Armchair
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10/7/2020
Turkish Armed forces (TSK) has conducted a number of successful operations in recent times in Syria and Libya. We are seeing a new template for warfare that is network driven and drone heavy, among other characteristics. The Afrin operation was a highly successful operation by Turkey; where TSK took 1,840 sq. km of land from a well fortified militia affiliated with the PKK terrorist organization.
There are a number of similarities between Afrin and Nagorno-Karabagh (NK) from a military standpoint. Both regions are mountainous, heavily fortified and have similar sized populations – about 150,000 – 200,000 inhabitants. NK is larger at 4,400 sq. km to 1,840 for Afrin. Both areas have been fortified with trenches, hardened command centers and a well distributed defensive position with multiple tiers. Both areas are supported by a larger enemy military, and have Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) to their main sponsors / backers.
In both NK and Afrin, the military approach has been to use artillery, drones and helicopters to attack key nodes of the entrenched forces. This has been followed by shallow assaults to take strategic ground such as high terrain. Another common salient has been a lesser emphasis on armored warfare, and highly effective use of ATGMs as ambush weapons.
We have also seen the use of proxy militias as an infantry component in both conflicts, showing a resurgence of mercenary militias as not only an irregular component in conflicts, but as an infantry component for conventional war. If the progression of war continues to follow the same pattern as Afrin, we may see a relatively slow progression of area conquered for the first 2 weeks before assault on the ground picks up pace.
The operational similarities may indicate that the military planners in Azerbaijan are either from Turkey or are influenced by their successful model. The question is, to what extent are the military professionals around the world taking lessons from this success? It may be that we are seeing a turning point in doctrine for military operations, and a much wider acceptance of drones, net-centric warfare and de-emphasis of armor.
Perhaps we may see this new pattern of warfare seeping down to the very military structures of armed forces in the future. One could perhaps have integral UCAV, UAV and EW components at the corps, division, brigade and perhaps even the battalion level. Simultaneously, we may see a greater emphasis on organic air defense, not only up to 10,000 feet but perhaps to 20,000 feet, to keep pace with UAV developments.
We may also see reduction in the tank and APC components of the infantry division or brigade, while inclusion of NLOS precision munitions – Harpy style loitering munitions being one such possibility.
The question still remains unanswered however: to what extent can this pattern of warfare be successful where the enemy has a meaningful air defense network in place, and an effective air force. Therefore, military planners will likely seek to hedge their bets and find a balance that is right for them. They will also look out to see how successful and replicable the results are. Nagorno-Karabkh is a test for the same. Nevertheless, it is perhaps clear that the art of war has changed irreversibly; the genie is out of the bottle; never to return again. Drones, EW, net-centric warfare, loitering munitions, NLOS assets, all are conspiring to change the fundamental dynamics of war as we knew it.
Turkish Armed forces (TSK) has conducted a number of successful operations in recent times in Syria and Libya. We are seeing a new template for warfare that is network driven and drone heavy, among other characteristics. The Afrin operation was a highly successful operation by Turkey; where TSK took 1,840 sq. km of land from a well fortified militia affiliated with the PKK terrorist organization.
There are a number of similarities between Afrin and Nagorno-Karabagh (NK) from a military standpoint. Both regions are mountainous, heavily fortified and have similar sized populations – about 150,000 – 200,000 inhabitants. NK is larger at 4,400 sq. km to 1,840 for Afrin. Both areas have been fortified with trenches, hardened command centers and a well distributed defensive position with multiple tiers. Both areas are supported by a larger enemy military, and have Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) to their main sponsors / backers.
In both NK and Afrin, the military approach has been to use artillery, drones and helicopters to attack key nodes of the entrenched forces. This has been followed by shallow assaults to take strategic ground such as high terrain. Another common salient has been a lesser emphasis on armored warfare, and highly effective use of ATGMs as ambush weapons.
We have also seen the use of proxy militias as an infantry component in both conflicts, showing a resurgence of mercenary militias as not only an irregular component in conflicts, but as an infantry component for conventional war. If the progression of war continues to follow the same pattern as Afrin, we may see a relatively slow progression of area conquered for the first 2 weeks before assault on the ground picks up pace.
The operational similarities may indicate that the military planners in Azerbaijan are either from Turkey or are influenced by their successful model. The question is, to what extent are the military professionals around the world taking lessons from this success? It may be that we are seeing a turning point in doctrine for military operations, and a much wider acceptance of drones, net-centric warfare and de-emphasis of armor.
Perhaps we may see this new pattern of warfare seeping down to the very military structures of armed forces in the future. One could perhaps have integral UCAV, UAV and EW components at the corps, division, brigade and perhaps even the battalion level. Simultaneously, we may see a greater emphasis on organic air defense, not only up to 10,000 feet but perhaps to 20,000 feet, to keep pace with UAV developments.
We may also see reduction in the tank and APC components of the infantry division or brigade, while inclusion of NLOS precision munitions – Harpy style loitering munitions being one such possibility.
The question still remains unanswered however: to what extent can this pattern of warfare be successful where the enemy has a meaningful air defense network in place, and an effective air force. Therefore, military planners will likely seek to hedge their bets and find a balance that is right for them. They will also look out to see how successful and replicable the results are. Nagorno-Karabkh is a test for the same. Nevertheless, it is perhaps clear that the art of war has changed irreversibly; the genie is out of the bottle; never to return again. Drones, EW, net-centric warfare, loitering munitions, NLOS assets, all are conspiring to change the fundamental dynamics of war as we knew it.
