What's new

Defence of EEZ: Pakistan's resource rich 5th province.

No ....We have sent invitation , but Islamabad didn't accept it..Andhra pradesh is not maharashtra to find RSS protests when you arrive.
Not invited

Actually first we sent an unofficial invite , but they weren't interested, so we didn't invited them officially.

Politics was not a reason , we had Israel and Iran together, Bangladesh and Burma together , even China and Italy.
 
An EEZ is not to be defended, in the military sense. It is to be administered and managed. An EEZ relates to the rights of exploration and exploitation (not ownership/sovereignty) of the seabed (eg manganese nodules), what is beneath it (e.g. oil) and in the water between seabed and seasurface (e.g. fish). The sea surface is international waters, the air above is international airspace.
 
Last edited:
An EEZ is not to be defended, in the military sense. It is to be administered and managed. An EEZ relates to the rights of exploration and exploitation (not ownership/sovereignty) of the seabed (eg manganese nodules), what is beneath it (e.g. oil) and in the water between seabed and seasurface (e.g. fish). The sea surface is international waters, the air above is international airspace.


"Sea (UNCLOS), which established EEZs as a feature of international law, gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters.30 The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world’s nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. In response to a request from CRS to identify the countries taking this latter position, the U.S. Navy states that countries with restrictions inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention [i.e., UNCLOS] that would limit the exercise of high seas freedoms by foreign navies beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast are [the following 27]:

Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

31 Other observers provide different counts of the number of countries that take the position that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities but also foreign military activities in their EEZs. For example, one set of observers, in an August 2013 briefing, stated that 18 countries seek to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs, and that three of these countries—China, North Korea, and Peru—have directly interfered with foreign military activities in their EEZs.32"

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf


UNCLOS will increasingly find it difficult to merge the two groups as complex geo-political scenarios and administrative issues will ultimately lead to a single resolution and that is each country being allowed to militarily regulate its EEZ .The longer they wait the more chance of collisions and that they woudnt want in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean atleast. In short Indian Navy wouldnt do Naval surveillance in Pakistani EEZ and vice versa as both believe in the same doctrine.
 
UNCLOS will increasingly find it difficult to merge the two groups as complex geo-political scenarios and administrative issues will ultimately lead to a single resolution and that is each country being allowed to militarily regulate its EEZ .The longer they wait the more chance of collisions and that they woudnt want in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean atleast. In short Indian Navy wouldnt do Naval surveillance in Pakistani EEZ and vice versa as both believe in the same doctrine.

Let;s have a closer look at what UNCLOS is and who's part of it:
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. The convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994 upon deposition of the 60th instrument of ratification.

The convention has been ratified by 167 parties, which includes 166 states (163 United Nations member states plus the UN Observer state Palestine, as well as the Cook Islands and Niue) and the European Union. An additional 14 UN member states have signed, but not ratified the convention.

Subsequently, the "Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" was signed in 1994, amending the original Convention. The agreement has been ratified by 147 parties (all of which are parties to the Convention), which includes 146 states (143 United Nations member states plus the UN Observer state Palestine, as well as the Cook Islands and Niue) and the European Union. An additional 3 UN member states have signed, but not ratified the agreement.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea

UNCLOS isn't an actor, it is an international treaty. The convention was signed by 181 parties (180 states) and ratified by 167 parties (166 states) . The subsequent implementation agreement was signed by 150 parties (149 states) and ratified by 147 (146 states). Clearly, those 18 or 27 states with a different position are greatly outnumbered by those that do not. One might argue some states should carry more weight e.g. due to their economy or population, but that is not a legal issue. Rather, it's a policy position at best.

Anyway, even if you assume that the group of 18 or 27 countries eventually would get their position recognized and adopted, a right to "regulate military foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters" does not mean the EEZ beyond territorial sea becomes sovereign territory and it also does not mean the coastal state would have "the right to defend or respond by military means" or, as you paraphrased the original text " to militarily regulate" . Nor is it the case that the EEZ would be unregulated in the absence of regulation by the coastal state (issue would be " who enforces?" > UN).

Signed and ratified both the Convention and the Agreement:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Signed the Convention but did not ratify (and thus also was not party to the Agreement):
Cambodia, Iran, North Korea, UAE

Neither signed nor acceded to both the Convention and Agreement:
Syria, Peru.

Personnally (but I'm not a lawyer), I think it is rather strange to sign and retify the Convention and then go on to sign and ratify the subsequent Agreement and then maintain a differing - obviously minority - position, as 22 of these 28 states apparently have done and do.
 
Last edited:
Positive rating from me:-):-):-)
Good read.

This Is Enough To Truly Become The Fifth Province of Pakistan

PakHuman9.jpg





Some 10 Years Back There Was A GSP Report That There Were More Than 6 Trillion Barrels of Crude Oil.Just Combine EEZ With CPEC.Maybe Oil and Gas Pipelines From Saudi/GCC Directly to China Plus Channel Tunnel Type Underground Road/Railway.Not To Mention Our Faisal Reza Abidi's Fabled "Gwadar Mega Oil City"

PHIR WEKH SHUGHAL :dance3::dance3::dance3:
 
Last edited:
An EEZ is not to be defended, in the military sense. It is to be administered and managed. An EEZ relates to the rights of exploration and exploitation (not ownership/sovereignty) of the seabed (eg manganese nodules), what is beneath it (e.g. oil) and in the water between seabed and sea surface (e.g. fish). The sea surface is international waters, the air above is international airspace.
ADIZ can be established over this area...

ADIZs: Legal Status and State Practice

What is an ADIZ?

Annex 15 to the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation defines ADIZ as a “special designated airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special identification and/or reporting procedures additional to those related to the provision of air traffic service”. In practical terms, ADIZ is a zone beyond the territorial sea in which a coastal State unilaterally declares that foreign aircraft entering the zone must identify themselves by submitting their Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Defense Visual Flight Rules (DVFR) flight plans and/or reporting their location to the coastal State in order to protect its security. Foreign aircraft may exercise freedom of overflight within the zone, but if they fail to identify themselves in advance, they are subject to being interrogated or intercepted so that the coastal State can be determine whether or not they have a hostile intent. ADIZs are a product of the Cold War. The justification for their establishment was national security. They were established to address the concern of a number of states over the possibility of massive nuclear attacks by hostile long-range bombers. The purpose was to enable the attacked states to have more time to apply their defensive aircraft and ground-to air missiles. In today’s world, with the advance of technology, nuclear attacks would not necessarily come from aircraft but from ground-based or ship-based missiles, ADIZs are useful only to States engaged in wars involving the use of aircraft.

ADIZs of the United States

The United States was the first nation to establish ADIZs. In 1950, it declared the world’s first ADIZs to reduce the risk of a surprise aerial attack from the Soviet Union. Under the United States Federal Aviation Regulations, ADIZ is defined as an airspace “over land or water in which the ready identification, location and control of all aircraft […] is required in the interest of national security”. The rule is that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft into […] an ADIZ unless the person files a DVFR [Defense Visual Flight Rules] flight plan containing the time and point of ADIZ penetration.”

Today, the United States has five zones (West Coast, East Coast, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam). The ADIZ of the continental coast of the United States extends out more than 300 nautical miles in some Atlantic areas and more than 400 nautical miles off southern California. The United States also has an ADIZ off the coast of Alaska that extends out at least 350 nautical miles into the airspace above the Bering Sea and a similar distance into the Arctic Sea from Alaska’s northern coast. In addition, it also has ADIZ off Hawaii and Guam that extend out more than 250 miles.

The United States has stated that the requirement of the foreign aircraft to identify itself in advance only applies to aircraft intending to enter the air space over US territory, and that the requirement of prior identification can be justified as a “condition of entry” into its territory. Consequently, the official policy of the United States is that it does not recognize the right of a coastal State to apply its ADIZ procedures to its aircraft not intending to enter the national airspace of that State. Its policy is that its military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace will not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other States, unless it has specifically agreed to do so.

Signed and ratified both the Convention and the Agreement:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
Ratification in Pakistan does not indicate that Pakistan has incorporated the International Treaty into her Domestic Legislation. Germany and USA it becomes law the moment it is signed. UK has to bring a bill to it Parliament where it would be debated on and then made into an act...Till that time it can not be considered to be ratified.

One more thing that I would like to highlight is an ADIZ is neither permitted nor prohibited by any international agreement. Hence some authors maintained that even though there is no treaty basis for an ADIZ right, given state practice since 1950s with few protests, the legal basis may be found in customary international law. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) describes international customs as ‘general practice accepted as law’. To conclude that the legality of ADIZs is settled under customary international law, one has to prove that the norm has met the threshold as determined by the ICJ.

"Sea (UNCLOS), which established EEZs as a feature of international law, gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters.30 The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world’s nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. In response to a request from CRS to identify the countries taking this latter position, the U.S. Navy states that countries with restrictions inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention [i.e., UNCLOS] that would limit the exercise of high seas freedoms by foreign navies beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast are [the following 27]:

Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

31 Other observers provide different counts of the number of countries that take the position that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities but also foreign military activities in their EEZs. For example, one set of observers, in an August 2013 briefing, stated that 18 countries seek to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs, and that three of these countries—China, North Korea, and Peru—have directly interfered with foreign military activities in their EEZs.32"

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf


UNCLOS will increasingly find it difficult to merge the two groups as complex geo-political scenarios and administrative issues will ultimately lead to a single resolution and that is each country being allowed to militarily regulate its EEZ .The longer they wait the more chance of collisions and that they woudnt want in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean atleast. In short Indian Navy wouldnt do Naval surveillance in Pakistani EEZ and vice versa as both believe in the same doctrine.
 
By Taj M Khattak
The writer is a former Vice Chief of the Naval

The idea of recognizing a nation state’s special rights over sea space outside territorial limits and calling it Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a relatively new one. In earlier times, a country’s sovereign territorial waters extended up to the distance where cannon shots landed in the water from the coast and was generally taken as three nautical miles. As gun ranges improved, this limit was extended to twelve nautical miles.

In a bid to secure resources of adjoining seas after WW-II, countries began to claim jurisdiction beyond the twelve miles limit. United States of America was the first country to proclaim exclusive jurisdiction beyond traditional territorial limit of twelve miles, while Chile and Peru were the first to put a figure of 200 nautical miles on their claims of maritime zones.

In 1982, United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) was formally adopted which recognized the concept of EEZ as an area beyond the territorial sea, subject to special legal regime established in Part V of the convention, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal States and the rights and freedom of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of the treaty.

This definition made a clear distinction between territorial sea and EEZ, wherein while the former conferred full sovereignty over waters adjoining its coast up to twelve nautical miles limit, the later conferred ‘sovereign rights’ below the surface of the sea. The sea surface however could be used by other states for ‘innocent passage’ of their flagged vessels.

In 1994, UNCLOS came into force after ratification of requisite number of sixty countries and to date approximately 162 countries have joined it. It is interesting to note that US has not ratified UNCLOS even though it recognizes it as codification of customary international law.

Pakistan has nearly 990 kilometers long coast line. With the acceptance of Pakistan’s claim early this year by UN commission for extension of its continental shelf from 200 to 350 nautical miles, its ‘sea bed territory’ has increased by another 50,000 square kilometers to 290,000 square kilometers. This is more than the combined area of Sind and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces.

An immediate consequence of this extension in Pakistan’s EEZ has been the negative impact on proposed Iran-Oman-India pipeline estimated to cost nearly $ 4 billion and capable of transporting nearly a trillion cubic feet gas over the next two decades. It was planned to be 1,300 kilometers long and 3400 meters under the sea and was to run from Chahbahar in Iran and Ras al Ratan in Oman to Porbandar in India with a compression station on Murray Ridge which now falls in our extended EEZ. Routing of the pipeline further south in deeper waters would disturb the cost-benefit ratio and pose complex technical challenges.

In 1995, Pakistan had blocked a proposed deep-sea pipeline from Oman to India because it crossed our EEZ. This forced India to adopt a route outside of our previous 200 nautical miles limit of EEZ and for which detailed design, equipment trials and procurement of long lead items were planned during 2013-15. We need to keep an eye on these developments and not be taken by surprise as India might try to dispute our fundamental sovereign rights over the sea bed in the extended EEZ.

India is already violating the spirit of UNCLOS by requiring 24 hours prior notice for ships carrying hazardous and dangerous cargos like oil, chemicals, noxious liquids, and radio-active material to enter its EEZ. In other words it is clearly endeavoring to ‘territorialize’ its EEZ.

Like neighboring Iran and India, Pakistan too has claimed authority to regulate military activities in its EEZ especially where the use of explosives or weapons is involved. In addition, we also require foreign aircraft to file flight plans before transiting over the EEZ. These claims reflect our legitimate security interest in the zone but in order to be taken seriously, it should now be followed by robust military capacity as well as pursuit of objectives through psychological measures, media warfare and legal means to dissuade adversaries from undermining our national interests.

This huge stretch of sea space can justifiably be called the fifth province of Pakistan. It is rich in hydrocarbons, fish, and other sea bed resources. In order to benefit from this gift of nature, Pakistan must undertake serious initiatives to acquire deep sea exploratory vessels which are capable of probing beneath the sea bed and evaluating data to determine presence of various natural resources.

Unless there is knowledge and information about what lies beneath the seabed under our jurisdiction, there is unlikely to be serious urge to extract this vast reservoir of national wealth. Outsourcing this task to other countries is not the answer as information on complete and authentic data on these resources is too precious to be shared with other countries.

One of the most precious resources under the sea bed in EEZ is the possibility of oil in Indus and Makran basins. The Indus basin constituting delta/fan system is second largest in the world after Bay of Bengal and is analogous to many producing basins in the world in geological terms. Pakistan hasn’t had much success in off-shore drilling in the past though efforts have been made by such drilling firms as Sun Oil Company, Wintershall, Husky, Occidental, Total, PPL, Shell, and Eni which in all drilled about twelve wells. But as technology improves, one can hope for a better success rate.

Sea food is another precious resource where our fish production in the marine sector, extending up to 35 nautical miles from the coast, is nearly 70 percent whiles the remaining 30 percent is obtained from inland sector. There is no reliable data on the quantum of fish resource beyond 35 nautical miles limit in the EEZ which is routinely transgressed by modern ‘floating factory’ type fishing trawlers from other countries.

Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency (MSA)
frequently apprehends Indian fishermen who intrude into Pakistani waters but its reach and capacity against ‘big time’ thieves operating further south of the coast is severely constrained. MSA does not have sufficient air surveillance assets to monitor the activities in EEZ, nor does it have enough surface vessel resources to effectively police the area once intruders have been reported.

The problem is compounded by unscrupulous interest groups residing in the city’s posh areas who regularly pass on movements of surveillance aircraft to alert erring fishing vessels. Since MSA has the entire responsibility of the country’s coastlines in terms of strategic security, as well as law enforcement within EEZ, it must be beefed up to measure up to the assigned task.

Our EEZ is located in close proximity to Straits of Hormuz which centuries ago was called western ‘entrepot’ of the Indian Ocean by the Portuguese. The other ‘entrepot’, or a centre to which good are brought for import and export and for collection and distribution, was Malacca Strait.

While this huge area offers opportunities to explore additional resources, its unique geographical proximity also poses challenges in the form of threats which could imperil our national security. These threats could emanate from inter-state territorial disputes, political instability, piracy, dumping of toxic waste, human smuggling, drugs and arms smuggling and transnational crimes including maritime terrorism such as the blowing up a fishing boat by Indian coast guard in the recent past.

As the world at large focuses sharply on environmental issues, we too need to make an effort to keep our surrounding seas clean and healthy. It is common knowledge in the marine industry that dumping of toxic waste and operational discharges from tankers are the most significant chronic and continuous sources of polluting the oceans and causing ‘sub-lethal toxicity’ for both human and marine life which induces generic damage even in low concentrations. .

Guarding our national interest in the EEZ is a huge challenge but so are the benefits due to its size and enormity of resources. It would make sense to chalk out a comprehensive strategy for exploration of resources both beneath the surface and under the sea bed, complete with its surveillance and defense and sooner the better.

Defence of EEZ – Pakistan’s resource rich fifth province | Pakistan | thenews.com.pk

This is a very bad article. Is nobody planning to analyse it and its claims and its language?
 
ADIZ can be established over this area...
Lots of things are possible. But has nothing to do with resources of the sea, surface or below surface or seabed, which is what EEZ is about. ADIZ does not give any sovereignty and has no basis in treaty. Custom in law is an Anglo-Saxon feature, not a Germanic or French law feature. In short, not so relevant to the discussion imho. Also, I doubt having an ADIZ would legitimize shooting an unidentified flying object (lol) down in international airspace. It does not have the word IDENTIFICATION for nothing.

Aircraft not intending to enter the airspace in question may not be required to identify themselves under the conditions of an ADiz, but that leaves unaffected the duty of such aircraft (including military aircraft) not to interfere with or endanger cilivian flight operations. This will be more important when dealing with more congested areas in terms of air traffic.

An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is airspace over land or water in which the identification, location, and control of civil aircraft is performed in the interest of national security. They may extend beyond a country's territory to give the country more time to respond to possibly hostile aircraft. The concept of an ADIZ is not defined in any international treaty and is not regulated by any international body.

The first ADIZ was established by the United States on December 27, 1950, shortly after President Truman had proclaimed a national emergency during the Korean War. Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, when civilian commercial aircraft were utilized for mass destruction, ADIZ became prominent as a tool by which to monitor and control foreign aircraft entering a given national airspace. About 20 countries and regions now have such zones including Canada, India, Japan, Pakistan, Norway and the United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, South Korea, Taiwan, United States, Sweden, Iceland and more. Russia and North Korea have unofficial ADIZ for themselves as well. Usually such zones only cover undisputed territory, do not apply to foreign aircraft not intending to enter territorial airspace, and do not overlap.

Air defense zones should not be confused with Flight Information Regions (FIRs), which are used to manage air traffic. FIR is different by the fact that they are areas established for the facilitation of air traffic and airspace management.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Identification_Zone

As for ratification, if a country signs and ratifies a treaty it is bound by it, irrespective of whether it becomes domestic law (one wouldn't be a trustworthy international partner if this weren't the case, and a treaty has legal status on its own).

This is a very bad article. Is nobody planning to analyse it and its claims and its language?
You could start by explaining why you think it is a bad article ;-)
 
Last edited:
Let;s have a closer look at what UNCLOS is and who's part of it:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea

UNCLOS isn't an actor, it is an international treaty. The convention was signed by 181 parties (180 states) and ratified by 167 parties (166 states) . The subsequent implementation agreement was signed by 150 parties (149 states) and ratified by 147 (146 states). Clearly, those 18 or 27 states with a different position are greatly outnumbered by those that do not. One might argue some states should carry more weight e.g. due to their economy or population, but that is not a legal issue. Rather, it's a policy position at best.

Anyway, even if you assume that the group of 18 or 27 countries eventually would get their position recognized and adopted, a right to "regulate military foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters" does not mean the EEZ beyond territorial sea becomes sovereign territory and it also does not mean the coastal state would have "the right to defend or respond by military means" or, as you paraphrased the original text " to militarily regulate" . Nor is it the case that the EEZ would be unregulated in the absence of regulation by the coastal state (issue would be " who enforces?" > UN).

Signed and ratified both the Convention and the Agreement:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Signed the Convention but did not ratify (and thus also was not party to the Agreement):
Cambodia, Iran, North Korea, UAE

Neither signed nor acceded to both the Convention and Agreement:
Syria, Peru.

Personnally (but I'm not a lawyer), I think it is rather strange to sign and retify the Convention and then go on to sign and ratify the subsequent Agreement and then maintain a differing - obviously minority - position, as 22 of these 28 states apparently have done and do.

It really depends how you define 'regulating militarily '.For some it might be using military apparatus to deter any suspicious entity esp. if the role is to safeguard sensitive installations or traffic at sea.
 
It really depends how you define 'regulating militarily '.For some it might be using military apparatus to deter any suspicious entity esp. if the role is to safeguard sensitive installations or traffic at sea.
No, ' regulating military' (as opposed to ' regulating civilian' ) refers to the object (that which you are regulating), rather than the method ('militarily regulate' is regulated by military i.e. it answers the how of regulation: regulated by the military or using military means). That is a fundamental difference and not semantics.
 
No, ' regulating military' (as opposed to ' regulating civilian' ) refers to the object (that which you are regulating), rather than the method ('militarily regulate' is regulated by military i.e. it answers the how of regulation: regulated by the military or using military means). That is a fundamental difference and not semantics.

lol In Pakistans case its always a 'militarily regulate' and not 'regulating the military' .Military makes the key decisions..:-)
 

Country Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom