howmuch they cost since they're so advanced>
$5 million to $10.5 million per Chinese DF-21D ASBM. About the price of an inflation-adjusted $12 million U.S. Pershing II. See citation below.
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Locating, tracking, and attacking a carrier group
Locating a carrier or Aegis destroyer:
1. Chinese Noss Triplet (Yaogan 9 and Yaogan 16 launches). Theoretically, a similar capability can be deployed on drones, including stealth drones.
NOSS Double and Triple Satellite Formations
"Introduction
One of the interesting sights in the night sky are the Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) satellite formations, each having two or three satellites in close proximity to one another. Normally these satellites are relatively dim to the unaided eye, but on occasion they brighten sufficiently to be easily seen in a dark sky.
NOSS satellites locate and track ships at sea by detecting their radio transmissions and analyzing them using the TDOA (time-difference-of-arrival) technique.
...
China's NOSS Triplet
In early 2010, China launched its own NOSS triplet, into very nearly the identical orbital inclination and altitude of U.S. NOSS. None of the U.S. NOSS triplets remain in formation, so the Chinese triplet is the only intact example in orbit today. They are readily visible in binoculars, and occasionally to the unaided eye.
...Common Catalog International
....Name... Number Designation Comments
------------ ------- ------------- --------
Yaogan 9A 36413 2010-009A Chinese NOSS satellite
Yaogan 9B 36414 2010-009B Chinese NOSS satellite
Yaogan 9C 36415 2010-009C Chinese NOSS satellite"
2. Over-the-horizon radar. SAR radar. Surface radar.
3. Infrared satellites or infrared sensors on drones (or aircraft) to detect heat from carrier, airplanes using afterburners to launch from carriers, and heat from Aegis destroyer smokestacks/mufflers.
4. Optical satellites or optical sensors on drones, aircraft, or stealth drones. Optical sensors can track on a clear or cloudy day and on clear nights, it should be able to differentiate the difference in reflectivity between moonlit water and non-reflective four-acres of carrier presence. Some satellites or sensors can detect a ship by locating the wake behind a ship.
5. SOSUS. Using acoustical sensors embedded in the seabed and on submarines or marine drones, China should be able to detect and triangulate the position of U.S. carriers through their noisy propellers. You can see the gigantic waves and bubbles trailing behind a carrier. Those create a lot of acoustic noise.
Attacking a capital ship (carrier or Aegis destroyer):
1. Will China open with a megaton EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapon to render the entire carrier group helpless in the ocean before its attack? If a thermonuclear-powered EMP device is objectionable, will China use a conventionally-powered EMP device instead?
Thank you to Dr. Somnath for the EMP illustration of China's ASBM
2. ASBM. DF-21D traveling at Mach 10 to 12, which is 2.5 miles per second.
3. Air-to-surface CM-400AKG missile traveling at Mach 5.5, which is 1.25 miles per second. Next, there is the LD-10 Mach 4 anti-radiation missile (based on its similarity to the SD-10/PL-12, we assume similar performance) that travels at 1 mile per second (reference:
China – New Anti-Radar Missile).
China's new CM-400AKG long-range (100 to 240km) air-to-surface missile has a terminal velocity of
Mach 5.5 (from Zhuhai Airshow 2012).
CM-400AKG Missile at Zhuhai Airshow 2012 | Defense Updates
"
CM-400AKG Missile at Zhuhai Airshow 2012
Saturday, November 24, 2012
At Zhuhai Aishow 2012, the CM-400AKG was displayed for the first time. The CM-400AKG is a high speed, Air-to-Surface Missile developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).
The CM-400AKG is in the same class as the Raduga KH-15 (AS-16 Kickback) missile. The fire-and-forget missile can reach a maximum speed of Mach 5.5 and a range of between 100 and 240 km. The missile has a length of 5.2 m and weighs about 900 kg.
Guidance is modular and include passive radar homing and Imaging Infrared. Unlike the sea-skimming profile of the C-802 missile, the CM-400AKG does a high-altitude climb after launch with a high-speed dive onto the target.
The missile was displayed with the JF-17 fighter and has been adopted into service according to officials from the Pakistan Air Force."
4. Air-to-surface slingshotted precision guided bomb
5. Sea-skimming cruise missile
6. Sea-skimming cruise missile with a supersonic terminal-phase warhead
7. Supersonic cruise missile that pulls up and attacks from above in terminal phase
8. Stealth cruise missile
China has proven they can design very-low-observable stealth manned aircraft in the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31 stealth fighters.
China has also proven they can build the DH-10 2,000km+ long-range cruise missile (see DH-10 range in Figure 17 "China's Missile Force" chart on p. 56 in Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008. Link:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf).
China merely has to combine its two proven skills. It only has to design a cruise missile with stealth features and coat it with RAM. We know China can produce normal RAM, transparent gold-colored cockpit canopy RAM, and adaptive RAM (seen on the Chengdu J-20 "2002" radome as two-toned paint).
In fact, the United States produced its first stealth cruise missile five years BEFORE the first flight of the F-22. It is now two years AFTER the first flight of the Chengdu J-20. It is highly probable that China has a stealth cruise missile in operation.
Given the power of today's computer chips, China should be able to program an unpredictable path for the cruise missile end-phase. A cruise missile should not come in straight and level to make it easy for a CIWS to shoot them down (as seen on YouTube). A cruise missile should come veering in at a sharp angle (or unpredictable stutter step such as change direction then level flight then direction change before impact) and change elevation if possible before impact to make life difficult for the CWIS.
9. Torpedoes
10. MLRS
Note all of these weapons will probably be deployed in the hundreds and used to attack simultaneously from all directions. The carrier group will be in the middle of a kill zone and its defensive weapons must perform 100% without fail. Also, if the CIWS overheats, jams, misfires, or runs out of ammunition then it's all over.
An U.S. carrier costs about $5 billion dollars. When you include the planes and ordnance on a carrier, its value doubles to about $10 billion dollars. A Chinese DF-21D ASBM costs about $10 million each. From a strictly economic perspective, China can afford to fire 1,000 DF-21D ASBMs at a carrier and still come out ahead economically (without considering the tremendous military and moral value if it succeeds). See citation below: "US Naval War College: China's DF-21D ASBM costs $5 to $10.5 million per missile"
Conclusion:
Under ideal conditions and defending against a single dumb (non-MIRVed or MARVed) missile, THAAD has a subpar success rate. It is almost inconceivable that the U.S. Navy would send its capital ships into a kill zone in Asia. The U.S. military is most likely to exert pressure on China by affecting its oil shipments near the Persian Gulf. However, this is unlikely to succeed because China can use its advantage on land to annex energy-and-resource-rich Mongolia.
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US Naval War College: China's DF-21D ASBM costs $5 to $10.5 million per missile
A Chinese DF-21D ASBM costs only $5 to $10.5 million. China can afford to build hundreds of them.
Out of the 100 DF-21D ASBMs fired at a single aircraft carrier, China only needs one or two hits to achieve a "soft kill" (e.g. knocked out of combat). If there are more impacts, the carrier might sink.
I have suggested China may fire 100 DF-21D ASBMs to arrive near-simultaneously and attack an aircraft carrier. However, is this economically feasible? As shown in the citation below, each DF-21D ASBM costs between $5 to $10.5 million per missile.
We'll pick the upper range and say each DF-21D ASBM costs $10 million. A bombardment of 100 DF-21D ASBMs will cost a total of $1 billion. This is a cost-effective way to attack a $5 billion aircraft carrier.
Anyway, in a war, costs don't really matter. China will attempt to sink the aircraft carrier with sufficient numbers of DF-21D ASBMs regardless of cost.
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From the third page at the following link from the US Naval War College:
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...9d27/The-Strategic-Implications-of-Obscurants
"While it is problematic to estimate accurately
the cost of the DF-21, sources place the unit price, in U.S. currency, between $5,000,000 and $10,500,000 per missile.[7] This seems a reasonable estimate in light of the cost of a similar weapon, the U.S. Pershing II, which adjusted for inflation would be roughly twelve million dollars per missile. In comparison, the ballistic-missile-defense-capable SM-3 costs roughly ten million dollars per missile. At first blush, the nearly equal prices of interceptor (SM-3) and ASBM (DF-21) suggest near parity in cost ratio, but a “shoot two to kill one” doctrine means a differential of nearly ten million dollars per exchange. However, even this is misleading, as the launch platform—essentially a big truck—of the DF-21 is far less expensive than that of the SM-3, a warship. This estimate also ignores the operational and developmental challenges of intercepting an ASBM; nor does it fold in the things like purchasing power disparity, labor costs, and government controls, which all favor China. Nonetheless, this simple cost comparison is striking."