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Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

"Copy that, thank you for the clarification. Please forgive my suspicion of military men and their memoirs. I've just read too many coming out of this war to trust any of them (perhaps Bgd. Dalvi could be the except if I get a hold of his book)"

Your opinions, IMO are quite correct. As a matter of fact; this "may" be extrapolated to any person who has had a role in any major (or controversial ) event.
Brig. Dalvi need not be an exception to this. All that i feel, is that he was a player in the 'micro' sense not a 'macro' sense.

i overlooked to tell you to draw Joe Shearer in to the discussion; but now i see that he has joined. Which is very good. He (i'm sure) has some more insight and knowledge in the matter.

Without comment on the insight and knowledge that you have hinted at, it is my duty to inform you that I was lassoed, hog-tied and dragged here bellowing, and released with strict instructions to participate and be enthusiastic about it.

As a race, the Chinese are relentless in their pursuit of their objectives.
 
@ Joe Shearer,
Sir, Welcome.
i cannot say if you were dragged (screaming and kicking) in to the discussion; nevertheless i would like to welcome you enthusiastically.

CardSharp has been unrelenting in his pursuit of the subject (i don't say that critically) my interest in it has waned quite a while ago. Coupled with my (present) lack of access to the printed material that i assiduously pursued earlier. Must confess that the military aspects (btw, which i read more of) interested me less than the political aspects. Actually at that time, i was greatly intrigued by the growth and establishment/consolidation of Chairman Mao and his "movement"; and that formed the basis of some study.

One point that you correctly mentioned (imho); would be to consider all aspects and views, even if one is considering only a "micro" matter viz. "tactics employed on the ground". A birds-eye (google-earth?) view helps to zoom in on specific matters of interest.

Among other things, i never really studied B.N. Mullick and his role in any great depth, rather in a cursory manner; but his role in "colouring" the events has been documented in quite a few places.

Eagerly awaiting more inputs from your side.
 
Still reading through Joe's response but :victory::victory: if I did have to drag him here kicking and screaming it was worth it.
 
Still reading through Joe's response but :victory::victory: if I did have to drag him here kicking and screaming it was worth it.

You know very well that I wouldn't refuse anything if you or chauism, who is sadly not to be seen, asked.

I await your response to my earliest post, and to others later, before proceeding further.

Warm regards,
 
@Cardsharp

Thank you for posting this extract from Burkitt, Scobel and Worzel. I was impressed when I first read their account, I continue to be impressed. I have only read their account partially, and besides taking away lessons relating to the 62 Conflict, sought an answer there for the sharply-contrasting outcome in Vietnam. That is invaluable, as it gives us a framework of reference for comparison: (i) the Korean War; (ii) the 62 Conflict; (iii) the clashes with Vietnam.

Their particular point of view apart, there are four levels, from a macro-level descending to a micro-level, in the 62 Conflict, each of which is a subject which has absorbed huge, learned tomes. These are:

1. China's claims to Tibet and Xinjiang;
2. Foreign relations between the British Empire and neighbouring states, including Imperial and Nationalist China, and independent India's dealings with relevant neighbours;
3. Political and civilian leadership of Indian military forces, and the interaction between the civilian and military leadership through the history of independent India;
4. The doctrinal, strategic and tactical analysis of the 62 Conflict.

Obviously, from your selected title for this thread, you would like to concentrate on the final two, nos. 3 and 4. However, neglecting the other two issues altogether is to reduce the amount of useful and relevant detail from the situation.

Do let me know your response to this, and your thoughts in general.

Please don't let my selection of the title skew the course of our discussion. I'd very much like to keep this an Indian affair because that is the more interesting side of the story.

1. is a prickly bundle of controversy that deserves its own in depth discussion.

2. is a separate area of interest that I definitely want to discuss one day soon.

3. is the bed that is neither too soft or too hard but just right.

I am fascinated by the facts you've just provided in this post.


This is incorrect.

There were several distinct phases of action. Please examine the dates. The intervals were sufficient to regroup, to restructure and to re-equip the troops; there was enough time to recover, far more than Harbaksh Singh had in 65 against the Pakistani attack on Akhnoor launched by Akhtar Hussain Malik.

The Indian Army leadership, under General Thapar, had completely surrendered to the political interference of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and General B.M.Kaul, who wanted to be Chief of Army Staff without having commanded a unit in battle in his entire professional career.

That is with reference to failures at the leadership level. There were also failures at field level. Please read the extracts, if you cannot read the full PDF version; it is clear that several myths that were propagated by our hyper-active media and film industry need careful re-examination.

The PLA did not outnumber the Indian Army in massive numbers. It did not defeat the Indian Army through human wave tactics, losing huge numbers of men before overwhelming the very small units facing it with almost 100% casualties to the Indian Army.

The fact is that the Indian Army had doctrinal blind spots, and these doctrinal blind spots continue to this date, with no corrective action. The drastic overhaul taken up by General Sundarji was completely sabotaged by the Defence Ministry which did not support his initiative by doing all the corrective, balancing work that was part and parcel of the overhaul. Having said that, this overhaul was technology-heavy; some basic faults in outlook, leadership and focus of the command levels at divisional levels and upwards are clearly evident.

That the troops were not ready and that the PLA won through surprise is only partly true. It does not highlight the fact that the top military leadership threw in troops which were ill-equipped; these were not selections of the politicians. It does not acknowledge the fact that the PLA achieved tactical surprise as well as strategic surprise.

Without understanding, absorbing and eliminating the causes of this debacle, the Indian Army will continue to fight and win on brute force, in frontal attacks and through the bloody sacrifices of its junior officers and its soldiers.

What you say here seems to absolve Nehru of some of his responsibilities and cast the conflict in light of a intelligence failure as well.


Also I am interesting in hearing what you think are the doctrinal blindspots that continue to dog the IA (perhaps we can then compare blindspots with the PLA)

How is this for preliminaries? Thanks again for coming to the rescue.
 
As an addendum.

My views on the tactical side of the conflict is roughly as follows.

The Indian force was largely disposed in outposts and stationary(save occasional patrolling). The PLA after it committed the to attack, used defiles and terrain to infiltrate past the strong points and attack the IA position in detail via local concentration of force (ala WWI Stoßtruppen). After the Indian positions were broken and communication/command+control broke down, it was just a matter of pressing the initiative in pursuit and not allowing the IA a chance to regroup.
 
Without comment on the insight and knowledge that you have hinted at, it is my duty to inform you that I was lassoed, hog-tied and dragged here bellowing, and released with strict instructions to participate and be enthusiastic about it.

As a race, the Chinese are relentless in their pursuit of their objectives.

Nice to see you back.

On the topic after going through all your posts on this, i am unable to restrain myself from asking a basic question sir. One can understand that our side officially did not and could not spell out the truth, as it was damaging obviously for the nation and the military as a whole.

However why didn't the media and when i say this i don't mean the present one which is more than that if u know what i mean. I am talking about the older one's some 30 years back which had a far better personnel of high integrity bring out the truth??

Though offtopic my grandfather has always mentioned this to me that newspapers then had a strong sense of truth.

Could this mean there was interference by the government then??
 
Please don't let my selection of the title skew the course of our discussion. I'd very much like to keep this an Indian affair because that is the more interesting side of the story.

1. is a prickly bundle of controversy that deserves its own in depth discussion.

2. is a separate area of interest that I definitely want to discuss one day soon.

3. is the bed that is neither too soft or too hard but just right.

Joe Shearer said:
@Cardsharp

Thank you for posting this extract from Burkitt, Scobel and Worzel. I was impressed when I first read their account, I continue to be impressed. I have only read their account partially, and besides taking away lessons relating to the 62 Conflict, sought an answer there for the sharply-contrasting outcome in Vietnam. That is invaluable, as it gives us a framework of reference for comparison: (i) the Korean War; (ii) the 62 Conflict; (iii) the clashes with Vietnam.

Their particular point of view apart, there are four levels, from a macro-level descending to a micro-level, in the 62 Conflict, each of which is a subject which has absorbed huge, learned tomes. These are:

1. China's claims to Tibet and Xinjiang;
2. Foreign relations between the British Empire and neighbouring states, including Imperial and Nationalist China, and independent India's dealings with relevant neighbours;
3. Political and civilian leadership of Indian military forces, and the interaction between the civilian and military leadership through the history of independent India;
4. The doctrinal, strategic and tactical analysis of the 62 Conflict.

Obviously, from your selected title for this thread, you would like to concentrate on the final two, nos. 3 and 4. However, neglecting the other two issues altogether is to reduce the amount of useful and relevant detail from the situation.

Do let me know your response to this, and your thoughts in general.

As was to be expected, you apparently combine diplomacy and a bland approach to controversy with your general learning and insatiable curiousity, all mingled with the discernment and fastidiousness of Goldilocks. I note that point 3 is to be discussed, primarily, although a little later, you have also mentioned point 4.

In my next post, then, I would like to remind ourselves about the events and incidents relating to the military and the civilian command over the military, and the severe, extremely painful consequences of this exercise, occasioned in part by Nehru's worry about the shape things were taking in the neighbouring country.


I am fascinated by the facts you've just provided in this post.
Joe Shearer said:
This is incorrect.

There were several distinct phases of action. Please examine the dates. The intervals were sufficient to regroup, to restructure and to re-equip the troops; there was enough time to recover, far more than Harbaksh Singh had in 65 against the Pakistani attack on Akhnoor launched by Akhtar Hussain Malik.

The Indian Army leadership, under General Thapar, had completely surrendered to the political interference of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and General B.M.Kaul, who wanted to be Chief of Army Staff without having commanded a unit in battle in his entire professional career.

That is with reference to failures at the leadership level. There were also failures at field level. Please read the extracts, if you cannot read the full PDF version; it is clear that several myths that were propagated by our hyper-active media and film industry need careful re-examination.

The PLA did not outnumber the Indian Army in massive numbers. It did not defeat the Indian Army through human wave tactics, losing huge numbers of men before overwhelming the very small units facing it with almost 100% casualties to the Indian Army.

The fact is that the Indian Army had doctrinal blind spots, and these doctrinal blind spots continue to this date, with no corrective action. The drastic overhaul taken up by General Sundarji was completely sabotaged by the Defence Ministry which did not support his initiative by doing all the corrective, balancing work that was part and parcel of the overhaul. Having said that, this overhaul was technology-heavy; some basic faults in outlook, leadership and focus of the command levels at divisional levels and upwards are clearly evident.

That the troops were not ready and that the PLA won through surprise is only partly true. It does not highlight the fact that the top military leadership threw in troops which were ill-equipped; these were not selections of the politicians. It does not acknowledge the fact that the PLA achieved tactical surprise as well as strategic surprise.

Without understanding, absorbing and eliminating the causes of this debacle, the Indian Army will continue to fight and win on brute force, in frontal attacks and through the bloody sacrifices of its junior officers and its soldiers.



What you say here seems to absolve Nehru of some of his responsibilities and cast the conflict in light of a intelligence failure as well.


Also I am interesting in hearing what you think are the doctrinal blindspots that continue to dog the IA (perhaps we can then compare blindspots with the PLA)

How is this for preliminaries? Thanks again for coming to the rescue.


Regarding Nehru's responsibility and the mitigating nature of the intelligence failure, I am not sure that this was the impression I was trying to create. Let us examine this in a separate post, again.
 
As was to be expected, you apparently combine diplomacy and a bland approach to controversy with your general learning and insatiable curiousity, all mingled with the discernment and fastidiousness of Goldilocks. I note that point 3 is to be discussed, primarily, although a little later, you have also mentioned point 4.

In my next post, then, I would like to remind ourselves about the events and incidents relating to the military and the civilian command over the military, and the severe, extremely painful consequences of this exercise, occasioned in part by Nehru's worry about the shape things were taking in the neighbouring country.


Regarding Nehru's responsibility and the mitigating nature of the intelligence failure, I am not sure that this was the impression I was trying to create. Let us examine this in a separate post, again.

lol I don't know why I used the Goldilocks analogy but hey it seemed fitting at the time. I am looking eagerly forward to your post.
 
Brigadier Dalvi saw the attack coming from miles away, he was on the ground and he knew that Delhi's actions were having tangible effects in the pattern of patroling, but I guess he was unable to communicate this to his higher ups or if he did, he was ignored.


As for the gogobot's question about "where the PLA found it easy , where they fond it challenging"

The weather and terrain were equally a problem for both sides, though the Chinese soldiers had comparatively better logistics due to the roads in the area, there were still many many casualties due to weather and temperature. At those altitudes and temperature, the conditions are as much your enemy as the opposite army.

The way I see it, 1962 allowed Chinese army to play to its strong suits. The PLA has always been an excellent light infantry force. It's origins came from the light/guerilla tactics in the Japanese+Civil war and it's Maoist people's war doctrine meant that its roots were in the light infantry.

The conditions in 1962, meant that it was very very hard to mount a combined arms attack. The terrain was impassable for armour, good airfields weren't present on either side, artillery was only used to a limited extent again because of terrain. These condition meant that the battles were fought by light infantry vs light infantry and the PLA were definitely the more experienced force. There were still many many combat vets still in the ranks from the civil war and even Korean war.

I think you should use this description along with your description of the weather and rough terrain as operating difficulties, to convey to those of us who have not sufficiently studied the 62 episode that Chinese and Indian troops were equally ill-equipped, that Chinese and Indian troops due to their respective historical legacies were equally matched as light infantry fighting in mountain terrain (almost all the Indian Army's war-fighting experience before WWII was in the frontier).

So why was there such a difference in results?

The Afghans knew all about light infantry/irregular tactics in broken ground; they practically wrote the book on it, just as the Japanese wrote the book on jungle fighting. The Afghans fought very mobile battles, concentrating and attacking in very large numbers almost instantaneously, dispersing like smoke when needed.

Indian Army tactics in no way differed from those that they essentially used in 62. They depended on an interlocking positional defence, with one fortified location within the fire-zones of others.

It is worth addressing this question in some detail.
 
It's a good question. If what I proposed isn't it (PLA's Korean experience) then what was it?

Could it be initiative and scale? The PLA had a battle plan going in and their forces moved as a whole and in concert while each group of Indian outposts was left to act on its own, out of support range of the other brigades. In short PLA active, IA reactive.
 
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It's a good question. If what I proposed isn't it (PLA's Korean experience) then what was it?

I didn't deny the relevance of the immediate prior experience in Korea, the long, hard grinding during the Civil War and the war against the Japanese. I was highlighting the similarity between the earlier mountain warfare that the old Indian Army was familiar with, and the mountain warfare in which they found themselves.

First question, was there a similarity? Should we look closely at the Afghan campaigns?

Second, which were the units? Did they all go to Pakistan at partition?

Third, was there too long a gap? When was the last engagement on the north-west frontier? Were those veterans retired?

Fourth, what were the units engaged on the Indian side? What was their battle experience during the previous couple of decades?

Fifth, PLA tactics in Korea have been very well-reported - a war of movement, all the time, of marching separately, very Napoleonic, and in Korea in Napoleonic numbers as well; mind-numbing superiority was achieved.

These numbers were not used in exclusively frontal attacks, although those were used as well; on the contrary, the more frequent method was to outflank UN troops using rough ground, going off-road wherever possible, attacking UN troops on their flanks, rolling them up with these flank attacks.

And when these UN forces disengaged and retreated, they found that the PLA had overwhelmed guard units, including military policemen, and were dug in, on slopes overlooking the lines of retreat, with heavy machine gun concentrations enfilading the line of retreat.

Does this match what Indian survivors reported?

All this at the battlefield, at the tactical level. There are other, similar questions at the strategic, at the theatre level, but these have been addressed before; it is the tactical level questions which remained slightly obscure, perhaps due to embarrassment. After all, the story put out for popular consumption (this is a hypothetical construct, there was no concerted bid to manufacture one, no black propaganda effort) did not talk about masterly tactics of the PLA on the battlefield, the deception practised, fires left burning on a forward slope of a hillside in view, unit marching quietly on a night march past the Indian positions to take up positions behind the Indian trenches and bunkers.

They did not talk about the night attacks after a buildup of preliminary noise and bugle calls, about extreme edges of trenches being attacked by the PLA in full strength, and rolling up the entrenched Indian formations.


Coming to your summary:

Could it be initiative and scale? The PLA had a battle plan going in and their forces moved as a whole and in concert while each group of Indian outposts was left to act on its own, out of support range of the other brigades. In short PLA active, IA reactive.

Indeed, it could. The decision to take the initiative was key, scale perhaps was not a factor, but integration was. Each PLA unit knew what it was doing, and what the others were doing, and why - their battle plan, as you put it, was up and running, their forces moved 'as a whole and in concert', while Indian formations were isolated, on their own, out of support range.

This is straight out of Mao Ze Dong - On Warfare. There Mao adapts Sun Tzu to guerrilla warfare. The principles are laid out in clear and lucid order, analogies hammered in until the meanest intelligence could grasp it, and it was reiterated until it begins to hurt - movement, movement, movement. And against that, B. M. Kaul's damned positional obsession.

There are many more questions, but let us ask all this progressively, as we go along, and it is hoped as others also contribute: Popeye must be straining at the leash!
 
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Integration is precisely what I meant and scale is a poor choice of words. While each individual Afghan maybe more than a match individually, they probably did not ever attack in large articulated units. It maybe described as analogous to the comparison of a Celt-Iberian swordsman to a Roman legionary. Both are skilled swordsman, both using a style of fighting suited to the shorsword, but one dominates the other on the battlefield by virtue of unit drill and cohesive action. So it maybe imagined that while the attacks by the PLA came in familiar fashion, the unit cohension and leadership meant a very different experience for the IA than what they went through in the Angelo-Afghan wars.

That’s the experience side. On the tactical side I see many similarlity between Korea and 1962. There was the same clash of military thinking, east versus west, quaintly summed up by the board games chess vs. go. Chess is a game with the two sides are arranged about an implicitly agreed upon line, whereas Go is a game where you place your pieces according to the position of the opponent. The Indian army with its interlocked fields of fire and outposts adapted (I think) a chess defence only to be confronted by a go strategy.

As for cutting off the routes of retreat. It would be surprising if the same roadblock tactics used in Korea wasn’t applied in 1962. This view may be supported superficially by the large number of prisoners taken (1:1 ratio to wounded killed missing). One can imagine the hellish retreat those men would have faced. I have an inkling it would have mirror the experience of Task force Faith at the Chosin reservior,

Battle of the Chosin Reservoir - 31st RCT

where a cut off a unit of the 32nd infantry, had to retreat down a single road, fighting through road block after road block, all the time coping with bitter cold, lack of supplies, and harrasment by the PVA. It's a harrowing tale and a very worthwhile read.

They did not talk about the night attacks after a buildup of preliminary noise and bugle calls, about extreme edges of trenches being attacked by the PLA in full strength, and rolling up the entrenched Indian formations

This also mirrors to a T, the PLA's favourite method of attack in Korea. Owing to the UN's air superiority, it was during this period that the PLA became experts in night-attacks. They would infiltrate at night close to a UN position on a hill and on a bugle signal, scream and yell attacking with ppsh "burp guns" and designated grenadiers armed only with bags of grenades.
 
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We appear to be converging. There are still narratives to be quoted and discussed, but the broad picture is clearing up. Let us take further detailed looks.

Integration is precisely what I meant and scale is a poor choice of words. While each individual Afghan maybe more than a match individually, they probably did not ever attack in large articulated units. It maybe described as analogous to the comparison of a Celt-Iberian swordsman to a Roman legionary. Both skilled swordsman, both using a style of fighting suited to the shorsword, but one dominates the other by virtue of unit drill and cohesive action. So it maybe imagined that while the attacks by the PLA came in familiar fashion, the unit cohension and leadership meant a very different experience for the IA than what they experience in the Angelo-Afghan wars.

I am not too sure about this, although there are definitely elements of truth about your account. Put very simply, was the integration of the Afghans, during their encounters with the Indian Army, comparable to the integration of the PLA?

The quick answer has to be 'No'. No, the Afghans did not fight with such close coordination; more, it seems from accounts left to us, as skirmishing parties and squads of irregulars fighting from behind very good cover, attacking a formation of regulars, and moving ahead to lay ambushes for that formation as it fought its way out of the previous one. Attacks on fixed points were mounted with cover from sniper fire, by squads which moved closer and closer under cover, until it was time for the final rush.

While the overall tactical situations may have been identical, the quality of command and the commitment to battle may have been different.

That’s the experience side. On the tactical side I see many similarlity between Korea and 1962. There was the same clash of military thinking, east versus west, quaintly summed up by the board games chess vs. go. Chess is a game with the two sides are arranged about an implicitly agreed upon line, whereas Go is a game where you place your pieces according to the position of the opponent. The Indian army with its interlocked fields of fire and outposts adapted (I think) a chess defence only to be confronted by a go strategy.

An excellent analogy, although I see it as the difference between a war fought on mobility versus static war. Please let us keep this in mind when we turn to doctrinal issues.

As for cutting off the routes of retreat. It would be surprising if the same roadblock tactics used in Korea wasn’t applied in 1962. This view may be supported superficially by the large number of prisoners taken (1:1 ratio to wounded killed missing). One can imagine the hellish retreat those men would have faced. I have an inkling it would have mirror the experience of Task force Faith at the Chosin reservior,

Battle of the Chosin Reservoir - 31st RCT

where a cut off a unit of the 32nd infantry, had to retreat down a single road, fighting through road block after road block, all the time coping with bitter cold, lack of supplies, and harrasment by the PVA.

It's a harrowing tale and a very worthwhile read.

As it happens, I was thinking of the Royal Gloucesters at the Battle of Imjin River, perhaps my colonial prejudices showing through, but the Battle of the Reservoir would be a perfectly good example.

The night attacks seem to have been identical.
 
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I am not too sure about this, although there are definitely elements of truth about your account. Put very simply, was the integration of the Afghans, during their encounters with the Indian Army, comparable to the integration of the PLA?

The quick answer has to be 'No'. No, the Afghans did not fight with such close coordination; more, it seems from accounts left to us, as skirmishing parties and squads of irregulars fighting from behind very good cover, attacking a formation of regulars, and moving ahead to lay ambushes for that formation as it fought its way out of the previous one. Attacks on fixed points were mounted with cover from sniper fire, by squads which moved closer and closer under cover, until it was time for the final rush.

While the overall tactical situations may have been identical, the quality of command and the commitment to battle may have been different.

I'm not sure we are disagreeing here. Do I read this correct? "the Afghan skirmishing mode of fighting is not comparable to the PLA's objective driven battles"
 

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