Sweety? No way
-
By Lt-Gen. J.F.R. Jacob
I got to know Indira Gandhi a little before the 1971 war. In 1969, she asked me to help her deal with the Naxalite problem, which had started from Naxalbari in West Bengal. Later, she had to focus on East Pakistan, where Yahya Khans atrocities and anti-democratic steps led to anger and rebellion. The Pakistan army, which was known for its professionalism, came down on the protesters, and waves of refugees entered India. In effect, it was a great human disaster.
Indira started receiving urgent telegrams from the chief ministers of Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. She had to act as India could not take any more of this wave of refugees, and she took the decision to go to war.
But we had to execute a successful war. East Pakistan was low-lying, waterlogged and crisscrossed by large rivers, mangroves and paddy fields. A monsoon war would have been foolish. We started preparing, as India had given political and diplomatic signals. As the commander of the Eastern Command, I held a staff conference at Fort William and issued orders to build up the infrastructure and logistics based on the draft outline plan we had made, without waiting for operation instruction from Army Headquarters.
Poor road and rail communications, particularly in Tripura, and a complete lack of any viable infrastructure meant that preparations would have to start early. There was a metre-gauge line from Assam to Dharamnagar in Tripura, which had a capacity of 30 wagons a day. This had to be increased. The road from Dharamnagar to Agartala and beyond was in poor condition and unfit for heavy traffic.
We requested the Border Roads Organisation to increase the capacity in this section. The preparatory work was done before the monsoon and even before the operation order from Army Headquarters was issued. Had we waited for the operation instruction or for the monsoon to end, we would not have been in a position to launch a successful offensive when the war broke out.
War brings out the best and the worst. What helped us was Indias political will. Sam Maneckshaw, despite our disagreements, did a great job. My friendship with Indira grew after the war when I became Governor of Meghalaya. She loved Shillong and the northeast. After all, it was the northeast that gifted her victory in the war.
Successful execution of the war was possible because of the dedication of our jawans. The 1971 war will be remembered for our soldiers, who proved that if political masters do their job well, then the soldiers can take on any adversary. Indias soldiers are unparalleled.
Though we gave every kind of food to the soldiers, because of the pressure of the war, they often took a liking for tea as the only source of nutrition. Once I was told that refrigeration had broken down and milk could not be kept for long. I was worried because without milk our soldiers would not get their tea. To solve this problem, I used wisdom learnt in my childhood. My uncle ran an ice factory in Kidderpore Dock, Kolkata.
We are Baghdadi Jews who have been living in Kolkata for centuries. I remember my uncle producing large blocks of ice for ships as they set sail. I told my juniors to freeze the milk and cover it with bhusa (sawdust). On reaching the soldiers, the milky ice was melted and boiled for tea. Such everyday wisdom helped us win the war.
Sam wanted to take control of towns around Dhaka. But I was focused on a Dhaka-centric strategy. It was similar to the one espoused by Babu Jagjivan Ram. He was the real backroom hero of the war. Once on a visit to Kolkata before the war broke out, he called me frantically as he was finding it difficult to convince people in the Writers Building about some matter. I went in and in my characteristic style dealt with all the opposition. After the meeting, Babuji hugged me outside the hall. I was flattered.
We had excellent political coordination at the top level, great military moves and finally a flawless execution that led to a quick war and a surprising surrender of more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers under Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi. The surrender was historically exceptional. Most other surrenders were long after hostilities had ceased, usually signed aboard a ship, as in the case of the Japanese surrender in WW-II, and grandly orchestrated. But the Pakistani surrender was a public affair at Dhaka. There was so much anger among the Bengalis that the ceremony had to be held in public.
After the war was over, I got to see another aspect of Indira. She once told me that her favourite musical was Fiddler on the Roof and that she liked cuttlefish. It was her decisiveness that made the difference in 1971. I think the Sweety joke attributed to Sam is just a myth. Considering who she was, no one could have addressed her like that.
Picture perfect
Before signing the Simla Accord, Indira personally helped arrange accommodation for Zulfikar Bhutto and his daughter Benazir. She removed a portrait of herself from Zulfikar's room so he would not have to be under her watchful eye all the time.
Sweety? No way
-
By Lt-Gen. J.F.R. Jacob
I got to know Indira Gandhi a little before the 1971 war. In 1969, she asked me to help her deal with the Naxalite problem, which had started from Naxalbari in West Bengal. Later, she had to focus on East Pakistan, where Yahya Khans atrocities and anti-democratic steps led to anger and rebellion. The Pakistan army, which was known for its professionalism, came down on the protesters, and waves of refugees entered India. In effect, it was a great human disaster.
Indira started receiving urgent telegrams from the chief ministers of Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. She had to act as India could not take any more of this wave of refugees, and she took the decision to go to war.
But we had to execute a successful war. East Pakistan was low-lying, waterlogged and crisscrossed by large rivers, mangroves and paddy fields. A monsoon war would have been foolish. We started preparing, as India had given political and diplomatic signals. As the commander of the Eastern Command, I held a staff conference at Fort William and issued orders to build up the infrastructure and logistics based on the draft outline plan we had made, without waiting for operation instruction from Army Headquarters.
Poor road and rail communications, particularly in Tripura, and a complete lack of any viable infrastructure meant that preparations would have to start early. There was a metre-gauge line from Assam to Dharamnagar in Tripura, which had a capacity of 30 wagons a day. This had to be increased. The road from Dharamnagar to Agartala and beyond was in poor condition and unfit for heavy traffic.
We requested the Border Roads Organisation to increase the capacity in this section. The preparatory work was done before the monsoon and even before the operation order from Army Headquarters was issued. Had we waited for the operation instruction or for the monsoon to end, we would not have been in a position to launch a successful offensive when the war broke out.
War brings out the best and the worst. What helped us was Indias political will. Sam Maneckshaw, despite our disagreements, did a great job. My friendship with Indira grew after the war when I became Governor of Meghalaya. She loved Shillong and the northeast. After all, it was the northeast that gifted her victory in the war.
Successful execution of the war was possible because of the dedication of our jawans. The 1971 war will be remembered for our soldiers, who proved that if political masters do their job well, then the soldiers can take on any adversary. Indias soldiers are unparalleled.
Though we gave every kind of food to the soldiers, because of the pressure of the war, they often took a liking for tea as the only source of nutrition. Once I was told that refrigeration had broken down and milk could not be kept for long. I was worried because without milk our soldiers would not get their tea. To solve this problem, I used wisdom learnt in my childhood. My uncle ran an ice factory in Kidderpore Dock, Kolkata.
We are Baghdadi Jews who have been living in Kolkata for centuries. I remember my uncle producing large blocks of ice for ships as they set sail. I told my juniors to freeze the milk and cover it with bhusa (sawdust). On reaching the soldiers, the milky ice was melted and boiled for tea. Such everyday wisdom helped us win the war.
Sam wanted to take control of towns around Dhaka. But I was focused on a Dhaka-centric strategy. It was similar to the one espoused by Babu Jagjivan Ram. He was the real backroom hero of the war. Once on a visit to Kolkata before the war broke out, he called me frantically as he was finding it difficult to convince people in the Writers Building about some matter. I went in and in my characteristic style dealt with all the opposition. After the meeting, Babuji hugged me outside the hall. I was flattered.
We had excellent political coordination at the top level, great military moves and finally a flawless execution that led to a quick war and a surprising surrender of more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers under Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi. The surrender was historically exceptional. Most other surrenders were long after hostilities had ceased, usually signed aboard a ship, as in the case of the Japanese surrender in WW-II, and grandly orchestrated. But the Pakistani surrender was a public affair at Dhaka. There was so much anger among the Bengalis that the ceremony had to be held in public.
After the war was over, I got to see another aspect of Indira. She once told me that her favourite musical was Fiddler on the Roof and that she liked cuttlefish. It was her decisiveness that made the difference in 1971. I think the Sweety joke attributed to Sam is just a myth. Considering who she was, no one could have addressed her like that.
Picture perfect
Before signing the Simla Accord, Indira personally helped arrange accommodation for Zulfikar Bhutto and his daughter Benazir. She removed a portrait of herself from Zulfikar's room so he would not have to be under her watchful eye all the time.
Sweety? No way
