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MMRCA: Counter Point | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
++
IDSA COMMENT MMRCA:- Counter Point
by- Ramesh Phadke
February 13, 2012
.
.
Since the announcement of the French Rafale as a
possible winner (possible because serious
negotiations on the final price based on life cycle
costs and Transfer of Technology (ToT) are yet to
be concluded) on January 31, 2012, a number of
very strong views against the decision have been
published. Academics, strategic affairs analysts
and journalists have generally highlighted two
major points. Firstly, that the Rafale is too
expensive; India could have purchased a larger
number of less expensive fighters because, with
the threat of a ‘two front war’, India needs
numbers rather than technology. Secondly, that
the choice of the USD 10 to 20 billion worth
contract should have been based more on
consideration of strategic gains instead of
technology alone. While at first glance, there
appears some substance in these arguments, a
deeper analysis of the various associated issues
and the long history of India’s choices in defence
procurement would lead us to different
conclusions.
A brief overview of India’s past decisions would
show that until the current buy, all defence
purchases were made without an ‘open tender’
process. As such, why the IAF chose a particular
piece of equipment or why the then government
gave it the green signal is shrouded in secrecy.
But, it is evident that there were many weighty
security and foreign policy issues behind such
decisions.
In 1948, India decided to buy an unspecified
number of Vampire jet fighters from Britain
because at the time Britain was the only country
that was ready to sell defence equipment to non-
aligned India. India also had a sizeable ‘sterling
balance’ or credit with the UK and did not have to
pay cash. That this sterling balance was very
quickly exhausted is another matter. In 1950-51,
tensions mounted following the issue of refugee
influx from the erstwhile East Pakistan. The then
Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan showed
increasing belligerence as time passed. Nehru, as
a precautionary measure, alerted the Indian
armed forces and even moved an armoured
brigade closer to the borders in the Punjab. To its
surprise, the IAF found that while it had plenty of
spares of all types, the vital ‘firing mechanism’ for
the Vampire guns was nowhere to be found.
Whether by design or default, the British
appeared to have placed the IAF in great difficulty.
The senior officers of the IAF then felt that India
needed to diversify her sources of defence supply
in the event one or the other supplier decided to
impose sanctions, as happened later during the
1965 Indo-Pak War. The IAF then chose the
Dassault Ouragon (called Toofani in India) instead
of the British Meteor, even though at that time a
senior British Officer Air Marshal Gibbs was the
Chief of the Air Staff of the IAF.
.
......................For full article please visit above link
++
IDSA COMMENT MMRCA:- Counter Point
by- Ramesh Phadke
February 13, 2012
.
.
Since the announcement of the French Rafale as a
possible winner (possible because serious
negotiations on the final price based on life cycle
costs and Transfer of Technology (ToT) are yet to
be concluded) on January 31, 2012, a number of
very strong views against the decision have been
published. Academics, strategic affairs analysts
and journalists have generally highlighted two
major points. Firstly, that the Rafale is too
expensive; India could have purchased a larger
number of less expensive fighters because, with
the threat of a ‘two front war’, India needs
numbers rather than technology. Secondly, that
the choice of the USD 10 to 20 billion worth
contract should have been based more on
consideration of strategic gains instead of
technology alone. While at first glance, there
appears some substance in these arguments, a
deeper analysis of the various associated issues
and the long history of India’s choices in defence
procurement would lead us to different
conclusions.
A brief overview of India’s past decisions would
show that until the current buy, all defence
purchases were made without an ‘open tender’
process. As such, why the IAF chose a particular
piece of equipment or why the then government
gave it the green signal is shrouded in secrecy.
But, it is evident that there were many weighty
security and foreign policy issues behind such
decisions.
In 1948, India decided to buy an unspecified
number of Vampire jet fighters from Britain
because at the time Britain was the only country
that was ready to sell defence equipment to non-
aligned India. India also had a sizeable ‘sterling
balance’ or credit with the UK and did not have to
pay cash. That this sterling balance was very
quickly exhausted is another matter. In 1950-51,
tensions mounted following the issue of refugee
influx from the erstwhile East Pakistan. The then
Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan showed
increasing belligerence as time passed. Nehru, as
a precautionary measure, alerted the Indian
armed forces and even moved an armoured
brigade closer to the borders in the Punjab. To its
surprise, the IAF found that while it had plenty of
spares of all types, the vital ‘firing mechanism’ for
the Vampire guns was nowhere to be found.
Whether by design or default, the British
appeared to have placed the IAF in great difficulty.
The senior officers of the IAF then felt that India
needed to diversify her sources of defence supply
in the event one or the other supplier decided to
impose sanctions, as happened later during the
1965 Indo-Pak War. The IAF then chose the
Dassault Ouragon (called Toofani in India) instead
of the British Meteor, even though at that time a
senior British Officer Air Marshal Gibbs was the
Chief of the Air Staff of the IAF.
.
......................For full article please visit above link
