Bane Blade
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China needs to really start talking for being a new Super Power I think that they should actually give their opinion more often.
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I am not so sure. Consider China's conduct during the U.S. conflict with North Vietnam. The U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Dr. Henry Kissinger, records in his memoirs that while China was publicly calling itself Hanoi's "reliable rear area", in private they were not so happy with the U.S. withdrawal from the conflict.tell me where Kashmir is. It's neighboring west China and two nuclear capable countries are fighting for it! Of course China wants it solved, but not by force
Good point. Consider this: Kashmir being the core issue between India and Pakistan, let's assume the back-channel diplomacy resumes and an agreement is reached between GoP and GoI. This would most likely be a compromise agreement involving open borders similar to borders between EU nations, limited local autonomy by unifying Indian-held and Pakistan-held Kashmir with a single Kashmiri Assembly, and LOC converted to formal IB leading to de-militarization in Kashmir, etc....
My answer to that is then why hasn't China led the diplomatic effort to see it so? Who has more invested in this region beside India and Pakistan than the PRC?
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Sure, but its harder IMO. The problem with the McMahon line is the absence of a face-saving solution for both countries. It's a zero-sum game. Unlike Kashmir, which is divided between the two countries, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim are entirely governed by India. GoI hence may not be eager for an open border solution with PRC, especially if there is thaw on the western front. But I do admit a post-Kashmir afterglow could defy expectations....
What's clear to me is that the mechanisms that extend to an India/Pakistan rapproachment in J&K would be available elsewhere in the region too. There is, therefore, a chance should a key be found to Kashmir that this same "principle" element may have value twice-fold.
Others may correct me if I'm wrong, but the relationship between PRC and Pakistan is similar to the USSR/India relationship during the Cold War, primarily based on defence-related purchases and joint ventures, and investment in areas where Western companies are unwilling to invest.I'm not certain that we'd see a decrease in relations between the PRC and Pakistan. There is a possibility an Indo-Pak rapproachment would (assuming Pakistan's survival) help Pakistan by reducing the need for a large standing army over time.
Yet there seems genuine warmth by the Pakistanis for the Chinese despite huge socio-cultural differences. I'd think this residue of good will won't immediately disappear, if ever.
One would think that a decrease in India-Pakistani tension opens opportunities for expanded business interests between the PRC and Pakistani markets that might offset a decline based upon shared defense views.
I am not so sure. Consider China's conduct during the U.S. conflict with North Vietnam. The U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Dr. Henry Kissinger, records in his memoirs that while China was publicly calling itself Hanoi's "reliable rear area", in private they were not so happy with the U.S. withdrawal from the conflict.
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My answer to that is then why hasn't China led the diplomatic effort to see it so? Who has more invested in this region beside India and Pakistan than the PRC?
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Yet there seems genuine warmth by the Pakistanis for the Chinese despite huge socio-cultural differences. I'd think this residue of good will won't immediately disappear, if ever.
...
"As far as Sino-Vietnam conflict is concerned, the main reason that China fought Vietnam in 1978 was that Vietname was trying to establish Indo-china Federation under the support of Soviet Union by invading Cambodia. That was a direct threat to Chinese security."
More specifically, it was a direct threat to the Chinese-sponsored Khmer Rouge gov't (the world's "taliban" before the taliban and even more blood-crazed and anti-intellectual if such is possible).
All which trailed came as acts of opportunism by one or the other following America's departure. Chou is correct in identifying the American puppets in Thieu and the S.V.N. gov't as impediments to peace. The SVN was thoroughly corrupt and undermined any positive efforts made by our forces and allies.
Could we have won? It required the dismantling of the mandarin-colonial legacy of malgovernance from within at the same time as battling the NLF's political assaults and the corresponding V.C./NVA attacks from without.
Perhaps. It would have required co-option of the NLF and V.C. Whether that was possible given PRC/NVA cadres within both is difficult to say. Much would have depended there upon reforms we might have instituted within the SVN gov't.
Without it, we ran out of patience and money to transform what, under the defined circumstances, patently could not be done.
We may yet find the same limits in Afghanistan. I hope not.