Defending Sind

[Signalian]

what I've concluded is that it's better to be mobile in the deserts rather than dig-in with static defences. a well-mechanized force will outflank you with ease and you'll be gobbled up. mechanization though, is not a prerequisite, considering how the 23 FF, raised with old reservists, retook Sadhewala from the crack 3 Grenadiers in November 1965 - inflicting heavy losses in process.

Mobile Infantry with heavy calibre weapons with enough firepower to take on any kind of threat from Indian forces. Transports could be mix of wheeled and tracked, depending upon availability. Small but highly mobile TFs made up of mix of armor, infantry with ATGM, AD, Arty as well as gunships (if required) used to delay and harass Indian forces dislodging them from their axis of attack. Indian Army can spread itself in different directions if it enters Sindh, this is where UCAVs and Gunships can play their part by flying swiftly to make contact them with them, inflict as much damage as possible and then returning. PA ground forces may not be able to cover distance as faster as air assets. This makes AH-1F relevant in war, even though its slated to be replaced by modern gunships.

Marines don't have heavy weapons and their numbers are small so their offensive capability is a bit staggered. Mobility is an issue for Marines so transport helicopters will make them rapidly deployable in the creeks or marshes, depending on their mission requirement. Hovercrafts and dinghies have their own limitations. They should have heavy weapon platoon in every company, not just mortars or RPGs, but also ATGMs for facing enemy T-72/BMP-2 and boats comfortably and also 35mm or 57mm AAA guns for AD and ground firepower for destructive suppressive fire support.

IMO, V-Corps should aim to capture enemy territory rather than allowing Indian Army to pour into Sindh. Such a plan should be formed in conjunction with PAF and PN. 25th Mech Div spearheads and captures a few areas, then withdraws as reserve after 16th Infantry Div digs in to defend the captured areas. 25th Mech Div stands as a mobile force to intercept, flank and thwart attacks by Indian Forces on 16th Infantry Div. 18th Div stands as reserve or along with Marines protect southern and Northern flanks of 16th infantry Div while reinforcements from XII Corps join V-Corps.
Otherwise, 25th Mechanised keeps advancing on with 18th Infantry Div till it makes contact with tip of Indian Armored forces and engages them. If 25th Mechanised Div faces losses, it withdraws and 18th Infantry Div forms a defensive line to allow regrouping of 25th Mechanised Div and counter attack Indian Armor later on. 16th Infantry Division either keeps defending the previously captured area or sends a part of its forces to help 18th Infantry Div, if 33rd Infantry Div or 41st Infantry Div from XII Corps get delayed to reinforce V-Corps. A brigade sized strength of Sindh Rangers would also come handy.

Not the exact locations but displaying the idea on the map.

The biggest issue in support from PAF when V-Corps cross the border. This applies to Marines also who would need air support and air cover from PAF or PN Mirages to conduct their operations.

 

[CriticalThought]

Mobile Infantry with heavy calibre weapons with enough firepower to take on any kind of threat from Indian forces. Transports could be mix of wheeled and tracked, depending upon availability. Small but highly mobile TFs made up of mix of armor, infantry with ATGM, AD, Arty as well as gunships (if required) used to delay and harass Indian forces dislodging them from their axis of attack. Indian Army can spread itself in different directions if it enters Sindh, this is where UCAVs and Gunships can play their part by flying swiftly to make contact them with them, inflict as much damage as possible and then returning. PA ground forces may not be able to cover distance as faster as air assets. This makes AH-1F relevant in war, even though its slated to be replaced by modern gunships.

Marines don't have heavy weapons and their numbers are small so their offensive capability is a bit staggered. Mobility is an issue for Marines so transport helicopters will make them rapidly deployable in the creeks or marshes, depending on their mission requirement. Hovercrafts and dinghies have their own limitations. They should have heavy weapon platoon in every company, not just mortars or RPGs, but also ATGMs for facing enemy T-72/BMP-2 and boats comfortably and also 35mm or 57mm AAA guns for AD and ground firepower for destructive suppressive fire support.

IMO, V-Corps should aim to capture enemy territory rather than allowing Indian Army to pour into Sindh. Such a plan should be formed in conjunction with PAF and PN. 25th Mech Div spearheads and captures a few areas, then withdraws as reserve after 16th Infantry Div digs in to defend the captured areas. 25th Mech Div stands as a mobile force to intercept, flank and thwart attacks by Indian Forces on 16th Infantry Div. 18th Div stands as reserve or along with Marines protect southern and Northern flanks of 16th infantry Div while reinforcements from XII Corps join V-Corps.
Otherwise, 25th Mechanised keeps advancing on with 18th Infantry Div till it makes contact with tip of Indian Armored forces and engages them. If 25th Mechanised Div faces losses, it withdraws and 18th Infantry Div forms a defensive line to allow regrouping of 25th Mechanised Div and counter attack Indian Armor later on. 16th Infantry Division either keeps defending the previously captured area or sends a part of its forces to help 18th Infantry Div, if 33rd Infantry Div or 41st Infantry Div from XII Corps get delayed to reinforce V-Corps. A brigade sized strength of Sindh Rangers would also come handy.

Not the exact locations but displaying the idea on the map.

View attachment 675697

The biggest issue in support from PAF when V-Corps cross the border. This applies to Marines also who would need air support and air cover from PAF or PN Mirages to conduct their operations.

Many thanks for your input. What are your thoughts on bringing in Harbah strikes from networked FACs against entrenched enemy in this area?

 

[Archie]

Their is unlikely to be a war in the plains and Deserts of Punjab Sindh and Rajasthan.

Their are 2 reasons for that
1. India doesnt want any part of Pakistani Punjab and Sindh, nor does pakistan want any part of Rajasthan
2. India Currently has 1600 T-72 Ajeya and 1000 T-90 Bhishma, 128 Arjun and 1200 BMP 2 IFVs deployed across the border in Rajasthan, Punjab and Gujarat
Compared to just 150 T-72 , 300 T-90 and 300 BMP2 currently deployed in faceoff with china

Thats enough to deter PA from launching an offensive in the plains since they will face a 3 to 1 disadvantage

 

[Mujahid Memon]

I don't get it....is India planning an invasion of Sindh?

India is just a breakaway province of Sindh.

The word 'India' originated from Sind

Sind > Hind > Hindustan > India

 

[proudindian20]

India is just a breakaway province of Sindh.

The word 'India' originated from Sind

Sind > Hind > Hindustan > India

Lol Sindh is nothing like India. Sindh is Islamic now after Arab conquest. It has nothing to do with India.

 

[Sal12]

On paper, it looks like Pak will loose territory in Sindh in a major offensive carried out by India in all out Indo Pak war unless PA raises another corps level formation to defend northern Sindh. This is also important because there is no natural barrier exist in Sindh unlike Punjab where there is network of canals and rivers which can slow down the offensive. Also most corps of IA are nearly twice the size of Pak army corps which puts lot of burden on a single corps of Sindh.

The XII corps can come to reinforce the PA formations in Sindh but this XII corps should be used as a reserve force and should not be limited to Sindh only.

 

[PanzerKiel]

This is also important because there is no natural barrier exist in Sindh unlike Punjab where there is network of canals and rivers which can slow down the offensive.

There are two major physical barriers, one natural and one man made... through which absolutely no movement is possible.

Natural one is Nara gap....total frontage being 200 kms

Man made is SCARP...total frontage being 100 kms.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel sir, many thanks for sharing your deep knowledge with us. It would help the discussion a lot if we could have realistic assessment of Indian capabilities in the modern time.

1. Mechanized Infantry - My knowledge is based on Wikipedia which says Indian Mechanized Infantry Regiment comprises tracked, 6 wheel and 8 wheel IFVs. Especially the BMPs are amphibious, able to cross water obstacles. How effective would these be in Sind?

2. Mobile SAMs - They are in the process of developing Akash. We could question their technical capabilities, but they have a long history of buying foreign equipment when local development fails. Their work on Akash shows their long term planning. In any battle in Sind, their formations will be accompanied by mobile SAMs of some variety.

3. Globemasters and Chinooks - In case Pakistani commanders make the mistake of trading time for space, Indian armor, mechanized infantry, and mobile SAMs will setup a defence perimeter and construct a quick runway strip for the Globemasters. If Dhaka airport can be repaired in 6 hours in 1971, a landing strip for Globemasters can be constructed in 2020 and beyond. They currently don't have a large inventory of Chinooks, but let's assume by the time the attack comes, they have a large inventory. This solves their mobility problem. With the defence perimeter setup, low flying Chinooks can carry M777s, supplies, and troops (let's forget that M777s are meant for the mountains for a moment).

4. With northern approaches secured, amphibious assaults in the marshland along with soldiers/commandos riding light vehicles can cause havoc and take away our coastline.

Can you please comment on these points, to the extent you are allowed to comment?

1. BMPs are as good as our M113s. However, they are better armed, but heavy and slower then our M113. Thats because our M113s are primarily made as personnal carriers, with a 12.7 mm AA HMG on top. BMPs pack a heavier punch since they are made as ICVs (Infanty combat vehicle).

2. Yes, Indian mobile groups will be protected with mobile SAMs.

3. Do please about Operation Eagle Claw on Wikipedia. You'll got some idea.

4. As i keep on mentioning everywhere, attacking through marshlands is one thing....logistically sustaining is another.....indian logistics is based on wheeled trucks which will not be able to traverse the marshes or boggy areas. Logistics is a bigger nightmare for them then attacking.

 

[PDF]

As i keep on mentioning everywhere, attacking through marshlands is one thing....logistically sustaining is another.....indian logistics is based on wheeled trucks which will not be able to traverse the marshes or boggy areas. Logistics is a bigger nightmare for them then attacking.

Interesting. I guess it will also hold true in a hypothetical war between India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh will be able to defend well against an Indian advance?

In your opinion, is India better suited for defense rather than offense? And if so, are our strike corps also at disadvantage?

When does the Nuclear option comes into play during the conventional conflict? With wars limiting themselves to weeks rather than years, does the direction of a conflict be certained within a week?

We all talk of the use of unconventional weapon, but never really focus on using missiles with conventional warheads. In case of nuclear warhead, the precision and accuracy doesn't matter much as it will take out cities, but if it is a non-nuke, our pinpoint- missiles will really be helpful to take out enemy field bases. But then, India will also be invited to strike our military HQs. Both countries have wide ranging delivery platforms and well matured.

Can someone expand in detail about the uses of missiles (conventional) in a war between India and Pakistan? How have we planned to counter this threat. In 1965 -1971 war, >1000 or even >500km Missiles were not present, but now Ballistic and Cruise missiles are found in large quantities.

 

[CrazyZ]

Lots of mobile artillery systems with cluster and precision munitions, infantry/vehicle atgm hunter killer teams, various UAV's/UGV's in tandem with conventional air/armor/infantry forces.

How could I forget land mines both pre placed and rapidly deployed in path of enemy advance.

 

[khanasifm]

 

[CriticalThought]

1. BMPs are as good as our M113s. However, they are better armed, but heavy and slower then our M113. Thats because our M113s are primarily made as personnal carriers, with a 12.7 mm AA HMG on top. BMPs pack a heavier punch since they are made as ICVs (Infanty combat vehicle).

2. Yes, Indian mobile groups will be protected with mobile SAMs.

3. Do please about Operation Eagle Claw on Wikipedia. You'll got some idea.

4. As i keep on mentioning everywhere, attacking through marshlands is one thing....logistically sustaining is another.....indian logistics is based on wheeled trucks which will not be able to traverse the marshes or boggy areas. Logistics is a bigger nightmare for them then attacking.

Many thanks Sir. Now I wish I could entertain you with a little factoid about Operation Eagle Claw that might amuse you. Alas, this little factoid is not to be shared on the internet!

But regarding the failure of Eagle Claw, America has learnt and moved on. The opening salvo of Desert Storm was not stealth bombers, not jet fighters. The very first bombs were released by low flying helis to take out an Iraqi radar site. Desert Storm also saw the advance of large amounts of armor and mechanized infantry through a desert.

Having said the above, I will be the first to acknowledge that my third point has a large number of moving parts. It must be said that at best it can be generously labeled a bold plan, and it would be folly on the part of Indians to execute such a plan without conducting multiple exercises first. The chances of Pakistan Army being caught unprepared and unaware are low. But I will still respect the cunning and connivance of Indian military planners who might practice all the individual components of such a plan without holding an overall exercise, so the hint may be lost.

My concept of marsh warfare is grueling kilometer by kilometer fighting. Supplies would need to be air dropped which have a high loss rate. Or brought in through the sea where they will be harassed by PN. And just the grueling nature of it begs the question: is it worth it? But there is a flip side to it as well: would Indians encounter heavy resistance? In the face of a weak resistance by PA, the Indians might be encouraged to occupy the marshes. A visionary Indian military planner would look to occupy some significant portion of our coastline and not give it away on the negotiations table, simply as a stepping stone towards a future goal in a future war.

Marsh lands would not support heavy SAM sites, so air defence will be limited to AA guns and manpads. This makes them ideal place for a combined ground/air assault with helis providing CAS. As a matter of fact, the main thrust might look like this: bring in troops on helis with CAS, fortify position, rappel back onto refueled heli, advance. It would still be slow and grueling, but take out some of the skullduggery of moving around. My search for 'marsh warfare' brings up this:

Battle of the Marshes - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

My analysis of 'Battle of Marshes': infiltration along marshes is a potent maneuver seeing the Iraqis had to resort to unconventional means to counter it. Electrocution is a very good defence but against a well proportioned opponent such as India, the first attack would come against the power plant supplying electricity. In-depth defence had to be used by Iraqis, which shows that the marshes cannot be left undefended. PA will have to provide stiff resistance in order to dissuade any overly smart Indian general from attempting an amphibious assault.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Many thanks Sir. Now I wish I could entertain you with a little factoid about Operation Eagle Claw that might amuse you. Alas, this little factoid is not to be shared on the internet!

But regarding the failure of Eagle Claw, America has learnt and moved on. The opening salvo of Desert Storm was not stealth bombers, not jet fighters. The very first bombs were released by low flying helis to take out an Iraqi radar site. Desert Storm also saw the advance of large amounts of armor and mechanized infantry through a desert.

Having said the above, I will be the first to acknowledge that my third point has a large number of moving parts. It must be said that at best it can be generously labeled a bold plan, and it would be folly on the part of Indians to execute such a plan without conducting multiple exercises first. The chances of Pakistan Army being caught unprepared and unaware are low. But I will still respect the cunning and connivance of Indian military planners who might practice all the individual components of such a plan without holding an overall exercise, so the hint may be lost.

My concept of marsh warfare is grueling kilometer by kilometer fighting. Supplies would need to be air dropped which have a high loss rate. Or brought in through the sea where they will be harassed by PN. And just the grueling nature of it begs the question: is it worth it? But there is a flip side to it as well: would Indians encounter heavy resistance? In the face of a weak resistance by PA, the Indians might be encouraged to occupy the marshes. A visionary Indian military planner would look to occupy some significant portion of our coastline and not give it away on the negotiations table, simply as a stepping stone towards a future goal in a future war.

Marsh lands would not support heavy SAM sites, so air defence will be limited to AA guns and manpads. This makes them ideal place for a combined ground/air assault with helis providing CAS. As a matter of fact, the main thrust might look like this: bring in troops on helis with CAS, fortify position, rappel back onto refueled heli, advance. It would still be slow and grueling, but take out some of the skullduggery of moving around. My search for 'marsh warfare' brings up this:

Battle of the Marshes - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

My analysis of 'Battle of Marshes': infiltration along marshes is a potent maneuver seeing the Iraqis had to resort to unconventional means to counter it. Electrocution is a very good defence but against a well proportioned opponent such as India, the first attack would come against the power plant supplying electricity. In-depth defence had to be used by Iraqis, which shows that the marshes cannot be left undefended. PA will have to provide stiff resistance in order to dissuade any overly smart Indian general from attempting an amphibious assault.

Dear
Both sides understand one thing very clearly.... Achieving surprise in today's highly net centric environment, with multiple surveillance means, is almost impossible now.

Your theory of a surprise assault on the marshes.... Try running it backwards..... Calculate the figure of the specific number of aircraft, helicopters and amphibious craft that will be required for such an operation....
... Then try assembling then at a place for launch
... Then calculate the troops as well, and also decide from which cantonments these troops will move to assemble...
... Then see whether such a big and assembly of such equipment can be hidden.... That too in today's environment where HUMINT is not the only source of info.


More than thirty years ago, we were able to detect and counter the move of Indian 6 Mountain Division, which is part of their strategic reserve, despite being out located in interior India.

There are different levels of alert. Int agencies work tirelessly to keep our soldiers informed of enemy movements. Let me quote you an example.

Last time Indian army planned, and were about to conduct, a conventional attack in an area...

..... They inducted 6 Mountain Division by air within about a week. Of course they faced a shortage of accommodation for the almost 10, 000 troops that arrived from nowhere. This airlift was remarkable enough.

As per Indian accounts, Pakistan staged a more remarkable airlift. 300 C130 sorties were flown within 3 days to bring in two extra brigades into FCNA which altered the attack ratio enough to force Indians to postpone and then cancel their attack a few hours before it was about to be launched.

You may like to appreciate our intelligence work... I mean, 6 Mountain Division must have been picked up once troops were being recalled, being equipped, driven to the airbase for airlift, then it took six more days for it to be fully concentrated in 15 Corps area.

As per Indian accounts, Pakistan staged a more remarkable airlift. 300 C130 sorties were flown within 3 days to bring in two extra brigades into FCNA which altered the attack ratio enough to force Indians to postpone and then cancel their attack a few hours before it was about to be launched.

And Indians, by their own accounts, were thoroughly impressed by our C130, it's capability to operate at surge rate without maintenance, and it's large overload capacity.

... Two full brigades in three days.....more than thirty years ago...

 

[CriticalThought]

Dear
Both sides understand one thing very clearly.... Achieving surprise in today's highly net centric environment, with multiple surveillance means, is almost impossible now.

Your theory of a surprise assault on the marshes.... Try running it backwards..... Calculate the figure of the specific number of aircraft, helicopters and amphibious craft that will be required for such an operation....
... Then try assembling then at a place for launch
... Then calculate the troops as well, and also decide from which cantonments these troops will move to assemble...
... Then see whether such a big and assembly of such equipment can be hidden.... That too in today's environment where HUMINT is not the only source of info.


More than thirty years ago, we were able to detect and counter the move of Indian 6 Mountain Division, which is part of their strategic reserve, despite being out located in interior India.

There are different levels of alert. Int agencies work tirelessly to keep our soldiers informed of enemy movements. Let me quote you an example.

Last time Indian army planned, and were about to conduct, a conventional attack in an area...

..... They inducted 6 Mountain Division by air within about a week. Of course they faced a shortage of accommodation for the almost 10, 000 troops that arrived from nowhere. This airlift was remarkable enough.

As per Indian accounts, Pakistan staged a more remarkable airlift. 300 C130 sorties were flown within 3 days to bring in two extra brigades into FCNA which altered the attack ratio enough to force Indians to postpone and then cancel their attack a few hours before it was about to be launched.

You may like to appreciate our intelligence work... I mean, 6 Mountain Division must have been picked up once troops were being recalled, being equipped, driven to the airbase for airlift, then it took six more days for it to be fully concentrated in 15 Corps area.

As per Indian accounts, Pakistan staged a more remarkable airlift. 300 C130 sorties were flown within 3 days to bring in two extra brigades into FCNA which altered the attack ratio enough to force Indians to postpone and then cancel their attack a few hours before it was about to be launched.

And Indians, by their own accounts, were thoroughly impressed by our C130, it's capability to operate at surge rate without maintenance, and it's large overload capacity.

... Two full brigades in three days.....more than thirty years ago...

Many thanks sir. Understood and acknowledged. Just to clarify, my point was about secrecy of large scale operational details. Taking cold start as an example, had the Indians wanted to keep the doctrine itself secret, they might have made large scale exercises public, but kept silent on how they would come together in a final assault. Because the Indians made the doctrine public, it allowed us to formulate a response. Now imagine if the doctrine had been kept secret, and we did not get the time to create the Nasr solution. In our present discussion, intel may provide details of large scale acquisitions, exercises to utilize those assets. Intel can also inform us about an impending operation, per the example you have provided. But surely, the Indians must have a way to keep their theatre level plans secret such that there is a possibility of PA being caught unawares?

Although PA generals would react to the situation as it allows, it is far better to be prepared in advance. Which brings the need to not just analyze their doctrines and tactics, but also the different and unexpected ways in which they can come together during battle.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Many thanks sir. Understood and acknowledged. Just to clarify, my point was about secrecy of large scale operational details. Taking cold start as an example, had the Indians wanted to keep the doctrine itself secret, they might have made large scale exercises public, but kept silent on how they would come together in a final assault. Because the Indians made the doctrine public, it allowed us to formulate a response. Now imagine if the doctrine had been kept secret, and we did not get the time to create the Nasr solution. In our present discussion, intel may provide details of large scale acquisitions, exercises to utilize those assets. Intel can also inform us about an impending operation, per the example you have provided. But surely, the Indians must have a way to keep their theatre level plans secret such that there is a possibility of PA being caught unawares?

Although PA generals would react to the situation as it allows, it is far better to be prepared in advance. Which brings the need to not just analyze their doctrines and tactics, but also the different and unexpected ways in which they can come together during battle.

Dear
It wasn't like that.

Indians were forced to make Cold Start public a long time AFTER we had already got its details thorough covert means and hammered out the responses. It was then the Indians thought it was no use to keep it secret anymore.

Otherwise, why would they make their top secret war doctrine public?