Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[ksgokul]

@CardSharp and @Joe Shearer!!!
Really awesome conversation. I never thought i would come across such a great conversation in this Forum. Looks like you guys are already doing some kind of Thesis report on this.
But as an illiterate of the warfare tactics, can i ask this question? Are these analysis useful for today's combat conditions? Hasn't warfare got more modernized with the missile and fighter aircrafts?

Thanks,
Gokul.

 

[CardSharp]

@CardSharp and @Joe Shearer!!!
Really awesome conversation. I never thought i would come across such a great conversation in this Forum. Looks like you guys are already doing some kind of Thesis report on this.
But as an illiterate of the warfare tactics, can i ask this question? Are these analysis useful for today's combat conditions? Hasn't warfare got more modernized with the missile and fighter aircrafts?

Thanks,
Gokul.

The question of tactics in war is a on-going and evolving question and one that is very much dependent on circumstance. Is the study of that past war useful? Yes, Is the war likely to be fought in the same manner? No.

The way a battle is fought is dependent on the circumstances and reality of that moment in time and no two situations are likely to be the same and consequently no two wars will be fought in the same way. A new war between China and India (God forbid) will be dictated by new technology, new objectives on each side, and new/different levels of commitment from either side. These more than anything that happened in the past will affect the tactics in a future war than what has already gone before.

But if you are asking for a simple answer, my guess is that war will still be an infantry war, and the side that builds the most roads and have the most heavy lift capability gain the upper hand. And whoever gains air supremacy will dictate the pace of that war. Fighting will happen the valleys and much of the fighting will be for passes through the mountains.

 

[LaBong]

But if you are asking for a simple answer, my guess is that war will still be an infantry war, and the side that builds the most roads and have the most heavy lift capability gain the upper hand. And whoever gains air supremacy will dictate the pace of that war. Fighting will happen the valleys and much of the fighting will be for passes through the mountains.

Depending on whether a country adopts an offensive doctrine or Scorched earth doctrine.

India, I think, historically adopted scorched earth against China and now I think adopts an offensive one. I'm not very informed though.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@K. S. Gokul

Your appreciation was inequitably distributed; CardSharp has access to records, data and to literature incomparably superior to mine. Some of the information he has reported as being available brought on an attack of irritable bowel syndrome, thankfully fairly short-lived.

The question of tactics in war is a on-going and evolving question and one that is very much dependent on circumstance. Is the study of that past war useful? Yes, Is the war likely to be fought in the same manner? No.

The bit in bold from CardSharp's comment can hardly be bettered as a caution against excessive study of the past, and as a guide to the useful study of the past, with a clear hint as to what is of importance.

Every general tends to fight the last war. Exceptions to this rule abound; those exceptions are what we know today as the Great Captains of history. Early Greek history is one source of useful study; as I have said before, my own personal favourite is neither Marathon nor Thermopylae, but Plataea, short, sharp and a brilliant illustration of Greek elan and fighting spirit in the face of a menacing but ill-disciplined throng. Remember that the charge by the Greeks across the Persian front was executed at a dead run, wearing the heavy Greek cuirass of the hoplite, and you will understand why it stirs the blood. And it was the same Greeks who cut up the Spartans on a lonely spit of sand and buried the legend of Spartan invincibility in battle once and for all. Finally, the hoplite was consigned to history with almost contemptuous ease by Epaminondas with his unbalanced phalanx, which formation ruled until a semi-barbarian king studied it carefully and devised a flexible formation of phalanx plus companions plus cavalry, the whole hinging on the companions, which could manouevre through the rather linear thinking of rival generals much like the unpredictable knight on a chessboard. This unlikely military thinker was Philip II of Macedon, and he was pretty much unbeatable, as was his son; his son made brilliant use of his new army formation to win some of the most sensational victories of ancient times, as well as to seem to have one which is increasingly in doubt. With the Romans, we had even more startling developments in the military field; leaving aside the the bickerings among the Romans and their cousins the Latins, the Punic campaigns are classics. Carrhae is still a byword for double envelopment.

I have mentioned the Greeks and Romans at some length because while, for an Indian, the record of the 62 campaign is ignominious, useful only to be studied and studied again, and used in our military training to ensure that this is never, ever repeated, as an amateur of military history, it was unusual in being an infantry campaign, innocent of air power or of armour, which in the year of our Lord 1962 was a pretty unusual circumstance. The PLA use of artillery and mortar fire was in no way alien to classic infantry doctrine, and its dictates of flanking and enfilading fire.

To me, the 62 was a classic campaign, inexplicably occurring in times which had far outgrown the technology used by either side in the campaign.

The way a battle is fought is dependent on the circumstances and reality of that moment in time and no two situations are likely to be the same and consequently no two wars will be fought in the same way. A new war between China and India (God forbid) will be dictated by new technology, new objectives on each side, and new/different levels of commitment from either side. These more than anything that happened in the past will affect the tactics in a future war than what has already gone before.

But if you are asking for a simple answer, my guess is that war will still be an infantry war, and the side that builds the most roads and have the most heavy lift capability gain the upper hand. And whoever gains air supremacy will dictate the pace of that war. Fighting will happen the valleys and much of the fighting will be for passes through the mountains.

Well, yes, rather; but history is said to repeat itself, and when it does so, it does so in very different tone and register. The first tragic occurrence is said to repeat itself as farce. God forbid, but there are signals which tend to the farcical.

Returning to CardSharp's comments, if we look at the entire sweep of the topology of Indian borders, we have the following scenario:

1. China: Aksai Chin and North West Tibet (military district Lanzhou): Infantry, artillery, armour, tactical air power, theatre air power;
   [*]China: Himachal and Uttaranchal, and South West Tibet (military district Lanzhou): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
2. China: Uttar Pradesh, Southern Tibet through Nepal (military district Chengdu): Infantry, artillery, armour, tactical air power, theatre air power;
   [*]China: West Bengal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Southern Tibet through Bhutan (military district Chengdu): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
   [*]China: Arunachal West, Southern Tibet (military district Chengdu): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
   [*]China: Arunachal East, Southern Tibet (military district Chengdu): mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
   [*]China: Arunachal East, Southern Tibet through Myanmar (military district Chengdu): mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;

This will explain why CardSharp says what he does: that a future India-China conflict, one that should never happen, will be fought as an infantry battle, unless the PRC decides to escalate on a major scale; it will be won by the side that has the better infrastructure, including roads; it will depend on the intelligent use of heavy air-lift and rail logistics capabilities.

Rather unpleasant reading for any Indian.

We can deal separately with the question of why fighting is likely to be restricted to the hills and mountains, and therefore the PLA is unlikely to outrun its lines of communications and of supplies.

We can also deal separately with the vexed question of air-power and its role: does close air support really have much to do in the mountains?

Depending on whether a country adopts an offensive doctrine or Scorched earth doctrine.

India, I think, historically adopted scorched earth against China and now I think adopts an offensive one. I'm not very informed though.

Some facts to consider: The last encounter between Indians and trans-Himalayan soldiers was between the Dogra expeditionary force led personally by Zorawar Singh. On that occasion, the Dogras were faced by a scorched earth policy themselves.

More soon.

 

[CardSharp]

I was wondering if you can explain this a little more

China: Aksai Chin and North West Tibet (military district Lanzhou): Infantry, artillery, armour, tactical air power, theatre air power;
China: Himachal and Uttaranchal, and South West Tibet (military district Lanzhou): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
---------------------------------------------------------------------
China: Uttar Pradesh, Southern Tibet through Nepal (military district Chengdu): Infantry, artillery, armour, tactical air power, theatre air power;
China: West Bengal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Southern Tibet through Bhutan (military district Chengdu): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
China: Arunachal West, Southern Tibet (military district Chengdu): Infantry, mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
China: Arunachal East, Southern Tibet (military district Chengdu): mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;
China: Arunachal East, Southern Tibet through Myanmar (military district Chengdu): mountain artillery, (possibly) tactical air power, theatre air power;

and what do you mean when you say tactical versus theatre air power? I understand it to be close air support ability versus fighter cover respectively.

 

[pmukherjee]

CONCENTRATING FORCES AND AUDACIOUS ACTION: PLA LESSONS FROM THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

Larry M. Wortzel
[/I]

Card sharp, I understand that you are a teenager like most of the other characters here and therefore I grant you the privilege of arrogance.

Dhaula post across the Thagla ridge across the Namka Chu was a platoon post of my batallion. The platoon perished to a man. Till this day, no one questions the orders to hold Thagla. All we talk about is how or if it could have been held better.

Perhaps you have not heard of my regiment, I don't blame you. Believe me, Alfred Tennyson was not wrong when he wrote his most famous poem. Please do not expect the same results the next time.

We still do not reason why.

 

[CardSharp]

Card sharp, I understand that you are a teenager like most of the other characters here and therefore I grant you the privilege of arrogance.

Dhaula post across the Thagla ridge across the Namka Chu was a platoon post of my batallion. The platoon perished to a man. Till this day, no one questions the orders to hold Thagla. All we talk about is how or if it could have been held better.

Perhaps you have not heard of my regiment, I don't blame you. Believe me, Alfred Tennyson was not wrong when he wrote his most famous poem. Please do not expect the same results the next time.

We still do not reason why.

Am not a teenager and I'm sorry if you found my posts here arrogant but I'm just introducing material here for discussion. So feel free to join in on the discussion. I think we'd all welcome some first hand information about that battle.

Best regards.

 

[Nagraj]

Awesome thread!!!!!
still going through it.
@cardsharp & Joeshearer
please keep up the good work!!!

 

[ksgokul]

Card sharp, I understand that you are a teenager like most of the other characters here and therefore I grant you the privilege of arrogance.

First of all, i salute you for being in our Military.

I just want to mention, that there was no arrogance on the part of CardSharp. I have seen his conversations, although not understanding some of it. But he is trying to have a meaningful discussion. May be you can point out, that he should have framed some of his opinions in a different way.

Thanks,
Gokul.

 

[GareebNawaz]

Card sharp, I understand that you are a teenager like most of the other characters here and therefore I grant you the privilege of arrogance.

Dhaula post across the Thagla ridge across the Namka Chu was a platoon post of my batallion. The platoon perished to a man. Till this day, no one questions the orders to hold Thagla. All we talk about is how or if it could have been held better.

Perhaps you have not heard of my regiment, I don't blame you. Believe me, Alfred Tennyson was not wrong when he wrote his most famous poem. Please do not expect the same results the next time.

We still do not reason why.

I salute you for serving the motherland.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Am not a teenager and I'm sorry if you found my posts here arrogant but I'm just introducing material here for discussion. So feel free to join in on the discussion. I think we'd all welcome some first hand information about that battle.

Best regards.

CardSharp, I regret the personal attack on you. It was uncalled for. Regarding your relative age, you might like to point out to your critics that it is a self-correcting defect.

 

[CardSharp]

CardSharp, I regret the personal attack on you. It was uncalled for. Regarding your relative age, you might like to point out to your critics that it is a self-correcting defect.

No biggie, let's keep the discussion going and I'll respond privately.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I was wondering if you can explain this a little more

Yes, certainly.

The purpose of that slightly academic categorisation was to point out that most of the possible future topographies that might be fought over might support infantry attacks and movements, but did not offer much scope for the use of armour. Granted, the Japanese and the British in that sequence proved in WWII that tanks did have an infantry support role to play in jungle warfare; it remains true that much of the terrain involved, except in two cases, is really essentially mountain or hilly terrain, or, in one case, jungle terrain.

Some of the exceptions brought in, and the justification:

I have assumed that the PRC, either in violation of neutrality or in collusion with a suitably cooperative government, might have access to India through neutral territory, a possibility that we consider bizarre today and have never taken into account. So much so that a former Command has been stripped down and reduced to a logistics entity with no fighting troops under it, and it happens to be the Command that would precisely face an attack of the sort described.

I have also assumed that Chengdu Military District might get similarly creative when plotting force distributions on a map. A relatively small detour through badly-guarded and thickly-forested hills might bring them within striking distance of what is essentially border guards and a relaxed frontier.

Apart from these two, all the rest are obvious points of tension. One of them has not seen any tension so far, which might well indicate that a wily enemy would consider it for use in future scenarios for precisely that reason.

It is hoped that identifying each of these with their corresponding instance in the seven cases mentioned will not be difficult.

The vast bulk of the other instances are favourable to infantry, supported by mountain artillery, but not much else, apparently.

and what do you mean when you say tactical versus theatre air power? I understand it to be close air support ability versus fighter cover respectively.

I have read serious doubts expressed by airmen about the thought that the IAF, or, for that matter, the PLA AF, would make much difference in mountain warfare. There were several reasons given; without going into detail which is appropriate only for trained pilots, it ranges from training to attack mountain sites, close coordination with troops on the ground to avoid friendly fire casualties, difficulties of manoeuvring fast jets at slow speeds at intermediate altitudes, increasing vulnerability to shoulder-mounted weapons and the lack of precision guided ammunitions which would achieve pinpoint attacks.

If these are even remotely true, the thought that has repeatedly recurred in writing about 62, that the IAF would have made a difference, is wrong.

By theatre air power, I meant in my usual clumsy phrasing the ability of an air force to control the flow of supplies to the enemy, in other words, interdiction of ground movement off the battlefield. This is far more relevant to the circumstances; it may have been possible to restrict PLA support operations far more than was done.

But it would have invoked the full strength of the PLA AF. Who knows what would have happened in such a case?

 

[CardSharp]

Yes, certainly.

The purpose of that slightly academic categorisation was to point out that most of the possible future topographies that might be fought over might support infantry attacks and movements, but did not offer much scope for the use of armour. Granted, the Japanese and the British in that sequence proved in WWII that tanks did have an infantry support role to play in jungle warfare; it remains true that much of the terrain involved, except in two cases, is really essentially mountain or hilly terrain, or, in one case, jungle terrain.

Some of the exceptions brought in, and the justification:

I have assumed that the PRC, either in violation of neutrality or in collusion with a suitably cooperative government, might have access to India through neutral territory, a possibility that we consider bizarre today and have never taken into account. So much so that a former Command has been stripped down and reduced to a logistics entity with no fighting troops under it, and it happens to be the Command that would precisely face an attack of the sort described.

I have also assumed that Chengdu Military District might get similarly creative when plotting force distributions on a map. A relatively small detour through badly-guarded and thickly-forested hills might bring them within striking distance of what is essentially border guards and a relaxed frontier.

If Myanmar could be persuaded or if China didn't mind violating its neutrality, I can see a brilliant Schlieffen like drive from its western borders to Bhutan and subsequently to the Sikkim gap. This in combination with an attack along the north (the 1962 route of attack) has the potential of cutting off all of AP, and Assam. It also seems eminently holdable given the narrow front from which India will have to attack to regain those territories.

I have read serious doubts expressed by airmen about the thought that the IAF, or, for that matter, the PLA AF, would make much difference in mountain warfare. There were several reasons given; without going into detail which is appropriate only for trained pilots, it ranges from training to attack mountain sites, close coordination with troops on the ground to avoid friendly fire casualties, difficulties of manoeuvring fast jets at slow speeds at intermediate altitudes, increasing vulnerability to shoulder-mounted weapons and the lack of precision guided ammunitions which would achieve pinpoint attacks.

If these are even remotely true, the thought that has repeatedly recurred in writing about 62, that the IAF would have made a difference, is wrong.

By theatre air power, I meant in my usual clumsy phrasing the ability of an air force to control the flow of supplies to the enemy, in other words, interdiction of ground movement off the battlefield. This is far more relevant to the circumstances; it may have been possible to restrict PLA support operations far more than was done.

But it would have invoked the full strength of the PLA AF. Who knows what would have happened in such a case?

No doubt you are thinking of how vulnerable IAF jets were to MANPADs during the Kargil skirmishes. Now come to thinking I think I agree. Given that natural defiles (valleys and ravines) makes up the majority of the terrain, it, they can provide excellent cover against air attack/provide place to ambush jets. (hide in the lee of a ridge, wait for a jet to pass over the ridge and shoot it in the tail.)

But air power will still determine who gets supplies and who is unable to supply their troops. Without supplies there can't be offensives. I think this is probably why I felt air power will dictate the pace of the battle and not decide the battle.

 

[Joe Shearer]

If Myanmar could be persuaded or if China didn't mind violating its neutrality, I can see a brilliant Schlieffen like drive from its western borders to Bhutan and subsequently to the Sikkim gap. This in combination with an attack along the north (the 1962 route of attack) has the potential of cutting off all of AP, and Assam. It also seems eminently holdable given the narrow front from which India will have to attack to regain those territories.

Well, in principle, yes. There are obviously differences in detail. This is the less dangerous of the two plans which depend on violating neutrality to achieve war aims.

Please also take a detailed look at the disposition of troops in the north east. They are no longer jammed up with their noses to the shopwindow. There is a good mix of positions; any detailed comment is unnecessary right away. We can return to this.

No doubt you are thinking of how vulnerable IAF jets were to MANPADs during the Kargil skirmishes. Now come to thinking I think I agree. Given that natural defiles (valleys and ravines) makes up the majority of the terrain, it, they can provide excellent cover against air attack/provide place to ambush jets. (hide in the lee of a ridge, wait for a jet to pass over the ridge and shoot it in the tail.)

But air power will still determine who gets supplies and who is unable to supply their troops. Without supplies there can't be offensives. I think this is probably why I felt air power will dictate the pace of the battle and not decide the battle.

It seems that by ourselves, just between the two of us, we have successfully replicated the Many Wise Men of Hindustan. :-D

However, I believe that we need not over-value the worth of the Myanmar option. Neither the Schlieffen Plan, nor its distortion, the subsequent Moltke (jr.) modification, is possible in the narrow confines of the passes of eastern India.

First, the Schlieffen Plan essentially required a door-like pivot of the German forces around the Ardennes, the very strong right wing striking harder and harder, the weaker left wing being actually weakened further during the course of the campaign in order to encourage the French to push forward into an envelopment situation, surrounded by the German right wing in its rear, and a still-strong left wing in front. As you will see, this requires an organic connection between the units of the opposing forces; in the case of the French, it was assumed that the French armies, from the First Army to the Sixth Army, would respond more or less as one unit; if they had dissolved into their component Armies, or into Corps or Divisions, the whole plan would have been a piece of nonsense. It is hard to see this happening in the broken country of the north-east. It is even harder to visualise either Army concerned manoeuvring at Army Group level.

Or perhaps you were thinking about the modified Plan Yellow of several decades later. There the surprise element was in Army Group A being tasked to march through what was thought to be unsuitable territory for armour, the Ardennes forest. The Army Group boosted on its firm base Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, Reinhardt's XLI Panzer Corps and the 7th Panzer Division under Rommel, all given attacking roles (from north to south, Rommel, Reinhardt and Guderian).

This might be a possible, but you should recall that against the demoralised French formations that the Germans faced, some consisting of reservists recalled and serving with the utmost reluctance, this adventurous strategy would call for a narrow push between mountain territory to right and left, along the banks of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries, and in the teeth of a strong Indian Army presence in the hilly territory on the left flank of the advance. And relatively unrestricted air power, particularly with regard to close air support, in the entire theatre outside the mountain passes and hill territory.

This is not to deny the possibility of armour being used in such a hypothetical situation; both the Japanese and the Indian Army have used armour in heavily forested or high mountain conditions, and it is possible that its use in such terrain could have a great deal of shock effect. As it happens, for obvious reasons, neither III Corps, IV Corps nor XXXIII Corps of the Indian Army have attached armour formations.

Regrettably, in spite of the war games I have heard anecdotal accounts of, an approach by the PLA from the Bailley Trail was not accounted for. Stranger things than this approach through Myanmar have happened.