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IAF fighter deal: Rafale much cheaper than Typhoon; govt rules out review
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NEW DELHI: It was the "substantially higher cost" of acquiring and operating the Eurofighter Typhoon that led to its ejection from the almost $20 billion MMRCA ( medium multi-role combat aircraft) project to supply 126 fighters to IAF.

"The French Rafale jet, the eventual winner, beat the Typhoon hollow both in terms of life cycle costs and direct acquisition costs. The entire MMRCA project cost would have gone up by around Rs 25,000 crore if Typhoon had been selected over Rafale," a top defence ministry source said on Thursday.

Given all this, MoD has ruled out the possibility of "any comeback" by Typhoon despite carping by the four nations (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy) backing it, and will begin "exclusive and extensive negotiations" with Rafale-manufacturer Dassault Aviation next week. "The actual contract for the complex project should be ready for inking by September-October," said a source.

British PM David Cameron may have vowed to "encourage" India to reconsider its decision to go in for Rafale, instead of the EADS-manufactured Typhoon, in the largest "open-tender" military aviation deal going around the globe. But that is highly unlikely to happen.

"The fact is that the cost deferential between Typhoon and Rafale was very high... it would cost India around 22% to 25% more if the former had been selected. No government can agree to so much extra," the source said.

Both Rafale and Typhoon had been found "compliant" on all the 643-660 technical parameters laid down to meet specific operational requirements of India, after gruelling field trials by IAF test pilots spread over two years.

The other four jets -- the American F/A-18 'Super Hornet' and F-16 'Super Viper', the Russian MiG-35 and Swedish Gripen - were weeded out from the hotly-contested race last year since they did not meet all the "test points".

"We went by the book, first in the extensive technical evaluation and now in the meticulous commercial evaluation, without any external factors coming into play," said the source.

For one, the "life cycle cost" of operating the Typhoon over a 40-year period, with 6,000 hours of flying, was found to be "higher" than Rafale after extensive calculations of flight costs, spares, maintenance and the like. "The life cycle costs were actually the tool to determine who was L-1 (lowest bidder)," he said.

For another, the difference in the 'direct acquisition cost', which will actually be used to ink the contract, was even bigger. "The Typhoon's commercial bid was way too high. Rafale was the clear L-1 in both life cycle as well as direct acquisition costs," he added.

Dassault will now have to submit a detailed project report on the transfer of technology (ToT) to Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). While the first 18 jets will come in "fly-away condition'' from France from mid-2015 onwards, the rest 108 fighters will subsequently be manufactured under licence by HAL over six years.

"We will negotiate each and every element in the complex project with the French. Payments, as also the 50% offsets specified in the contract, will be spread over 11 to 13 years," he said.

The first jet built in HAL is expected to roll out by 2017-2018. Thereafter, HAL will deliver six jets per year, which will go up to 20 per year later. "HAL will achieve 85% technology absorption by the end. Incidentally, Typhoon's cost of ToT was also very high," he said.

This "mother" of all defence deals will later become the "granny", as reported by TOI earlier, since India will in all probability go in for another 63 fighters after the first 126 jets.

IAF is looking at these 126 new jets, apart from the ongoing progressive induction of 272 Sukhoi-30MKIs contracted from Russia for around $12 billion, to stem its fast-eroding combat edge against Pakistan and China. IAF has already identified Ambala and Jodhpur airbases in the western sector, followed by Hashimara in the eastern sector, to house the first MMRCA squadrons.

India is now finalizing details of the stealth Indo-Russian FGFA (fifth-generation fighter aircraft) to be built in the coming decades. IAF hopes to begin inducting the first lot of the 250 to 300 FGFA from 2020 onwards, which rough calculations show will eventually cost India around $35 billion.

IAF fighter deal: Rafale much cheaper than Typhoon; govt rules out review - The Economic Times

 

[vijayjha]

selecting Rafale has another strategic advantage , its arch rival Pakistan wont be able to get any other plane out of five (except F16) . Euro-fighter is too expensive for Pakistan , Rafale is out of PAF's equation now , Gripen will be banned by USA as it uses lot of american components and F18 is out of PAF's league .
so basically selecting Rafale will leave Pakistan with only option of Chinese toys thus giving IAF clear edge over PAF .

 

[praveen007]

Flying into rough weather - The Times of India
++
Flying into rough weather
.
India's long and convoluted search for a new
fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat
aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New
Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by
Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to
meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement.
Only price negotiation now remains.
The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the
Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally
included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and
F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39
Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is
over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's
choice are unlikely to end any time soon.
Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former
IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably
the first decision that was made purely on
technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious
strategic shortsightedness. While the government
should have received inputs from the IAF, such a
decision should not have been taken on purely
technical grounds. For India's decision-makers,
limiting themselves to technical specifications was
a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the
state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the
wisdom of the choice they made.
Ideally, the Indian decision should have been
guided by a strategy that balances reducing
danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly,
the question for New Delhi should have been
how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's
strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic
blunder to narrowly focus on technical
specifications and capabilities alone, as many
proponents of the IAF's choice have done.
A decision of this magnitude should have been
filtered through three key parameters: strategic,
operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy
would have been to analyse the risk and
opportunity through these three parameters and
then make the final decision about which of the
fighter plane choices would have best advanced
Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical
terms, France can provide little help to India in
either Asia or in the global theatre. While France
has always been a well-wisher, it has never had
much capacity to help India. For example, though
France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it
could do little to change the nuclear non-
proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so.
It took Washington to change these rules to
India's benefit.
Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could
acquire) and cost should have been factored in.
Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might
make some fighter jocks happy, but having
greater numbers might be more relevant to a
country like India which faces a two-front threat
from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in
the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority
required technological superiority, range and
payload but an equally important consideration is
that of numbers.
Numerical superiority in India's regional context is
of particular significance given that the current
strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600,
and unless replenished, it will reach critically low
numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and
Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter
fleets. India could have procured far greater
numbers of fighters with the US or Russian
option.
Though the probability of a two-front war is low,
no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker
should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this
reason that the Indian army is raising new forces
to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the
technological superiority of the Rafale is so great
as to compensate for the smaller numbers that
India will have to settle for.
Cost should have also had an important role in
the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for
Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20
billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet
would have been far cheaper. The Russian option
would have been the least expensive whereas the
American fighters would have been somewhere
in the middle with the European jets being the
most expensive. In overall terms, the American
F-18s would have been the best given that they
(as well as the F-16s) came with the second-
generation AESA radars.
Lastly, the most important consideration should
have been the strategic benefits that accrue to
India through this deal. Indian decision-makers
should have been mindful of the fact that this deal
was as much about making strategic investments
in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India
does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and
these security needs are important. But India also
needs to balance these with its requirements as a
rising power, which means having capable
friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity
to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia
or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi
has ended up antagonising both of them.
The standard response that India has signed
many other defence contracts with both Russia
and the US does not wash because this was a
very different and high-profile deal which was
closely watched around the world. Signing
smaller deals, even if they add up to significant
amounts, does not have the same weight as the
MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful
in both understanding strategic moments and
being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the
global high table.

 

[vijayjha]

Flying into rough weather - The Times of India
++
Flying into rough weather
.
India's long and convoluted search for a new
fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat
aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New
Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by
Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to
meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement.
Only price negotiation now remains.
The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the
Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally
included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and
F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39
Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is
over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's
choice are unlikely to end any time soon.
Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former
IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably
the first decision that was made purely on
technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious
strategic shortsightedness. While the government
should have received inputs from the IAF, such a
decision should not have been taken on purely
technical grounds. For India's decision-makers,
limiting themselves to technical specifications was
a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the
state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the
wisdom of the choice they made.
Ideally, the Indian decision should have been
guided by a strategy that balances reducing
danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly,
the question for New Delhi should have been
how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's
strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic
blunder to narrowly focus on technical
specifications and capabilities alone, as many
proponents of the IAF's choice have done.
A decision of this magnitude should have been
filtered through three key parameters: strategic,
operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy
would have been to analyse the risk and
opportunity through these three parameters and
then make the final decision about which of the
fighter plane choices would have best advanced
Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical
terms, France can provide little help to India in
either Asia or in the global theatre. While France
has always been a well-wisher, it has never had
much capacity to help India. For example, though
France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it
could do little to change the nuclear non-
proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so.
It took Washington to change these rules to
India's benefit.
Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could
acquire) and cost should have been factored in.
Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might
make some fighter jocks happy, but having
greater numbers might be more relevant to a
country like India which faces a two-front threat
from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in
the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority
required technological superiority, range and
payload but an equally important consideration is
that of numbers.
Numerical superiority in India's regional context is
of particular significance given that the current
strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600,
and unless replenished, it will reach critically low
numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and
Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter
fleets. India could have procured far greater
numbers of fighters with the US or Russian
option.
Though the probability of a two-front war is low,
no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker
should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this
reason that the Indian army is raising new forces
to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the
technological superiority of the Rafale is so great
as to compensate for the smaller numbers that
India will have to settle for.
Cost should have also had an important role in
the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for
Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20
billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet
would have been far cheaper. The Russian option
would have been the least expensive whereas the
American fighters would have been somewhere
in the middle with the European jets being the
most expensive. In overall terms, the American
F-18s would have been the best given that they
(as well as the F-16s) came with the second-
generation AESA radars.
Lastly, the most important consideration should
have been the strategic benefits that accrue to
India through this deal. Indian decision-makers
should have been mindful of the fact that this deal
was as much about making strategic investments
in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India
does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and
these security needs are important. But India also
needs to balance these with its requirements as a
rising power, which means having capable
friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity
to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia
or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi
has ended up antagonising both of them.
The standard response that India has signed
many other defence contracts with both Russia
and the US does not wash because this was a
very different and high-profile deal which was
closely watched around the world. Signing
smaller deals, even if they add up to significant
amounts, does not have the same weight as the
MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful
in both understanding strategic moments and
being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the
global high table.

this article is nothing but full of crap

 

[peep]

this article is nothing but full of crap

add to that the crappy presentation.

praveen007: Bro, plz don't post articles in such a crapped up format plz. thanks !!

 

[praveen007]

Yaar som time my cell seems to play trick while posting.
.

---------- Post added at 08:43 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:43 AM ----------

Landing Gear differences in the Rafale C (air force variant) and the Rafale M (naval variant)

++
Rafale C landing gear

++
Rafale M landing gear

++
Rafale B with Rafale M stationed together

 

[sudhir007]

The forces behind Dassault

India’s lucrative and long-running medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition took an important step forward recently with the announcement that India will now enter into exclusive negotiations with French contractor Dassault for its Rafale. This is a major blow for the other major contender, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the product of a consortium of the major aerospace companies of four partner nations: Germany, UK, Italy, and Spain. The Eurofighter group had been convinced that they were offering the technically superior aircraft, and the Typhoon certainly performed better in competitive trials in 2010. But as everyone who follows defence sales knows, selling fighter planes is not necessarily about having the better product.

Indian analyses have focused on explaining the latest decision largely on the basis of costs. It is true that concerns over its price tag have dogged the expensive Eurofighter Typhoon from the outset. But this explanation is a little too convenient in the complex world of arms sales, where other issues including technology transfers, the possibility of joint production, and political partnerships all play a role in influencing the decision-making process. Providing they are not too far apart (and the bids submitted by Dassault and Eurofighter would not have been), costs can be altered to suit a strategic choice. Small adjustments to factors such as payloads carried and distances flown on hypothetical sorties can make a big difference. And taking total life-cycle costs into account has proved a complicated, difficult and possibly contestable process.

If not simply cost, a further explanation is required for India’s choice. Dassault may have shown more flexibility over matters of technological transfer than Cassidian, the EADS subsidiary that led on the Eurofighter bid. But Cassidian certainly tried its best to suggest otherwise, opening the first foreign-operated defence-oriented engineering centre in India last year. Another criterion may have been greater political benefits. But it is unclear whether a single partner is more attractive than several European partners who have combined to make Eurofighter the continent’s largest collaborative military programme.

In part, the decision could have related to lobbying, although not of the sinister kind being whispered about in many Delhi salons. Simply speaking, the French government was more politically active, particularly when compared to the more low-key approach of Germany, which acted as the lead nation of the Eurofighter bid. Germany’s defence industries have never enjoyed the level of political support experienced by their French counterparts. In Germany, a “war room” — like that assembled by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to coordinate his defence, finance, and foreign ministries in support of Dassault’s search for its first foreign buyer — would have been unimaginable. While lobbying may not have made a difference in this particular case, greater political support for a major defence contract generally translates into a more flexible approach in linking it to other incentives in the defence or non-defence realms.

Keeping the debate focused on the aircraft’ costs does, however, play to India’s advantage as negotiations now enter a new, exclusive, phase. After all, as both suppliers know, this is not a final decision. Protracted negotiations between Dassault and the MoD can be expected over the coming months. India will want to extract the maximum concessions possible and hinting periodically that Eurofighter are not entirely out of the running will do it no harm. Meanwhile, Dassault knows only too well from prior experience that exclusive negotiations can always break down and decisions can be reversed. Only late last year, the UAE stepped back from its exclusive talks on buying the Rafale to ask the Eurofighter consortium to make a counter offer.

The latest decision is an important one for India. But it is also an important one for France. If this deal goes ahead, the Rafale’s future, which had been in question, looks assured. The multi-billion dollar deal also offers the prospect of a vital economic boost for French President Nicolas Sarkozy as he prepares for a difficult re-election campaign. Now that the French are the frontrunners, they cannot afford to lose this tender. New Delhi will know this, and will be hoping to use it to its advantage.

Sarah Raine is a non-resident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Berlin and a consulting research fellow with IISS. Dhruva Jaishankar is programme officer for Asia at GMF in Washington

 

[Bl[i]tZ]

"The French Rafale jet, the eventual winner, beat the Typhoon hollow both in terms of life cycle costs and direct acquisition costs. The entire MMRCA project cost would have gone up by around Rs 25,000 crore if Typhoon had been selected over Rafale," a top defence ministry source said on Thursday.

"The fact is that the cost deferential between Typhoon and Rafale was very high... it would cost India around 22% to 25% more if the former had been selected. No government can agree to so much extra," the source said.

IAF fighter deal: Rafale much cheaper than Typhoon; govt rules out review - The Economic Times

Guys, the govt says that if they selected Typhoon cost would have gone up 25k crore and they also say that this is 22-25%. That means that Dassault Rafale quoted 100k crore. and EF Typhoon 122/125k crore.

That's staggering $20 billion dollars for Rafale. Well, atleast $10 billion will be invested by the French back as offsets into Indian defense industry.

 

[rockstarIN]

Rafale price got sweetened by the same Indian money for Mirage & MICA deal...

 

[帅的一匹]

selecting Rafale has another strategic advantage , its arch rival Pakistan wont be able to get any other plane out of five (except F16) . Euro-fighter is too expensive for Pakistan , Rafale is out of PAF's equation now , Gripen will be banned by USA as it uses lot of american components and F18 is out of PAF's league .
so basically selecting Rafale will leave Pakistan with only option of Chinese toys thus giving IAF clear edge over PAF .

J10b is good enough to take on Rafale ,no need for PAF to worry about.

 

[peep]

J10b is good enough to take on Rafale ,no need for PAF to worry about.

No offence but plz don't post like a fanboy. Either support your claim or shut up.

J10B has not even matured as a concept while Rafale has been flying high from 1998. IMO, rafale can trump j10B any time day or night.

 

[帅的一匹]

No offence but plz don't post like a fanboy. Either support your claim or shut up.

J10B has not even matured as a concept while Rafale has been flying high from 1998. IMO, rafale can trump j10B any time day or night.

Don't bet too much stakes on Rafale, you don't get it yet. On which ground you say Rafale can trump j10b any time? Claim or shut up.

 

[praveen007]

Don't bet too much stakes on Rafale, you don't get it yet. On which ground you say Rafale can trump j10b any time? Claim or shut up.

.
.
on the specs of both plane avilable in open source, plus the quality of avionics in the plane also say a lot .
So follow my advise and provide your resoning of how Rafale is not better or jus SHUT-UP.

 

[帅的一匹]

.
.
on the specs of both plane avilable in open source, plus the quality of avionics in the plane also say a lot .
So follow my advise and provide your resoning of how Rafale is not better or jus SHUT-UP.

J10b is equal to rafale. More important, it is cheaper for production and maintenance. Rafale got no edges when it face j10 in the air combat.

 

[Tija]

Don't bet too much stakes on Rafale, you don't get it yet. On which ground you say Rafale can trump j10b any time? Claim or shut up.

Then why you still inducting su-30MKK, SU-30MK2, N J11 ?