Muhammed45
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I know and it is bad for India.
USA is a parasite, wherever i see this virus, i can smell trouble, war, ISIS, AlQaeda etc.
Anyways i wish for peace
Doklam standoff: India increases troops ALL along border, caution level raised
- Thread starter Stephen Cohen
- Start date
USA is a parasite, wherever i see this virus, i can smell trouble, war, ISIS, AlQaeda etc.
Anyways i wish for peace
Rajaraja Chola
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You know what? Chinese leader just visited India in 1961 wanting peace. Border posts inside China is their version. Our version is we created border posts within our border. First know the difference.
IA took so much time to define the areas in the map, that Aksai Chin ruled by Kashmir Maharaja had a Chinese road through it and IA discovered it only in 1957. Till that time IA didnt even know the exact border locations with the Chinese as we were concentrating on Pakistan.
You can cheerlead later. Chinese definitions of historical records are just BS. In that case we should claim historical rights over whole of SA and some parts of SEA.
Farhan Bohra
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I dont think so. Having good relations with any country is not a bad sign.
axisofevil
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And what about India........Why do you assume its India who is stirring up trouble. Bhutan has a defense pact with India and they initiated it when China started building roads in disputed territory
Muhammed45
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Look dude
USA wants it's domination in whole world and i'm not blind to the truth. Whether by NUKEing Japan or threatening NK and China or training ISIS and Al-Qaeda through it's regional puppets or liquidating Dresden's citizens or etc.
They always introduce Iran, Russia, China and NK as the biggest trouble for their parasite regime. Since we have the least or zero dependence on them.
Believe me this parasite will bring a big trouble for all of regional countries. This is their president :
Guess the rest
66% of American citizens cannot find NK on world map and indeed they would believe everything the MSM claims. Why don't you remember WMDs in Iraq and 9/11 false flag.
The parasite spreads through war and terrorism
Ghareeb_Da_Baal
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Lets hope things dont escalate!
Farhan Bohra
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Look dude
USA wants it's domination in whole world and i'm not blind to the truth. Whether by NUKEing Japan or threatening NK and China or training ISIS and Al-Qaeda through it's regional puppets or liquidating Dresden's citizens or etc.
They always introduce Iran, Russia, China and NK as the biggest trouble for their parasite regime. Since we have the least or zero dependence on them.
Believe me this parasite will bring a big trouble for all of regional countries. This is their president :
Guess the rest
66% of American citizens cannot find NK on world map and indeed they would believe everything the MSM claims. Why don't you remember WMDs in Iraq and 9/11 false flag.
The parasite spreads through war and terrorism
You have a problem with US in current world order dude. I dont.
ISIS is not a threat to India. Taliban is.
No, what you see is just a facade, in reality, they are extremely greedy and opportunistic and frankly, there is nothing wrong with that, everyone would care for his own interests and that's normal but they have this tendency of stealing others' lands one way or the other.They did the same to us in the past and now tried to pull a similar stunt in Bhutan but failed to take India into account, and the result is what you are seeing now.
Guess he has fallen for the Chinese propaganda, can't really blame him though.
DarX
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Keep day dreaming and rewriting history.
Building islands for military purposes, so peaceful.
China was building a road in Doklam and India got scared. What should one do that will not scare Indians?
Banglar Bir
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Doklam’s unintended consequence
C. Raja Mohan, August 9, 2017
Whatever the eventual outcome in Doklam, the current stand-off is bound to significantly alter Indian perceptions of China. For one, the political goodwill in India towards China that was constructed over the last three decades will be increasingly difficult to sustain in the coming years. For another, India, which long resisted the idea of balancing China, is likely to move inevitably in that direction.
It took a lot of bold moves, including those by Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the foreign minister in the late 1970s and Rajiv Gandhi as the prime minister in the late 1980s, for the Indian elite to overcome the sense of Chinese betrayal in 1962. While leaders like Vajpayee and Rajiv Gandhi understood the imperatives of normalising relations with China, there was entrenched resistance in the political class and in the bureaucracy, armed forces and the security agencies that would take many years to overcome. Indian business too has been deeply fearful of engaging China.
The slow but definitive normalisation of relations was aided immensely by the pragmatism in Beijing, especially that of Deng Xiaoping, whose emphasis was on creating a peaceful external environment for the economic modernisation of China. But as China’s power grew rapidly, Deng’s successors have abandoned that pragmatism in favour of assertiveness. The current generation of leaders in Beijing believes China can now shape its external environment rather than merely adapt to it. As the newly predominant power in Asia, China may now see no reason to defer to Indian sensitivities.
The signals of China’s new approach to India were evident since 2008 when China opposed the nuclear exemption for India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Thanks to strong support to India from then-US President George W. Bush, China backed off. Meanwhile, tensions on the border began to rise as the PLA improved the military logistics in Tibet. China’s embrace with Pakistan has grown tighter and Beijing’s penetration of South Asia deeper over the last decade.
On its part, the UPA government in Delhi downplayed the differences with Beijing and underlined the prospects for collaboration with China in the quest for a multipolar world. The Narendra Modi government had a taste of Chinese pressures in September 2014 when PLA’s incursions into Ladakh coincided with President Xi’s visit to India. Modi’s followed his success in defusing this crisis by a strong effort to expand economic ties on a practical basis. But the Chinese actions — brazen opposition to India’s membership to the NSG, the reluctance to support international sanctions against known terrorists in Pakistan, and most recently the aggressive posture in the Doklam crisis — have dashed hopes for a positive turn in bilateral ties.
If Modi, as the strongest leader since Rajiv Gandhi, presented a rare opportunity to reconstruct Sino-Indian relations, Xi seems utterly uninterested. Sensible statecraft must, however, try and temper the pessimism of analytics with optimism about political agency. Hence , the unprecedented restraint in Delhi’s language and its patient calls for a dialogue to resolve the Doklam crisis in the face of Chinese threats and demands for unilateral Indian concessions.
India sees no reason to pick up a needless quarrel with a neighbour and rising power like China. But Beijing might be terribly wrong in presuming that Delhi would simply fold up under pressure. Pushed to a corner, India has every incentive to simply dig in. If China sees itself as an irresistible force today, India could well turn out to be that immovable object. There will be no happy ending for this confrontation.
China appears to have been carried away by the success of its recent coercive diplomacy in East Asia and the South China Sea. Unlike China’s East Asian neighbours, India has the capacity to absorb pressures from Beijing. With limited economic interdependence with China, Delhi can bear the costs of a severed commercial relationship. If India could turn its back on the dominant powers of the West for many decades during the Cold War, it could do that with China again.
China is also wrong to believe that asymmetry in power potential will automatically lead to surrender. China could learn from Pakistan’s refusal to submit to the widening strategic gap with India. Beijing’s haughty and unpleasant diplomacy in the current crisis will eventually lead to the conviction in Delhi that strategic defiance of China must prevail over the temptations for appeasement.
One of the consequences of power asymmetry is the pressure on the weaker power to turn to balancing strategies. Until now, India has deeply resisted walking down that road in the expectation that a reasonable accommodation of interests with China is possible. If China makes it clear there is no room for compromises, India will have to turn to both internal and external balancing of China.
One of the unintended consequences for China from the Doklam crisis would be an India that is forced to think far more strategically about coping with China’s power. For nearly a century, sentimentalism in Delhi about Asian solidarity and anti imperialism masked the more structural contradictions with China. Beijing’s approach to the Doklam crisis could well help bury those illusions.
[The writer is director, Carnegie India, Delhi.]
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/09/doklams-unintended-consequence/
C. Raja Mohan, August 9, 2017
Whatever the eventual outcome in Doklam, the current stand-off is bound to significantly alter Indian perceptions of China. For one, the political goodwill in India towards China that was constructed over the last three decades will be increasingly difficult to sustain in the coming years. For another, India, which long resisted the idea of balancing China, is likely to move inevitably in that direction.
It took a lot of bold moves, including those by Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the foreign minister in the late 1970s and Rajiv Gandhi as the prime minister in the late 1980s, for the Indian elite to overcome the sense of Chinese betrayal in 1962. While leaders like Vajpayee and Rajiv Gandhi understood the imperatives of normalising relations with China, there was entrenched resistance in the political class and in the bureaucracy, armed forces and the security agencies that would take many years to overcome. Indian business too has been deeply fearful of engaging China.
The slow but definitive normalisation of relations was aided immensely by the pragmatism in Beijing, especially that of Deng Xiaoping, whose emphasis was on creating a peaceful external environment for the economic modernisation of China. But as China’s power grew rapidly, Deng’s successors have abandoned that pragmatism in favour of assertiveness. The current generation of leaders in Beijing believes China can now shape its external environment rather than merely adapt to it. As the newly predominant power in Asia, China may now see no reason to defer to Indian sensitivities.
The signals of China’s new approach to India were evident since 2008 when China opposed the nuclear exemption for India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Thanks to strong support to India from then-US President George W. Bush, China backed off. Meanwhile, tensions on the border began to rise as the PLA improved the military logistics in Tibet. China’s embrace with Pakistan has grown tighter and Beijing’s penetration of South Asia deeper over the last decade.
On its part, the UPA government in Delhi downplayed the differences with Beijing and underlined the prospects for collaboration with China in the quest for a multipolar world. The Narendra Modi government had a taste of Chinese pressures in September 2014 when PLA’s incursions into Ladakh coincided with President Xi’s visit to India. Modi’s followed his success in defusing this crisis by a strong effort to expand economic ties on a practical basis. But the Chinese actions — brazen opposition to India’s membership to the NSG, the reluctance to support international sanctions against known terrorists in Pakistan, and most recently the aggressive posture in the Doklam crisis — have dashed hopes for a positive turn in bilateral ties.
If Modi, as the strongest leader since Rajiv Gandhi, presented a rare opportunity to reconstruct Sino-Indian relations, Xi seems utterly uninterested. Sensible statecraft must, however, try and temper the pessimism of analytics with optimism about political agency. Hence , the unprecedented restraint in Delhi’s language and its patient calls for a dialogue to resolve the Doklam crisis in the face of Chinese threats and demands for unilateral Indian concessions.
India sees no reason to pick up a needless quarrel with a neighbour and rising power like China. But Beijing might be terribly wrong in presuming that Delhi would simply fold up under pressure. Pushed to a corner, India has every incentive to simply dig in. If China sees itself as an irresistible force today, India could well turn out to be that immovable object. There will be no happy ending for this confrontation.
China appears to have been carried away by the success of its recent coercive diplomacy in East Asia and the South China Sea. Unlike China’s East Asian neighbours, India has the capacity to absorb pressures from Beijing. With limited economic interdependence with China, Delhi can bear the costs of a severed commercial relationship. If India could turn its back on the dominant powers of the West for many decades during the Cold War, it could do that with China again.
China is also wrong to believe that asymmetry in power potential will automatically lead to surrender. China could learn from Pakistan’s refusal to submit to the widening strategic gap with India. Beijing’s haughty and unpleasant diplomacy in the current crisis will eventually lead to the conviction in Delhi that strategic defiance of China must prevail over the temptations for appeasement.
One of the consequences of power asymmetry is the pressure on the weaker power to turn to balancing strategies. Until now, India has deeply resisted walking down that road in the expectation that a reasonable accommodation of interests with China is possible. If China makes it clear there is no room for compromises, India will have to turn to both internal and external balancing of China.
One of the unintended consequences for China from the Doklam crisis would be an India that is forced to think far more strategically about coping with China’s power. For nearly a century, sentimentalism in Delhi about Asian solidarity and anti imperialism masked the more structural contradictions with China. Beijing’s approach to the Doklam crisis could well help bury those illusions.
[The writer is director, Carnegie India, Delhi.]
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/09/doklams-unintended-consequence/
Hyperion
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Banglar Bir
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Is a second Sino-Indian border war imminent?
Feng Zhang, August 11, 2017
The Sino-Indian standoff in the Doklam (Donglang in Chinese) region of the Himalayas where the borders of China, India and Bhutan converge is now nearly two months old. The dispute arose in mid-June when China attempted to build a road in an area it believed to be under its sovereign control, provoking Indian authorities to block the construction by crossing the Sino-Indian border with troops and bulldozers.
As yet there’s little sign of an end to the standoff. On the contrary, talk of war is now heard from both sides, and Chinese voices, both official and unofficial, are particularly strident in accusing India of ‘invading’ Chinese territory.
How likely is it that the current standoff will escalate into a border war? I’ll first assess the probability from the Chinese side.
That China should want to fight a war with India at this moment seems a highly unlikely prospect. Beijing is about to hold the BRICS summit in Fujian province. That gathering is one of the two major ‘home-field’ foreign policy events of this year, the other being the Belt and Road Initiative summit held in May. A war with India would upset proceedings.
Second, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of President Xi Jinping is in the final stage of organising the 19th Party Congress. The once-every-five-years party congress is the most important event in Chinese politics, and President Xi is expected to consolidate his power for a second five-year term. With stability a top priority for Chinese leaders, a war with India would create undesirable complications.
Third, Chinese policymakers can’t fail to notice that China is facing a number of security contingencies along its vast periphery. It’s unclear whether the standoff with India is the most significant. From North Korea to the South China Sea, those scenarios are constantly occupying the minds of Chinese planners.
How important is the standoff with India in China’s overall strategic context? I suggest that, depending on different conceptions of strategic interests and ways to achieve them, the above arguments against war with India can be turned on their head.
First, although the diplomatic success of the BRICS summit is desirable, territorial sovereignty now ranks as one of China’s highest national priorities. The summit will offer a precious chance for President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi to find a diplomatic solution. But if no agreement is reached the probability of a military showdown will increase significantly.
Second, an orderly party congress is desirable to further anoint Xi’s power and authority. But a successful limited war fought on Chinese terms won’t necessarily damage that prospect. On the contrary, such a war would rally Chinese elites and the public around Xi, who would be acclaimed the new strategic mastermind.
Third, Chinese moderates will oppose a war with India on the grounds that the national interests involved are nowhere as vital to generate such a forceful response. However, the hardliners, armed with a different set of strategic assumptions, will argue that such a punitive war promises unique strategic benefits. Aside from bending India to China’s will it would send a ripple effect throughout Asia about the new strategic reality of Chinese power and resolve. Moreover, with a weakened US, isn’t this an opportune moment for some strategic surprise? India and the US may have moved closer in recent years, but they aren’t treaty allies. In a war with China, India would fight alone.
Also Read: Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory
In fact, China has been sending highly unusual signals in recent days. On 2 August, the foreign ministry published a 12-page position paper demonstrating India’s ‘invasion of Chinese territory’. From 3 August, within a 24-hour period, six organisations—the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the Xinhua News Agency, the foreign ministry (a second time), the defence ministry, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, and the People’s Daily—delivered a barrage of warnings to India about the dire consequences of underestimating Chinese resolve.
In a speech marking the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA on 1 August, Xi sternly affirmed:
We will never permit anybody, any organisation, any political party to split off any piece of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form. Nobody should nurse any hope that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harm to our national sovereignty, security and development interests.
If China is mobilising domestic support for a possible showdown, that will make any future compromise hard and costly and, consequently, a punitive war more attractive and acceptable. By now key Chinese elites and the public are convinced that India has ‘invaded’ Chinese territory and that a short, sharp war to expel Indian ‘invaders’ would be just and appropriate.
None of the above is to suggest that war is about to break out next week or next month. Chinese leaders will have to weigh the cost–benefit calculus before making the final call. One hopes that deft diplomacy will prevail—as has been the case since the last border war of 1962. But one shouldn’t rule out the possibility of conflict. Neither China nor India should be complacent about the current situation or underestimate the consequences if war does break out.
AUTHOR
Feng Zhang is a fellow in the Australian National University’s Department of International Relations and adjunct professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in China. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/11/second-sino-indian-border-war-imminent/
Neither India nor China has shown any sign of backing off from a face-off that began nearly three months ago along the Sikkim border when Indian soldiers entered the Doklam plateau to stop the Chinese army from constructing a road.
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indi...aised-report-1736676?pfrom=home-lateststories
Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory
SAM Report, August 10, 2017
Nearly two months have passed since Indian troops illegally crossed the China-India boundary in Sikkim Sector, and there is no sign of withdrawal so far.
According to Xinhua, what the Indian side has done is committed seven “sins” against Chinese sovereignty and international law. These severe mistakes may trigger unpredictable consequences and greatly undermine regional peace and stability.
India’s military trespassing is an infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. On June 18, Indian border troops, carrying weapons and driving bulldozers, illegally crossed the boundary in the Sikkim Sector at the Duo Ka La (Doka La) pass and entered Chinese territory.
For almost two months, India has maintained its military presence in the Doklam area, a place recognized by both India and the international community as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Chinese sovereign territory.
It is fundamentally different in nature from past frictions between the border troops of the two sides at an undefined part of the boundary.
The blatant move contravenes the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, which has clearly delimited this part of the boundary between the Tibet Autonomous Region and India’s Sikkim State.
Every Indian government since independence has confirmed the boundary as it stands under the Convention. It is hard to understand why India abandons its previous position at this time.
Once a boundary is established by a convention, it is under the protection of international law. It is obvious that India’s military invasion, under the pretext of so-called “security concerns,” tramples on the principles of the law as well as international order and cannot be tolerated by any sovereign state.
Since the incident broke out, India has invented various excuses to whitewash its illegal move and smear China’s normal and legitimate activities, but its arguments have no factual or legal grounds and are simply untenable.
India has argued that China’s building of roads would represent a “significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India,” but the fact is, Chinese construction is being conducted within its own territory. It is India that has broken the status quo by trespassing onto Chinese soil.
Even more ridiculous, India has attempted to justify its incursion in the name of “protecting Bhutan,” arguing that Doklam is Bhutanese territory.
The fact is that the Bhutanese authorities have clearly told Chinese officials that Doklam is not Bhutan’s territory and expressed bewilderment at India’s trespassing into Chinese soil.
Matters concerning the China-India-Bhutan boundary tri-junction have nothing to do with this incident. By kidnapping an unrelated third party to stir up troubles in the border area, India seeks to obstruct border negotiations between China and Bhutan.
China has a strong will to solve the problem peacefully, but the prerequisite is that the Indian trespassers must withdraw unconditionally and immediately. China will never negotiate with an invading force when its national territorial integrity remains infringed.
The Indian side keeps playing lip service of seeking diplomatic channels to resolve the issue while refusing to withdraw its troops.
India must be fully aware that as a reckless intruder to its neighbors, it should take responsibility for inflaming border tensions and swallow possible consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/10/indian-militarys-seven-sins-trespassing-chinese-territory/
Feng Zhang, August 11, 2017
The Sino-Indian standoff in the Doklam (Donglang in Chinese) region of the Himalayas where the borders of China, India and Bhutan converge is now nearly two months old. The dispute arose in mid-June when China attempted to build a road in an area it believed to be under its sovereign control, provoking Indian authorities to block the construction by crossing the Sino-Indian border with troops and bulldozers.
As yet there’s little sign of an end to the standoff. On the contrary, talk of war is now heard from both sides, and Chinese voices, both official and unofficial, are particularly strident in accusing India of ‘invading’ Chinese territory.
How likely is it that the current standoff will escalate into a border war? I’ll first assess the probability from the Chinese side.
That China should want to fight a war with India at this moment seems a highly unlikely prospect. Beijing is about to hold the BRICS summit in Fujian province. That gathering is one of the two major ‘home-field’ foreign policy events of this year, the other being the Belt and Road Initiative summit held in May. A war with India would upset proceedings.
Second, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of President Xi Jinping is in the final stage of organising the 19th Party Congress. The once-every-five-years party congress is the most important event in Chinese politics, and President Xi is expected to consolidate his power for a second five-year term. With stability a top priority for Chinese leaders, a war with India would create undesirable complications.
Third, Chinese policymakers can’t fail to notice that China is facing a number of security contingencies along its vast periphery. It’s unclear whether the standoff with India is the most significant. From North Korea to the South China Sea, those scenarios are constantly occupying the minds of Chinese planners.
How important is the standoff with India in China’s overall strategic context? I suggest that, depending on different conceptions of strategic interests and ways to achieve them, the above arguments against war with India can be turned on their head.
First, although the diplomatic success of the BRICS summit is desirable, territorial sovereignty now ranks as one of China’s highest national priorities. The summit will offer a precious chance for President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi to find a diplomatic solution. But if no agreement is reached the probability of a military showdown will increase significantly.
Second, an orderly party congress is desirable to further anoint Xi’s power and authority. But a successful limited war fought on Chinese terms won’t necessarily damage that prospect. On the contrary, such a war would rally Chinese elites and the public around Xi, who would be acclaimed the new strategic mastermind.
Third, Chinese moderates will oppose a war with India on the grounds that the national interests involved are nowhere as vital to generate such a forceful response. However, the hardliners, armed with a different set of strategic assumptions, will argue that such a punitive war promises unique strategic benefits. Aside from bending India to China’s will it would send a ripple effect throughout Asia about the new strategic reality of Chinese power and resolve. Moreover, with a weakened US, isn’t this an opportune moment for some strategic surprise? India and the US may have moved closer in recent years, but they aren’t treaty allies. In a war with China, India would fight alone.
Also Read: Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory
In fact, China has been sending highly unusual signals in recent days. On 2 August, the foreign ministry published a 12-page position paper demonstrating India’s ‘invasion of Chinese territory’. From 3 August, within a 24-hour period, six organisations—the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the Xinhua News Agency, the foreign ministry (a second time), the defence ministry, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, and the People’s Daily—delivered a barrage of warnings to India about the dire consequences of underestimating Chinese resolve.
In a speech marking the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA on 1 August, Xi sternly affirmed:
We will never permit anybody, any organisation, any political party to split off any piece of Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form. Nobody should nurse any hope that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harm to our national sovereignty, security and development interests.
If China is mobilising domestic support for a possible showdown, that will make any future compromise hard and costly and, consequently, a punitive war more attractive and acceptable. By now key Chinese elites and the public are convinced that India has ‘invaded’ Chinese territory and that a short, sharp war to expel Indian ‘invaders’ would be just and appropriate.
None of the above is to suggest that war is about to break out next week or next month. Chinese leaders will have to weigh the cost–benefit calculus before making the final call. One hopes that deft diplomacy will prevail—as has been the case since the last border war of 1962. But one shouldn’t rule out the possibility of conflict. Neither China nor India should be complacent about the current situation or underestimate the consequences if war does break out.
AUTHOR
Feng Zhang is a fellow in the Australian National University’s Department of International Relations and adjunct professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in China. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/11/second-sino-indian-border-war-imminent/
Neither India nor China has shown any sign of backing off from a face-off that began nearly three months ago along the Sikkim border when Indian soldiers entered the Doklam plateau to stop the Chinese army from constructing a road.
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indi...aised-report-1736676?pfrom=home-lateststories
Indian military’s 7 ‘sins’ in trespassing into Chinese territory
SAM Report, August 10, 2017
Nearly two months have passed since Indian troops illegally crossed the China-India boundary in Sikkim Sector, and there is no sign of withdrawal so far.
According to Xinhua, what the Indian side has done is committed seven “sins” against Chinese sovereignty and international law. These severe mistakes may trigger unpredictable consequences and greatly undermine regional peace and stability.
India’s military trespassing is an infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. On June 18, Indian border troops, carrying weapons and driving bulldozers, illegally crossed the boundary in the Sikkim Sector at the Duo Ka La (Doka La) pass and entered Chinese territory.
For almost two months, India has maintained its military presence in the Doklam area, a place recognized by both India and the international community as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Chinese sovereign territory.
It is fundamentally different in nature from past frictions between the border troops of the two sides at an undefined part of the boundary.
The blatant move contravenes the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, which has clearly delimited this part of the boundary between the Tibet Autonomous Region and India’s Sikkim State.
Every Indian government since independence has confirmed the boundary as it stands under the Convention. It is hard to understand why India abandons its previous position at this time.
Once a boundary is established by a convention, it is under the protection of international law. It is obvious that India’s military invasion, under the pretext of so-called “security concerns,” tramples on the principles of the law as well as international order and cannot be tolerated by any sovereign state.
Since the incident broke out, India has invented various excuses to whitewash its illegal move and smear China’s normal and legitimate activities, but its arguments have no factual or legal grounds and are simply untenable.
India has argued that China’s building of roads would represent a “significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India,” but the fact is, Chinese construction is being conducted within its own territory. It is India that has broken the status quo by trespassing onto Chinese soil.
Even more ridiculous, India has attempted to justify its incursion in the name of “protecting Bhutan,” arguing that Doklam is Bhutanese territory.
The fact is that the Bhutanese authorities have clearly told Chinese officials that Doklam is not Bhutan’s territory and expressed bewilderment at India’s trespassing into Chinese soil.
Matters concerning the China-India-Bhutan boundary tri-junction have nothing to do with this incident. By kidnapping an unrelated third party to stir up troubles in the border area, India seeks to obstruct border negotiations between China and Bhutan.
China has a strong will to solve the problem peacefully, but the prerequisite is that the Indian trespassers must withdraw unconditionally and immediately. China will never negotiate with an invading force when its national territorial integrity remains infringed.
The Indian side keeps playing lip service of seeking diplomatic channels to resolve the issue while refusing to withdraw its troops.
India must be fully aware that as a reckless intruder to its neighbors, it should take responsibility for inflaming border tensions and swallow possible consequences.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/10/indian-militarys-seven-sins-trespassing-chinese-territory/
A.Muqeet khan
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Why not make this thread sticky with all INDO- CHINA standoff related articles placed here.
Kiss_of_the_Dragon
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Let see who will get more troop to the borders, I sense moment is come for China to issue the Ultimatum...I hope no more cheap warning but count down.
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