Sino-US Relations: What can China expect from Obama?
Wang Jianwei
17 Feb 2009
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on her first overseas trip to Asia as the United States chief diplomat this week. While the leadership in all the four capitals she will visit are eager to gauge the pulse of the new US government, Beijing is probably even more anxious to figure out the Obama administrations thinking on China and its vision on US-China relations, a subject that was substantively absent from the run-up to last years presidential election.
While it is still too early to enunciate the substance of Obamas China policy, it might be useful to predict the future of Sino-American relations from the context of the historical patterns of American foreign policy. One theory in the study of American foreign policy generalises that the evolution of American foreign policy is characterised by alternative periods of introversion and extroversion or defensive and offensive, with each period lasting about a quarter century.
The last extroversion/offensive episode, began in the 1980s during the Reagan administration, featured the second cold war and climaxed with collapse of the Soviet Union. If we accept the logic of this insight, one can argue that after some 25 years of expanding American influence, American foreign policy may enter another period of strategic contraction under the Obama administration.
The early signs since President Obama assumed office seem to point in that direction. Obamas inaugural speech was in sharp contrast with the one delivered by George W. Bush in many important ways. Instead of calling for an ideological crusade for the spread of freedom and democracy to eliminate all the tyrannies in the world, Obama posited that the US was ready to be a friend of all nations in the world and even to extend a hand to those countries that were on the wrong side of history. He pointed out that American power did not entitle it to do whatever it pleased and emphasised the prudent use of force. Diplomacy rather than the discourse of with us or against us pre-emptive military action, seem to represent Obamas foreign policy. This was symbolically demonstrated by his visit to the State Department rather than Pentagon on the second day of his presidency.
If it is plausible to assume that as a whole, American foreign policy under Obama in his first term may turn to inversion/contraction rather than extroversion/expansion, then what does this mean for US-China relations? Taking recent history as a guide, a more moderate and defensive American foreign policy in general is not bad news for China.
It was during the last period of American strategic contraction during the Nixon administration when Sino-American relations were thawed, thus opening a new era of strategic cooperation for about two decades. Washington needed Beijings help to get out of the Vietnam War and to deal with the perceived Soviet threat. This new period of strategic adjustment under Obama may mimic that era.
However, the policy configuration during the Obama years is likely to differ from the Nixon era. First of all, Beijing may see more continuity in Americas China policy than on other major foreign policy issues facing the Obama administration. The China policy was one of the few bright spots in George Bushs foreign policy. As China sees it, since it has proved successful, there is really no urgent need to modify it. Furthermore, with so much on Obamas plate, his China policy is unlikely to occupy a central place in the overall schema.
But that does not mean China is not important. The fact that Clintons first foreign trip includes Beijing indicates the Obama team understands the strategic importance of China. Rather less attention in future could imply that US-China relations are relatively stable. Change and new initiatives are likely to be deferred because of more urgent US domestic and foreign policy issues. Hillary Clintons speech at the Asia Society before her departure clearly indicated a conceptual departure from the Bush administration - a China on the rise is not by definition an adversary.
Separately, after coming to power, Obama informed Chinese leader Hu Jintao that for both sides, no other bilateral relationship was more important that the US-China relationship. The de-emphasis on strategic rivalry will make it less likely that Washington will consciously challenge the core national interests of China. On the most sensitive issues for Beijing, such as Taiwan, Beijing has reasons to expect the Obama administration to pursue restraint and constructive policies.
Despite this, American strategic suspicion regarding Chinas long-term intentions will not evaporate. Indeed when the US feels vulnerable both at home and abroad, it could be more sensitive and anxious about perceptions of Chinese military capabilities. The recent comments made by both Secretary Defence Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Mike Mullen reflects such thinking.
Therefore it is an urgent task for the two countries to take the advantage of window of strategic opportunity to build more robust, dynamic, and transparent military-to-military relations, all of which were decidedly fragile and lukewarm during the Bush administration. In this regard, a separate high-level military strategic dialogue might be required in addition to the political and economic strategic dialogues. Chinas overture to resume the military-to-military exchanges is a wise move. But Beijing also needs to make more careful and prudent calculations when developing its long-range power projection capabilities.
The appointment of special envoys to Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan clearly indicate the Obama administrations current foreign policy priorities. But Washington would certainly appreciate it if Beijing could do more to help stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On many other hot-button third party issues such as North Korea, Sudan, Iran, and Myanmar, the Obama administration could have even higher expectations on Beijing than the Bush administration, especially if it the US continues to be preoccupied with the Middle East/West Asia. By the same token, on urgent and global issues such as the climate change, energy issues and humanitarian assistance, the Obama administration will probably call on Beijing for more leadership and cooperation. The items on the agenda of Secretary Clintons East Asia trip inform such a policy orientation. Beijing needs to pay more attentions to these non-conventional or soft issues that are even more likely to determine US-China relations.
The Obama administrations concentration on domestic economic problems could also mean that intermestic issues such as trade, currency, market access, intellectual property could become more salient markers of the US-China relationship. Secretary of Treasury Geithners out of blue comments on currency manipulation caught the Chinese off guard. The sharp and sometimes emotional reactions to the incident from the Chinese side, including Premier Wen Jiabao, highlight Beijings frustration and fear that China might once again be made a scapegoat for Americas own economic woes. Many Chinese strongly believe that China is helping rather than hurting the American economy by acting as the bank of America. As Wen bluntly put it, it is unfair to blame those who lend money to help those who overspend.
To sum up, if both governments take appropriate and sensitive approaches towards each other, US-China relations could enter a period of strategic opportunity, where some short-term problems and long term concerns are more rationally and effectively addressed. For this purpose, China and the US need genuine strategic dialogue and consultations across a broad spectrum of international and bilateral issues, regardless whether they are held separately or jointly. For this reason, Secretary of State Clintons remarks about a comprehensive dialogue with China makes sense. The leaders of both countries cannot afford to let this window of opportunity slip through their hands without compromising the fundamental interests of these two great nations, as well as that of the world at large.
Wang Jianwei is the Eugene Katz Letters and Science Distinguished Professor of at the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He is currently a visiting scholar at Center for American Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai.