Defining Strategic Depth

[ssheppard]

Here is a thought provoking article I just read....really makes you think....

Defining ‘strategic depth’

And how does it help us? We are engaged in the Great Game in Afghanistan, we are told, because ‘strategic depth’ is vital for Pakistan due to the fact that our country is very narrow at its middle and could well be cut into half by an Indian attack in force.

Strategic depth, we are further informed, will give respite to our armed forces which could withdraw into Afghanistan to then regroup and mount counter-attacks on Indian forces in Pakistan. I ask you!

I ask you for several reasons. Let us presume that the Indians are foolish enough to get distracted from educating their people, some of whom go to some of the best centres of learning in the world. Let us assume that they are idiotic enough to opt for war instead of industrialising themselves and meeting their economic growth targets which are among the highest in the world.

Let us imagine that they are cretinous enough to go to war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan and effectively put an immediate and complete end to their multi-million dollar tourism industry. Let us suppose that they lose all sense, all reason, and actually attack Pakistan and cut our country into half.

Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes?

And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?

More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pakhtuns?

Case in point: the absolute and repeated refusal of even the Taliban government when it was misruling Afghanistan, to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite the fact that it was a surrogate of Pakistan — propped into power; paid for; and helped militarily, diplomatically and politically by the Pakistani government and its ‘agencies’.

Indeed, it even refused the Commando’s interior minister, the loudmouth Gen Moinuddin Haider when he went to Kabul to ask for the extradition of Pakistani criminals being sheltered by the Taliban. We must remember that the Commando, as chief executive of the country, was pressing the Foreign Office till just a few days before 9/11 to use every effort to have the Taliban regime’ recognised by more countries!

This poppycock of ‘strategic depth’ can only be explained by our great military thinkers and strategists and geniuses: it is not for mortals like yours truly to make sense of any of it. Particularly because this nonsense can only happen after the Americans depart from Afghanistan. And what, pray, is the guarantee that they will leave when they say they will?

Why this subject at this time, you might well ask. Well I have just been reading David Sanger’s The Inheritance in which he meticulously lays out the reasons why he believes the Pakistani “dual policy” towards the Taliban exists.

On page 247 he states that when Michael McConnell, the then chief of US National Intelligence went to Pakistan in late May 2008 (three months after the elections that trounced Musharraf and his King’s Party, mark) he heard Pakistani officers make the case for the Pakistani need for having a friendly government in Kabul after the Americans departed.

When he got back to Washington McConnell “ordered up a full assessment” of the situation. ‘It did not take long … Musharraf’s record of duplicity was well known. While Kayani was a favourite of the White House, he had also been overheard — presumably on telephone intercepts — referring to one of the most brutal of the Taliban leaders, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, as a “strategic asset”. Interesting, for Kayani’s former boss, Musharraf is quoted thus in Der Spiegel:

Spiegel: “Let us talk about the role of the ISI. A short time ago, US newspapers reported that ISI has systematically supported Taliban groups. Is that true?”

Musharraf: “Intelligence always has access to other networks — this is what Americans did with KGB, this is what ISI also does. You should understand that the army is on board to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. I have always been against the Taliban. Don’t try to lecture us about how we should handle this tactically. I will give you an example: Siraj Haqqani ...”

Spiegel: “... a powerful Taliban commander who is allegedly secretly allied with the ISI.”

Musharraf: “He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.”

Well, there they go again!

But back to ‘strategic depth’. Will the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, help Pakistan gain this ‘depth’ in Afghanistan? Are we that gone that we need these backward yahoos to save our army?

PS By the way what about our nuclear weapons? Are they not enough to stop the Indians in their tracks? What poppycock is this ‘strategic depth’?!

DAWN.COM | Columnists | Defining ?strategic depth?

 

[karan.1970]

We are engaged in the Great Game in Afghanistan, we are told, because ‘strategic depth’ is vital for Pakistan due to the fact that our country is very narrow at its middle and could well be cut into half by an Indian attack in force.

Strategic depth, we are further informed, will give respite to our armed forces which could withdraw into Afghanistan to then regroup and mount counter-attacks on Indian forces in Pakistan. I ask you!

I ask you for several reasons. Let us presume that the Indians are foolish enough to get distracted from educating their people, some of whom go to some of the best centres of learning in the world. Let us assume that they are idiotic enough to opt for war instead of industrialising themselves and meeting their economic growth targets which are among the highest in the world.

Let us imagine that they are cretinous enough to go to war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan and effectively put an immediate and complete end to their multi-million dollar tourism industry. Let us suppose that they lose all sense, all reason, and actually attack Pakistan and cut our country into half.

Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes?

And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?

More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pakhtuns?

Case in point: the absolute and repeated refusal of even the Taliban government when it was misruling Afghanistan, to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite the fact that it was a surrogate of Pakistan — propped into power; paid for; and helped militarily, diplomatically and politically by the Pakistani government and its ‘agencies’.

Indeed, it even refused the Commando’s interior minister, the loudmouth Gen Moinuddin Haider when he went to Kabul to ask for the extradition of Pakistani criminals being sheltered by the Taliban. We must remember that the Commando, as chief executive of the country, was pressing the Foreign Office till just a few days before 9/11 to use every effort to have the Taliban regime’ recognised by more countries!

This poppycock of ‘strategic depth’ can only be explained by our great military thinkers and strategists and geniuses: it is not for mortals like yours truly to make sense of any of it. Particularly because this nonsense can only happen after the Americans depart from Afghanistan. And what, pray, is the guarantee that they will leave when they say they will?

Why this subject at this time, you might well ask. Well I have just been reading David Sanger’s The Inheritance in which he meticulously lays out the reasons why he believes the Pakistani “dual policy” towards the Taliban exists.

On page 247 he states that when Michael McConnell, the then chief of US National Intelligence went to Pakistan in late May 2008 (three months after the elections that trounced Musharraf and his King’s Party, mark) he heard Pakistani officers make the case for the Pakistani need for having a friendly government in Kabul after the Americans departed.

When he got back to Washington McConnell “ordered up a full assessment” of the situation. ‘It did not take long … Musharraf’s record of duplicity was well known. While Kayani was a favourite of the White House, he had also been overheard — presumably on telephone intercepts — referring to one of the most brutal of the Taliban leaders, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, as a “strategic asset”. Interesting, for Kayani’s former boss, Musharraf is quoted thus in Der Spiegel:

Spiegel: “Let us talk about the role of the ISI. A short time ago, US newspapers reported that ISI has systematically supported Taliban groups. Is that true?”

Musharraf: “Intelligence always has access to other networks — this is what Americans did with KGB, this is what ISI also does. You should understand that the army is on board to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. I have always been against the Taliban. Don’t try to lecture us about how we should handle this tactically. I will give you an example: Siraj Haqqani ...”

Spiegel: “... a powerful Taliban commander who is allegedly secretly allied with the ISI.”

Musharraf: “He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.”

Well, there they go again!

But back to ‘strategic depth’. Will the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, help Pakistan gain this ‘depth’ in Afghanistan? Are we that gone that we need these backward yahoos to save our army?

PS By the way what about our nuclear weapons? Are they not enough to stop the Indians in their tracks? What poppycock is this ‘strategic depth’?!

 

[karan.1970]

Thought the article was good.. Dont mean it as any flame..

 

[EjazR]

Kamran Shafi as harsh as usual, but the main theme is legitimate.

After nukes, the Pakistani security establishment should'nt even need to worry about "invasion" by India. Otherwise whats the use of developing and maintaining this arsenal. Especially when Pakistan does not even have a no first use policy while India does.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes?

And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?

When has the Pakistan Army outlined 'Strategic Depth in Afghanistan' to reflect the above arguments/tactics?

If the PA has not defined Strategic Depth in this manner, then the entire article is nothing but an exercise in advancing a Strawman argument - the author comes up with his own 'definition' of strategic depth, ascribes it to the PA and then proceeds to roundly criticize it.

If any of you follow Kamran Shafi's writings, he is anti-Army to the core, and nowhere close to objective in a lot of his critique of the Army.

There was a far more 'enlightening' discussion of 'Strategic Depth' from the Pakistani perspective between S-2, Xeric and I on the Rah-e-Nijaat thread I believe.

 

[Barrett]

He has given strategic depth a whole new meaning here, every country would want to have friendly relations with its neighbors but retreating your forces to that country regrouping and attacking again is just absurd, I don't know who has been thinking on these lines other then Kamran shafi himself.
Two reasons for writing this article.
He couldn't find anything else.
Woke up on the wrong side of the bed.

 

[Xeric]

Well Kamran Deserter (i call him this coz he calls him a Commando), both have earned it!), i think you have lost it completely!. i have a question for you; when was the last time you saw someone in Pakistan (the military, govt, intelligence etc) talking about this strategic depth? When was the last time we seemed worrisome in this?

Digging graves would only get you to rotten flesh and nothing else.

Sir Deserter, do you actually think this would materialize? Mr Kamran while you lose your intellect in totality i have this to say about strategic depth on a personal note; do you actually believe that we would allow the indian 96-hour-wishful-onslaught to cross the Indus and then we would execute the plans that bases and defend Pakistan from an area which neither has fuel, ammo, water, roads but only poor trafficability?

 

[Xeric]

Hey where did my post go? it was the third or fourth and now it's gone, had to repost it.

Were the threads merged?

 

[forcetrip]

How has he come up with this insane plot of having a rear base in afghanistan? When has the army ever said this? I agree we have strategic assets in afghanistan but in no way can it organize a counter attack by OUR armed forces. They will retreat? I mean to counter attack you need to take a running start from the other end of afghanistan and plow into their offense?? .. oh my .. I feel a little stupid replying in this thread.

 

[HAIDER]

Well what ever writer said and predict. End of day Pashtun factor will play final role. When 35% of Pak army has Pashtuns.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Kamran Shafi as harsh as usual, but the main theme is legitimate.

After nukes, the Pakistani security establishment should'nt even need to worry about "invasion" by India. Otherwise whats the use of developing and maintaining this arsenal. Especially when Pakistan does not even have a no first use policy while India does.

The main theme is not legitimate. From the Indian side one could point to Kargil as being an example of a limited conflict being fought under a nuclear umbrella, whereas the Pakistani side could point to the Indian mobilization for war under Operation Parakram.

There is also the matter of the Indian COAS's own comments on the issue:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...ed-war-possible-indian-army-chief-kapoor.html

As I said, Shafi is far from an objective commentator on the military, and that can be seen from his articles. This particular one has 'more holes that Swiss cheese' to use an oft used cliche.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Not again . I give up, last time also had a lengthy discussion with few members, don't have the stomach this time.

Some people are so much delusional, had no idea .

I guess Kamran Sb had nothing else to write about for some days, as no more firing happened on his house, so he came up with this one, raising the dead elephant from the grave again.

I am gonna sit one this out for the time being

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I guess Kamran Sb had nothing else to write about for some days, as no more firing happened on his house, so he came up with this one, raising the dead elephant from the grave again.

The incident of the 'firing' on his house is a good example of a lack of objectivity on his part - he was screaming that the 'agencies did it', all because there were no empty casings from the bullets to be found around the site from which the attack took place, and he recalled that in his army days soldiers were trained to shoot with their caps over the ejection chamber to catch the casings.

Apparently placing some sort of cover to catch ejected casings is such a mysterious and top secret tactic that only the 'agencies' in Pakistan thought of it and use it.

I'd wager that any professional criminal would have enough sense to not leave behind empty casings that might have fingerprints or other evidence to link him to an incident.

Shafi is a anti-military screwball, along with NF Paracha. Conspiracy Theories and distortions galore.

 

[Xeric]

The incident of the 'firing' on his house is a good example of a lack of objectivity on his part - he was screaming that the 'agencies did it', all because there were no empty casings from the bullets to be found around the site from which the attack took place, and he recalled that in his army days soldiers were trained to shoot with their caps over the ejection chamber to catch the casings.

Apparently placing some sort of cover to catch ejected casings is such a mysterious and top secret tactic that only the 'agencies' in Pakistan thought of it and use it.

I'd wager that any professional criminal would have enough sense to not leave behind empty casings that might have fingerprints or other evidence to link him to an incident.

Shafi is a anti-military screwball, along with NF Paracha. Conspiracy Theories and distortions galore.

i dont remember doing that!


We have better options to 'catch khokas'!

Anywaz, coming back to the topic; Strategic Depth or not, it wont matter, this is a separate issue. SD may validate itself or it may turn out to be a 'hoax', time will tell. There are better people at better places to authenticate or scrap this possibility out, BUT, what worries me is the fact that what made this Deserter to write on this issue? What was the context exactly? Was there a regime change in Afg? Did the govt or the military changed its stance over this strategy? Did we fence the Durand Line? i mean in what backdrop someone would write a piece knowing fully well that it would just end being a paper to wipe ones ..well i dont say it, as it got no relevancy with the current happenings nor does it bore any resemblance with present political/military outlook!!!

May be he got carried away by Gen Kapoor's two-front war shout or may be he tried to preempt a very docile topic as there was some news that the US has made the Afg govt to agree on sharing the fencing thing on Durand Line or may the Deserter panicked and took the indian announcements about its aggressive designs too seriously!

 

[naved_kam]

If any of you follow Kamran Shafi's writings, he is anti-Army to the core, and nowhere close to objective in a lot of his critique of the Army.

Sir, you may be right in your above assertion. But that does not mean that Mr. Shafi is wrong.

Whichever perspective be put to this "Stragetic Depth" is it not by the end a term justifying the aspirations of Pakistan Army to keep Afganistan unstable at any cost. Would a civilian government undertake such a strategy to keep its neighbour unstable at any cost?

What objective has this vision of Pakistan Army achieved besides the destruction of Afganistan and the creation of terror factories within Pakistan?

Besides, Mr. Shafi's article is not purely allegations. He also quotes facts. He is right in pointing out that Pakistan could not bring an end to long held disputes with Afganistan even when they had "their boys" creating mayhem in Afganistan for over 10 years.

You may Sir, question the author's definition of this term so endeared to the Pakistan Army, but not the sum total of what it has borne earlier up on Afganistan and more recently on Pakistan.