BATMAN
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And throw out all the Indian crap, which they intook after 911 due to animosity with Pakistan.
China asks local airlines to ground Boeing 737 Max
- Thread starter ZeEa5KPul
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Jlaw
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Airbus is better imo.
At least Trump is more rational than the fake FAA.
Enigma SIG
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Don't take my word for it. The MCAS does "emphasis" rely on a single sensor. That my friend is shoddy engineering. And supposedly some expert people here were denying the fact. Reference below:
https://arstechnica.com/information...delayed-by-government-shutdown-report-claims/
Enigma SIG
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This takes the definition of criminal to new highs. Apparently senior members were refuting my earlier assumption that the 737max flight contol systems relied on a single sensor.
Yet here we are; a single point of failure that doesn't make sense coming from a company that has been manufacturing planes for decades.
Boeing downplayed 737 MAX software risks, self-certified much of plane’s safety.
Recovered "black box" data from Ethiopia crash shows similarities to Lion Air disaster.
On Sunday, Ethiopia's transport minister announced that information recovered from flight data recorders aboard the ill-fated Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 revealed "clear similarities" to the data from the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 off Indonesia last October. And analysis of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft's control surfaces had put the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 into a dive just before it crashed, killing all aboard.
While the investigation is still underway, the flight data increases the focus on Boeing's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight software—software developed to help manage the shifted handling characteristics of the 737 MAX aircraft from other 737s. And that software, it turns out, was originally presented to the Federal Aviation Administration as much less risky than it actually was, which limited FAA oversight.
Now the Transportation Department and Justice Department have launched a new investigation into how Boeing got the initial safety certification for the 737 MAX from the FAA two years ago.
The Seattle Times reports that Boeing may have undersold the safety impact of the MCAS system during its 2015 safety certification review. Engineers who worked on the program told the Times' Dominic Gates that the safety analysis of MCAS presented to the FAA understated the magnitude of control adjustments the software could make. It also failed to take into account that, unlike previous automatic stabilizer trim systems, MCAS would reset itself each time a pilot corrected against it—in other 737s, overriding an anti-stall correction would disable the software's changes.
Additionally, the MCAS system was designed to work based on input from only one sensor—despite the fact that Boeing rated a failure of the system as "hazardous." That level of risk—which in itself was understated, according to engineers—should have been enough to require redundant sensors.
All of these understated analyses gave the FAA a false picture of the impact of the MCAS system, which was presented as a simple modification of systems aboard existing 737s. But the changes were enough that Brazilian authorities cited a need for additional pilot training on the 737 MAX even while the FAA allowed the system to go essentially unmentioned in US operation manuals.
Safety efficiency
Boeing has had wide latitude over a number of safety checks for years, despite warnings from Department of Transportation auditors in 2012 that the FAA was not doing enough to "hold Boeing accountable." That's because the FAA and Congress have given increasing power to aircraft designers over safety certifications in the name of government efficiency.
The FAA has outsourced safety certification for some parts of new aircraft to their manufacturers for decades, but the agency used to have approval authority over which engineers were selected for the job. In 2005, the FAA started to loosen regulations over Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), giving the companies more leeway over who was selected to do the work. While they were technically employees under FAA's authority, the engineers were still managed by the companies.
The changes were completely in place by 2009, and according to investigators, they gave Boeing a lot of leverage over safety-certification engineers. As Bloomberg reports, the 2012 Department of Transportation audit found that Boeing had created a "negative work environment" for engineers reviewing new designs—to the degree that many interviewed by auditors said that they'd faced retaliation for bringing up concerns.
Additional concerns were raised over Boeing's safety-certification practices in 2015 after fires aboard 787 "Dreamliners" were caused by lithium batteries used in auxiliary power. But under the Trump administration, things have been loosened up even more. In October of 2017—six months after the 737 MAX was certified—President Donald Trump signed a law that allows aircraft manufacturers to press the FAA to give them authority over how they certify components considered to be low- or medium-risk items. And if the manufacturers can convince the FAA that something falls into one of those two categories, they could essentially have free rein over how they certify their craft as safe.
Yet here we are; a single point of failure that doesn't make sense coming from a company that has been manufacturing planes for decades.
Boeing downplayed 737 MAX software risks, self-certified much of plane’s safety.
Recovered "black box" data from Ethiopia crash shows similarities to Lion Air disaster.
On Sunday, Ethiopia's transport minister announced that information recovered from flight data recorders aboard the ill-fated Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 revealed "clear similarities" to the data from the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 off Indonesia last October. And analysis of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft's control surfaces had put the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 into a dive just before it crashed, killing all aboard.
While the investigation is still underway, the flight data increases the focus on Boeing's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight software—software developed to help manage the shifted handling characteristics of the 737 MAX aircraft from other 737s. And that software, it turns out, was originally presented to the Federal Aviation Administration as much less risky than it actually was, which limited FAA oversight.
Now the Transportation Department and Justice Department have launched a new investigation into how Boeing got the initial safety certification for the 737 MAX from the FAA two years ago.
The Seattle Times reports that Boeing may have undersold the safety impact of the MCAS system during its 2015 safety certification review. Engineers who worked on the program told the Times' Dominic Gates that the safety analysis of MCAS presented to the FAA understated the magnitude of control adjustments the software could make. It also failed to take into account that, unlike previous automatic stabilizer trim systems, MCAS would reset itself each time a pilot corrected against it—in other 737s, overriding an anti-stall correction would disable the software's changes.
Additionally, the MCAS system was designed to work based on input from only one sensor—despite the fact that Boeing rated a failure of the system as "hazardous." That level of risk—which in itself was understated, according to engineers—should have been enough to require redundant sensors.
All of these understated analyses gave the FAA a false picture of the impact of the MCAS system, which was presented as a simple modification of systems aboard existing 737s. But the changes were enough that Brazilian authorities cited a need for additional pilot training on the 737 MAX even while the FAA allowed the system to go essentially unmentioned in US operation manuals.
Safety efficiency
Boeing has had wide latitude over a number of safety checks for years, despite warnings from Department of Transportation auditors in 2012 that the FAA was not doing enough to "hold Boeing accountable." That's because the FAA and Congress have given increasing power to aircraft designers over safety certifications in the name of government efficiency.
The FAA has outsourced safety certification for some parts of new aircraft to their manufacturers for decades, but the agency used to have approval authority over which engineers were selected for the job. In 2005, the FAA started to loosen regulations over Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), giving the companies more leeway over who was selected to do the work. While they were technically employees under FAA's authority, the engineers were still managed by the companies.
The changes were completely in place by 2009, and according to investigators, they gave Boeing a lot of leverage over safety-certification engineers. As Bloomberg reports, the 2012 Department of Transportation audit found that Boeing had created a "negative work environment" for engineers reviewing new designs—to the degree that many interviewed by auditors said that they'd faced retaliation for bringing up concerns.
Additional concerns were raised over Boeing's safety-certification practices in 2015 after fires aboard 787 "Dreamliners" were caused by lithium batteries used in auxiliary power. But under the Trump administration, things have been loosened up even more. In October of 2017—six months after the 737 MAX was certified—President Donald Trump signed a law that allows aircraft manufacturers to press the FAA to give them authority over how they certify components considered to be low- or medium-risk items. And if the manufacturers can convince the FAA that something falls into one of those two categories, they could essentially have free rein over how they certify their craft as safe.
gambit
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What are the odds that your understanding of 'sensor' is wrong?
What are the odds of your understanding that the sensor is working well and will not cost a dive even it's not working well?
gambit
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Better than all of you -- COMBINED -- on how the overall system works, where the system can fail, and how it can fail.
Lol, I know u can't answer that and desperately defending the likely outcome where Boeing need to bear the fault. Just like how US destroyer crushed into merchant ships and some fools still trying to paint merchant ship needs to bear most fault. Guess what is the outcome?
gambit
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You know shit. I have explained the foundation of modern day avionics many times over. No one on this forum takes you Chinese seriously when it comes to technical subjects.
TaiShang
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More trouble for Boeing.
***
Boeing 737-800 Makes Emergency Landing in Russia, Engine Trouble Possible
Source:sputniknews.com Published: 2019/3/19
A Boeing 737-800 aircraft made an emergency landing in the northwest of Russia, in the city of Syktyvkar on Friday. The regional transport office of the Russian Investigative Committee is looking into the incident, which may have involved engine failure, a representative of the committee told Sputnik.
"It [the emergency landing in Syktyvkar] did happen. A preliminary investigation is ongoing. The preliminary version is that engine failure was the reason," the representative said.
The aircraft, which was travelling from the town of Mirny located in the east of Russia to Moscow, is in Syktyvkar airport, and passengers are safe and unharmed, the official said.
This comes after Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft model, a newer series than the 737-800s, has been under fire over the crash in Ethiopia on Sunday, which prompted many countries around the world, including the US, China, the EU and Russia, to either close their airspace for the aircraft model or suspend Boeing 737 Max flights. All 157 people from over 30 countries who were on board were killed.
The recent crash was the second deadly incident involving the aircraft in less than five months.
In late October 2018, another Boeing 737 MAX 8, operated by Indonesia's Lion Air, plunged into the Java Sea following take-off; 189 people died as a result. According to the preliminary investigation, the plane's sensors were showing incorrect speed and altitude readings.
***
Boeing 737-800 Makes Emergency Landing in Russia, Engine Trouble Possible
Source:sputniknews.com Published: 2019/3/19
A Boeing 737-800 aircraft made an emergency landing in the northwest of Russia, in the city of Syktyvkar on Friday. The regional transport office of the Russian Investigative Committee is looking into the incident, which may have involved engine failure, a representative of the committee told Sputnik.
"It [the emergency landing in Syktyvkar] did happen. A preliminary investigation is ongoing. The preliminary version is that engine failure was the reason," the representative said.
The aircraft, which was travelling from the town of Mirny located in the east of Russia to Moscow, is in Syktyvkar airport, and passengers are safe and unharmed, the official said.
This comes after Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft model, a newer series than the 737-800s, has been under fire over the crash in Ethiopia on Sunday, which prompted many countries around the world, including the US, China, the EU and Russia, to either close their airspace for the aircraft model or suspend Boeing 737 Max flights. All 157 people from over 30 countries who were on board were killed.
The recent crash was the second deadly incident involving the aircraft in less than five months.
In late October 2018, another Boeing 737 MAX 8, operated by Indonesia's Lion Air, plunged into the Java Sea following take-off; 189 people died as a result. According to the preliminary investigation, the plane's sensors were showing incorrect speed and altitude readings.
powastick
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TaiShang
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It appears that Boeing has strong influence over FAA, including their safety checks.
This is a form of legalized corruption.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/inve...e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html?noredirect=on
gambit
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As usual, people jumped to conclusion without doing even basic research...
https://www.aeroinside.com/item/494...on-nov-5th-2014-loss-of-4000-feet-of-altitude
https://www.aviationtoday.com/1999/10/01/safety-if-it-was-good-enough-for-the-wright-brothers/
Is waiting for investigation data too much to ask? Apparently so.
https://www.aeroinside.com/item/494...on-nov-5th-2014-loss-of-4000-feet-of-altitude
The angle-of-attack sensor is not a unique component to Boeing's aircrafts. The AOA sensor went back to the Wright Flyer.
https://www.aviationtoday.com/1999/10/01/safety-if-it-was-good-enough-for-the-wright-brothers/
Every single aircraft design -- civilian and military -- have experienced AOA errors, either from a design/engineering flaw or from manufacturing defects or from maintenance. Lufthansa's Airbus A321 flight 1829 is one example of where the flight control system (FLCS) detected a measurement discrepancy between its two AOA sensors and the system reacted as programmed -- nose down.
Is waiting for investigation data too much to ask? Apparently so.
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