Are Chinese cars still not available in the US? At least one can buy them in EU now. It may take 10 years to establish a Chinese brand comparable to Hyundai or Toyota on Western car markets.
China US relations
- Thread starter muse
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Are Chinese cars still not available in the US? At least one can buy them in EU now. It may take 10 years to establish a Chinese brand comparable to Hyundai or Toyota on Western car markets.
Actually these car markers are all assembly factories and major systems such as engines and transmission systems are most likely imported from S. Korea or Japan. So emission wont be big problem. Safety is the issue really worth of a second thought. Good luck to you if you would own a Chinese car in the future.
CHINA: In No Mood For Criticism From New US Gov't
By Antoaneta Bezlova
BEIJING, Nov 6 (IPS) - While China appears to have succumbed to the euphoria unleashed by the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President, analysts warn of an assertive approach by Beijing to the new dispensation.
Chinese President Hu Jintao said the world has entered a "new era of history" while the communist partys flagship Peoples Daily declared that "Obama has created a miracle".
Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao both sent congratulatory messages to the US president- elect in immediate after the victory of the Democratic party candidate was announced.
"In a new era of history, I look forward to taking our bilateral relationship on constructive co-operation to a new height," Hu said in his message. "Developing a long-term and healthy Sino-US relationship will benefit the basic interest of the peoples in the two countries".
But analysts hailed Obamas victory as a sign of the emergence of a new United States that is "reflective" and "humbled".
"This victory means that America has the potential to reflect on its past mistakes and transform," said columnist Chen Bing. "They have been obviously searching for answers to many current questions like the war in Iraq and the financial crisis but also about the role of race and religion in their society". Shi Yinhong, director of U.S. Studies at Renmin University, believes that financial crisis has thought the U.S. a lesson and even Obamas victory would not change the fact that Washington is no longer in a position to dictate terms.
"I have never seen the rest of the world so critical of the leading superpower," he said. "It was one thing facing global opposition about the war in Iraq but it is a totally different picture when they (the US) emerge as incapable of handling their economy.
.......
Read more at CHINA: In No Mood For Criticism From New US Gov't
By Antoaneta Bezlova
BEIJING, Nov 6 (IPS) - While China appears to have succumbed to the euphoria unleashed by the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President, analysts warn of an assertive approach by Beijing to the new dispensation.
Chinese President Hu Jintao said the world has entered a "new era of history" while the communist partys flagship Peoples Daily declared that "Obama has created a miracle".
Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao both sent congratulatory messages to the US president- elect in immediate after the victory of the Democratic party candidate was announced.
"In a new era of history, I look forward to taking our bilateral relationship on constructive co-operation to a new height," Hu said in his message. "Developing a long-term and healthy Sino-US relationship will benefit the basic interest of the peoples in the two countries".
But analysts hailed Obamas victory as a sign of the emergence of a new United States that is "reflective" and "humbled".
"This victory means that America has the potential to reflect on its past mistakes and transform," said columnist Chen Bing. "They have been obviously searching for answers to many current questions like the war in Iraq and the financial crisis but also about the role of race and religion in their society". Shi Yinhong, director of U.S. Studies at Renmin University, believes that financial crisis has thought the U.S. a lesson and even Obamas victory would not change the fact that Washington is no longer in a position to dictate terms.
"I have never seen the rest of the world so critical of the leading superpower," he said. "It was one thing facing global opposition about the war in Iraq but it is a totally different picture when they (the US) emerge as incapable of handling their economy.
.......
Read more at CHINA: In No Mood For Criticism From New US Gov't
kvLin
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Not all of them, I guess you know automakers like Chery.
ACTECO for example, is a 100% Chinese engine.
ÆæÈðÆû³µ¹É·ÝÓÐÏÞ¹«Ë¾
muse
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Friends I am posting this article in the hope that it may lead to a greater understanding and much civil discussion. The article's tone and information about the author and the direction of his interest should also be clear, nevertheless, it deserving of attention, as are the underlying premises the article is built on - I encourage reader to note the quote from a Chinese editorial about "US defense interest" and to compare the degree to which this is in concorde with world opinion with regard to the consequences of the pursuit of those "interests" :
WHY CHINA FEARS OBAMA
The danger of an attractive America
By John Lee Published: February 2, 2009
In contrast to the general rush in most parts of the world to congratulate Barack Obama and hail a new era of American leadership, an initially muted response from Beijing followed by an outburst in the state-run China Daily immediately after the inauguration is significant.
It suggests that the enthusiasm with which Obama was received in Europe will not be replicated in China, at least not in the Communist leadership. On the contrary, the new president may well fan old Chinese fears, pointing to difficult times ahead in the most important bilateral relationship for the world.
The editorial on Jan. 22 in the China Daily, the official English-language newspaper frequently used by Beijing to voice its views to the rest of the world, was extraordinary in its harshness, given the Chinese Communist Party's usual prudence in refraining from public criticism of America.
The article began by criticizing President Bush for taking a "wrecking-ball" to world affairs.
Then, turning to Obama and his vision for America, the paper said "U.S. leaders have never been shy about talking about their country's ambition. For them, it is a divinely granted destiny no matter what other nations think." Obama's "defense of U.S. interests," the article said, "will inevitably clash with those of other nations."
Tough editorials in the China Daily, especially about America, are not issued lightly. In many ways, Chinese rulers and policy experts are obsessed with America. In a study of 100 recent articles by leading academics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), I found that about four in every five were about the United States - understanding the American system and political values, or how to limit, circumvent, bind or reduce American power and influence. Within these themes, several emerged that help better understand the thinking behind articles such as the one in the China Daily.
One was that Beijing views international politics in broadly neorealist terms - the distribution of power in the world will determine tomorrow's conflicts. In particular, China clearly sees building competition between itself and America as the defining big-picture strategic play.
Beijing believes that tension can be managed, but never resolved, between the established power and the emerging one. Tension is a structural inevitability. Beijing believes that America is currently distracted by its two wars and a weak economy, but that Washington's strategic attention will soon turn eastwards. As one prominent CASS analyst puts it, the "spearhead will soon be pointed at Beijing."
Second, the Chinese experts view America as a unique superpower which relentlessly seeks not only to build and maintain its power, but also to spread its democratic values.
This is of grave concern to the authoritarian Chinese leaders, because they believes that America will have difficulty accepting a greater leadership role for Beijing so long as Communist Party remains exclusively in power. Senator John McCain's "League of Democracies" might never become a formal reality, but Beijing believes that it already exists de facto in U.S. military alliances with Asian countries.
Third, Beijing fears the American democratic process. While the West views democracy as an advantage since it can offer an institutional and bloodless process for renewal, Beijing views it as a source of irrationality and unpredictability. Many in Beijing believe that the democratic process can cause uncomfortable shifts in policy that might disrupt the best laid plans.
This brings us to why Beijing fears Barack Obama.
In Beijing's eyes, President Bush followed an ambitious but reckless foreign policy. In the attempt to extend American power, he sacrificed American influence; his broad "war on terror" opened up huge strategic opportunities for China.
As America became distracted by war, China made tremendous gains in Asia - undermining America's relationship with allies and partners in the region while putting itself forward as a uniquely "Asian power."
In contrast, President Obama could present a difficult challenge for Beijing. Like all presidents since World War II, Obama seeks to continue protecting and extending America's leadership role in the world - which Beijing believes to be to its detriment.
But unlike Bush, Beijing believes that Obama better understands the facets of American power and influence - hard power versus soft and "smart" power, coercion versus legitimacy, inducements versus persuasion, and the power of example.
Scholars at CASS have spent considerable effort trying to analyze understand the advantage the United States gains whenever it produces charismatic leaders such as John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan - and now Obama.
In short, Beijing is wary of attractive presidents who may replenish the reserves of U.S. leadership and influence in the world.
Moreover, Obama spoke in his inaugural address about defending freedom against authoritarian "isms," whom he relegated to "the wrong side of history." Once that meant the Soviet Union; this time it was China. This is not the message Beijing wants to hear from a new American president.
John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Center for Independent Studies in Sydney and the author of "Will China Fail?"
WHY CHINA FEARS OBAMA
The danger of an attractive America
By John Lee Published: February 2, 2009
In contrast to the general rush in most parts of the world to congratulate Barack Obama and hail a new era of American leadership, an initially muted response from Beijing followed by an outburst in the state-run China Daily immediately after the inauguration is significant.
It suggests that the enthusiasm with which Obama was received in Europe will not be replicated in China, at least not in the Communist leadership. On the contrary, the new president may well fan old Chinese fears, pointing to difficult times ahead in the most important bilateral relationship for the world.
The editorial on Jan. 22 in the China Daily, the official English-language newspaper frequently used by Beijing to voice its views to the rest of the world, was extraordinary in its harshness, given the Chinese Communist Party's usual prudence in refraining from public criticism of America.
The article began by criticizing President Bush for taking a "wrecking-ball" to world affairs.
Then, turning to Obama and his vision for America, the paper said "U.S. leaders have never been shy about talking about their country's ambition. For them, it is a divinely granted destiny no matter what other nations think." Obama's "defense of U.S. interests," the article said, "will inevitably clash with those of other nations."
Tough editorials in the China Daily, especially about America, are not issued lightly. In many ways, Chinese rulers and policy experts are obsessed with America. In a study of 100 recent articles by leading academics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), I found that about four in every five were about the United States - understanding the American system and political values, or how to limit, circumvent, bind or reduce American power and influence. Within these themes, several emerged that help better understand the thinking behind articles such as the one in the China Daily.
One was that Beijing views international politics in broadly neorealist terms - the distribution of power in the world will determine tomorrow's conflicts. In particular, China clearly sees building competition between itself and America as the defining big-picture strategic play.
Beijing believes that tension can be managed, but never resolved, between the established power and the emerging one. Tension is a structural inevitability. Beijing believes that America is currently distracted by its two wars and a weak economy, but that Washington's strategic attention will soon turn eastwards. As one prominent CASS analyst puts it, the "spearhead will soon be pointed at Beijing."
Second, the Chinese experts view America as a unique superpower which relentlessly seeks not only to build and maintain its power, but also to spread its democratic values.
This is of grave concern to the authoritarian Chinese leaders, because they believes that America will have difficulty accepting a greater leadership role for Beijing so long as Communist Party remains exclusively in power. Senator John McCain's "League of Democracies" might never become a formal reality, but Beijing believes that it already exists de facto in U.S. military alliances with Asian countries.
Third, Beijing fears the American democratic process. While the West views democracy as an advantage since it can offer an institutional and bloodless process for renewal, Beijing views it as a source of irrationality and unpredictability. Many in Beijing believe that the democratic process can cause uncomfortable shifts in policy that might disrupt the best laid plans.
This brings us to why Beijing fears Barack Obama.
In Beijing's eyes, President Bush followed an ambitious but reckless foreign policy. In the attempt to extend American power, he sacrificed American influence; his broad "war on terror" opened up huge strategic opportunities for China.
As America became distracted by war, China made tremendous gains in Asia - undermining America's relationship with allies and partners in the region while putting itself forward as a uniquely "Asian power."
In contrast, President Obama could present a difficult challenge for Beijing. Like all presidents since World War II, Obama seeks to continue protecting and extending America's leadership role in the world - which Beijing believes to be to its detriment.
But unlike Bush, Beijing believes that Obama better understands the facets of American power and influence - hard power versus soft and "smart" power, coercion versus legitimacy, inducements versus persuasion, and the power of example.
Scholars at CASS have spent considerable effort trying to analyze understand the advantage the United States gains whenever it produces charismatic leaders such as John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan - and now Obama.
In short, Beijing is wary of attractive presidents who may replenish the reserves of U.S. leadership and influence in the world.
Moreover, Obama spoke in his inaugural address about defending freedom against authoritarian "isms," whom he relegated to "the wrong side of history." Once that meant the Soviet Union; this time it was China. This is not the message Beijing wants to hear from a new American president.
John Lee is a visiting fellow at the Center for Independent Studies in Sydney and the author of "Will China Fail?"
Last edited:
Aeneas
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in my opinion,absolute democracy or centralization are both wrong.the correct system must be mixture of democracy and centralization,X% democracy plus Y% centralization(X+Y=100),the value of X,Y is under discussion.there must be a correct group of X,Y that make up a best political system,then benefit people bestly.it's like a parabola,there is a peak value on it.
China have superfluous centralization than democracy,that's the case,and we want change it also.
and I don't think one party policy could not make democracy.
China have superfluous centralization than democracy,that's the case,and we want change it also.
and I don't think one party policy could not make democracy.
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muse
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According to the Author Dr. lee, democracy in the West is about bloodless transition of leadership -- however; we have seen that whereever so called "democrats" institute "democracy" western style, there is a great deal of blood letting and internal strife and some can be forgiven for thinking that this is exactly what some in the West have in mind for China and others who the West see as possible competitors.
In any case, the larger issue is US policy driven by "defense interests" - if the US can tolerate no others that are able to shape events, then the subject of any "...cracy" or "ism" is mute and it's as simple as might is right.
In any case, the larger issue is US policy driven by "defense interests" - if the US can tolerate no others that are able to shape events, then the subject of any "...cracy" or "ism" is mute and it's as simple as might is right.
muse
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Sino-US Relations: What can China expect from Obama?
Wang Jianwei
17 Feb 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on her first overseas trip to Asia as the United States chief diplomat this week. While the leadership in all the four capitals she will visit are eager to gauge the pulse of the new US government, Beijing is probably even more anxious to figure out the Obama administrations thinking on China and its vision on US-China relations, a subject that was substantively absent from the run-up to last years presidential election.
While it is still too early to enunciate the substance of Obamas China policy, it might be useful to predict the future of Sino-American relations from the context of the historical patterns of American foreign policy. One theory in the study of American foreign policy generalises that the evolution of American foreign policy is characterised by alternative periods of introversion and extroversion or defensive and offensive, with each period lasting about a quarter century.
The last extroversion/offensive episode, began in the 1980s during the Reagan administration, featured the second cold war and climaxed with collapse of the Soviet Union. If we accept the logic of this insight, one can argue that after some 25 years of expanding American influence, American foreign policy may enter another period of strategic contraction under the Obama administration.
The early signs since President Obama assumed office seem to point in that direction. Obamas inaugural speech was in sharp contrast with the one delivered by George W. Bush in many important ways. Instead of calling for an ideological crusade for the spread of freedom and democracy to eliminate all the tyrannies in the world, Obama posited that the US was ready to be a friend of all nations in the world and even to extend a hand to those countries that were on the wrong side of history. He pointed out that American power did not entitle it to do whatever it pleased and emphasised the prudent use of force. Diplomacy rather than the discourse of with us or against us pre-emptive military action, seem to represent Obamas foreign policy. This was symbolically demonstrated by his visit to the State Department rather than Pentagon on the second day of his presidency.
If it is plausible to assume that as a whole, American foreign policy under Obama in his first term may turn to inversion/contraction rather than extroversion/expansion, then what does this mean for US-China relations? Taking recent history as a guide, a more moderate and defensive American foreign policy in general is not bad news for China.
It was during the last period of American strategic contraction during the Nixon administration when Sino-American relations were thawed, thus opening a new era of strategic cooperation for about two decades. Washington needed Beijings help to get out of the Vietnam War and to deal with the perceived Soviet threat. This new period of strategic adjustment under Obama may mimic that era.
However, the policy configuration during the Obama years is likely to differ from the Nixon era. First of all, Beijing may see more continuity in Americas China policy than on other major foreign policy issues facing the Obama administration. The China policy was one of the few bright spots in George Bushs foreign policy. As China sees it, since it has proved successful, there is really no urgent need to modify it. Furthermore, with so much on Obamas plate, his China policy is unlikely to occupy a central place in the overall schema.
But that does not mean China is not important. The fact that Clintons first foreign trip includes Beijing indicates the Obama team understands the strategic importance of China. Rather less attention in future could imply that US-China relations are relatively stable. Change and new initiatives are likely to be deferred because of more urgent US domestic and foreign policy issues. Hillary Clintons speech at the Asia Society before her departure clearly indicated a conceptual departure from the Bush administration - a China on the rise is not by definition an adversary.
Separately, after coming to power, Obama informed Chinese leader Hu Jintao that for both sides, no other bilateral relationship was more important that the US-China relationship. The de-emphasis on strategic rivalry will make it less likely that Washington will consciously challenge the core national interests of China. On the most sensitive issues for Beijing, such as Taiwan, Beijing has reasons to expect the Obama administration to pursue restraint and constructive policies.
Despite this, American strategic suspicion regarding Chinas long-term intentions will not evaporate. Indeed when the US feels vulnerable both at home and abroad, it could be more sensitive and anxious about perceptions of Chinese military capabilities. The recent comments made by both Secretary Defence Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Mike Mullen reflects such thinking.
Therefore it is an urgent task for the two countries to take the advantage of window of strategic opportunity to build more robust, dynamic, and transparent military-to-military relations, all of which were decidedly fragile and lukewarm during the Bush administration. In this regard, a separate high-level military strategic dialogue might be required in addition to the political and economic strategic dialogues. Chinas overture to resume the military-to-military exchanges is a wise move. But Beijing also needs to make more careful and prudent calculations when developing its long-range power projection capabilities.
The appointment of special envoys to Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan clearly indicate the Obama administrations current foreign policy priorities. But Washington would certainly appreciate it if Beijing could do more to help stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On many other hot-button third party issues such as North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Myanmar, the Obama administration could have even higher expectations on Beijing than the Bush administration, especially if it the US continues to be preoccupied with the Middle East/West Asia. By the same token, on urgent and global issues such as the climate change, energy issues and humanitarian assistance, the Obama administration will probably call on Beijing for more leadership and cooperation. The items on the agenda of Secretary Clintons East Asia trip inform such a policy orientation. Beijing needs to pay more attentions to these non-conventional or soft issues that are even more likely to determine US-China relations.
The Obama administrations concentration on domestic economic problems could also mean that intermestic issues such as trade, currency, market access, intellectual property could become more salient markers of the US-China relationship. Secretary of Treasury Geithners out of blue comments on currency manipulation caught the Chinese off guard. The sharp and sometimes emotional reactions to the incident from the Chinese side, including Premier Wen Jiabao, highlight Beijings frustration and fear that China might once again be made a scapegoat for Americas own economic woes. Many Chinese strongly believe that China is helping rather than hurting the American economy by acting as the bank of America. As Wen bluntly put it, it is unfair to blame those who lend money to help those who overspend.
To sum up, if both governments take appropriate and sensitive approaches towards each other, US-China relations could enter a period of strategic opportunity, where some short-term problems and long term concerns are more rationally and effectively addressed. For this purpose, China and the US need genuine strategic dialogue and consultations across a broad spectrum of international and bilateral issues, regardless whether they are held separately or jointly. For this reason, Secretary of State Clintons remarks about a comprehensive dialogue with China makes sense. The leaders of both countries cannot afford to let this window of opportunity slip through their hands without compromising the fundamental interests of these two great nations, as well as that of the world at large.
Wang Jianwei is the Eugene Katz Letters and Science Distinguished Professor of at the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He is currently a visiting scholar at Center for American Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai.
Wang Jianwei
17 Feb 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on her first overseas trip to Asia as the United States chief diplomat this week. While the leadership in all the four capitals she will visit are eager to gauge the pulse of the new US government, Beijing is probably even more anxious to figure out the Obama administrations thinking on China and its vision on US-China relations, a subject that was substantively absent from the run-up to last years presidential election.
While it is still too early to enunciate the substance of Obamas China policy, it might be useful to predict the future of Sino-American relations from the context of the historical patterns of American foreign policy. One theory in the study of American foreign policy generalises that the evolution of American foreign policy is characterised by alternative periods of introversion and extroversion or defensive and offensive, with each period lasting about a quarter century.
The last extroversion/offensive episode, began in the 1980s during the Reagan administration, featured the second cold war and climaxed with collapse of the Soviet Union. If we accept the logic of this insight, one can argue that after some 25 years of expanding American influence, American foreign policy may enter another period of strategic contraction under the Obama administration.
The early signs since President Obama assumed office seem to point in that direction. Obamas inaugural speech was in sharp contrast with the one delivered by George W. Bush in many important ways. Instead of calling for an ideological crusade for the spread of freedom and democracy to eliminate all the tyrannies in the world, Obama posited that the US was ready to be a friend of all nations in the world and even to extend a hand to those countries that were on the wrong side of history. He pointed out that American power did not entitle it to do whatever it pleased and emphasised the prudent use of force. Diplomacy rather than the discourse of with us or against us pre-emptive military action, seem to represent Obamas foreign policy. This was symbolically demonstrated by his visit to the State Department rather than Pentagon on the second day of his presidency.
If it is plausible to assume that as a whole, American foreign policy under Obama in his first term may turn to inversion/contraction rather than extroversion/expansion, then what does this mean for US-China relations? Taking recent history as a guide, a more moderate and defensive American foreign policy in general is not bad news for China.
It was during the last period of American strategic contraction during the Nixon administration when Sino-American relations were thawed, thus opening a new era of strategic cooperation for about two decades. Washington needed Beijings help to get out of the Vietnam War and to deal with the perceived Soviet threat. This new period of strategic adjustment under Obama may mimic that era.
However, the policy configuration during the Obama years is likely to differ from the Nixon era. First of all, Beijing may see more continuity in Americas China policy than on other major foreign policy issues facing the Obama administration. The China policy was one of the few bright spots in George Bushs foreign policy. As China sees it, since it has proved successful, there is really no urgent need to modify it. Furthermore, with so much on Obamas plate, his China policy is unlikely to occupy a central place in the overall schema.
But that does not mean China is not important. The fact that Clintons first foreign trip includes Beijing indicates the Obama team understands the strategic importance of China. Rather less attention in future could imply that US-China relations are relatively stable. Change and new initiatives are likely to be deferred because of more urgent US domestic and foreign policy issues. Hillary Clintons speech at the Asia Society before her departure clearly indicated a conceptual departure from the Bush administration - a China on the rise is not by definition an adversary.
Separately, after coming to power, Obama informed Chinese leader Hu Jintao that for both sides, no other bilateral relationship was more important that the US-China relationship. The de-emphasis on strategic rivalry will make it less likely that Washington will consciously challenge the core national interests of China. On the most sensitive issues for Beijing, such as Taiwan, Beijing has reasons to expect the Obama administration to pursue restraint and constructive policies.
Despite this, American strategic suspicion regarding Chinas long-term intentions will not evaporate. Indeed when the US feels vulnerable both at home and abroad, it could be more sensitive and anxious about perceptions of Chinese military capabilities. The recent comments made by both Secretary Defence Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Mike Mullen reflects such thinking.
Therefore it is an urgent task for the two countries to take the advantage of window of strategic opportunity to build more robust, dynamic, and transparent military-to-military relations, all of which were decidedly fragile and lukewarm during the Bush administration. In this regard, a separate high-level military strategic dialogue might be required in addition to the political and economic strategic dialogues. Chinas overture to resume the military-to-military exchanges is a wise move. But Beijing also needs to make more careful and prudent calculations when developing its long-range power projection capabilities.
The appointment of special envoys to Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan clearly indicate the Obama administrations current foreign policy priorities. But Washington would certainly appreciate it if Beijing could do more to help stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On many other hot-button third party issues such as North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Myanmar, the Obama administration could have even higher expectations on Beijing than the Bush administration, especially if it the US continues to be preoccupied with the Middle East/West Asia. By the same token, on urgent and global issues such as the climate change, energy issues and humanitarian assistance, the Obama administration will probably call on Beijing for more leadership and cooperation. The items on the agenda of Secretary Clintons East Asia trip inform such a policy orientation. Beijing needs to pay more attentions to these non-conventional or soft issues that are even more likely to determine US-China relations.
The Obama administrations concentration on domestic economic problems could also mean that intermestic issues such as trade, currency, market access, intellectual property could become more salient markers of the US-China relationship. Secretary of Treasury Geithners out of blue comments on currency manipulation caught the Chinese off guard. The sharp and sometimes emotional reactions to the incident from the Chinese side, including Premier Wen Jiabao, highlight Beijings frustration and fear that China might once again be made a scapegoat for Americas own economic woes. Many Chinese strongly believe that China is helping rather than hurting the American economy by acting as the bank of America. As Wen bluntly put it, it is unfair to blame those who lend money to help those who overspend.
To sum up, if both governments take appropriate and sensitive approaches towards each other, US-China relations could enter a period of strategic opportunity, where some short-term problems and long term concerns are more rationally and effectively addressed. For this purpose, China and the US need genuine strategic dialogue and consultations across a broad spectrum of international and bilateral issues, regardless whether they are held separately or jointly. For this reason, Secretary of State Clintons remarks about a comprehensive dialogue with China makes sense. The leaders of both countries cannot afford to let this window of opportunity slip through their hands without compromising the fundamental interests of these two great nations, as well as that of the world at large.
Wang Jianwei is the Eugene Katz Letters and Science Distinguished Professor of at the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He is currently a visiting scholar at Center for American Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai.
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