to provide it with a nuclear umbrella, without much hope of success. Relations between Pakistan and the US, once extremely close, have been worsening for some years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington that the test is “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would have to learn to live with it,” although he is aware this is a “little rough” on the Pakistanis.
No Punishment - No sanctions are imposed on India, or the countries that sold the technology to it, and they continue to help India’s nuclear program. Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will later say that, if Kissinger had replied otherwise, Pakistan would have not started its own nuclear weapons program and that “you would never have heard of A. Q. Khan.” Shahi also points out to his colleagues that if Pakistan does build a bomb, then it will probably not suffer any sanctions either.
Pakistan Steps up Nuclear Program - Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then decides that his country must respond to this “grave and serious threat” by making its own nuclear weapons. He steps up Pakistan’s nuclear research efforts in a quest to build a bomb, a quest that will be successful by the mid-1980s (see 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 11-14; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 39-40]
Entity Tags: Agha Shahi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Henry A. Kissinger
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
After May 18, 1974: A. Q. Khan Offers Services to Pakistan
After India’s first successful nuclear test on May 18, 1974, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, at this time working in a centrifuge production facility in the Netherlands, begins to approach Pakistani government representatives to offer help with Pakistan’s nuclear program. First he approaches a pair of Pakistani military scientists who are in the Netherlands on business. He tells them he wants to help Pakistan’s nuclear program, but they discourage him, saying it would be hard for him to find a job in Pakistan. Undaunted, Khan then writes to Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He sets out his experience and encourages Bhutto to make a nuclear bomb using uranium, rather than plutonium, the method Pakistan is currently trying to adopt. Pakistan will examine Khan’s idea and find it a good one (see Summer-Autumn 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 48]
Entity Tags: Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Summer-Autumn 1974: Pakistan Considers A. Q. Khan’s Proposals for Uranium Bomb
Pakistani government leaders consider a secret proposal made by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan that it build a uranium bomb (see After May 18, 1974) and find it to be a good idea. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto writes of Khan, “He seems to be making sense.” Siddique Butt, an employee of Pakistan’s embassy in Belgium who will go on to help Khan’s future nuclear smuggling ring, investigates Khan and finds he is a top scientist who can be helpful to Pakistan. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, another future key associate of Khan’s, is asked to write another assessment, which finds that, if implemented, Khan’s ideas could give Pakistan enough uranium for a bomb by 1979. Based on these reports, the Pakistani government starts working with Khan, who begins to steal secrets for them (see October 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 49-50]
Entity Tags: Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Siddique Butt
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Progress with Pakistani Nukes
October 1974: A. Q. Khan Begins Stealing Nuclear Secrets for Pakistan
After Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan agrees to help Pakistan obtain the technology to make a nuclear bomb (see Summer-Autumn 1974), he begins to steal secrets from a Dutch company he works for to help them. Khan is asked to help translate a top-secret report on the G2 centrifuge, a major advance in uranium enrichment technology. To this end, he is assigned to a high-security section of the company, but the strict security procedures are ignored and he has free access for 16 days to the company’s main centrifuge plant. He takes full advantage of the situation, noting down details of the various processes. Around this time, neighbors also notice that Khan is receiving late-night visits from French and Belgian cars with diplomatic license plates, presumably Pakistani contacts to whom Khan is passing the secrets. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 50-1]
Entity Tags: URENCO, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Progress with Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
December 1974: A. Q. Khan Travels to Pakistan for Discussions on Uranium Bomb
A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani employee of the Dutch nuclear equipment company Urenco, travels to Pakistan and meets Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Munir Khan, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Khan again tells Bhutto that Pakistan should build a uranium, not plutonium bomb, and agrees to continue with his job in the Netherlands, where he is stealing secrets for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (see October 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 51-2]
Entity Tags: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Munir Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
After February 15, 1975: Pakistan Begins Uranium Enrichment Program
Following discussions with fellow Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, on February 15, 1975, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Khan proposes that Pakistan formally establish a uranium enrichment program, to go with the plutonium enrichment program it already has. The $450 million plan calls for a centrifuge plant, a uranium mine, and a facility to produce uranium gas, which would allow Pakistan to produce a nuclear weapon. The proposal is approved by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and a scientist known as Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood is placed in charge of the program. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 52-3]
Entity Tags: Munir Khan, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
March-December 15, 1975: A. Q. Khan Steals More Secrets in Europe for Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Following the commencement of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program (see After February 15, 1975), A. Q. Khan meets program head Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Belgium and then begins to steal an unprecedented amount of information from the company he works for, a European nuclear company called Urenco, to support the program. According to authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento: “Khan sent everything from centrifuge designs and technical literature to parts and lists of suppliers. He even sent blueprints of an entire uranium enrichment facility. In at least one instance, Khan sent [an associate] a discarded component from a uranium centrifuge.” He evens asks a photographer he shares an office with to photograph some centrifuges and components. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 53-4]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, URENCO, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Mid-1975: Colleague Warns Nuclear Equipment Manufacturer of A. Q. Khan, No Action Taken
Frits Veerman, a photographer who works with Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan at the nuclear equipment manufacturer Urenco, becomes suspicious of Khan, and attempts to warn the company. Veerman becomes suspicious because Khan keeps asking him to photograph centrifuges and components, evidently so he can send the photographs back to Pakistan. When Veerman visits Khan’s house, he sees highly classified centrifuge designs lying around. He also meets other Pakistanis at the house, and will later learn they are agents working under diplomatic cover. His suspicions aroused, Veerman warns Urenco of this repeatedly. However, the company denies there is a problem and tells Veerman not to make allegations against a superior. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, URENCO, Frits Veerman
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Mid-October 1975: Dutch Begin to Investigate A. Q. Khan over Disclosure of Nuclear Secrets
The BVD, a Dutch intelligence service, begins investigating A. Q. Khan over suspicions he is passing on nuclear secrets from the uranium enrichment company Urenco, for which he works, to Pakistan. The investigation starts because of two incidents. In the first, the Pakistani embassy in Belgium uses a report that appears to have come from one of Urenco’s owners to order specialized wrapping foil for centrifuges from Metalimphy, a French company. Metalimphy checks with Urenco’s owner, which says that the report belongs to it, and should not be in the Pakistanis’ hands. The BVD then learns that Khan was asking suspicious questions at a trade fair in Switzerland about atomic weapons. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Metalimphy, URENCO, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
November 1975: CIA Instructs Dutch Not to Arrest A. Q. Khan over Passage of Nuclear Secrets; Khan Flees to Pakistan
Ruud Lubbers. [Source: ru(.nl)]After the BVD, a Dutch intelligence agency, informs the CIA that it intends to arrest A. Q. Khan over the passage of nuclear secrets to Pakistan (see Mid-October 1975), the CIA tells the Dutch to let Khan continue with his activities. Former Dutch Minister of Economc Affairs Ruud Lubbers will say, “The Americans wished to follow and watch Khan to get more information.” Lubbers questions this and the CIA tells him to block Khan’s access to the secrets, which the Dutch do by promoting him to a job where he no longer has access to sensitive data from the uranium enrichment company Urenco. Lubbers will later suggest that the real reason the US does not want Khan arrested is because of its interest in helping Pakistan, an enemy of Soviet-leaning India. Because Khan no longer has access to the sensitive data after his promotion, the CIA cannot find out anything by monitoring him. In addition, the promotion alerts Khan to the fact he may be under surveillance, and he flees to Pakistan in mid-December. Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will later comment: “What no one yet realized was that Khan had already absconded with the plans for almost every centrifuge on Urenco’s drawing board, including the all-important G-2 [centrifuge]. It would prove to be one of the greatest nuclear heists of all time.” [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: Ruud Lubbers, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, Central Intelligence Agency, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
Early 1976: A. Q. Khan Formally Hired to Help Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
After returning from the Netherlands, where he had stolen secrets to help Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program but was under investigation by the authorities (see March-December 15, 1975 and November 1975), Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is formally hired to assist with Pakistan’s program to build nuclear weapons. The hiring results from a report by Khan to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto about the state of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program. After touring the country’s enrichment facility, Khan tells Bhutto that the program is in a bad state, and Bhutto offers Khan a managerial position. When Bhutto is told that Khan has accepted the position, he reportedly pounds his fist on the table and declares, “I will see the Hindu bastards now.” Because of the knowledge Khan has gained during his time in Europe, he soon becomes well respected within the project. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 56-57]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
Early 1976: US Intelligence Finds Pakistan Has ‘Crash Program’ to Build Nuclear Bomb
US intelligence discovers that Pakistan has begun a “crash program” to build a nuclear weapon. The weapon is to be a plutonium bomb made using fuel from a reprocessing plant that will be built in Pakistan by the French and financed by Libya. The Ford administration attempts to pressure Pakistan to give up these attempts, and in a meeting in August 1976 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will offer Pakistan over a hundred fighter planes in return for its giving up the efforts. He will also threaten to “make a horrible example” of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan will not respond to these threats, but will eventually abandon this program in favor of attempts to build a uranium bomb by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 62-63]
Entity Tags: Ford administration, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Henry A. Kissinger
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes
July 31, 1976: A. Q. Khan Appointed Head of Pakistan’s Uranium Enrichment Program
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is appointed director of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program, replacing Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. The program is also separated from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Khan is to report directly to the prime minister. The changes are a result of complaints Khan made about Mahmood and PAEC chief Munir Khan. In letters to both Munir Khan and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Khan had threatened to resign and said that progress with uranium enrichment was very slow: “Each week passing is putting the project behind by at least two to three months.” In a meeting with Bhutto, Khan calls the PAEC chief and his associates “liars and cheats,” and points out there is no way they can carry out a promised test for a plutonium bomb by the deadline they have set. The separation of the plutonium bomb project under Munir Khan and the uranium bomb project under A. Q. Khan does have a benefit for Pakistan: the world is focused on frustrating Munir Khan’s plutonium project, and for a short while A. Q. Khan can “move forward relatively unhindered.” [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 57-59]
Entity Tags: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Khan, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
After September 1976: Work Begins on Nuclear Weapons Facility at Kahuta
Pakistan’s Project 706, an effort to build nuclear weapons headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, begins work on a facility in Kahuta, about 20 miles southeast of Islamabad. The facility, later renamed Khan Research Laboratories, will be the chief site in Pakistan’s attempts to build a nuclear weapon. Khan believes the location is a big asset, as skilled employees will have access to good education and health care in Islamabad, and he will be close to the seat of the government. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 59]
Entity Tags: Kahuta Research Laboratories, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
(April 1978): Civilian Committee Overseeing Pakistan Nuclear Facility Disbanded, Replaced by General
May 1, 1972: A. Q. Khan Starts Work for Dutch Nuclear Company, Obtains Classified Information despite Lacking Proper Clearance
A. Q. Khan starts work for an engineering company called Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), which is based in the Netherlands. He obtains the job, evaluating high-strength metals to be used for centrifuge components, through a former university classmate and a recommendation from his old professor, Martin Brabers. FDO is a subcontractor for a company called Urenco. Urenco owns an enrichment facility and was established in 1970 by the governments of Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands to manufacture top-quality centrifuges that can be used to produce highly-enriched uranium for use in power plants and nuclear weapons.
Khan Obtains Security Clearance - Khan obtains a security clearance with minimal background checks because he tells investigators he intends to become a Dutch citizen. However, he finds that security is lax and he has access to areas that should be denied him. For example, less than a week after he is hired, he visits the centrifuges, although he does not have clearance to see them. He obtains access to data about them and is also asked to help translate sensitive documents, as he has lived in various European countries and can speak several languages. Khan is allowed to take the documents home, even though this is a clear violation of security protocols. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 46-7]
Studied in Europe, Developed Network of Contacts - Prior to being hired by FDO, Khan had studied in Europe for some time. First he attended a series of lectures about metallurgy at the Technical University in West Berlin in 1962, then obtained a master’s degree in engineering from Delft Technical University in the Netherlands in 1967, and received his doctorate from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium in 1971. His studies in Europe will later turn out to be useful when he starts a nuclear smuggling ring. Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will comment, “Along the way the affable Pakistani had developed a wide range of contacts, including individuals who would later emerge as part of his smuggling network.” [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 22-25; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 46-7]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, URENCO
Category Tags: Netherlands, A. Q. Khan's Career
March 1974: Pakistan Sets up Nuclear Warhead Design Team, Facility
A team of scientists and engineers working on conventional weapons at a Pakistan army ordnance facility are transferred to a secret location to begin working on a nuclear warhead design. The team is led by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a founding member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. However, the team will not have finished its work by 1981, and a second, competing program will then be set up (see 1981). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 90-91]
Entity Tags: Samar Mubarakmand
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
May 18, 1974: India Tests First Nuclear Device
India detonates a nuclear device in an underground facility. The device had been built using material supplied for its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program by the United States, France, and Canada. The test, and this aspect of India’s nuclear program, is unauthorized by global control mechanisms. India portrays the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” and says it is “firmly committed” to using nuclear technology for only peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: 'Fait Accompli' - Pakistan, India’s regional opponent, is extremely unhappy with the test, which apparently confirms India’s military superiority. Due to the obvious difficulties producing its own nuclear bomb, Pakistan first tries to find a diplomatic solution. It asks the US to provide it with a nuclear umbrella, without much hope of success. Relations between Pakistan and the US, once extremely close, have been worsening for some years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington that the test is “a fait accompli and that Pakistan would have to learn to live with it,” although he is aware this is a “little rough” on the Pakistanis.
No Punishment - No sanctions are imposed on India, or the countries that sold the technology to it, and they continue to help India’s nuclear program. Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will later say that, if Kissinger had replied otherwise, Pakistan would have not started its own nuclear weapons program and that “you would never have heard of A. Q. Khan.” Shahi also points out to his colleagues that if Pakistan does build a bomb, then it will probably not suffer any sanctions either.
Pakistan Steps up Nuclear Program - Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then decides that his country must respond to this “grave and serious threat” by making its own nuclear weapons. He steps up Pakistan’s nuclear research efforts in a quest to build a bomb, a quest that will be successful by the mid-1980s (see 1987). [LEVY AND SCOTT-CLARK, 2007, PP. 11-14; ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 39-40]
Entity Tags: Agha Shahi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Henry A. Kissinger
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
After May 18, 1974: A. Q. Khan Offers Services to Pakistan
After India’s first successful nuclear test on May 18, 1974, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, at this time working in a centrifuge production facility in the Netherlands, begins to approach Pakistani government representatives to offer help with Pakistan’s nuclear program. First he approaches a pair of Pakistani military scientists who are in the Netherlands on business. He tells them he wants to help Pakistan’s nuclear program, but they discourage him, saying it would be hard for him to find a job in Pakistan. Undaunted, Khan then writes to Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He sets out his experience and encourages Bhutto to make a nuclear bomb using uranium, rather than plutonium, the method Pakistan is currently trying to adopt. Pakistan will examine Khan’s idea and find it a good one (see Summer-Autumn 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 48]
Entity Tags: Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Summer-Autumn 1974: Pakistan Considers A. Q. Khan’s Proposals for Uranium Bomb
Pakistani government leaders consider a secret proposal made by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan that it build a uranium bomb (see After May 18, 1974) and find it to be a good idea. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto writes of Khan, “He seems to be making sense.” Siddique Butt, an employee of Pakistan’s embassy in Belgium who will go on to help Khan’s future nuclear smuggling ring, investigates Khan and finds he is a top scientist who can be helpful to Pakistan. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, another future key associate of Khan’s, is asked to write another assessment, which finds that, if implemented, Khan’s ideas could give Pakistan enough uranium for a bomb by 1979. Based on these reports, the Pakistani government starts working with Khan, who begins to steal secrets for them (see October 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 49-50]
Entity Tags: Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Siddique Butt
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Progress with Pakistani Nukes
October 1974: A. Q. Khan Begins Stealing Nuclear Secrets for Pakistan
After Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan agrees to help Pakistan obtain the technology to make a nuclear bomb (see Summer-Autumn 1974), he begins to steal secrets from a Dutch company he works for to help them. Khan is asked to help translate a top-secret report on the G2 centrifuge, a major advance in uranium enrichment technology. To this end, he is assigned to a high-security section of the company, but the strict security procedures are ignored and he has free access for 16 days to the company’s main centrifuge plant. He takes full advantage of the situation, noting down details of the various processes. Around this time, neighbors also notice that Khan is receiving late-night visits from French and Belgian cars with diplomatic license plates, presumably Pakistani contacts to whom Khan is passing the secrets. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 50-1]
Entity Tags: URENCO, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Progress with Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
December 1974: A. Q. Khan Travels to Pakistan for Discussions on Uranium Bomb
A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani employee of the Dutch nuclear equipment company Urenco, travels to Pakistan and meets Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Munir Khan, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Khan again tells Bhutto that Pakistan should build a uranium, not plutonium bomb, and agrees to continue with his job in the Netherlands, where he is stealing secrets for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (see October 1974). [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 51-2]
Entity Tags: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Munir Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
After February 15, 1975: Pakistan Begins Uranium Enrichment Program
Following discussions with fellow Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, on February 15, 1975, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Khan proposes that Pakistan formally establish a uranium enrichment program, to go with the plutonium enrichment program it already has. The $450 million plan calls for a centrifuge plant, a uranium mine, and a facility to produce uranium gas, which would allow Pakistan to produce a nuclear weapon. The proposal is approved by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and a scientist known as Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood is placed in charge of the program. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 52-3]
Entity Tags: Munir Khan, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
March-December 15, 1975: A. Q. Khan Steals More Secrets in Europe for Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Following the commencement of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program (see After February 15, 1975), A. Q. Khan meets program head Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Belgium and then begins to steal an unprecedented amount of information from the company he works for, a European nuclear company called Urenco, to support the program. According to authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento: “Khan sent everything from centrifuge designs and technical literature to parts and lists of suppliers. He even sent blueprints of an entire uranium enrichment facility. In at least one instance, Khan sent [an associate] a discarded component from a uranium centrifuge.” He evens asks a photographer he shares an office with to photograph some centrifuges and components. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 53-4]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, URENCO, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Mid-1975: Colleague Warns Nuclear Equipment Manufacturer of A. Q. Khan, No Action Taken
Frits Veerman, a photographer who works with Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan at the nuclear equipment manufacturer Urenco, becomes suspicious of Khan, and attempts to warn the company. Veerman becomes suspicious because Khan keeps asking him to photograph centrifuges and components, evidently so he can send the photographs back to Pakistan. When Veerman visits Khan’s house, he sees highly classified centrifuge designs lying around. He also meets other Pakistanis at the house, and will later learn they are agents working under diplomatic cover. His suspicions aroused, Veerman warns Urenco of this repeatedly. However, the company denies there is a problem and tells Veerman not to make allegations against a superior. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, URENCO, Frits Veerman
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Netherlands
Mid-October 1975: Dutch Begin to Investigate A. Q. Khan over Disclosure of Nuclear Secrets
The BVD, a Dutch intelligence service, begins investigating A. Q. Khan over suspicions he is passing on nuclear secrets from the uranium enrichment company Urenco, for which he works, to Pakistan. The investigation starts because of two incidents. In the first, the Pakistani embassy in Belgium uses a report that appears to have come from one of Urenco’s owners to order specialized wrapping foil for centrifuges from Metalimphy, a French company. Metalimphy checks with Urenco’s owner, which says that the report belongs to it, and should not be in the Pakistanis’ hands. The BVD then learns that Khan was asking suspicious questions at a trade fair in Switzerland about atomic weapons. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Metalimphy, URENCO, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
November 1975: CIA Instructs Dutch Not to Arrest A. Q. Khan over Passage of Nuclear Secrets; Khan Flees to Pakistan
Entity Tags: Ruud Lubbers, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, Central Intelligence Agency, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Netherlands
Early 1976: A. Q. Khan Formally Hired to Help Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
After returning from the Netherlands, where he had stolen secrets to help Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program but was under investigation by the authorities (see March-December 15, 1975 and November 1975), Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is formally hired to assist with Pakistan’s program to build nuclear weapons. The hiring results from a report by Khan to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto about the state of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program. After touring the country’s enrichment facility, Khan tells Bhutto that the program is in a bad state, and Bhutto offers Khan a managerial position. When Bhutto is told that Khan has accepted the position, he reportedly pounds his fist on the table and declares, “I will see the Hindu bastards now.” Because of the knowledge Khan has gained during his time in Europe, he soon becomes well respected within the project. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 56-57]
Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
Early 1976: US Intelligence Finds Pakistan Has ‘Crash Program’ to Build Nuclear Bomb
US intelligence discovers that Pakistan has begun a “crash program” to build a nuclear weapon. The weapon is to be a plutonium bomb made using fuel from a reprocessing plant that will be built in Pakistan by the French and financed by Libya. The Ford administration attempts to pressure Pakistan to give up these attempts, and in a meeting in August 1976 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will offer Pakistan over a hundred fighter planes in return for its giving up the efforts. He will also threaten to “make a horrible example” of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan will not respond to these threats, but will eventually abandon this program in favor of attempts to build a uranium bomb by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 62-63]
Entity Tags: Ford administration, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Henry A. Kissinger
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes
July 31, 1976: A. Q. Khan Appointed Head of Pakistan’s Uranium Enrichment Program
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is appointed director of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program, replacing Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. The program is also separated from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Khan is to report directly to the prime minister. The changes are a result of complaints Khan made about Mahmood and PAEC chief Munir Khan. In letters to both Munir Khan and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Khan had threatened to resign and said that progress with uranium enrichment was very slow: “Each week passing is putting the project behind by at least two to three months.” In a meeting with Bhutto, Khan calls the PAEC chief and his associates “liars and cheats,” and points out there is no way they can carry out a promised test for a plutonium bomb by the deadline they have set. The separation of the plutonium bomb project under Munir Khan and the uranium bomb project under A. Q. Khan does have a benefit for Pakistan: the world is focused on frustrating Munir Khan’s plutonium project, and for a short while A. Q. Khan can “move forward relatively unhindered.” [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 57-59]
Entity Tags: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Khan, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Category Tags: A. Q. Khan's Career
After September 1976: Work Begins on Nuclear Weapons Facility at Kahuta
Pakistan’s Project 706, an effort to build nuclear weapons headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, begins work on a facility in Kahuta, about 20 miles southeast of Islamabad. The facility, later renamed Khan Research Laboratories, will be the chief site in Pakistan’s attempts to build a nuclear weapon. Khan believes the location is a big asset, as skilled employees will have access to good education and health care in Islamabad, and he will be close to the seat of the government. [ARMSTRONG AND TRENTO, 2007, PP. 59]
Entity Tags: Kahuta Research Laboratories, Abdul Qadeer Khan
Category Tags: Progress with Pakistani Nukes
(April 1978): Civilian Committee Overseeing Pakistan Nuclear Facility Disbanded, Replaced by General
