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Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

Vis-a-Vis application of Tactical Air-power in the 1962 scenario, it had very little application (given the resources and doctrines/training) on either side.
In the present context, notwithstanding the developments in resources; not much change except for the use of guided munitions and stand-off weapons and stuff.
Air-power in the Strategic Role--ummm.
Armoured units/formations--?!?
That said, big role for Artillery; all kinds especially portable/transportable units and Air-Cavalry. But the biggest player--- boots on the ground.
Who can do without the humble foot-slogging "pongo".
 
Well, in principle, yes. There are obviously differences in detail. This is the less dangerous of the two plans which depend on violating neutrality to achieve war aims.

Looking at the terrain map on google maps, I am struck by how much a bowl Assam is with mountains on all sides and how it has factors in favour and disfavour of its defence. The biggest disadvantage I see is how the borders of the neighboring countries are drawn.

Please also take a detailed look at the disposition of troops in the north east. They are no longer jammed up with their noses to the shopwindow. There is a good mix of positions; any detailed comment is unnecessary right away. We can return to this.


I am not quite sure what is this. Are we talking about the PLA or the IA? (Sorry I'm dense)


*I also had to look up the reference to the six men of Hindustan lol.
 
Vis-a-Vis application of Tactical Air-power in the 1962 scenario, it had very little application (given the resources and doctrines/training) on either side.

India deliberately abstained in 62, leading to considerable speculation about might-have, could-have, should-have and the like.

In the present context, notwithstanding the developments in resources; not much change except for the use of guided munitions and stand-off weapons and stuff.

Two points: if experienced pilots are sceptical about the application of air power for close air support today, it must have been equally difficult if not more so 50 years ago.

Second, that same article spoke about the lack of utility of PGM against scattered, dispersed infantry units, whether on the move or dug in, in mountain terrain. The point was made that this was high-grade, big-ticket ammunition, to be used against major targets, not against bunkers, exactly, although that was what was forced on the Air Force in Kargil.

A third and fourth points (afterthoughts): we still don't have pilots training on close air support in mountain territory; we still don't have army-air force joint exercises to improve coordination at tactical level.

Air-power in the Strategic Role--ummm.

Steady on! You aren't talking to Le May or to Spaatz here. I only was referring to interdiction of supply lines and communications, roadways, railways and the like. Nothing beyond the theatre; if we go nuclear, you and I will be glowing for years, and will save a lot of money on car headlights. Oh, well! I at any rate.

Armoured units/formations--?!?

Bizarre but not impossible. See references in the comment immediately above.

That said, big role for Artillery; all kinds especially portable/transportable units and Air-Cavalry.

But the biggest player--- boots on the ground.
Who can do without the humble foot-slogging "pongo".

Ah, we agree! Why didn't you say so before? :p:
 
India deliberately abstained in 62, leading to considerable speculation about might-have, could-have, should-have and the like.

Could have- yes. Did not- unequivocally yes.
Now for some 20/20 hindsight (foresight). The IAF then had not trained for (an offensive role). Supply dropping (difficult as it was) was it. The main reason why it did not happen.
Now in the contemporary context; there is some reference to air-ops in Kargil and so on. But it is pertinent to note that both weather and topography are vastly different in Kargil/Ladakh and North East/Arunachal Pradesh. Was then and still is now. And both happen to be major factors in flying. IAF pilots in Silchar/Jorhat will be able to explain that better.

Two points: if experienced pilots are sceptical about the application of air power for close air support today, it must have been equally difficult if not more so 50 years ago.

Somewhat true. Not much change except for the development of GPS, Inertial Navaids; dramatically and exponentially different from the "stop-watch and compass" (i.e. Dead Reckoning + Mk.1 eyeball-- if/when you could see the ground) methods of the past. That is a big change, however points noted above have not.


Second, that same article spoke about the lack of utility of PGM against scattered, dispersed infantry units, whether on the move or dug in, in mountain terrain. The point was made that this was high-grade, big-ticket ammunition, to be used against major targets, not against bunkers, exactly, although that was what was forced on the Air Force in Kargil.

For two reasons:
Lack of Arty. in suitable positions.
To create Shock and Awe.

A third and fourth points (afterthoughts): we still don't have pilots training on close air support in mountain territory; we still don't have army-air force joint exercises to improve coordination at tactical level.

i don't know too much about that.

Steady on! You aren't talking to Le May or to Spaatz here. I only was referring to interdiction of supply lines and communications, roadways, railways and the like. Nothing beyond the theatre; if we go nuclear, you and I will be glowing for years, and will save a lot of money on car headlights. Oh, well! I at any rate.

Agreed. "Tooey" Spaatz and "Chompin" Le May were creatures of a different age. Immediately post WW2 (and later) there was a great discussion about the efficacy of Strategic Bombing. It probably did not do too much except "Shock and Awe". Even "Bomber" Harris got left by the wayside by "Finest Hour" Churchill after the war.
"Fortress without a Roof-The Allied Bombing of the Third Reich" by Wilbur H. Morrison studies this topic in some depth.
However, interdiction of supply roads/ railroads, dumps and marshalling points is in order. Some gadgets/gizmos for that purpose already exist.

Bizarre but not impossible. See references in the comment immediately above.

That said, big role for Artillery; all kinds especially portable/transportable units and Air-Cavalry.


Originally Posted by Capt.Popeye
But the biggest player--- boots on the ground.
Who can do without the humble foot-slogging "pongo".
Ah, we agree! Why didn't you say so before? :p:

Was i supposed to disagree?
 
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Looking at the terrain map on google maps, I am struck by how much a bowl Assam is with mountains on all sides and how it has factors in favour and disfavour of its defence. The biggest disadvantage I see is how the borders of the neighboring countries are drawn.

Are you ready for this? Are you sitting down? They were never drawn.

OK, that's an exaggeration.

The India-Tibet border was never drawn. If you want a detailed account, I will have to publish it elsewhere, and inform you where to look.

Looking left and right:

The boundaries with Bhutan were clearly established both because Bhutan became a state within the British sphere of influence very soon, and the Bhutanese themselves built strong links to India; close to where I stay in Calcutta, there is an enormous multi-stored condominium, one of the best and oldest in Calcutta, still a hugely fashionable address, something like the Watergate Complex, which was jointly developed by two Calcutta entrepreneurs and the Bhutanese. They winter here, or rather, take off from here for their winter expeditions. All the senior bureaucrats and policemen were very well treated in Bhutan, and it is difficult culturally to be hostile to the Bhutanese. So the border demarcation was smooth and painless; whenever they wanted an adjustment, they got it.

Sikkim, ditto. It was divided between two quasi-royal families, the Chogyal and the Kazi being head of the two. In historical times, it was the cockpit of the Himalayas, and was fought over by Bhutanese and Nepalese and Tibetan. At one stage, it was a tributary of the Qing, as much as Tibet was. In the late 19th century, it succumbed to British pressure and became a British protectorate, independent but under suzerainty, like the princely states of India. In 47, it was mysteriously allowed a choice, which no other princely state was, and the referendum which followed left them under Indian suzerainty but separate. At this stage, the Chogyal had an American wife, a real public relations problem of major, major dimensions; just to balance him, the Kazi was married to the niece of Field Marshal Mannerheim. The Finns won; the Chogyal was removed by popular pressure, not without the deft guidance and management of the Kazi, who continued in power as an elected representative for the rest of his life. Here, too, being so close to the hill station of Darjeeling, the dimensions are absolutely clear.

Myanmar borders were absolutely unclear. In three campaigns, the British took over Burma in the 19th century, sent the last Mughal emperor to Burma to live out the rest of his days, balanced this by sending the last Burmese king to Maharashtra to live out the rest of his days, and ruled Burma under the identical same bureaucracy and police service as the rest of India. The most famous Burmese policeman was Eric Blair, who resigned and went back to England to become a famous writer, under the nom de plume of George Orwell. Since the bureaucracy was one and the same, boundaries were established very, very clearly, but there are large tracts which are just lines on the map, there being no geographical attribute to mark the separation. It is quite possible to contemplate villages in all the border regions straddling the boundary. Since these borderlands are inhabited by rebels against both states, neither side wants to grasp the nettle too firmly, not just yet. In some Burmese border areas, not the ones next to Yunnan that we are both looking at with such fascination, the border regions keep Chinese time and use Chinese currency. As you may imagine, this is not very amusing for New Delhi to contemplate.

Bangladesh was India until 47, so not much problem with borders but for the enclaves and for Berubari. Leaving Berubari aside for the time being - unless you have 72 undivided hours to spare - the problem of the enclaves is the problem of the dratted princely state of Coochbehar; it was ruled by a tribal dynasty, which fought off the Mughals and the Ahoms alike till they succumbed to the vastly greater resources against them and accepted the sovereignty of the Mughals. Their land holdings were in penny packets near the borders of their state, as is usual in feudal land-holdings. Now the partition on this border gave the whole of the state of Coochbehar to India, so Coochbehar's enclaves outside Coochbehar went to India, while the surrounding territory in these couple of hundred cases went to Bangladesh - Pakistan that was. And similarly, there were bits of Bangladesh in India (Coochbehar). Apart from this, no serious issues.

I am not quite sure what is this. Are we talking about the PLA or the IA? (Sorry I'm dense)


*I also had to look up the reference to the six men of Hindustan lol.

The IA; look up dispositions of III Corps and IV Corps (both under Eastern Command).

I sincerely hope you and others are enjoying this exchange.
 
Very Informative post above; esp about Cooch Behar (which i was unaware of) being more dazzled by the likes of Gayatri Devi.

Originally Posted by Capt.Popeye
I am not quite sure what is this. Are we talking about the PLA or the IA? (Sorry I'm dense)


*I also had to look up the reference to the six men of Hindustan lol.

Typo in the underlined part. Dont create an identity crisis for me. :p:

Otherwise- i'm lovin' it (apologies to Ronald McDonald).
 
Gud post indeed.But alas instead of PLA,If GOI shud ve done such a home work then situation for us cud be much better.
 
This is a request to <pmukherjee> to join in and add an element of reality to our academic exchanges. This is made most sincerely, and I hope you will consider it favourably.

Are you ready for this?
<snip>
And similarly, there were bits of Bangladesh in India (Coochbehar). Apart from this, no serious issues.

Truthfully, this was just a thumb-nail sketch, and a detailed explanation of the north-eastern frontiers is worth a monograph. It must be remembered that Curzon and his predecessors and successors were imperialist to the core, at a time when that was a term of praise and adulation, and did whatever they could to expand. We tend to lose sight of the fact that they were intent on expansion in the east, as much as they were on expansion in the north-west. That was the historical context for the expansion through Assam and the hills, not to mention Burma.

For my Chinese friends, as a useful corrective to the usual stuff that we all get to read, may I recommend "The North-East Frontier of India: 1865 - 1914" for a very useful foundation work on the ethnicity of the so-called South Tibet? Our governments have their own points of view; I request very earnestly that we should do our best to get to the bottom of every question and understand the social, anthropological and historical factors involved, as our contributions to these discussions.

CardSharp, this is my first response to that heart-rending and most humiliating mail you made me read! Please do respond positively, and encourage your friends also to do so.



The IA; look up dispositions of III Corps and IV Corps (both under Eastern Command).

I sincerely hope you and others are enjoying this exchange.

We have made certain decisions implicitly in this disposition of our forces, especially in mothballing huge sections of the older armoured formations without any effort at conversion or modification. Is this correct? I wish we had faujis involved in this discussion.

We have also decided implicitly how soon we can react to a situation with the disposition of our forces as we can make out from mapping the various Corps and Divisions. Is that reasonable? Can the PLA move faster? with greater strength? What are their accessible resources in Chengdu? in neighbouring districts?

How seriously should we take the Myanmar option? There is already a railway line being built down to Chittagong; what does it cost to build little spur lines pointing west?

Finally, can a Maoist regime in Nepal open a straight line down excellent highways and rail lines pointing at Patna? What happened to Central Command, after the Chief of Staff vented his ire on Panag, and castrated the entire command? Now who plugs the gap in the frontiers?

Very Informative post above; esp about Cooch Behar (which i was unaware of) being more dazzled by the likes of Gayatri Devi.

Don't get me started on Gayatri Devi.

Typo in the underlined part. Dont create an identity crisis for me. :p:

Otherwise- i'm lovin' it (apologies to Ronald McDonald).

I didn't really get that. What typo? Anyway, if it's minor enough, apologies; if not, if you explain, I shall grovel in form.

Gud post indeed.But alas instead of PLA,If GOI shud ve done such a home work then situation for us cud be much better.

Well, if duffers like us can do this analysis, don't you think some smart Army boy is doing it too? But let's finish our analysis before looking for something else somewhere else.
 
Hi joe,
i am little off topic here.
but after going through this thread i realise that our version of history is rather not complete.
i wanted to know your take on the issue.
were the details left out deleberatly???
or did we twist history to suit our needs which is something akin to one of our neighbouring country does???
 
Hi joe,
i am little off topic here.
but after going through this thread i realise that our version of history is rather not complete.
i wanted to know your take on the issue.
were the details left out deleberatly???
or did we twist history to suit our needs which is something akin to one of our neighbouring country does???

I am so glad to see the discussion on track again. Greats posts everyone. A simple answer for your question is Of Course! Everyone and I mean everyone twists history to suit their own needs. The writing and re-writing of history arguably the most powerful tools in politics. It can do everything from providing moral justification, to rousing the masses to see things your way. One need to look no further than the plethora of American politically historical writing. It doesn't take long when reading one of these politicized histories to know the author's party affiliation.

That said, the tricky part is to be aware when you are being lied to and be understand your own inherent political (and more relevant here nationalistic bias). Go about reading history, putting a desire for objective truth ahead of emotion and you'll come out more enlightened I'm sure.
 
Hi joe,
i am little off topic here.
but after going through this thread i realise that our version of history is rather not complete.
i wanted to know your take on the issue.
were the details left out deleberatly???
or did we twist history to suit our needs which is something akin to one of our neighbouring country does???

If I could continue from a very Indian point of view - CardSharp's sense of delicacy will never allow him to state the blunt truth about another nation, particularly if this is disparaging in some sense - there are a couple of places to look.

First, the Henderson Brooks Report, actually, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, the Bhagat being that idol of his soldiers, Prem Bhagat, VC. Any Indian who has not already done so, please read up on how he got his VC. He had served under Henderson Brooks before, and served him well on this occasion too, helping him, some say, coaxing him to expand the scope of the report to include the behaviour and performance of higher echelons also. The Henderson Brooks Report has never been released officially by the Government of India, largely because this would show the extent to which the clumsy, downright stupid handling of the armed forces by Nehru and his sycophant, Krishna Menon, had led directly to defeat. As is usual with Government of India, since the book is still secret, it is widely available on the Internet. If no other way is available, read Maxwell (below), which is in effect based largely on a copy which he managed to 'procure'.

Second, the book, "India's China War", by Neville Maxwell. Maxwell, a journalist, is difficult to read; he is so plainly anti-Indian. However, the essentials of the story are clear, and they are not pleasant reading for an Indian. The truth emerges, however, and the truth will set us free.

Third, the writings of a host of Indian officers about their experiences in the 62 War. These form part of a much larger corpus of writing by Indian officers, and I am preparing a detailed bibliography of these. For the moment, I sincerely urge that at least whatever comes to hand should be read.

More later, if something interesting occurs to me.
 
If I could continue from a very Indian point of view - CardSharp's sense of delicacy will never allow him to state the blunt truth about another nation, particularly if this is disparaging in some sense - there are a couple of places to look.

First, the Henderson Brooks Report, actually, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, the Bhagat being that idol of his soldiers, Prem Bhagat, VC. Any Indian who has not already done so, please read up on how he got his VC. He had served under Henderson Brooks before, and served him well on this occasion too, helping him, some say, coaxing him to expand the scope of the report to include the behaviour and performance of higher echelons also. The Henderson Brooks Report has never been released officially by the Government of India, largely because this would show the extent to which the clumsy, downright stupid handling of the armed forces by Nehru and his sycophant, Krishna Menon, had led directly to defeat. As is usual with Government of India, since the book is still secret, it is widely available on the Internet. If no other way is available, read Maxwell (below), which is in effect based largely on a copy which he managed to 'procure'.

Second, the book, "India's China War", by Neville Maxwell. Maxwell, a journalist, is difficult to read; he is so plainly anti-Indian. However, the essentials of the story are clear, and they are not pleasant reading for an Indian. The truth emerges, however, and the truth will set us free.

Third, the writings of a host of Indian officers about their experiences in the 62 War. These form part of a much larger corpus of writing by Indian officers, and I am preparing a detailed bibliography of these. For the moment, I sincerely urge that at least whatever comes to hand should be read.

More later, if something interesting occurs to me.


A note on Maxwell. Though I've not read his book, I have heard the various talks he gave which were recorded. His POV can largely be considered a stand-in for the largely absent of Chinese literature in English on the subject. According to his detractors, Chinese scholars largely agree with his presentation of the events (probably true)
 
Hi joe,
i am little off topic here.
but after going through this thread i realise that our version of history is rather not complete.
i wanted to know your take on the issue.
were the details left out deleberatly???
or did we twist history to suit our needs which is something akin to one of our neighbouring country does???

When you say "our version of history", which one are you referring to? I have heard the story from a person, who has read the book " Himalayan Blunder " during my school days. When the internet age started I read the Wikipedia. Our School history books don't even talk about 1965 and 1971 very well. All the sources, more or less paint the same picture.
a) Nehru didn't have the Military knowledge, nor did he allow some wise military men to be around him, as India's freedom was fought that way. China claimed their freedom through military means. So their leaders have good military knowledge
b) From Nehru's perspective he has supported China in the International scene very well. He even refused Security council membership offered at that time to India, and recommended China for that. I could find this, when i did a quick search.
Obama supports adding India as a permanent member of U.N. Security Council.
So he thought War will never break out.

c) May be he could have done everything through diplomacy. ( Like We support you for these and we resolve the border like this )

But i feel that war was good for us. "Here i respectfully disagree with Joe Shearer". Indian rulers were always defeated in History. So i don't know why some feel that we will feel pain in accepting the defeat(except few instances like Chandra Gupta Maurya defeating Selukas Nikater and Rajendra Chola capturing Kadaram). Even Wikipedia says that India gained more from the defeat of 1962 war, as we have gained from the British Imperialism.

"All is Well"
 
b) From Nehru's perspective he has supported China in the International scene very well. He even refused Security council membership offered at that time to India, and recommended China for that.

This is an Urban legend.

I don't know how this misinformation has become so widespread in India.

This is straight from Nehru himself:

Prime Minister Nehru has categorically denied any offer, formal or informal, having been received about a seat for India in the UN Security Council. He made this statement in reply to a short notice question in the Lok Sabha on September 27 by Dr. J.N. Parekh whether India had refused a seat informally offered to her in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said: "There has been no offer, formal or informal, of this kind. Some vague references have appeared in the press about it which have no foundation in fact. The composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter, according to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition can be made to this without an amendment of the Charter. There is, therefore, no question of a seat being offered and India declining it. Our declared policy is to support the admission of all nations qualified for UN membership.''

The Hindu : Miscellaneous / This Day That Age : dated September 28, 1955: UN seat: Nehru clarifies
 

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