JaiMin
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Well, about nuclear development, this articles from American academy is quite detail. About Cambodia, it is less likely to receive nuclear hand deliver if they don't want to become isolated by the rest of the world and become failed states again, and i don't think China govt will considered that option, it will damage their reputation. About nuclear development in Vietnam, it is receive support from international community generally and also from China and U.S.A in particular
@Carlosa , @Yorozuya, @Viet, @TaiShang
@Rechoice
Nuclear Power in Vietnam: International Responses and Future Prospects
For nearly a decade, Vietnam has been leading the field among states planning to introduce nuclear energy in Southeast Asia. Although the Communist Party of Vietnam (VCP) is cooperating fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has stated that it has no plans to develop the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, it is keeping its options open, raising the question of whether a deterioration of the strategic environment in East Asia, combined with certain domestic developments, might tempt future Vietnamese leaders to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Within Southeast Asia, this possibility is not taken seriously. The widely held view among regional scholars and practitioners is that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) norms and institutions, especially the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), will constrain intraregional proliferation dynamics.1 This optimism is shared by some observers outside the region, who contrast what they see as Southeast Asia’s benign strategic environment and proactive security community-building efforts with the fractious and conflict-prone international relations of the Middle East and Northeast Asia.2 But some of this optimism is misplaced: proliferation pressures are growing in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, and ASEAN’s security institutions currently demonstrate limited capacity to address them. This paper discusses these dynamics, explaining Vietnam’s peaceful nuclear power ambitions and regional and international responses to them; identifying potential future nuclear proliferation triggers; and examining regional proposals for reducing and managing proliferation pressures in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia more generally.
VIETNAM’S NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANS
Contrary to some expectations, the Fukushima nuclear disaster has failed to quell Vietnam’s nuclear ambitions. Despite some second thoughts over the wisdom of pursuing nuclear energy elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese government and nuclear industry have firmly stated their determination to continue implementing the nuclear energy plan, but with a strong focus on safety, drawing on lessons from Japan’s experience.7In May 2011, Vuong Huu Tan, Chairman of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC), stated, “[W]e understand the nature of the problem in Japan. They use the old type of reactor, built 40 years ago.”8 He asserted that the new generation of reactors, which Vietnam will develop, were safer and that potential threats from earthquakes, tsunamis, and climate change would be factored into the reactor designs. Soon after, Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai stated that there are no alternative energy sources that could be used to replace nuclear power in Vietnam by the year 2050. He explained that following events in Japan, the government had discussed alternatives, such as importing electricity and the further development of hydropower plants, but decided that both faced too many difficulties; nuclear power could not be avoided.9 This pledge was echoed by Le Dinh Tien, Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, who stated: “[W]e will still go ahead with our plans [for building nuclear power plants]. . . . After the breakdown of the nuclear plant in Japan, the international community has discussed and taken steps to raise safety standards. . . . In Vietnam, safety will also be one of the most important factors during construction.”10
Although political commitment to the nuclear power plan remains strong, questions over safety have led the VCP’s originally ambitious implementation targets to be put back by about three years. Two independent studies dating from 2011, both of which identified potential problems over siting, have contributed to these delays and could cause them to increase.11 The first study claimed to have found evidence that southern Ninh Thuan province could be seismically unsafe. This claim was made by a group of scientists from the Vietnam Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources, based on their discovery of two previously unknown fault lines, at Suoi Mia and Vinh Hai.12 According to the scientists, the faults have the potential to cause earthquakes that could rupture any proposed structures nearby. The second study, undertaken by scientists from Italian research institutions, argued that Vietnam’s coastline is vulnerable to earthquake-generated tsunamis originating farther east in the South China Sea.13 According to their analysis and simulation map, Ninh Thuan and a few nearby provinces are among the most vulnerable to wave impact. The findings prompted the Ministry of Science and Technology to fund further research, which is yet to be completed. When the follow-on studies were launched, the VAEC’s Vuong Huu Tan stated: “If it is found that these fault lines threaten the safety of the planned nuclear power plants, they will be moved to other places”—an outcome that would cause significant delays.14
In addition to the safety-related challenges, Vietnam faces a number of capacity-related problems that are slowing progress; but most of these can be overcome with the help of external assistance. In fact, Vietnam has found no shortage of cooperation partners keen to get a toehold in its nuclear industry, which offers the second largest market for nuclear power in East Asia (after China), and is estimated to be worth $50 billion by 2020. The most recent agreement (known as a “123 agreement”) was signed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh on October 10, 2013, and approved by U.S. President Barack Obama on February 24, 2014. If ratified by the U.S. Congress, this agreement will allow U.S. companies to export nuclear equipment to Vietnam. This follows nuclear cooperation agreements with a large number of other countries, the most advanced of which are with Russia and Japan. Signed in October 2010, the Russian agreement was with Atomstroyexport, which agreed to build the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant. Rosatom has confirmed that it will supply the fuel, and also claims that it will take back the used fuel for the life of the plant (although Vietnamese experts have questioned the legal status of spent fuel arrangements, as discussed in the next section). In August 2011, state media announced that Vietnam was negotiating with Russia to borrow about $7.7 billion toward the cost of building the plant, and was seeking to raise $48.8 billion overall for power projects in 2011 to 2020.15 It also announced that Vietnam and Russia had agreed to speed up their cooperation, especially in the fields of trade, education and training, and nuclear power.16 The other advanced agreement, signed with the Japan Atomic Power Company in November 2010, commits Japan to build two reactors at the second plant site in Ninh Thuan province and to cooperate in a number of other areas, including the exploration and mining of uranium resources.17 In July 2013, Japan and Vietnam agreed to accelerate this cooperation, but no firm dates for construction have yet been set for either the Russian or the Japanese projects. The most recent reports suggest that construction may not begin until 2017–2018 (two to three years later than originally planned).18
VIETNAM’S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS
Mounting energy demands and the desire for energy diversification are the primary motivators behind Vietnam’s decision to develop nuclear power.19 The country has relatively rich energy resources; it exports up to 40 percent of the energy it produces, but domestic demand is exceptionally high. When the 2006 nuclear energy strategy was approved, the Ministry of Industry forecast that the country’s electricity demand would double in just over four years, and then continue to rise by 17 to 22 percent annually over the 2010–2015 period.20 Experts in the ministry argued that this growth in energy consumption could not be satisfied if Vietnam were to rely solely on its current mix of hydropower (42 percent), natural gas (37 percent), coal (17 percent), and oil (4 percent). They were also concerned about the unreliability of hydropower and the potential impact that power outages could have on foreign direct investment. They predicted that a shortage of electricity supply could occur by 2015, leaving Vietnam more dependent on electricity imports from China and Laos, which would need to be increased. Vietnamese officials worry that this dependence on foreign suppliers could compromise energy security, a situation that is politically complicated by disputes in the South China Sea, where Vietnam, China, and a number of other countries in Southeast Asia have competing claims over oil- and gas-rich territory.
Vietnam has consistently reassured its neighbors and the international community that its nuclear intentions are peaceful, and has taken concrete steps to demonstrate this commitment. Three developments are key in this regard. The first is the Law on Atomic Energy of June 2008, which sets out the legal framework for the development of the nuclear energy sector in Vietnam. The law, which was drafted with assistance of experts from the IAEA and officials from Australia, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, explicitly forbids the development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear proliferation. (Article 12 of the law prohibits Vietnam from “researching, developing, manufacturing, trading in, transporting, transferring, storing, using, or threatening to use nuclear or radiation weapons.”)21 The second is Vietnam’s ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol on September 13, 2012; this agreement grants international inspectors expanded rights of access to Vietnam’s nuclear and related facilities. If it is fully implemented (a complex process that is by no means guaranteed), this step should provide the international community with stronger assurances that Vietnam’s declared nuclear activities are peaceful and that potential undeclared activities are not taking place.22 The third important development is the IAEA’s declaration, on July 3, 2013, that Vietnam is free of weapons-grade uranium, following a final shipment of 16 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Vietnam’s Dalat national research center to Russia, where it will be down-blended into low-enriched uranium to fuel power reactors.23 This step has positive nuclear security and nonproliferation implications. Vietnam’s leadership also fully supported the initiative to establish the recently launched ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), which aims to promote cooperation and transparency in nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Southeast Asia.24
These actions show that Vietnam wants to be seen by the international community as a responsible nuclear energy aspirant, both to quell potential concerns over the dual use nature of nuclear technologies and to attract the nuclear cooperation agreements and assistance that it desperately needs. This partly explains the increasingly proactive nonproliferation diplomacy that Vietnam’s leadership has pursued in regional forums, as it has sought to deepen Vietnam’s already solid nonproliferation credentials. Examples of these activities have multiplied year on year since Vietnam held the ASEAN Chair in 2010, which it used as an opportunity to launch a high-profile diplomatic campaign to strengthen the SEANWFZ. Since then, Vietnam has sustained its nonproliferation leadership, a role that has been enhanced by the appointment of Le Luong Minh, Vietnam’s former ambassador to the United Nations in New York, as Secretary General of ASEAN from 2013 to 2017, as well as the election of Vietnam’s Ambassador to Austria and Slovenia, Thiep Nguyen, as Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors for a one-year mandate from 2013 to 2014.
Le Luong Minh’s leadership was clearly on display during the regional seminar on maintaining a Southeast Asia region free of nuclear weapons, held in Jakarta in February 2013. In a powerful keynote address, he called the IAEA safeguards system an “indispensable instrument in nuclear nonproliferation,” and he highlighted the Additional Protocol as a critical mechanism for “enhancing nuclear transparency and strategic trust among states.”25 In the same speech, he called the Bangkok Treaty a “strategic instrument for peace and security” in Southeast Asia, and emphasized that the IAEA safeguards system should be a key component of the control system that is to be established to verify compliance with the nonproliferation provisions of the Bangkok Treaty. He ended by warning his audience that the introduction of nuclear energy into Southeast Asia could trigger the future emergence of clandestine nuclear weapons programs, despite the existence of SEANWFZ. “There should be no room for complacency,” he urged. Le Luong Minh’s successor in New York, Le Hoai Trung, reinforced this forceful nonproliferation advocacy during the UN First Committee on October 15, 2013, calling for the world’s highest priority to be given to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and for countries to “work harder together to create an environment of strategic trust.”26
Despite Vietnam’s peaceful nuclear intentions and proactive nonproliferation diplomacy, uneasiness exists among some U.S. nonproliferation experts and legislators over how the new nuclear power program could be misused in the future.27 The development of nuclear energy is not necessarily a stepping-stone to nuclear weapons acquisition, but history shows that it can be, especially if the sensitive nuclear technologies of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing are pursued either openly or secretly. Vietnam has made it clear that it is not currently planning to introduce these sensitive technologies; rather, it is planning to purchase nuclear fuel on the global market, which is normal for states in the early stages of nuclear energy development. Indeed, it is not logical from an economic perspective to develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to serve a modest nuclear energy program (which is one of the reasons why Iran’s nuclear activities have long been considered suspect).
Official Vietnamese statements on the subject of nuclear fuel first appeared back in 2005, when VAEC Chairman Vuong Huu Tan said that Vietnam had not considered studying uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.28 Of course, this was a statement about the past and not the future, but since then a number of official statements have confirmed that Vietnam has no plans to pursue enrichment or reprocessing. Most recently, during negotiations over the U.S.-Vietnam 123 agreement in October 2013, Vietnamese officials reportedly made a commitment to rely on international fuel markets for nuclear fuel rather than acquiring enrichment or reprocessing technology. The text of this agreement is not publicly available, but according to insider accounts, the commitment is political rather than legal, and thus non-binding, and applies to Vietnam’s current plans rather than future ambitions. In other words, it could be characterized as a promise from the Vietnamese to refrain from doing something they are not currently intending to do anyway.29 Vietnam could change its mind at any time and reverse this agreement, even if the text does not include specific language confirming that Vietnam maintains its right to pursue sensitive nuclear activities at a later date.30 However, it is significant nonetheless, signalling a high degree of confidence among U.S. negotiators that Vietnam’s stated nuclear goals are sincere. Indeed, in approving the deal, President Obama stated, “I have determined that the performance of the agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”31
These developments, while generally regarded as positive, are unlikely to erase the concerns of the most cautious nonproliferation stalwarts, and to be fair, there are good reasons to question Vietnam’s willingness to rely on external suppliers over the longer term. On the one hand, Vietnam’s leaders have been open to different fuel supplier arrangements, having also entered into an agreement with Rosatom to purchase Russian fuel for the life of the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant; discussed possible fuel supplier arrangements with Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev during his official visit in October 2011; and shown interest in the Russian-led International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC), which was launched under the aegis of the IAEA in 2010.32 On the other hand, it is still unclear whether Vietnam’s officials and nuclear experts support external fuel supply arrangements in principle or if they consider them a short- to medium-term stop-gap. Serious reservations do appear to exist, including questions over the reliability of supplier countries, which might subject customers to unfair demands, and over the capacity of the IAEA to remain independent in any supplier dispute.33 This might help explain why debate among elites has quietly begun over the possibility of developing the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle after 2030.34
If, in the future, Vietnam does opt to develop the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle to reduce reliance on suppliers, proliferation risks would grow. With this in mind, the spent fuel that will be generated by Vietnam’s nuclear power plants, which is to be stored on-site,35 could become a significant security issue. (If reprocessing technology is developed, used fuel can be recycled into fresh fuel, a process that can produce weapons-usable plutonium.) Much depends on how the spent fuel is managed, a highly complex and politically sensitive challenge confronting all countries that have chosen to develop nuclear energy, and a challenge that calls for multinational cooperation.36 Vietnamese experts assert that the Russia-Vietnam nuclear cooperation agreement covering Ninh Thuan 1 does not include a clear legal obligation from Vietnam to return spent fuel and other radioactive waste to Russia, although it does commit Russia to cooperate with Vietnam to seek “reasonable solutions related to back-end fuel cycle services.”37 The same is true of the Japan-Vietnam agreement, which includes a vague provision to cooperate in the management of spent fuel, but does not include a clear legal commitment to return spent fuel to Japan.38 It is also worth noting that Vietnam possesses natural uranium deposits, and is exploring the possibilities for mining them, and with India’s help, is developing uranium ore processing technologies.39 This adds weight to the argument that Vietnam could choose to end its reliance on external fuel supplies once an alternative, independent path becomes viable. Its leaders could conceivably decide that it is in Vietnam’s national interest to pursue a higher degree of energy self-sufficiency.
EXTRAREGIONAL RESPONSES
Outside Southeast Asia, international responses to Vietnam’s nuclear energy plan have been overwhelmingly supportive. Indeed, Vietnam’s experience exposes the inaccuracy of claims—common among NAM members—that developing states are at the mercy of a U.S.-dominated regime of technology denial. Although there are a couple of notable exceptions, the U.S. approach is to assess the merits and negotiate the specifics of nuclear cooperation on a case-by-case basis: where states are in good standing with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, as Vietnam is, the economic and strategic arguments in favor of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements trump the concerns of those who highlight potential safety, security, and proliferation risks.57 Thus, far from being constrained by international concerns about the dual-use nature of nuclear technology and the potential for future proliferation, nuclear momentum in Vietnam is being helped along by economic and strategic maneuvering among the nuclear supplier states, including the United States.58
Nuclear energy cooperation is widely seen as a benign form of engagement for cementing allegiances and balancing threats. This is as true of Vietnam as it is of its nuclear cooperation partners. According to reports, Hanoi originally favored European reactor technology as its preferred option, but chose to pursue nuclear energy partnerships with regional powers, Russia and Japan, based on strategic calculations.59 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, this dimension of nuclear cooperation has been a topic of discussion among scholars and practitioners for the past few years. According to Lee Mei Yi, the Singaporean author of an article in Pointer (Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces), nuclear energy expansion in Southeast Asia should be regarded as a prime opportunity to maintain U.S. influence in the region and to counter the dominance of Chinese soft power.60 She wrote:
Today, the rising enthusiasm for nuclear energy in Southeast Asia coincides with another reshuffling of the international order. Unquestioned American hegemony is a thing of the past. As the American “unipolar moment” draws to an end, its influence in Asia is increasingly challenged by China’s soft power. . . . Set against the backdrop of U.S.-China rivalry, Southeast Asia’s need for nuclear assistance and the American struggle to maintain its influence will bring both together in close collaboration on nuclear projects. . . . [T]he collaboration between Southeast Asia and the United States—both in the public and private sectors—is the lynch pin for continued American dominance in Asia.61
All of Vietnam’s nuclear cooperation partners are conscious of these dynamics, and have been using nuclear cooperation agreements as part of their broader foreign policy goal of boosting their influence in Southeast Asia. In this, Japan, China, and South Korea have been able to use the ASEAN Plus Three meetings to their advantage, especially the Ministers on Energy Meeting, which has promoted an exchange of information on nuclear energy development between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. In the future, Japan’s firm foothold in Vietnam’s nuclear energy program could be matched by South Korea and China, which are both also energetically pursuing nuclear cooperation agreements: South Korea signed an agreement in March 2012, and in June 2013 launched a preliminary feasibility study to examine Vietnam-South Korea cooperation on two nuclear reactor projects.62 China is also pursuing a nuclear cooperation deal and may offer Vietnam an export version of the CPR-1000 reactor.63
There has also been plenty of interest in Vietnam’s nuclear program outside Northeast Asia. Russia has a long-standing agreement to build the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant using two Russian reactors, and has recently ramped up other areas of bilateral energy cooperation.64 India also has several nuclear cooperation agreements in place with Hanoi, including one involving the joint exploration of uranium-ore processing technology.65 As India’s “Look East Policy” matures further and the economic and strategic benefits of nuclear cooperation become more attractive, this bilateral relationship might well expand.66 Additional agreements have been signed with France, Canada, and, as mentioned above, most recently with the United States, which had been pursuing a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement since initial deals were signed in 2007 and 2010.
In all of these negotiations, reservations about the wisdom of providing international assistance to facilitate Vietnam’s nuclear energy development have rarely been expressed. There are many reasons for this, including positive assessments of Vietnam’s benign intentions, discussed above; the economic and strategic arguments in favor of cooperation; the legal underpinnings of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation, as set out in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and the relative lack of interest in international civil nuclear cooperation among civil societies in East Asia, beyond the contention that international cooperation is facilitating nuclear energy programs that pose a risk to public safety. Reservations over Vietnam’s nuclear ambitions have also been quite muted and limited in the United States, although sophisticated debate on all aspects of U.S. nonproliferation policy has meant that there has inevitably been some criticism of U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation. In particular, the U.S.-Vietnam 123 agreement has caused consternation among those who hoped that the Obama administration would insist Vietnam legally renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies.67 Critics argue that the economic and alliance benefits associated with nuclear supplier relationships should not be allowed to trump proliferation concerns, however benign a nuclear aspirant’s intentions appear to be, in part because nuclear cooperation facilitates the expansion of nuclear capabilities that can be extremely difficult to reverse if the strategic environment changes. These concerns have been expressed forcefully by U.S. nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski, who has argued that the United States should negotiate United Arab Emirates-type cradle-to-grave supplier arrangements as an international gold standard and should not compromise.68 Others have raised the same concerns, and have also noted the strong correlation between nuclear energy cooperation and conventional arms deals.69 Concerns focus not on current U.S. and Vietnamese intentions, which are seen as legitimate, but on the possible unintended consequences of nuclear cooperation agreements: that is, even when both parties intend for them to boost security and stability by strengthening bilateral alliances and partnerships, they could have the opposite effect, increasing insecurities among neighbors, accelerating competitive dynamics among extraregional powers, and exacerbating proliferation challenges over the longer term.
These criticisms are occurring among a handful of the staunchest U.S. nonproliferation advocates. Outside this group, most U.S. officials, legislators, and analysts believe the approach they advocate is unnecessarily inflexible, unrealistic, and even unfair: why would or should Vietnam be strong-armed into signing away its rights; why should the United States insist upon this, especially when Vietnam is in good standing with its NPT commitments, and even has the Additional Protocol in force; and why would any country adopt a policy that would reinforce divisions in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, exacerbating long-standing sensitivities over the balance of rights and obligations?70 The United States, in common with Vietnam’s other negotiating partners, has shown that it is willing to accept Vietnam’s voluntary commitments, to be led by the VCP’s solid nonproliferation record, and to accept that Hanoi is unlikely to develop the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, given the huge costs involved and the availability of foreign fuel supplies.
MITIGATING PROLIFERATION RISKS
While it is unlikely that Vietnam would choose to develop a nuclear weapons program, it cannot be ruled out altogether. Indeed, it seems more credible today than it did just seven years ago, showing how quickly the strategic environment in East Asia is changing.95 This is a concern, notwithstanding Hanoi’s currently peaceful nuclear intentions, because a nuclear-armed Vietnam would present risks to its neighbors and the international community, and would undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The extent of the risks would depend on the governance of what William Walker and Nicholas J. Wheeler have called the two “nuclear estates” (the scientific/industrial domain and the military/defense establishments), the nature of decision-making among the Vietnamese policy executive, and the internal stability of the state.96 A nuclear-armed Vietnam would likely fit into a category of states that Walker and Wheeler, among other scholars, consider potentially problematic: states that are authoritarian, usually with high levels of corruption and militarization, with a leadership that is dedicated to the maintenance of internal control through fear and coercion.97 Walker and Wheeler categorize these states as “hard weak states,” in that they can superficially appear strong, but their weak civil societies and fragile legal and regulatory systems undermine their legitimacy and capacity for responsible nuclear sovereignty. In particular, a lack of transparency and checks on power can augment nuclear dangers, increasing the possibility of accidents and different forms of criminality, and heightening threat perceptions due to increased uncertainty and anxiety among neighbors.
Whatever the characteristics of Vietnam’s future nuclear governance, a Vietnamese nuclear weapons program would have serious consequences for ASEAN. First, it is unlikely that the Bangkok Treaty would survive a case of nuclear breakout, and although its disintegration would not necessarily lead to copycat programs elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the kind of strategic environment that could plausibly lead Vietnam to choose the nuclear path would create strong proliferation pressures among some of its ASEAN partners, particularly the Philippines and Thailand, and possibly also Indonesia and Malaysia. It would also likely have even wider regional repercussions beyond the nuclear realm, putting immense pressure on other regional institutional mechanisms, possibly even leading to the demise of ASEAN. A suspected illicit program (as opposed to a confirmed one) would not have the same dramatic impact; but if the intelligence was credible and the proliferation motives appeared to be strong, the fruits of years of ASEAN confidence-building efforts would be threatened, and depending on how the suspicions were handled, could lead to a more gradual demise of regional frameworks and the reemergence of the zero-sum strategic calculations and instability that dominated pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia.
Mitigating proliferation risks is therefore just as important in Southeast Asia as it is elsewhere: although the risks are low, they do exist, and they are rising due to uncertainties stemming from current power shifts. Of course, in addition to normative constraints, serious domestic and international deterrents confront any state that might be tempted to develop a nuclear weapons program, some of which are already strong, such as the threat of international sanctions and loss of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, or the chance that illicit nuclear activities would backfire, increasing insecurity by making the state a target of hostile counterproliferation actions. The fact that nuclear facilities can become military targets, and have been bombed in the past, would surely factor into any state’s calculations over whether pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program is worth the potentially very high price.
More important are positive constraints, especially bilateral and multilateral initiatives that have the potential to ameliorate strategic insecurities—the “win-win cooperation” that Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung alluded to at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue.98 Most of these mitigation measures are beyond the scope of this paper and require detailed studies in their own right: steps to enhance military transparency and deepen political and defense cooperation within ASEAN, between ASEAN and the wider region, and internationally.99 There are many possibilities, including parallel trilateral India-Vietnam-Japan, China-Vietnam-Australia, and U.S.-ASEAN-China initiatives, which would provide a platform for Indo-Pacific countries to seek peaceful solutions to issues of mutual concern, particularly in the maritime sphere. A number of these arrangements already exist in the region, including India-Japan-U.S. and Australia-Japan-U.S. trilaterals, but as yet none include Vietnam and most exclude China, which is likely to be counterproductive over the longer term. But if this imbalance can be rectified (a big if), and efforts turn to building genuinely inclusive and cooperative approaches to security, these types of arrangements could have a much more significant impact on nuclear proliferation dynamics than specifically targeted nonproliferation initiatives. This is because the former can help shape the international order as a whole, building strategic trust and reducing tensions, whereas the latter are directed at managing one aspect of a much bigger and more complex problem. Nevertheless, there are some important priorities in the nuclear realm that deserve attention.
A key step is to successfully conclude negotiations between ASEAN members and the nuclear weapons states (NWS) on the thorny issue of the Protocol of the Bangkok Treaty, which many hoped would be possible at the 20th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in July 2012.100 Unfortunately, at best, the Protocol talks have stalled, and there are even indications of regression in negotiating positions. This is especially true of China, which had previously favored signing the Protocol, but has begun repeating its pre-2004 objections over the Protocol’s challenge to its territory, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves.101 Reservations are also continuing to be raised by the other NWS, but from Vietnam’s perspective, China’s newly expressed resistance is likely to be especially troubling due to the difficult nature of Sino-Vietnam relations. Entry into force of the Protocol would have tremendous security benefits for Hanoi, given that Article 2 commits signatories to “undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State party to the [Bangkok] Treaty” and “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.”102 This might not seem particularly relevant in the context of current Chinese nuclear doctrine, which includes a “no first use” commitment, but reports of China’s nuclear expansion and modernization, combined with doubts over the sincerity and durability of Beijing’s no-first-use pledge,103 mean that it is much more significant for Vietnam than many realize. This makes the disappointed expectations of the 2012 negotiations and subsequent backtracking by the NWS all the more significant.
In addition to the negotiations over the Bangkok Treaty Protocol, several important initiatives are under way that specifically address nuclear issues in Southeast Asia, but in common with the Protocol negotiations, their success will largely be determined by much broader strategic imperatives. Specific initiatives, most of which are still at an early stage in their development and require much more focused attention, include:
- The new Plan of Action that will strengthen implementation of the SEANWFZ.104 The plan outlines several steps to ensure compliance with the undertakings of the Bangkok Treaty, including, most significantly, a commitment to implement a control system to verify treaty compliance, in line with the obligations listed in Articles 10–13. If implemented, this would help ASEAN members dispel suspicions that clandestine nuclear weapons activities are under way.
- The creation of numerous regional networking and capacity-building initiatives, which aim to build assurances among countries in Southeast Asia that nuclear energy plans are peaceful and will be implemented according to best practices in terms of safety, security, and safeguards. Key among these are ASEANTOM, which aims to promote best practices in nuclear safety, and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), which promotes the sharing of nuclear safeguards information, knowledge, and practical experiences among countries in the region. Southeast Asian members of APSN include Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
- Implementation of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), a regional security initiative that promises to improve strategic trade management in Southeast Asia. An agreement to establish and implement the ASW was signed on December 9, 2005, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, committing ASEAN members to coordinate and streamline the export control activities of their customs and other relevant agencies, which should make it easier to curtail the trade in proliferation-sensitive materials in Southeast Asia.105 However, nearly a decade after agreement was reached on its establishment, implementation has only recently begun.
- Annual meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. These formal discussions bring together officials from across the Asia-Pacific to highlight nuclear challenges, including those posed by the development of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, and to agree to Work Plans to enhance regional nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.106 A number of useful Track II activities feed into these meetings, including three that are held under the auspices of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). These are the Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Export Controls Experts Group, and the Nuclear Energy Experts Group, all of which meet twice a year and play important agenda-setting, bench-marking roles in the nuclear sphere.
- Ongoing awareness-raising activities of the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. This is a group of forty-three senior political, diplomatic, and military leaders from fourteen countries around the Asia-Pacific, the objective of which is to inform and energize public opinion, and especially high-level policy-makers, to take seriously the very real threats posed by nuclear weapons. In February 2013, the network published a paper exploring the concept of an Asia-Pacific nuclear energy community, which could enable and encourage high-level consultation on nuclear plans and programs, including collaborative arrangements for fuel cycle management.107
History shows that uncertainty and controversy are features of most cases of suspected non-compliance—features that are often exploited by non-compliant states to buy more time to pursue their illicit activities. Breaking this unhealthy cycle is crucial and there are steps that ASEAN members could take to help. One positive step would be to encourage states in Southeast Asia to launch regional discussions on the conditions under which an IAEA special inspection would be considered appropriate. ASEAN members could also progressively extend the nonproliferation function of regional bodies to address potential future proliferation threats, so that they work more closely with the IAEA to increase the transparency and accountability of regional nuclear energy programs. Vietnam’s adoption of the Additional Protocol is a very positive step in this regard. However, once nuclear power plants become operational (and especially if the attention turns to the possibility for indigenous enrichment and reprocessing), the time would be ripe for regional dialogue on how the Additional Protocol could be improved. Areas for possible improvement include regular updates of Annex II, which lists equipment and materials specially designed and prepared for nuclear use. The current Annex II list, which was compiled in 1997, is rapidly becoming outdated. Bringing the list into line with the regularly updated Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List would significantly strengthen the Additional Protocol. Another potential improvement would be to extend Annex II so that it includes information on dual-use items as well as equipment and materials specifically prepared for nuclear use. This would increase the IAEA’s ability to seek out and identify indicators of possible undeclared nuclear activities for further investigation by increasing access to information on procurement. Beyond IAEA safeguards, ASEAN members could also discuss innovative regional nuclear arrangements that would offer maximum transparency and efficiency savings, including the concept of shared, multinationally manned facilities.108
Currently, these are very sensitive topics for debate in the ASEAN context, not least due to concerns that strengthened nonproliferation mechanisms are associated with the activities of the NSG, which is unpopular among many developing states. Devising strategies for sensitively handling these discussions would be paramount, because they can arouse the suspicions—often expressed by NAM members in global forums—that unfair hurdles are being strewn into the path of nuclear energy aspirants, in contravention of Article IV of the NPT. Vietnamese officials, who are otherwise proactive on proliferation issues, often express these concerns. This is a strong indication that discussions on strengthened safeguards and innovative regional arrangements need to keep in step with nuclear energy development in Southeast Asia, rather than racing ahead of it.109 Discussions should especially be encouraged in selective regional forums among ASEAN members, with IAEA representation but without the participation of extraregional states. There are numerous regional forums that would be suitable, including the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting and the ADMM. The newly established ASEANTOM, which held its first meeting in Thailand in September 2013, could also potentially play a role, helping stimulate ASEAN-wide debate and feed expert advice from national regulatory authorities into elite level discussions. The same forums could be used to stimulate discussion over the potential for the emergence of an A. Q. Khan figure in Southeast Asia, on the need for enhanced regional information-sharing and nuclear forensics expertise to ensure the early identification of such an individual (or group of individuals), and on the need to develop strategies for curtailing their activities.
Source:Nuclear Power in Vietnam: International Responses and Future Prospects - American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Seriously why do you always dream about getting WMD? 
You do realize the US invaded Iraq and wanted to invade Syria because they believe those rogue nations possesses WMD in the first place.
