Nevermind.. here we go. A lot of technical inaccuracies in terms of designations of equipment and origin. But fairly spot on the dynamics and parameters of the fight. There was a rebuttal but a journalist which I will post as well. Somehow, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
Just to give you an idea of the background of the officer.
Rebuttal by Vayu Aerospace Pushpindar Singh.. I have written on the comments where Pushpindar singh has been inaccurate
The IAF did not undertake any IvIs at Nellis during Red Flag, nor did they engage thrust vectoring during the Exercise. IvIs were flown only at Mountain Home AFB. In none of the IvIs were the Su-30MKIs ever vulnerable, let alone shot down. As all exercises were flown with ACMI, the situations are recorded and available to substantiate this aspect. Additionally, the MKI’s behaviour with thrust vectoring is dramatically different from that described by the Colonel. F-15 and F-16 aircrew were well appreciative of IAF manoeuvres with thrust vectoring.
1.The col never mentioned 1vs1 at Nellis, Singh has simply cooked up a negative thing out of nowhere to add to his rebuttal.
2. Unsubstantiated and unknown till proven with ACMI.. who is going to release those
Ø Colonel Fornof’s statement on Su-30MKI rates of turn with thrust vectoring (20o/ sec) is grossly ‘out’ but apparently gives away actual F-22 performance (28o/sec) Pitch of the talk seemed as to whether thrust vectoring was important or not. As all sorties were with ACMI, entire profiles are recorded, can be analysed and surely would have been replayed to drive the point home and make the ‘chest thumping’ sound more real. Apparently this was not done. Perhaps, as the Colonel is aware of F-22 data, he has tried to down play the Su-30MKI in comparison. Surprisingly, while there was no systems / avionics / comparison between the two types or with any other type of ‘legacy’ aircraft, the speaker does admit that radar of the MKI is ‘superior’ to that of the F-15 and F-16, however ‘inferior’ to AESA of the F-22 (a correct assessment). However, the IAF used the Su-30′s radar in the training mode, with downgraded performance vis-à-vis operational mo! de, as they could hardly participate without this primary sensor
1.Incorrect, it seems Mr Singh has issues with English comprehension.. the col never mentioned 20 deg a sec with TVC but without TVC.. additionally for the F-22 where he mentions 28 degrees without TVC.
Ø The ‘Bison’ radar : the USAF should be aware that the ‘Bison’ does not have an Israeli radar, it is Russian. Nor does the Su-30MKI have Tumansky engines (but the NPO-Saturn). Surprisingly the Colonel seems oblivious of such facts, yet tries to convey that he is an
authority on the matter.
1. Nowhere was it claimed. Singh sounds like someone with seriously hurt ego issues.
Ø Fratricide by IAF fighters : this is correct, the IAF did ‘shoot down’ some ‘friendlies’ and that was assessed and attributed to the IAF not being networked. However, what the Colonel did not bring out were the two essential reasons for this. Firstly, this occurred mainly when the AWACS was not available (unserviceable) and controlling was done by GCI. More significantly it happened during extremely poor controlling by their operators, this fact being acknowledged during debriefs and the controllers being admonished accordingly. ‘Accents’ were perhaps the main culprit here, which very often led to American controllers not being able to understand Indian calls.
1. The issue mentioned was datalink
Ø Now hear this : the F-15C and other USAF fighters had the same number of fratricides as the IAF ! Considering they are well networked, yet their pilots shot down the same number of ‘friendlies’. This was not only a major concern but also turned out to be a major source of embarrassment as the USAF had everything — Link 16, IFF Mode 4 etc and the IAF had nothing. Under the Rules of Engagement, they did not even permit the IAF to use data link within themselves. All cases of USAF fratricide were covered in the next day’s mass briefing as lessons learnt by concerned aircrew. In the IAF, the incidents were covered by concerned controllers, and attributed to lack of adequate integration, excessive R/T congestion and poor controlling. Gloating on cases of IAF fratricide is frivolous and unprofessional.
1. This makes sense, and the col should have pointed this out.
Ø However, Colonel Fornof did appreciate IAF ‘professionalism’ and that the IAF were able to dovetail with USAF procedures within short time. There was not a single training rule / airspace violation. This is a most important aspect.
Ø Since the Colonel could hardly tell his audience that the IAF had given the USAF good run for their money, they downplayed the Su-30′s capability. It is correct that the IAF aircrew included some very young pilots — nearly 70 percent – but they adapted rapidly to the environment (totally alien), training rules (significantly different), airspace regulations etc but to say that they were unable to handle the Su-30 in its envelope (something that they have been practicing to do for four to five years) is just not credible ! If young pilots can adapt to new rules and environment within a short span of two weeks, it is because they are extremely comfortable and confident of their aircraft.
Ø The IAF’s all round performance was publicly acknowledged during, and at end of the Exercise, specifically by those involved. Not a single TR / airspace violation was acknowledged. Mission achievement rate was in excess of 90%. The drop out / mission success rates of all others, inclusive of USAF, were significantly lower. This is of major significance considering the fact that IAF was sustaining operations 20,000 km away from home base while the USAF were at home base. (The 8 Su-30s flew some 850 hrs during the deployment, which is equivalent to four months of flying task in India over 75 days). IAF’s performance at Mountain Home AFB was even better that that at Nellis AFB.
Ø FOD : At Mountain Home, IAF had reduced departure intervals from the very beginning (30″ seconds) considering that operating surfaces were very clean. However, a few minor nicks were encountered and it was decided to revert to 60 seconds rather than undertake engine changes. This was communicated by the IAF at the very start (IPC itself).
1. Already mentioned .. just twisting stating to try and drive home another "Jai hind" point.
Ø There is no need to go in for ‘kill ratios’ as that would be demeaning. However, the IAF had significant edge throughout and retained it. In fact the true lesson for the USAF should be : ‘do not field low value legacy equipment against the Su-30MKI’ !.
(demeaning or otherwise, it is understood that the kill ratio (at Mountain Home AFB) was 21 : 1, in favour of the Su-30MKIs).
1. No idea on claims and unverified. Makes me doubt Mr Singhs honesty on the matter.
This was 2008.. and this is what Pakistan was then. Or if it wasnt, then the IAF is purposefully training its pilots wrong.