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I am not sure if the location of the line itself was not clear. I would think the maps should have been clear and detailed enough.
It will be good if you can substantiate that it was not the case.
In 1947, China, wracked by civil war, was in what appeared to be death throes and no conceivable threat to anyone. That changed with astonishing speed, however, and, by 1950, when the new-born People's Republic re-established in Tibet the central authority which had lapsed in 1911, the Indian government will have made its initial assessment of the possibility and potential of a threat from China, and found those to be minimal, if not non-existent.
First, there were geographic and topographical factors, the great mountain chains which lay between the two neighbours and appeared to make large-scale troop movements impractical (few could then see in the German V2 rocket the embryo of the ICBM). More important, the leadership of the Indian government -- which is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru -- had for years proclaimed that the unshakable friendship between India and China would be the key to both their futures, and therefore Asia's, even the world's.
The new leaders in Beijing were more chary, viewing India through their Marxist prism as a potentially hostile bourgeois state. But, in the Indian political perspective, war with China was deemed unthinkable and, through the 1950s, New Delhi's defence planning and expenditure expressed that confidence.
By the early 1950s, however, the Indian government, which is to say Nehru and his acolyte officials, had shaped and adopted a policy whose implementation would make armed conflict with China not only "thinkable" but inevitable.
From the first days of India's Independence, it was appreciated that the Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and that territorial disputes with China were part of India's inheritance. China's other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing.
The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable -- that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at will -- Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.
Through the 1950s, that policy generated friction along the borders and so bred and steadily increased distrust, growing into hostility, between the neighbours. By 1958, Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments. India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of committing 'aggression' by refusing to surrender to Indian claims.
From 1961, the Indian attempt to establish an armed presence in all the territory it claimed and then extrude the Chinese was being exerted by the Army and Beijing was warning that if India did not desist from its expansionist thrust, the Chinese forces would have to hit back. On October 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. That bravado had by then been forced upon him by public expectations which his charges of 'Chinese aggression' had aroused, but Beijing took it as in effect a declaration of war. The unfortunate Indian troops on the frontline, under orders to sweep superior Chinese forces out of their impregnable, dominating positions, instantly appreciated the implications: 'If Nehru had declared his intention to attack, then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked.'
Prime Minister Chou:
…
So they (Russians) had no way of passing this away, and anyway, the TASS
Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Neville
Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government
believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate
against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our
borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian
troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China
doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up
north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory,
how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three
open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused.
He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy
of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out.
...
(In the context of Sino-Soviet border)
The borderline was just drawn as
the pencils in the hands of the Czar’s surveyors went along the border,
sometimes on the right bank, sometimes in the middle, and sometimes
on the other bank. In a similar fashion the railroad between
Moscow and Leningrad—Petrograd—was just drawn by a stroke of a
pencil. Also in the same fashion, Britain’s McMahon drew the so-called
borderline between China and India. That still exists today. This was
also the way European countries carved up Africa.
President Nixon: That’s why so many African countries are really
not countries. It was a terrible error.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and many countries are divided. But
even so, we still have a desire to settle problems through negotiations.
We have settled our border question with Burma. Part of the McMahon
line runs along the Sino–Burmese borderline. But General Ne
Win14 was a farsighted man, and we solved the question between China
and Burma. But U Nu refused to do so. He was very difficult and raised
many petty matters. However, the boundary settlement of this
Sino–Burmese boundary line was one of mutual accommodation,
but actually the result was that Burma gained a bit more, which was
reasonable. Since they are a smaller country than us we gave them the
benefit of the doubt.
Also we settled the border question between China and Nepal. We
have a treaty with Sikkim, and a non-disputed borderline with Bhutan
and later with Pakistan. Of course, this raised a problem with India,
because they said the borderline included part of their territory. In settling
the boundary between China and Nepal, we resolved that the
highest peak in the world, Mount Everest or Chomolungma, should
belong to both China and Nepal, and we each took half. The second
highest mountain is on the border between China and Pakistan, K–2,
and we also shared it.
We also have a very tiny border between China and Afghanistan,
where the silk road ran, and we solved that question.
As for Mongolia, there is the problem that the People’s Republic
of Mongolia used to be part of China, but since Chiang Kai-shek put
his signature on the Yalta Agreement we could only take his legacy.
But now he refuses to recognize his own signature. If I met with him
I would have to ask him about that. But we were able also to define
the border between China and the People’s Republic of Mongolia at a
time when the People’s Republic of Mongolia took a rather reasonable
approach.
We also have a border between China and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. There is a lake on it, T’ien Ch’ih, on the peak
of a very high mountain. In the past the Manchus said the lake belonged
to them, and the Koreans said it belonged to them. We finally
solved the question by dividing and sharing the lake.
It is very easy to solve questions if both sides are reasonable. We
have generally settled the borders between China and Vietnam/Laos,
and although there are still questions in some places, it is mostly settled.
There are only two big countries, the Soviet Union and India,
which haven’t settled. They’re cooperating in this.
I encourage all Indian friends read those quotes carefully and think over it carefully: why China has been able to solve most of its land dispute with the neighbors, and India has not at all.
If India thinks it will benefit from those disputes, it is only those politicians who would callously think so.
Yes, Nehru's asinine idea of Forward Policy led to 1962 war, but the india's defeat is due to following 3 main reasons
Erroneous assessment by the political leadership that China will not react to India's 'Forward Policy' in NEFA region and Ladakh.
Ill-equipped and ill prepared Indian army.
China's unfounded perception of Indian designs to seize Tibet.
Now coming to post-1962 war, India has not vilified China without any unfounded reasons. The reasons being, supply of nuclear weapons know-how, missile technology to our neighbors and string of pearls strategy to encircle India with hostile neighbors by China. More recently, its not so subtle attempts to scuttle the NSG agreement. All these points toward China being a big threat to India's security.
And no, India doesn't need the china scare-mongering by our politicians to keep its flock together.
gpit, in the present context, the main contention between India and China is Tawang, which is a populated area.
Article VII of the "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles" signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's India visit in April 2005, states: "In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall safeguard populations in border areas."
Now china is backing out from this. The reason is, china doesn't want to lose any leverage over India in order it not to question its hegemony in Asia.
Juangarh and Hyderabad had overwhelming Hindu populations.
My previous post with sources should answer most of you puzzles.
For your statements underlined, watch out your logical reasoning: it wouldn't be surprised if you vilify China after the war. It would truly be if you do not! After that (1962), each side can get into chicken-egg sequence easily.
BTW, I hesitate to call 1962 a war but rather a conflict.
Let’s put aside somebody’s inadvertent or involuntary fondness of getting bogged down in history mess. An interesting phenomenon is: why there is no improvement on border problems on India side that has infested India perpetually for more than 0.5 century, as is in contrast to China?
I fully doubt whether the two sides enjoy the same understandings on same lines of text, as revealed by history.
and kashmir had a 77 % population of muslims in 1947 with only 20% hindu
dont change policies when it comes to a different region
Unsubstantiated speculation on whether Jinnah would have held a plebiscite or not. I can say Gandhi was planning to rape minors all day long in his ashram - what validity does that claim have unless I Can back it up - ditto with your pointless speculation on what Jinnah would or would not have done.
On the question of undivided Punjab and Bengal - the idea was that the two provinces should go to Pakistan since they were culturally and territorially UNITED entities, and therefore they would be included whole into Pakistan.
You keep repeating that canard of 'what happened to minorities' when you still haven't been able to show how Pakistan's (West Pakistan) minority population has changed disproportionately since 1947, when you take out the migrants due to the partition itself, compared to similar minority immigration out of India.
When it is clearly written that populated areas will be kept away from border disputes and when it is signed by Chinese premier, how can one understand and interpret it differently. This, I don't understand.
The real reason why China wants Arunachal is religious - they cannot fully stamp out Tibetan Buddhism unless they have control over the seat of the monastery at Tawang.
By remembering that Buddhism, which originated in Nepal and once flourished but now nearly vanished in India, has been rooted those days in East Asia, I would phrase your statement differently.
"The real reason why China wants Arunachal is religious - they can not fully nourish Buddhism and not let it be utilized by evil foreign forces unless they have unified the seat of the monastery at Tawang of southern Tibet with Tibet and the motherland."
By remembering that Buddhism, which originated in Nepal and once flourished but now nearly vanished in India, has been rooted those days in East Asia, I would phrase your statement differently.
"The real reason why China wants Arunachal is religious - they can not fully nourish Buddhism and not let it be utilized by evil foreign forces unless they have unified the seat of the monastery at Tawang of southern Tibet with Tibet and the motherland."