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Can today's India compare to China around 15 years ago?

You had a great living standard since very old age. That is why you guys eat cocroaches, snakes, cats, dogs, frogs. You are a great civilization right from bigining.

Who do not get admission here goes to china for medixal studies. We provide lots of our rejected students to in different parts of world to top there. One of my friend's nephew with ordinary academics went china to study. He got some 9.5/10 inichinese language study. They are our rejected students.
yo why r u advertising for China?
 
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Obviously, Indian are happy with the democracy system that adopted in India; and Chinese are also happy to see the democracy system be adopted in India.

Indian happy, Chinese happy. So it is a win-win
Yes, I am also happy for india adopting english as the lingua franca.
They are proud of their colonial heritage, we are happy for their pride.
 
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Yes, I am also happy for india adopting english as the lingua franca.
They are proud of their colonial heritage, we are happy for their pride.

Indian constitution is written in English and English is the authoritive language of Indian courts. It’s the language that create India. So in effect, it’s the political and legal language of India.

It also created the call center jobs.
 
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Indian constitution is written in English and English is the authoritive language of Indian courts. It’s the language that create India. So in effect, it’s the political and legal language of India.

It also created the call center jobs.
They use English in courts?
They can't translate all legal terms in their aboriginal languages?
@Bussard Ramjet
 
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They use English in courts?
They can't translate all legal terms in their aboriginal languages?
@Bussard Ramjet

They can, if they pay for it. But it’s not Authoritive. So if translations got screw up, they are on the hook. That is why English is the legal language of India, not native language.


In effect, English is the most important language of India. British empire live on.
 
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They can, if they pay for it. But it’s not Authoritive. So if translations got screw up, they are on the hook. That is why English is the legal language of India, not native language.


In effect, English is the most important language of India. British empire live on.
Do their doctors use English?
I cannot imagine people in China, Korea, Germany, France and Russia using English as their medical professional language.

All big non-Anglo-Saxon countries thrive on their own native languages.
 
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Do their doctors use English?
I cannot imagine people in China, Korea, Germany, France and Russia using English as their medical professional language.

All big non-Anglo-Saxon countries thrive on their own native languages.

I don’t know, but I can imaging not when they counseling the patients. They would use the patient language.

But English is the international language of science. So all doctors would know English. Most modern western doctors in China know English, isn’t it?

As for English influence in India, Britain literally did create the Indian nation. That is why English is the legal language of India. England didn’t create Russia, China or Germany.

England also created US and Australia. Portugal created Brazil. Etc.
 
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I don’t know, but I can imaging not when they counseling the patients. They would use the patient language.

But English is the international language of science. So all doctors would know English. Most modern western doctors in China know English, isn’t it?

As for English influence in India, Britain literally did create the Indian nation. That is why English is the legal language of India. England didn’t create Russia, China or Germany.

England also created US and Australia. Portugal created Brazil. Etc.
There is a difference between know and use.
German doctors use medical manuals written in German.
French doctors use medical manuals written in French.
Chinese doctors use medical manuals written in Chinese.
All these manuals may come from the same English-written original book.
But nothing is lost in translation.
Hence, these languages are still the lingua franca in these countries' professional fields.
 
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There is a difference between know and use.
German doctors use medical manuals written in German.
French doctors use medical manuals written in French.
Chinese doctors use medical manuals written in Chinese.
All these manuals may come from the same English-written original book.
But nothing is lost in translation.
Hence, these languages are still the lingua franca in these countries' professional fields.
Do their doctors use English?
I cannot imagine people in China, Korea, Germany, France and Russia using English as their medical professional language.

All big non-Anglo-Saxon countries thrive on their own native languages.
ok probably you don´t know. from the world perspective, English is the lingua franca of the medicine, displacing French and German that were used besides English in the medicine a century ago. ok Let´s say you are a Chinese tourist, getting sick in Germany and have to visit a doctor, he or she will make a report in German (in France the report is written in French and so on) and prescribe a medicine or multiple medicines in Latin. that will make sure, you will get the correct pills, the medicine everywhere, be in Germany, France, Italy or Greece or elsewhere.

Latin makes sure nothing is lost in translation. she is the lingua franca of the medicine.

Latin is a mother language of French, Italian and Spanish. About half of German and English words are derived of Latin.

if you study medicine at a German university, you must master Latin at a certain proficiency.

Last, I wonder why you chinese increasingly love India bashing. Every country has problem, so India. so China.
 
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@randomradio @Viet et al....When you need to use it, please do:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/21/nobody-knows-anything-about-china/

Nobody Knows Anything About China
Including the Chinese government.
BY JAMES PALMER | MARCH 21, 2018, 2:59 PM

As a foreigner in China, you get used to hearing the retort “You don’t know China!” spat at you by locals. It’s usually a knee-jerk reaction to some uncomfortable modern issue or in defense of one of the many historical myths children in the mainland are taught as unshakeable facts about the world. But it’s also true. We don’t know China. Nor, however, do the Chinese — not even the government.

We don’t know China because, in ways that have generally not been acknowledged, virtually every piece of information issued from or about the country is unreliable, partial, or distorted. The sheer scale of the country, mixed with a regime of ever-growing censorship and a pervasive paranoia about sharing information, has crippled our ability to know China. Official data is repeatedly smoothed for both propaganda purposes and individual career ambitions. That goes as much for Chinese as it does for foreigners; access may sometimes be easier for Chinese citizens, but the costs of going after information can be even higher.

We don’t know the real figures for GDP growth, for example. GDP growth has long been one of the main criteria used to judge officials’ careers — as a result, the relevant data is warped at every level, since the folk reporting it are the same ones benefitting from it being high. If you add up the GDP figures issued by the provinces, the sum is 10 percent higher than the figure ultimately issued by the national government, which in itself is tweaked to hit politicized targets. Provincial governments have increasingly admitted to this in recent years, but the fakery has been going on for decades. We don’t know the extent of bad loans, routinely concealed by banks. We don’t know the makeup of most Chinese financial assets. Sometimes we don’t know the good news of recoveries because the concealment of bad news beforehand has disguised it. We don’t know China’s real Gini coefficient, the measure of economic inequality.

But economic data may be, ironically, more reliable than most just because so much attention has been paid to its unreliability. China’s National Bureau of Statistics itself has repeatedly called out instances of bad data reportage and now attempts to gather provincial data directly itself. There have been clean-ups and attempts at rectifying past mistakes — although the increasingly ideological and paranoid turn of the party-state may be obstructing these efforts.

But what we don’t know goes far beyond just economics. Look at any sector in China and you’ll find distorted or unreported public information; go to the relevant authorities and they’ll generally admit the most shocking practices in private.

We don’t know the true size of the Chinese population because of the reluctance to register unapproved second children or for the family planning bureau to report that they’d failed to control births. We don’t know where those people are; rural counties are incentivized to overreport population to receive more benefits from higher levels of government, while city districts report lower figures to hit population control targets. Beijing’s official population is 21.7 million; it may really be as high as 30 or 35 million. Tens — perhaps hundreds — of millions of migrants are officially in the countryside but really in the cities. (Perhaps. We don’t know the extent of the recent winter expulsions of the poor from the metropolises.) We don’t know whether these people are breathing clean air or drinking clean water because the environmental data is full of holes.

We don’t know anything about high-level Chinese politics. At best, we can make — as I have — informed guesses. We don’t know how the internal politics of Zhongnanhai, the Chinese Kremlin equivalent, operate. Chinese politicians don’t write tell-all memoirs; Chinese journalists can’t write a Fire and Fury, a What It Takes, or even a Game Change. We don’t know whether Xi Jinping truly values China’s wealth and power or only his own.

We don’t know whether the officials targeted in the “anti-corruption” campaigns were really unusually corrupt, lascivious, or treacherous — or whether they were just political opponents of Xi. We don’t know the extent of factionalism within the Chinese Communist Party, though we do know how often its existence is condemned — by Xi and his faction. We don’t know whether officials who lather slavish praise on Xi actually believe anything of what they say or are acting out purely out of fear and greed.

We don’t know what people really think. We don’t know whether interviewees really support the government or give cautious answers when asked questions by a stranger in a politically repressive country. We don’t know why Chinese tell pollsters they are more trusting of others than any other country in the world, while in practice paranoia about the intentions of others is so rampant that old people aren’t helped on the streets for fear they’re running a scam and children like toddler Wang Yue are left to die after being hit by cars.

We don’t know the real defense budget. We don’t know the everyday conditions of the Chinese army because the restrictions placed on military coverage and the ability of soldiers to talk are even more tightly limited than for civilians.

We don’t know how good Chinese schools really are because the much-quoted statistics provided by the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) that placed China first in the world were taken from the study of a small group of elite Shanghai schools. As soon as that was expanded merely to Beijing — another metropolis — and two rich provinces, the results dropped sharply. (PISA’s willingness to accept only this limited sample is typical of the gullibility and compliance of many foreign NGOs, especially in education, when dealing with China; I have seen numerous foreign educators fall victim to obvious Potemkinism, including believing that Beijing No. 4 High School — the rough equivalent of Eton — was a “typical Chinese public school.”) We don’t know the extent of the collapse of rural education. We don’t know the real literacy figures, not least because rural and urban literacy is measured by different standards — a common trick for many figures.

We don’t know the real crime figures, especially in the cities, which may represent as little as 2.5 percent of the actual total. We don’t know the death toll for the ethnic Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang, where local officials, in the words of one government terrorism expert, “bend figures as much as during the Great Leap Forward,” nor do we know how many people are currently held in “re-education camps.” (Incidentally, we don’t know how many people died in the Great Leap Forward, piled up in village ditches or abandoned on empty grasslands: the 16.5 million once given in official tolls or the 45 millionestimated by some historians.)

And we don’t know what we don’t know. These are the known unknowns, but the unknown unknowns are equally worrying. We may be missing the biggest future stories, the ones that will shake or transform China and the world, right now. Foreign reporters are limited to residence in a few major cities, chiefly Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen; they are followed and harassed when they travel elsewhere in the country and find it particularly difficult to reach the countryside. (According to the official population figures, Beijing and Shanghai, often portrayed as the norm for the new China, house less than 4 percent of the country’s residents.) The situation for Chinese journalists is far worse; a limited ability to conduct investigative journalism in the 2000s has been almost obliterated by authorities determined that there will be no oversight beyond the party. Fear grips throats; those who would once give names now talk anonymously, where many others do not talk at all.

Our sources of information, always a thin stream, have dried up almost entirely under an increasingly tight censorship regime of the last few years. Social media platform Weibo was once a limited window into provincial complaints and scandals; it is now massively censored. Private messaging groups on WeChat, an all-conquering messaging service, replaced it; last year, they were massively censored in turn.

All this makes the work of those who manage to successfully extract meaningful economic or political data, such as the masterful researcher Adrian Zenz, all the more impressive. And as the government closes down any source of information outside its control, we can only wonder at how much it knows itself. Local officials have always demanded enormous amounts of data — it’s not uncommon to receive requests like: “List everybody who attends religious services in your district and where.” But the system has always distorted the information it sends up even internally and may be doing so even more as Xi establishes outright dictatorship. Li Keqiang, the increasingly irrelevant (we think) Chinese premier, complained to U.S. diplomats in 2007 of his inability to know basic economic information about the province he then ruled and his need to send out friends and colleagues on surreptitious data-gathering trips.

The government’s solution to this is an increasing faith in big data, a belief that by circumventing lower-level officials it can gather information directly from the source. Huge amounts of money are being poured into big data, including efforts at predictive policing and the widespread monitoring of dissidents. The government requires Chinese firms, and foreign firms with a Chinese presence, such as Apple, to store and hand over data on a vast scale. But big data itself is prone to systematic distortions, misplaced trust, and the oldest rule of coding: garbage in, garbage out.

As the economist Josiah Stamp recounted of another power trying to control a vast territory through oppressive means, “The Government [of British India] are very keen on amassing statistics—they collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the chowty dar (village watchman), who just puts down what he damn pleases.” Will technology let the Chinese government today do any better? We don’t know.

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And another oldie but goldie, esp when CPC troll Nanking complex is boiling over:

https://camphorpress.com/5000-years-of-history/

Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt speaking in 2007

“Five thousand years of history.” It’s a phrase repeated by both Chinese and non-Chinese. Somehow we are supposed to believe that China has more history than other places. A slightly strange concept anyway, and, regardless of whether you want to define “history” as starting with written records or by the emergence of “civilization” as seen in the first large settlements, the five thousand figure is wrong.

The Shang dynasty (founded around 1600 BC) of the Yellow River valley in northern China is as far back as we have solid archaeological evidence and positive proof of the first written records. Earlier than that, history disintegrates into mythology. But even if you accept the preceding mythical Xia dynasty as the start, it takes you back only to around 2000 BC.

In terms of age, civilizations in other parts of the world precede China. Writing systems in Egypt and Mesopotamia predate Chinese writing by a thousand years. The world’s first city, Uruk, in modern-day Iraq, dates back seven thousand years. Even in comparison to Europe, China isn’t that old. Confucius’ life overlapped with those of Pythagoras and Socrates. China was first unified in 221 BC, a century after Alexander the Great had created the Hellenistic Empire, and just a few centuries before the zenith of the Roman Empire.

Three, three-and-a-half, four millennia — surely all ancient enough. Does it really matter that China doesn’t have five thousand years of history? Yes, it does matter, and not because it’s annoying to have this inaccuracy spouted ad nauseam as historical fact, not to mention the hypocrisy of glorifying history yet so poorly preserving it. The myth is important because of the inference that China is uniquely old and so deserves special consideration. This has real-life consequences. When dealing with China — whether trying to turn a profit or awaiting democratic reforms — the implication is you need to be more patient and just wait a little bit longer. After all, the country has five thousand years of history.

In 1991 former American president Richard Nixon told his biographer, “Within twenty years China will move to democracy” and explained the need for America to have patience: “You can’t rush them. The Chinese look at history and the future in terms of centuries, not decades, the way we do, because they’re so much older as a culture.”

The quotation from the Google CEO at the start of this chapter was also a reference to the need for patience. Here is the full quote: “China is a nation with a five-thousand-year history. That could indicate the duration for our patience.” The year before, Google had set up a Chinese site, Google.cn, which self-censored search results in order to keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) happy. Searches on sensitive subjects like Tibetan and Taiwanese independence and the Tiananmen “tank man” came up empty or with sanitized material. So much for Google’s informal company motto of “Don’t be evil.” Despite tarnishing their reputation by caving in to Chinese demands for censorship, there was no commercial pay-off. Google struggled to gain market share and had problems with the Chinese authorities. Events came to a head in 2009 with a series of cyber attacks against Google, targeting the Gmail accounts of Chinese dissidents; the attacks originated in China and were tracked to state institutes. Google’s patience finally ran dry; deciding they would no longer censor search results, they redirected their website to Hong Kong.

Aside from patience, the “five thousand years of history” mantra implies the need for extra respect and cultural sensitivity. A good example of this is when Chris Patten, the last Governor General of Hong Kong, was preparing a speech for his swearing-in ceremony. He recounts: “The reference in my draft to the shared historic responsibilities in Hong Kong of ‘two great and ancient civilizations’ was scored out on the grounds that Chinese civilization was much older than the West’s and China might feel offended by the assumption of parity.” Patten, showing the backbone and bluster that would soon have him branded by the CCP as “a whore, a criminal, a serpent,” and, bizarrely, “a tango dancer,” ignored his advisors and went with “two ancient civilizations.”

Chinese history is long and fascinating; there’s no need to spin it, and it’s a shame to see it used by the government and media as an instrument of nationalism. The implied superiority of such a long history begets a dangerous sense of entitlement. And it’s just plain silly. Imagine if we applied the logic of “old civilizations deserve special treatment” to Egypt and the modern Mesopotamian nations of Iraq and Iran, places that actually do have five thousand years of history. Imagine executives explaining, “Our joint venture in Cairo is losing money but we have to be patient — they built the pyramids four-and-a-half-thousand years ago.” Or picture political commentators urging caution along the lines of: “Can’t push the Iranian government too hard for democratic reforms — they had cities when we were still living in caves.”

Lazy writers continue to churn out falsehoods about China’s glorious past and to contrast it against our own “upstart” cultures. They paint hyperbolic vignettes juxtaposing Oriental sophistication with Western crudity; silk-robed scholars sip tea and contemplate poetry while far away in darkest Europe the inhabitants run around in furs. In a recent biography on Sinologist Joseph Needham, author Simon Winchester contrasts the engineering masterpiece of a two-thousand-year-old Chinese irrigation waterworks with Westerners who “still coated themselves in woad and did little more than grunt.”

As well as its sheer age, China being the “longest continuous civilization” is often said to make it unique. The idea of Chinese civilization as a monolithic unchanging entity stretching in an unbroken line through the millennia is another myth that colours perceptions of China past, present and future. Sometimes the falsehoods are not just quaint asides, but the very foundations of narratives. Martin Jacques’ 2009 bestseller, When China Rules the World, is a case in point. Jacques regurgitates the line that China is special because of its antiquity and continuity, and adds his own take on it: China as a “civilization state” rather than a nation state. He sees an ascendant China ruled by Confucian authoritarianism, and, as it becomes more powerful, the reassertion of the age-old sense of superiority and a return to tributary-style relationships with lesser nations. This sort of commentary is demeaning to Chinese people, turning them into passive victims of their history forever condemned to repeat it.
 
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These old cliche won't help anything of your argument... This is like we say "cow piss" about you...
Top or not, we don't know... But certainly they can help you to reach our 1980s life expectancy...
I wish you will have some good food to eat which we eat for many mallanium.

Yeah...yeah....Indian Medical education is so good. Only the rejects go to China. That's why life expectancy of Indians is like 8 years lower than that of China. Amazing logic.
It's global times which says this. First build some hospitals where hepatitis patients can be treated. Make your drugs affordable which are 20 timest costlier than India and than Breg here.

yo why r u advertising for China?

I am happy if you take it as advertisemet.
 
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It's global times which says this. First build some hospitals where hepatitis patients can be treated. Make your drugs affordable which are 20% costlier than India and than Breg here.
Per capita is like 5 times of India but medicine price only 20% higher than India's. Are you bragging or trolling your own country?

I am not a Chinese, btw.
 
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