Yar I was a part of that war if they would have coordinated the air attacks against Isreal they could have won. we had pilots in Egypt and in Syria but orders were orders. I hope you can understand I cannot say anything which is not in the books( big reason behind it US).That might give you a little clue.
The day Isreal attacked most of the pilots did'nt take off PAF had given strict orders not to fly we had our own problems being there. Funny thing is that I will got caught because we were speaking Punjabi and that is why Orders came from above to stay as instructors. in the book it says that PAF pilots were not present when the attack took place, but they were. In syria things were different at that time MM alam was there with me as an observer. I dont understand why does'nt the PAF give recognition to pilots who have done more than Sattar Alvi, specially Arif ( Moota) 100 times better than Sattar in every aspect and many more did a fantastic job, Every time Isreali's were outmanuvered and on the first sign they bugged out, reason getting shotdown by a syrian pilot was an insult to there egos, knowing that they might be Pakistani pilots that is why they tried to get Sattar into a trap and got them selves shot down.
Another thing the attack was quick that only a few took off with no Dog fight skills, they were trained to bomb and return not dog fight, That is why we were called to train them but before we did things had already ended.
how can you train a bunch of people who prade in an Air conditioned prade square 2 miles by 2 miles, everything for them was so comfy that we did'nt even know where to start how to make them into fighters remember not everyone can be a fighter pilot you need to have a heart like a Lion ( Do or die but never say why) . One of the most indicipline Air Forces I had ever seen, yes there were good pilots like Maj Auzgaar always ready to take on a fight but not all. Now look at them they are tuff and excellent fighter pilots not because USA helped them in given them good planes because we the PAF made a solid base from which they could start, till today we have turkish, egyptian pilots in 9 Sqd and 11 sqd who come train and go back and same goes for the PAF our pilots go there and train them.
NOW THE OFFICIAL STORY
Post-haste summons for volunteers found an eager band of sixteen PAF fighter pilots on their way to the Middle East, in the midst of the 1973 Ramadan war. After a gruelling Peshawar-Karachi-Baghdad flight on a PAF Fokker, they were whisked off to Damascus in a Syrian jet. Upon arrival, half the batch was told to stay back in Syria while the rest were earmarked for Egypt. By the time the PAF batch reached Cairo, Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire; it was therefore decided that they would continue as instructors. But in Syria it was another story.
The batch in Syria was made up of pilots who were already serving there on deputation (except one), but had been repatriated before the war. Now they were back in familiar surroundings as well as familiar aircraft, the venerable MiG-21. They were posted to No 67 squadron, 'Alpha' Detachment (all PAF). Hasty checkouts were immediately followed by serious business of Air Defence Alert scrambles and Combat Air Patrols from the air base at Dumayr.
Syria had not agreed to a ceasefire, since Israeli operations in Golan were continuing at a threatening pace. Israeli Air Force missions included interdiction under top cover, well supported by intense radio jamming as the PAF pilots discovered. The PAF formation using the call-sign "Shahbaz" was formidable in size -- all of eight aircraft. Shahbaz soon came to stand out as one that couldn't be messed with, in part because its tactics were innovative and bold. Survival, however, in a jammed-radio environment was concern number one. As a precaution, the Pakistanis decided to switch to Urdu for fear of being monitored in English. Suspicions were confirmed during one patrol, when healthy Punjabi invectives hurled on radio got them wondering if Mossad had recruited a few Khalsas for the job!
After several months of sporadic activity, it seemed that hostilities were petering out. While the Shahbaz patrols over Lebanon and Syria had diminished in frequency, routine training sorties started to register a rise. Under these conditions it was a surprise when on the afternoon of 26th April 1974, the siren blasted from the air-shafts of the underground bunker. Backgammon boards were pushed aside and the "qehva" session was interrupted as all eight pilots rushed to their MiGs; they were airborne within minutes. From Dumayr to Beirut, then along the Mediterranean coast till Sidon, and a final leg eastwards, skirting Damascus and back to base -- this was the usual patrol, flown at an altitude of 6 km.
The limited fuel of their early model MiG--21F permitted just a 30 minutes sortie; this was almost over when ground radar blurted out on the radio that two bogeys (unidentified aircraft) were approaching from the southerly direction ie Israel. At this stage fuel was low and an engagement was the least preferred option. Presented with a fait accompli, the leader of the formation called a defensive turn into the bogeys. Just then heavy radio jamming started, sounding somewhat similar to the "takka tak" at our meat joints, only more shrill. While the formation was gathering itself after the turn, two Israeli F-4E Phantoms sped past almost head-on, seemingly unwilling to engage. Was it a bait?
Flt Lt Sattar Alvi, now the rear-most in the formation, was still adjusting after the hard turn when he caught sight of two Mirage-III-CJ zooming into them from far below. With no way of warning the formation of the impending disaster, he instinctively decided to handle them alone. Peeling away from his formation, he turned hard into the Mirages so that one of them overshot. Against the other, he did a steep reversal dropping his speed literally to zero. (it takes some guts to let eight tons of metal hang up in unfriendly air!) The result was that within a few seconds the second Mirage filled his gun-sight, the star of David and all. While Sattar worried about having to concentrate for precious seconds in aiming and shooting, the lead Mirage started to turn around to get Sattar. Thinking that help was at hand, the target Mirage decided to accelerate away. A quick-witted Sattar reckoned that a missile shot would be just right for the range his target had opened up to. A pip of a button later, a K13 heat-seeker sped off towards the tail of the escaping Mirage. Sattar recollects that it wasn't as much an Israeli aircraft as a myth that seemed to explode in front of him. (The letter 'J' in Mirage-IIICJ stood for 'Jewish', it may be noted.) He was tempted to watch the flaming metal rain down, but with the other Mirage lurking around and fuel down to a few hundred litres, he decided to exit.
For 1971 war the term 'brain behind the conspiracy' is more suitable.
So this means you know who I am by now
here you go BATMAN
. luckly one of the pilots became my best friend we did ASCS in Maxwell AFB in USA togather it was very intersting how we both met and how we knew that it was him and he knew it was I.
