Chief of Army Staff | General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

[Agni5000]

A Picture equals thousand words.

I am outsider, but could not resist.

If he is so popular, he will not self extend his retirement age and hold army, he would have contested election.
My solution is PA should start a political party. Anyway they run bank, bakery, construction etc..

 

[muse]

Spiteful in defeat, as our post above has indicated, the US policy makers imagine they will be able to sell anti-terrorism to US citizenry - and they just might, because what they are seeking is a response out of Pakistan which will justify to both the Afghan leadership and the home population, an open ended presence -- and they may get it --- But what if they don't and what if things don't go as planned, will then then divide Afghanistan? And how much will that cost?





June 22, 2011
Drawing Down, With a Vigilant Eye on Pakistan
By DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON — Hours after the Sept. 11 attacks, Pakistan’s leaders were given an ultimatum by the Bush administration: Because the looming war in Afghanistan could not be won without Pakistan’s help, Islamabad would have to choose between continuing its alliance with the Taliban or joining forces with the United States.

Just shy of 10 years later, President Obama’s announcement on Wednesday night that he is beginning the long-anticipated withdrawal from Afghanistan marks another step in the gradual reversal of that calculus. Though the president could not say so directly, one of the constraints on America’s retreat from a hard and bloody decade is the recognition that, more than ever, the United States will be relying on Afghanistan’s help to deal with the threats emerging from Pakistan.

The administration argues that the killing of Osama bin Laden last month at his compound deep inside Pakistan, combined with scores of other counterterrorism strikes, have given it greater leeway to reduce its troop numbers in Afghanistan. Yet Pakistan’s angry reaction to that raid also makes it more urgent than ever that the United States maintain sites outside the country to launch drone and commando raids against the militant networks that remain in Pakistan, and to make sure that Pakistan’s fast-growing nuclear arsenal never falls into the wrong hands.

What the raid of the Bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, “demonstrated more vividly than ever is that we need a base to strike targets in Pakistan, and the geography is simple: You need to do that from Afghanistan,” said Bruce Reidel, a retired C.I.A. officer who conducted Mr. Obama’s first review of strategy in the region.

As such, there are two reasons American planners hope to negotiate with the government of President Hamid Karzai an agreement to keep upward of 25,000 American forces in Afghanistan, even after the 30,000 “surge” troops are withdrawn over the next 14 months, and tens of thousands of more by the end of 2014.

Their first is to assure that Afghanistan never again becomes a base for attacks on the United States. But the more urgent reason is Pakistan. In his speech, Mr. Obama invited Pakistan to expand its peaceful cooperation in the region, but he also noted that Pakistan must live up to its commitments and that “the U.S. will never tolerate a safe haven for those who would destroy us.”

Pakistan has already made it clear, however, that it will never allow American forces to be based there. As relations have turned more hostile with the United States in recent months, it has refused to issue visas to large numbers of C.I.A. officers and seems to be moving quickly to close the American drone base in Shamsi, Pakistan.

For their part, administration officials make it clearer than ever that they view Pakistan’s harboring of terrorist groups as the more urgent problem. “We don’t see a transnational threat coming out of Afghanistan,” a senior administration official said Wednesday in briefing reporters before the president’s speech. Later he added, “The threat has come from Pakistan.”

Those realities have placed increasing pressure on Obama administration officials to secure some long-term success from the war in Afghanistan. That is by no means guaranteed. As the bulk of international forces leave, the country may yet descend into civil war and chaos.

Indeed, several senior administration officials acknowledged in recent days that the announcement by Mr. Obama merely put the best face possible on a three-year plan to retreat from what was once an expansive experiment in nation-building.

The key goal now will be a diminished one — counterterrorism work to finish off Al Qaeda — that is far closer to the mission that Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and some political aides at the White House argued for 18 months ago. With Wednesday’s announcement, President Obama indicated that he has slowly inched toward that view as well.

“The hard part over the next few years will be proving to the Afghans that there is something in this for them,” Mr. Reidel said.

That is particularly difficult because what the Afghans may well draw from Mr. Obama’s prime-time speech is that the Americans are leaving again — just as they did after the Soviet Union gave up its war in 1989 — but this time more slowly.

Over the past decade, the Afghans heard many promises from Washington. Months after ordering the invasion that drove out the Taliban government, President George W. Bush declared that the United States would initiate a new Marshall Plan for Afghanistan; it never fully materialized.

In 2009 Mr. Obama spoke of a “civilian surge” of “agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers” who would train Afghans how to create a modern country. The results have been limited, and Mr. Obama never mentioned those goals in the speech Wednesday night.

Administration officials insist that those efforts will continue, despite the drawdown. Even after all the “surge” forces return home, there will still be 68,000 American troops on the ground next year — more than twice the number that were in Afghanistan the day Mr. Obama took office.

But over time, the counterterrorism mission will require fewer troops in the region, administration officials said.

“When we think about Al Qaeda and we talk about them within Afghanistan, we say it is about 50 or 75 folks who are actually in there as fighters, and mostly they are embedded within Haqqani units,” one senior administration official said in an interview last week, referring to a militant network based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The official made clear that the administration’s primary focus now was a much larger, and more dangerous, presence of insurgents remaining in Pakistan.

The essence of Mr. Obama’s decision is to accelerate what’s working — no matter how loudly the Pakistanis protest about drone strikes and violations of their sovereignty.

Over the past few weeks, officials have used that same logic to justify a steeper reduction of forces in Afghanistan.

“What they are doing, of course, is changing the metrics of success,” said David Rothkopf, who wrote a leading history of the National Security Council, which has led Mr. Obama’s effort to narrow the objectives in Afghanistan — and focus anew on counterterrorism strikes inside Pakistan.

“It was only a few years ago that we debated how long it would take to train the Afghan military to take the lead in securing the most violent, contested parts of the country,” he added. “Or how long it would take to build schools and courts and provide basic services. No one wants to talk about that very much any more — the time lines are longer and the costs larger than the politics here at home will bear.”

 

[S.M.R]

I am outsider, but could not resist.

If he is so popular, he will not self extend his retirement age and hold army, he would have contested election.
My solution is PA should start a political party. Anyway they run bank, bakery, construction etc..

Just read the bold parts, Who told you that? Anything substantiating your claim?

 

[air marshal]

No PR150/2011-ISPR - Rawalpindi - June 23, 2011: Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani visited various locations of South Waziristan Agency to review the progress of development projects being undertaken under Army’s supervision.

COAS inaugurated Road Wana - Angoor Adda Section of total 220 Kilometers Road network in Waziristan Agency being constructed by Frontier Works Organization. The road projects will provide access to local tribes of Waziristan with settled areas of Pakistan and will also provide link with Afghanistan.

The new roads will provide economic opportunities and open a trade route for locals Tribes. COAS also inaugurated Cadet College Wana recently established by the Army. While addressing the Wazir elders, he emphasized the need for educating the youth and also thanked the locals for their support and cooperation.

Later COAS visited Modal Village, Government High School and market complex at Chagmali, reconstructed by the Army. He performed earth breaking of Waziristan Institute of Technical Education (WITE) established to impart technical education to the local youth. He also visited rehabilitation projects at Kotkai and lauded efforts of local formation to develop the areas badly affected by terrorism. He appreciated the great sacrifices and efforts of recently returned IDP’s at Chagmali and Kotkai.

Earlier on arrival, COAS was received by Corps Commander Peshawar Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik.

 

[air marshal]

Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in a Group Photo with the Cadets and Teachers of the Cadet College Wana on (23 Jun 2011)-Photo ISPR.

Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani inaugurated the newly Constructed Cadet College Wana during his visit to South Waziristan on (23 Jun 2011)-Photo ISPR

Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani shaking hand with the cadet of the Cadet College Wana during his visit on the eve of the inauguration of the Cadet College Wana on (23 Jun 2011)-Photo ISPR

 

[air marshal]

 

[fatman17]

General Kayani shows no signs of quitting soon


* Participants of NDU meeting where army chief fielded questions say he showed no outward sign of being under pressure


ISLAMABAD: At the height of the storm which swept Pakistan after the May 2 killing of Osama bin Laden, army chief General Ashfaq Kayani spoke for 1-1/2 hours, then told his officers they could ask whatever they wanted, and lit a cigarette.

“This is a very delicate situation,” he said, in answer to a question about relations with the United States at the National Defence University on May 19. “It’s not an easy one.” “If we come out of it, keep our relevance and show them we are part of the solution, not part of the problem, we will succeed,” Kayani said in one of a series of “town hall” meetings he held to revive army morale. Those meetings have since fuelled speculation - particularly in the United States - that the most powerful man in Pakistan, by opening himself up to questions, is fighting for survival.

Participants at the meeting, however, said Kayani showed no outward sign of being under pressure as he sat in full dress uniform at a table on the same level as his audience. Equipped only with a file, ashtray and glass of water and facing rows of some 80 officers along with a few civilians, he patiently answered questions from all ranks. “In uniform, we tend to see everything in black and white,” Kayani said when a young colonel asked why Pakistan kept a relationship United States if Washington did not trust it. “In the real world there are a lot of grey areas and you have to deal with it.”


A Reuters correspondent attended the meeting, but since it was off-the-record did not report it until after participants themselves relayed to the media versions of what Kayani had said. The Pakistan Army has come under intense pressure since US forces found and killed bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad on May 2. That same month terrorists attacked a naval base in Karachi and blew up two maritime patrol aircraft. Nobody knows what is going to happen next.

Yet no one expects Kayani to step down any time soon. And nor do they expect his most senior officers to turn against him. “The army as an institution is under attack so if the Corps Commanders ask him to leave, that unleashes a very explosive dynamic,” said Imtiaz Gul at the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad. “That’s why the Corps Commanders will never ask him to step down.”

In inviting questions, Kayani was following a military tradition where officers encourage their men to express their doubts before going into battle, but after the orders are given, expect them to be followed without question. “In the military, it is regarded as a reflection of loyalty if you are frank,” said General (retired) Ehsan ul-Haq, when recalling meetings of the Corps Commanders, the army’s top officers with command over troops across the country.

At the evening meeting at the National Defence University, Kayani, far from appearing on the defensive, actively encouraged questions. When a young female student put up her hand to ask a question and the officer running the event said there was no more time – it was by then nearly midnight – Kayani insisted on answering it. The student asked about the threats Pakistan faced. Kayani in response made no mention of Pakistan’s traditional rival India – the subject did not come at all in four-hour long session. “What worries me is the indirect threat and that is the economy,” he said. “If you want to be secure ... you have to address your internal situation and the economy is the major issue.”

And rather than relying on the Americans for money, Pakistan should reform its economy and raise taxes domestically. “We have to stand up on our own feet and we cannot do this unless we have a strong economy,” he said. reuters

 

[muse]

“What worries me is the indirect threat and that is the economy,” he said. “If you want to be secure ... you have to address your internal situation and the economy is the major issue.”

And rather than relying on the Americans for money, Pakistan should reform its economy and raise taxes domestically. “We have to stand up on our own feet and we cannot do this unless we have a strong economy,” he said

To me that's the most important part of the piece fatman just posted -- the realization within the armed forces, that the economy not India, no Afghanistan, not US or NATO, bu the economy, is or should be the priority suggests that the armed forces have internalized that strength and power arise from the economy in this multi-polar dynamic.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

To me that's the most important part of the piece fatman just posted -- the realization within the armed forces, that the economy not India, no Afghanistan, not US or NATO, bu the economy, is or should be the priority suggests that the armed forces have internalized that strength and power arise from the economy in this multi-polar dynamic.

It's simply the truth. I'm glad the anti-army brigades didnt --in their normal fashion -- come in and say "dont interfere with civilian domain" kind of nonsense

lol who is in charge of the economy.....? Every public enterprise is chock full of circular debt!

 

[nescafe]

I am outsider, but could not resist.

If he is so popular, he will not self extend his retirement age and hold army, he would have contested election.
My solution is PA should start a political party. Anyway they run bank, bakery, construction etc..

they are the most successful political party.

 

[VCheng]

To me that's the most important part of the piece fatman just posted -- the realization within the armed forces, that the economy not India, no Afghanistan, not US or NATO, bu the economy, is or should be the priority suggests that the armed forces have internalized that strength and power arise from the economy in this multi-polar dynamic.

Well, DUH! as Homer Simpson would say.

The problems have been allowed to fester and grow unmanaged for so long that it will not be easy to set the economic house in order anytime soon. This will expose Pakistan to a certain measure of risk it can ill afford at this time.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,


See---the general---out of kindness and pressure tried to do the thing that he thought it was right to do---but there is an issue of marketing and directing the thinking of the soldiers and officers in a different direction---the american perspective needs to be seen by the pakistani army----for that a pakistani american needs to speak to the soldiers---heart to heart---soul to soul---.

I don't see anything special handled in that meeting accept that the general officer wanted to sit in front of his soldiers and ' take it like a man '---. I commend him for that ---he should have stood up for pakistan in front of the world forum---or he should have someone else speak on his behalf----.

The u s should have not been able to blast pakistan as it did---somebody should have been designated to fight for the pak millitary---somebody who knew both the sides well----. The american media as well as pres Obama has severely damaged pakistan's image --- pak needs to learn to talk to the u s in kind---in the same tone and manner as the u s does.

The general must not do such a thing again---it is just like a father sitting in front of his children---asking them to beat him up verbally---what are the children going to do---. Basically a wrong approach---bad tactics---bad technique---somebody needs to talk to the officers and share the other view from the prism.

Remember the example I gave on this board a few days ago about Jonathan Pollard---our ambassador used that in front of the congress as well----. Shut them up a tad bit----.

 

[fatman17]

Militant Sympathies in Pakistani Army's Senior Ranks

By Reza Jan

June 22, 2011


On Tuesday, Major General Athar Abbas, the head of the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), confirmed that the Pakistani army arrested Brigadier General Ali Khan for links to the banned extremist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and for possibly “plotting an attack on a military target.”[1] The arrest is significant as it highlights the unprecedented level of extremist infiltration into the Pakistani army. It is also unusual that the Pakistani military has chosen to deal with such a sensitive case in a fairly public manner.

That the officer in question, Brigadier Ali Khan, was arrested for links to an extremist organization is alarming given his background as much as his rank. Brig. Khan is a decorated military officer with a “brilliant” service record and comes from a family with “three generations of military service.”[2] Brig. Khan was assigned to the Pakistani military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi where he was posted in the Regulation Directorate, a human resources branch of the army.[3]

Brig. Khan has reportedly been in custody since May 6, just four days after the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad.[4] According to media reports, Brig. Khan had been under surveillance for some time for his links to HuT.[5] The Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani had reportedly asked to be personally briefed on the case and after being “satisfied by the weight of the ‘evidence,’ ordered the arrest himself.”[6] Efforts are also reportedly underway to track down other members of HuT with whom Brig. Khan may have had contact, and four more majors are currently being investigated.[7]

HuT is an Islamic extremist organization that rejects democracy and calls for the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate.[8] Banned in Pakistan, it operates openly in many countries across the world, including the U.S. and U.K. While the group publicly disavows violence and claims to be distinct from al Qaeda, it operates “in a gray area where global jihadi sympathies lurk.”[9] Indeed, while it does not make explicit calls for violence, it “promotes an intolerant mindset” that could encourage its adherents to take up militancy.[10] It frequently urges its followers in the military to revolt against their superiors and the Pakistani state.[11] HuT has had particular success over the years in infiltrating the military due to its strategy of recruiting people from the “urban, educated and professional segments of society.”[12] Just last year, two officers were court-martialled for having links to HuT.[13]

News of the arrest comes at a particularly sensitive time for the Pakistani military. Public perception of the army and morale within the military have hit historic lows following a series of embarrassing incidents, including the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town, the military’s apparent inability to stop the U.S. raid that killed bin Laden, a siege on a military base in Karachi by Taliban commandos, the publicized extrajudicial killing of an unarmed man by paramilitary forces in Karachi, and the torture and murder of a popular journalist widely attributed to the ISI.[14] This latest issue is only likely to add to the very full plate of Gen. Kayani who, facing unprecedented levels of pressure from inside and outside the army, is reportedly fighting to keep his job.[15]

The arrest of so high-ranking an officer for links to militant groups and for potentially plotting attacks against a military target is alarming. Militant infiltration in the lower ranks of the Pakistani army has long been a problem, but this is the first publicized case of radicalization at such a senior level; indeed, Brig. Khan is the most senior officer arrested in nearly a decade.[16] Fears of extremist infiltration and sympathies in the military have been bolstered, especially in the wake of the bin Laden raid, the Karachi base siege, and the alleged leaking to militants by sources in the Pakistani military of classified information provided by the U.S.[17] Strong suspicions persist that bin Laden was receiving support at some level from rogue officers in the Pakistani military; the Taliban militants who besieged PNS Mehran are believed to have had inside help in planning their attack.[18] Similar suspicions were held following an attack on GHQ in 2009. According to a report in early June, the navy had detained and was questioning a number of officers suspected of links to al Qaeda.[19] A leaked cable from 2006 reports a Pakistani air force commander complaining of airmen committing acts of sabotage against jets being used against Taliban and al Qaeda militants in the northwest.[20] Some military analysts see Brig. Khan’s arrest as the latest indication that the Pakistan Army is slowly coming around to the danger posed by this “inside threat,” and that this arrest would force the army to reexamine its vetting process, especially for higher ranked officers.[21] The overriding fear is that of radicalized officers colluding to put a nuclear weapon into the hands of Islamist terrorists.

It is unclear if Brig. Khan’s arrest marks the beginning of a genuine crackdown on radicalism and militant links in the military. There are concerns that Brig. Khan’s arrest may simply be an attempt to deflect U.S. pressure and criticism that the Pakistani military refuses to break its ties with militant Islamist organizations.[22] Indeed, it is unusual that the military is now publicizing an arrest made over a month ago of so senior an officer for having links to extremists. The Pakistani military normally tries to deal with such issues internally and out of public scrutiny.[23] There does not appear to be any shift so far in the military’s stance towards the Haqqani Network or Lashkar-e-Taiba, two dangerous trans-national terrorist organizations based in Pakistan that the Pakistani military has taken no significant action against.

In the end it seems as if the army continues to make distinctions between official policies supporting certain radical groups that serve its purpose, and the internal, unchecked radicalization of its own personnel. It remains relatively intolerant of the latter, especially where that radicalization could lead to soldiers turning against the army and the state. What it does not seem to grasp is that this policy dichotomy is only likely to increase the rot on the inside. Until the army is prepared to cut its links and crack down upon the full menu of militant Islamist groups in Pakistan, it will continue to see its personnel radicalized by association. The longer it takes to come to this realization, the more militant sympathizers it will likely have to deal with within its ranks, and the more difficult it will become over time to reverse the radicalization backslide. The future of the Pakistani military and indeed the state depends on the military seeing this incident as a systematic problem and taking action before it is too late. Brig. Khan should be the first of many steps in that direction.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Maj. Gen. Abbas said that an investigation was ongoing and that “strict disciplinary action” would be taken. “We follow [a] zero tolerance policy of such activities within the military therefore prompt action was taken on detection,” he said.
Kamran Yousef, “Army confirms brigadier’s arrest for extremist ties,” Express Tribune, June 22, 2011. Available at Army confirms brigadier
Jennie Matthew, “Pakistani officer arrested over links with banned group,” AFP, June 21, 2011. Available at AFP: Pakistani officer arrested over links with banned group
Robert Mackey, “Pakistan Detains Senior Army Officer over Suspected Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at Pakistan Detains Senior Army Officer Over Suspected Militant Ties - NYTimes.com
[2] Brig. Khan’s father was a junior commissioned officer in the army, and his son and son-in-law are both captains. Brig. Khan’s brother is currently a serving colonel in an “intelligence agency,” likely a veiled reference to the Pakistani military’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
“Pakistan army office held for ‘links with extremists,’” BBC, June 21, 2011. Available at BBC News - Pakistan army officer held for 'links with extremists'
[3] Prior to his time at GHQ, Brig. Khan served as a commander in Azad Kashmir and even completed a military training course in the United States several years ago. He had reportedly previously been denied a promotion due to his Islamist leanings and was set to retire soon.
Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Brigadier held for links with extremists,” Dawn, June 21, 2011. Available at Brigadier held for links with extremists | Newspaper | DAWN.COM
[4] Jennie Matthew, “Pakistani officer arrested over links with banned group,” AFP, June 21, 2011. Available at AFP: Pakistani officer arrested over links with banned group
[5] “Senior officer detained for links with Islamists,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 21, 2011. Available at Nexis.com
[6] “Pakistan army office held for ‘links with extremists,’” BBC, June 21, 2011. Available at BBC News - Pakistan army officer held for 'links with extremists'
[7] Pakistan probes officers over banned group links,” AFP, June 22, 2011. Available at Pakistan probes officers over banned group links - Yahoo! News
[8] Munir Ahmed, “Pakistan army asks 4 officers about extremist ties,” AP, June 22, 2011. Available at Pakistan army officer held on extremism suspicions - Yahoo! News
[9] Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
[10] Munir Ahmed, “Pakistan army officer held on extremism suspicions,” AP, June 21, 2011. Available at Pakistan army officer held on extremism suspicions - Yahoo! News
[11] In a 2010 letter, HuT called for soldiers to overthrow the government and military leadership for their alliances with the United States. Following the raid that killed bin Laden on May 2, HuT members “clandestinely dropped pamphlets in military cantonments” calling on military officers to “establish an Islamic caliphate.”
Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
Robert Mackey, “Pakistan Detains Senior Army Officer Over Suspected Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at Pakistan Detains Senior Army Officer Over Suspected Militant Ties - NYTimes.com
[12] Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
[13] “Pakistan army office held for ‘links with extremists,’” BBC, June 21, 2011. Available at BBC News - Pakistan army officer held for 'links with extremists'
[14] Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Chief of Army Fights to Keep His Job,” New York Times, June 15, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/asia/16pakistan.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all
“In wake of bin Laden raid, Pakistani chief works on military pride, shoring up own position,” AP, June 19, 2011. Available at In wake of bin Laden raid, Pakistani chief works on military pride, shoring up own position - The Washington Post
[15] Gen. Kayani is reportedly facing a strong backlash from a number of his corps commanders and junior officers who are seething at the embarrassment of the bin Laden raid and Pakistan’s perceived closeness to the U.S.; they view Gen. Kayani as the main force behind the relationship.
Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Chief of Army Fights to Keep His Job,” New York Times, June 15, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/asia/16pakistan.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all
“In wake of bin Laden raid, Pakistani chief works on military pride, shoring up own position,” AP, June 19, 2011. Available at In wake of bin Laden raid, Pakistani chief works on military pride, shoring up own position - The Washington Post
[16] Kamran Haider, “Pakistan arrests brigadier over Islamist ties,” Reuters, June 21, 2011. Available at Pakistan arrests brigadier over Islamist ties | Reuters
[17] Kimberly Dozier, “AP sources: Pakistanis tip off militants again,” June 19, 2011. Available at Report: Bin Laden courier's phone provides leads - Yahoo! News
[18] “Inside help suspected in PNS Mehran base attack,” The News, May 27, 2011. Available at Inside help suspected in PNS Mehran base attack
[19] “Senior officer detained for links with Islamists,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 21, 2011. Available at Nexis.com 2011
[20] “WikiLeaks: Pakistani airmen sabotaging F-16s,” NDTV, May 20, 2011. Available at WikiLeaks: Pakistani airmen sabotaging F-16s
[21] Salman Masood, “Pakistan Detains Officer on Suspicion of Militant Ties,” New York Times, June 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html?pagewanted=1
[22] Munir Ahmed, “Pakistan army asks 4 officers about extremist ties,” AP, June 22, 2011. Available at Pakistan army officer held on extremism suspicions - Yahoo! News
[23] Munir Ahmed, “Pakistan army asks 4 officers about extremist ties,” AP, June 22, 2011. Available at Pakistan army officer held on extremism suspicions - Yahoo! News

 

[tamimy]

salute sir

 

[Windjammer]

Rawalpindi - June 27, 2011:
The Tripartite Commission comprising senior military representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, held a meeting in Kabul today. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Sher Mahammed Karimi, Chief of the Afghan General Staff and General David H. Petreaus, Commander International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan headed the respective delegations.
The meeting reviewed the current security situation along the Pak-Afghan Border. Measures to improve effectiveness of ongoing operations in the respective areas also came under discussion. Steps for better coordination and enhanced cooperation to avoid misunderstandings as regard to the border security were also discussed.
Forum reiterated the resolve and commitment to restore peace and stability in the area. The commission is a recurring event, and today’s meeting was the 34th since the inaugural session conducted in Islamabad in 2003.