Ahhh yes. Let me try to explain myself better (these discussions would go a lot smoother, face to face and with pints of lager)
I think the difference lies not in the ultimate goal (ie destroy that outpost on that hill) but the way it is managed. As with most ancient skirmishers, the Afghans would try to destroy the opposing force by wearing down the enemy. In your words
These tactics would be the order of the day. Only when they judge the enemy sufficiently weaken would they risk pressing home "the final rush". This is a minimal risk and opportunistic strategy that makes sense for non-profession irregulars. Where I contend the difference lays is PLA leaders are given objectives and a timetable in which to achieve them. This would necessarily make action more direct and the attack more vigorous than the wearing down tactics of the Afghans. While the IA's interlock fields of fire may do well against Afghans skirmishing in cover, they may not do as well against infiltration tactics of larger units using weather and terrain as cover.
I really hope I am making sense.
You are making ENORMOUS sense.
The most difficult part of a discussion, as I have always, ALWAYS pointed out, and in fact, written in almost these identical words as well, is the part in which we tease out agreeable or friendly elements in each other's argument. This is seldom possible without an atmosphere which is conducive.
Personally I recommend a dark ale in preference to continental lagers, perhaps a stout, a Guinness over all else!
Now regarding the rest of your response, the general practice that seems to have been followed by PLA attackers is that they wound up a line of trenches by attacking one end of it and rolling up the defences along the line. This did not allow the defenders' fire-power to bear on the attackers, only those elements in the trenches facing attack, from one side or the other, often without warning, were able to shoot back, often with only seconds of notice. The results were grim and almost inevitable, in the conditions of night attack, often with confusing noises, trumpets, drums and other noises being made in a distracting and confusing way, in other directions.
While the IA's interlock fields of fire may do well against Afghans skirmishing in cover, they may not do as well against infiltration tactics of larger units using weather and terrain as cover.
In fact, I think that this analysis needs some slight modification.
If weather and terrain had been sufficient cover for infiltration, then the trenches in question must have been most unprofessionally located, not to allow all-weather defence. That may not have been the case.
Instead, in more than one case, the attacking force rolled up a trench-full of attackers by enfilading the line. This was done in conditions of darkness and tremendously confusing distracting noises and demonstrations of a completely misleading nature.
Only in some cases, where this was not possible because of the layout of the Indian Army defences, were there massed frontal attacks, and presumably, relatively higher casualties.
Your thoughts on this, please?