Diaoyu Islands News and Updates

[CCP]

Well, Diaoyu island is under Chinese Air defence identification zone(ADIZ).
Japan and US airways have to confirm their Identity to China before enter that ADIZ.(Japan refused to do so at first place but agreed after US signed with China).


Some pic western media will never show you.

H-6 over Diaoyu island

CAN YOU FIND ANY PHOTO THAT JAPANESE PLANE WITH DIAOYU ISLAND AFTER CHINA SETTED the ADIZ?

One Year of ADIZ: What Next for China?
China’s East China Sea air defense identification zone (ADIZ) remains ambiguous. (2014)

It’s now been a year since China unilaterally declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over a large swathe of the East China Sea. Beijing’s decision to do so came at a time of rising tensions between China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While that dispute persists today, tensions were significantly higher a year ago, with the potential for escalation high on both sides. At the time, The Diplomat hosted a wide range of perspectives on why Beijing chose to act as it did and the ramifications the ADIZ decision would carry going forward for the security of the Asia-Pacific region, China-Japan relations, and more. A year later, most of the questions raised then still endure. For example, will Beijing follow up on the mixed signals it’s been sending about a potential ADIZ over the South China Sea? Could Beijing’s enforcement of its ADIZ draw international legal action? Finally, will Beijing’s justification of the ADIZ evolve with time? I’ll mostly focus on the first question here.

We’ve seen mixed signals come out of China regarding the possibility of a South China ADIZ. For example, while a senior PLA official called for China to establish an ADIZ over the South China Sea, noting that it was “necessary for China’s long-term national interest,” these calls had been contradicted by official Chinese foreign ministry statements noting that there were no plans to install an ADIZ over the South China Sea. The geography of the South China Sea and China’s capacious territorial claim to almost the entirety of the region, down to the Borneo coastline, make the decision to declare an ADIZ there more complicated. Specifically, as I’ve discussed here before, the nature of China’s dashed line claim leaves some interesting and strategically advantageous ambiguities that would be threatened with the declaration of a de jure ADIZ.

Currently, Beijing’s claim delineates the maximum extent of Chinese control over the region. By declaring an ADIZ, Beijing would have to worry about the issue of enforcement. While the PLAN is the by far the strongest regional navy in terms of both quality and quantity of its assets, both it and its sibling service, the PLAAF, would likely find the task of enforcing an ADIZ over the entirety of the South China Sea an unmanageable task given current realities. Additionally, when China declared its East China Sea ADIZ, countries like Japan and the United States went further than ignoring the declaration: they actively defied Beijing’s declaration, challenging China to take the step of enforcement. Japanese civilian flights continued through the region, and the United States flew B-52 bombers through the region. If similar opposition were to emerge from the Philippines, Vietnam, and other claimants in the South China Sea, the ADIZ would only expose China’s inability to effectively administer its claimed territory. The sort of legal advantage that Beijing sought to gain with the East China Sea ADIZ is considerably more challenging to attain in the context of the South China Sea.

At this point, given ASEAN’s inability to come together to agree on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, declaring an ADIZ would be strategically imprudent for Beijing. In the East China Sea case, the ADIZ declaration came at a time of escalating tensions between Japan and China and bore few costs for Beijing. Given its current position in the South China Sea, there is no need for China to wage lawfare against claimants with an ADIZ. The impetus to impose an ADIZ will rise the more progress other South China Sea claimants make on either resolving disputes between themselves or putting forth a united front against China.

While the prospect of a South China Sea ADIZ will remain on the horizon, what is more important is for Beijing to make important clarifications about the justification of its East China Sea ADIZ which currently leaves numerous legal ambiguities. As Roncevert Almond notes in The Diplomat this week, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission highlighted this need in its report to the U.S. Congress. Having been condemned by the U.S., the E.U., Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even ASEAN to an extent, China’s ADIZ won’t be forgotten anytime soon. Going forward, China will find itself having to continue to address the ADIZ issue in its bilateral diplomacy with other major powers with interests in the East China Sea, including the United States.

One Year of ADIZ: What Next for China? | The Diplomat

 

[Keel]

Chinese Coastguards have conducted patrolling in the territorial waters of Diaoyu Islands for 13 times this year

中国海警舰船编队今年已13次巡航钓鱼岛领海
军事要闻中国网
2015-05-04 08:52

外交部强调，钓鱼岛自古以来是中国固有领土。中方敦促美方采取负责任的态度，恪守在有关领土主权问题上不选边站队的承诺，停止发出错误信号。

国家海洋局此前发布的《中国海洋发展报告》研判，美国亚太战略调整已经成为影响中国周边海上安全形势的最重要因素。

今年，中国钓鱼岛专题网站已正式上线，内容包括基本立场、历史依据、法律文件等，证明中国对钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿拥有无可争辩的主权。该网站由国家海洋信息中心主办，使用“www.diaoyudao.org.cn”和“www。钓鱼岛.cn”域名。目前网站已开通中、英、日文版，随后将开通法、德、西、俄、阿等其他文字版本。

 

[Our friend :Pakistan]

The Diaoyu Islands are Chinese!!!We all believe ！！！

 

[Keel]

The Diaoyu Islands are Chinese!!!We all believe ！！！

Not just believe we are patrolling it in celebration for the victory against barbaric jpnese facists

China patrols Diaoyu Islands to celebrate defeating Japan in WW2

 

[Keel]

Will the Japanese get inspired?

Former Prime Minister: Japan Should Shelve the Islands Dispute With China to Avoid A Spiral into Conflict

 

[Aepsilons]

Yawn. Nice pictures. Cool ya

 

[Keel]

Not just believe we are patrolling it in celebration for the victory against barbaric jpnese facists

China patrols Diaoyu Islands to celebrate defeating Japan in WW2

Diaoyu Islands in very good hands

China’s Massive Coast Guard Ships > ENGINEERING.com

4000 T in patrol of our territorial waters

Something like this or BIGGER?

 

[kungfugymnast]

Yawn. Nice pictures. Cool ya

Nihonjin = 日本人 = Japan man

What is your opinion on PLA took over Diaoyu Islands aka senkaku?

Diaoyu Islands in very good hands

China’s Massive Coast Guard Ships > ENGINEERING.com

4000 T in patrol of our territorial waters

Something like this or BIGGER?

The second photo, the coast guard patrol ship is really large. Why coast guard and not PLAN ships that patrol Diaoyu islands?

Most likely to avoid tension as navy warship is a threat being too close to Japan territory.

 

[Aepsilons]

Nihonjin = 日本人 = Japan man

What is your opinion on PLA took over Diaoyu Islands aka senkaku?

為せば成る
為さねば成らぬ何事も
成らぬは人の為さぬなりけり

 

[CAPRICORN-88]

Will the Japanese get inspired?

Former Prime Minister: Japan Should Shelve the Islands Dispute With China to Avoid A Spiral into Conflict

At least there are still realistic folks residing in Japan.

By either returning to the status quo or giving the island back to China, Japan would have immediately remove its security concern and can now look forward to better economic tie e.g. Toyota lost its title as the biggest car manufacturer to VW because of China's market. Will the TPP increase Japan's hare of US auto mart. IMO NO! We will wait and see whether I am right or not. Whatever China 23 million annual car sales is too significant to be lost.

 

[kungfugymnast]

為せば成る
為さねば成らぬ何事も
成らぬは人の為さぬなりけり

Nan desu ka? Taberu koto, yes enjoy the buns... lol!

 

[Aepsilons]

Nan desu ka? Taberu koto, yes enjoy the buns... lol!

It's sweet , tongue licking good!

 

[bobsm]

An interesting read. Japan is defeated in 5 days, in a Rand Corp. simulation.

How FP Stumbled Into a War With China — and Lost

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/15...-war-with-china-and-lost/?wp_login_redirect=0

excerpt:

Senkakus Incident — Day 5

Meanwhile, Chinese forces continue to hammer Japanese surface vessels near the Senkakus. In less than 24 hours, one-fifth of the Japanese navy is knocked out of action and hundreds are dead. To drive home its point, China also initiates attacks on the Japanese economy, knocking out the vulnerable power grid and blasting a crucial jet-fuel refinery.

Facing massive disruption at home and the destruction of its navy, Japan again pleads for help. Tokyo makes three concrete requests: It wants the American aircraft-carrier group that it has hosted for so many years sent into the fight to help protect Japanese ships; it wants more attacks on Chinese ships; and it seeks targeted strikes on the sites used for anti-ship missiles on the Chinese mainland.

For Washington, there are only bad options on the table. “Those treaty obligations looked more important a few days ago,” Keith says.

Our gut reaction is to stop the spiral before the carnage — and the risks — expand. The first option is to tell the Japanese that the United States is not ready to stage attacks on the Chinese homeland or join Tokyo in offensive operations. Sending in the aircraft carrier, which could be hit or sunk by Chinese missiles, is also ruled out. We offer Tokyo to send U.S. submarines and aircraft into the battle zone to cover the withdrawal of its naval forces. That way, the United States can avoid an all-out war with China and stop the fighting before Japan’s naval forces are utterly decimated or its economy strangled.

That decision is “operationally sensible,” Shlapak says, but China emerges as the tactical victor. Beijing took on both the United States and Japan and won. China is now in possession of the Senkakus. Longer term, though, China may have won itself a Pyrrhic victory: Japan and other nations in Asia will likely redouble spending on defense and bandwagon against China both militarily and economically.

In any scenario, Shlapak says, “nobody comes out of it better off.”

What would have happened if we had acceded to Japanese requests? Here’s how that played out:

The United States sends humanitarian aid and disaster-response teams to Japan to bolster its homeland defense and dispatches the carrier at a safe distance in flight range of the Senkakus. It also launches targeted, precision strikes on a handful of Chinese missile sites on the coast, clearly explaining to Chinese leadership the limited nature of the measures.

Long story short, plunging deeper into the fight did not make matters easier for any of the three countries.

U.S. missiles rain down on the Chinese homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas; China’s shiny new navy is quickly shrinking under relentless undersea attacks. In reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and take a potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the George Washington, damaging it and forcing it out of the area. The casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead.

“You probably see where this is going,” Shlapak tells us.

The U.S. military could keep punching, hitting key Chinese naval bases, targeting China’s sole aircraft carrier, or even implementing a blockade in the South China Sea to try to strangle the Chinese economy. Nothing, though, preserves Japan’s navy or helps defend its islands. The Chinese can inflict unlimited damage on Japan.

Years of gaming such scenarios have convinced Shlapak of the importance of understanding the inherent risks in wars between great powers, rather than in the one-sided affairs that have dominated U.S. military adventures in recent decades.

“It’s like an avalanche. All you know is that it will end eventually, but you don’t know how, or why, or what the cost will be,” he says, pounding the table for emphasis. Wading into a Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkakus is particularly fraught for the United States and doesn’t allow for any attractive outcomes.

“To get into this fight is a strategic failure of the first magnitude,” Shlapak says.

Our takeaways:

Chastened at the results, we came away with several conclusions after our quick-and-dirty foray into the East China Sea.

First, alliances can be dangerous things, as the ancient Athenians learned more than 2,000 years ago when their allies in Corcyra sucked them into the Peloponnesian War.

Second, it’s hard to put a lot of defense into the mutual defense treaty with Japan. Its ships, aircraft, and home islands are all vulnerable, even if any attacking force would suffer huge casualties. Missile defense, in particular, is exceptionally difficult — if not impossible — given China’s vast and lethal missile arsenal.

Third, China’s military advances have totally changed the game for all sides. A decade ago, Japan could have fended off any challenge in the Senkakus all by itself. Now, China has a modern navy, a vast array of ballistic and cruise missiles, an effective air force, and increasingly sophisticated drones.

Fourth, America’s super aircraft carriers are a bit of an albatross. They are vulnerable as never before to long-range strikes, especially from Chinese anti-ship missiles. But the steps needed to safely bring carriers into the fight either escalate matters (striking at Chinese missile sites) or reduce the ships’ effectiveness (by having to operate at a safe distance.) Conversely, American stealthy attack submarines are very useful operationally — but perhaps lead to more trouble at the strategic level. Ordering a submarine strike is a tempting option, perhaps too tempting; as we saw, a submarine’s risk-free ability to inflict punishment drew us into a state of war with China.

And finally, for all three countries in our scenario, nationalism is hugely powerful and potentially deadly. It sparked the initial spat, fueled each successive escalatory step, and severely constrained each nation’s available responses as the crisis escalated.

That’s why Shlapak suggested that the best way to manage a crisis in a place like the Senkakus, which can’t support any inhabitants anyway, may be to simply ignore it.

 

[anon45]

This is very interesting read that I missed.

Again many anti-Americans underestimate the independence US allies have. They are not vassals by any means.

Clinton e-mail: U.S. asked Japan to talk with China before buying Senkakus

January 31, 2016
By KENJI MINEMURA/ Correspondent

WASHINGTON--In a private e-mail forwarded to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a high-ranking U.S. official asked Japan to consult with China before the Japanese government put the Senkaku Islands under state ownership in September 2012.

The correspondence is among the 1,000 e-mails disclosed by the U.S. State Department on Jan. 29 in response to the controversy that Clinton was using her private e-mail server for official duties while serving as secretary of state.

The e-mail, dated Sept. 3, 2012, was written by Kurt Campbell, then U.S. assistant secretary of state, and sent to several high-ranking U.S. government officials. One of the officials forwarded the message to Clinton.

The e-mail suggests that the United States was concerned that the purchase of the islands, located in the East China Sea, would worsen relations between Japan and China, which also claims them.

It also described a high-ranking Japanese Foreign Ministry official as telling Campbell that China would likely eventually accept Japanese state ownership of the islands.

According to the e-mail, when Campbell visited Japan in August 2012, he strongly urged then Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae (currently Japanese ambassador to the United States) and other Japanese officials to consult China in advance on state ownership of Senkaku Islands.

As for state ownership, the governments of Japan and China talked several times. However, the Chinese government strongly opposed the plan.

Campbell wrote the e-mail after he was informed by Sasae that the Japanese government would soon embark on purchasing the Senkakus from a private owner.

“The GOJ (government of Japan) has just concluded a round of deliberations (on the state ownership plan) and apparently their PRC (People’s Republic of China) counterparts were irate. Sasae, however, believes that China actually understands the necessity of these actions and will accept them,” Campbell wrote in the e-mail.

Then, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, apparently unconvinced by Sasae's belief, wrote, “I’m not so sure.”

 

[Kiss_of_the_Dragon]

This is very interesting read that I missed.

Again many anti-Americans underestimate the independence US allies have. They are not vassals by any means.

Clinton e-mail: U.S. asked Japan to talk with China before buying Senkakus

Nice try...you think you can take Chinese for fool? US was well aware of Japan's intention regarding the Diaoyu buying, if US didn't give the nod, Japan wouldn't dare to do that. and not only that US publicly gave Japan the assurance to be on it side in any eventual conflict with China over this island under the false pretense that it has defense treaty with Japan...

...and you did the same with Philippine by saying you have defense treaty regarding SCS. Americans dare to do that because they think their still have military edge over China, the day China reach the military parity or the way to counter US, American will have no allies to defend because they wont have any advantage to be American's allies and your so call defense treaty will be worth less than toilet paper.